


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THE INDIVIDUAL AND
THE SOCIAL ORDER

By JOSEPH A. LEIGHTON

MAN AND THE COSMOS
THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY
RELIGION AND THE MIND
OF TODAY
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER

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THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS
AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

BY

JOSEPH A. LEIGHTON, PH.D., LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY; AUTHOR
OF "MAN AND THE COSMOS," "THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY,"
"RELIGION AND THE MIND OF TO-DAY," ETC.



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AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS
AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

BY

JOSEPH A. LICHTON, PH.D., LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
"THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL ORDER"
"THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL ORDER"

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TO
MY STUDENTS
HOBART COLLEGE 1898-1910
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School of Theology
at Claremont

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PREFACE

It has seemed to me, ever since I began the study of ethics, that Plato and Aristotle were right in their emphasis on the intimate interdependence of ethics and social philosophy. I have always felt that the attempt to discuss the problems of moral values, obligations, virtues, and goods in isolation from the theory of the social order is a somewhat profitless enterprise. I have written the following introduction in this conviction.

I have aimed to give, as a background for the systematic consideration of ethical and social problems, a brief sketch of what appear to me the most significant features in the history of western ethical thought. Equally important, if not more so, is the study of the psychology of volition. Hence, I have sketched the genetic psychology of volition before discussing theories of the moral standard. My own theory I have called *social humanism*. The final division of the work is an application of this theory to some of the chief problems of social philosophy. This is really applied ethics, since, in the final analysis, the problems of the authority and functions of the state, of the production and distribution of economic goods, of the value of democracy, and the place of education and religion in the community are ethical problems, that is, problems of human values.

J. A. L.

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PART I

THE RISE OF THE PROBLEMS OF
ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

THE SCOPE OF ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Descriptive and Normative Science

There are two distinct ways in which we may regard the facts and problems of human nature. We may, on the one hand, treat them descriptively. We may collect and analyze all sorts of facts concerning human nature and make generalizations therefrom. We may formulate laws descriptive of the actual operations of human nature. Such is the procedure of *psychology*, the general science of human behavior. Such is the procedure of *sociology*, the science of human behavior in its social relations. *Social psychology* is really the key to sociology. It is the description and interpretation of the individual's behavior, as influenced by social contacts and in turn as determining his social attitudes. The distinction between individual psy- See Cas
chology and social psychology is simply one of emphasis. Reading
In individual psychology the self's social contacts and attitudes are considered primarily as properties of the individual person. In social psychology the individual person is regarded primarily as the meeting point of social relations. Both procedures are correct if not pushed to the point of excluding one another.

On the other hand, we may study human nature normatively. When we do this we are concerned with the facts of human behavior, including, particularly, thoughtful behavior, with special regard to the values, the ends, the goods or the ideals which man by his purposeful activity

seeks to realize. Ethics is commonly defined as the fundamental science of human values. It is the business of ethics to determine in the light of rational reflection what are the most comprehensive and best values, ends, goods, ideals which should guide man in his purposive activity. Now the business of ethics and social philosophy is preëminently with values, ends, goods; and philosophy is the systematic study of human values, therefore ethics is a philosophical science and an essential part of philosophy.

It is generally agreed that ethics or moral science, or moral philosophy, is the systematic study of the principles for determining the rightness and wrongness, the goodness and badness of human actions and motives and characters. It is likewise admitted that human conduct and characters fall under the categories of moral judgment, as right and wrong, good and bad, only in so far as conduct is the expression of voluntary deliberation or consciously willed action.

The admission of the distinction between willed or voluntary action and involuntary action is the basic presumption upon which all ethical judgments depend. If this distinction be invalid, if there be no real difference in kind between a mechanically determined action and a voluntary, a consciously self-determined action, then ethics falls to the ground. It becomes a pseudo-science, a systematic study of illusions. There are, then, no different meanings in judgments of ethical valuation, in speaking of good and bad and allotting reward and punishment, praise and blame than there are in applying oil to an engine or in cleaning or removing some of its parts. If man as a moral agent be not free in the sense of having the power of self-determining valuation and choice with respect to some of his acts, then it is not only idle, it is silly to talk of human responsibility. Then the phrase, moral agent, is empty and misleading and leads to cruel discrimination. The concept

of responsibility is worthless and mischievous. Voluntary conduct, conduct that is subject matter for ethical judgment, is conduct in which the end of the act is intended by the agent, chosen by him because it promises to satisfy some interest. The end is valued or, as in the case of play or creative work, the means are valued as part of the end. Behaviour
+ Conscience

A good act is good because it furthers experiences which have value for some one. A bad act is bad because it thwarts or destroys some experience of value. Value and good are identical from an ethical standpoint; unvalue and bad are likewise identical. A right act is one which promotes something good, some value for a self; a wrong act, one which hinders or destroys a good. So, too, with motive and intentions. To say that ethics is the science of human values is the same as to say that ethics is the systematic study of the principles of the good life. Value + a

It is the business of ethics to determine, by systematic reflection, what are the most comprehensive and inclusive standards for the guidance of human beings in determining the good or valuable experiences that they should seek.

Ethics is concerned with the intrinsic values or goods of life; in other words, with the valued acts, experiences or goods which are worth while for their own sakes, since they satisfy the deepest and most lasting cravings of selves. In contrast with ethical values, the economic and industrial values which lands, machinery, capital and money have are instrumental, since these things have value as instruments to promote human welfare. The enjoyment of beauty, love, friendship, understanding, scientific and scholarly knowledge and philosophic insight and religious communion seem to be the intrinsic values since they satisfy essential capacities of human nature. Ethics is called a normative science since it deals with norms or standards of valuation for human conduct. It is contrasted with *descriptive sciences*, such as chemistry or psychology which analyze, describe Intrinsic
Values
Instrumental
Values

and correlate facts. This distinction is useful if it be not misunderstood and misapplied. Ethics is descriptive, too, for it deals with facts—the facts of human conduct with reference to its valuations and aims or purposes. The natural sciences also involve norms. A discovery in chemistry may lead to a norm of behavior in engineering, medicine or diet; a discovery in psychology to a norm in education or psycho-therapeutics.

Value of Ethics

But what need is there for a study of ethics; of what use is this so-called science? Cannot human beings determine what is good without the study of ethics? Our answer is that they cannot, in our present complex and sophisticated civilization, determine what are the relative goods, what are the relative values of varying kinds of motives, aims and ideals of conduct without ethical reflection, whether or no they study ethics formally. The existence of communities of human beings, from a family to a nation, implies certain socially accepted and effective modes of regulating the impulses of the individual in relation to his fellows. These are the mores, customs or folkways of social groups. In a custom-ridden community, the individual's acts are entirely regulated by the recognized and enforced code of the group. He must obey the customs. If he violates them, punishment is swift and sure. The code is backed by the group conscience and its supernatural guardians. In a complex modern civilization, not only is the individual much freer in the choice of his aims, but he is actually confronted by a variety of different and often conflicting interests, aims, standards. Even if he wills to accept the accepted morals of some group with which he identifies his interests, he must at least take some attitude towards the morals of other groups. If he be a union labor man he must take an attitude towards the open shop,

non-union labor and the employer. If he become a Buddhist or Christian Scientist or a pacifist he must take some attitude toward the morals of other groups.

Now, the central problem of ethics arises just here. How shall the individual be guided, in facing the various social claims which confront him, towards an intelligent and good choice? In a complex society composed of reflective individuals, the central problem of ethics is that of social obligations. How shall the individual adjust the various social claims upon him, made by community interests of different types, to one another and to his own individuality?

Minister's
Disagreement
To what is
say "no!"

Ethics and Social Philosophy

If the central problem of ethics be what is stated above, no sharp distinction can be drawn between ethics and social philosophy. Since the key question of ethics is the relation between the individual's own preferences or interests or valuations and his obligations as a member of various groups or communities, it is impossible to attempt to solve ethical problems without a social philosophy. The heart of ethics is the heart of social philosophy. The central question is: How may the individual's life be ordered so that he can be a moral self as a member of the community of moral selves?

Key? of self

It is often said that ethics deals with the individual as the source and bearer of moral values, whereas social philosophy deals with the moral relations of individuals as members of society. But the individual, as the source and bearer of moral values, is already a member of social groups. He cannot be a *human* individual otherwise. And social groups consist of individuals in various relations of contact, coöperation, communion, conflict.

One may begin with the consideration either of the individual or of the group; but one can make no headway at all, and certainly one can reach no conclusion, if one re-

mains where one begins. The individual is a subject of moral life only as a member of social groups. The group is a moral fact and as such it consists of individuals in interrelations of action and passion.

Ethics, the doctrine of the good life, the comprehensive theory of human values, has a wider and richer scope than morals, the doctrine of right social relationships. There are supermoral values. But supermoral values have place only when the moral foundation has been laid. Human values include more than morals, but this more is built on morals.

The ethical agent is such only in relation to his fellows, and the social order is nothing more than the order of relations between individuals that are thus far members of one or more social groups. We may discuss the ethics of certain aspects of private life that do not easily lend themselves to treatment from the standpoint of social or group relationships—such as the ethics of an individual's æsthetic gratifications; or his tastes in clothes, food, drink, amusements or private hobbies. But even these modes of behavior bring him into some relation to his fellows. We may study the ethical principles of the social order without paying particular regard to the idiosyncrasies of its constituent members. But certainly an ethical theory of the social order which ignored the facts and claims of human idiosyncrasy would be a one-sided, and thus far unethical, social philosophy. In brief, the chief part of ethics is social ethics, and social ethics is but a concretion or specification of social philosophy. One might discuss actual problems of concrete social ethics without constantly lugging in his social philosophy or theory of social values, but one can never arrive at a rational solution of the concrete problems of social ethics without employing a social philosophy.

The Relation of Ethics and Social Philosophy to Politics, Economics and Jurisprudence

Politics¹ is the comparative study of the definite types of political organization and the distinction of the relative values of the different types. It is clear that the basic problems of politics can be intelligently considered only in the light of a social philosophy. Political philosophy, the theory of what the state ought to be, is a part of social philosophy. Any attempt to weigh the respective merits of the different types of political constitution presupposes on the part of the weigher a conviction in regard to the fundamental human values to which political organization should be instrumental. Jurisprudence, or the philosophy of law, is simply the application of a social ethics or social philosophy to the facts and problems of the legal order. Law is a means to a social end. Its principles consist of the ethical minima in conduct that can be formulated and enforced by the power of the state. Economics is the systematic study of the facts of the production and distribution of material wealth. Thus far it is purely a descriptive science. It is often treated as having a normative aspect. In this regard it becomes simply the application to the judgment of the actual economic order of the theory of social values. In other words, when one undertakes to judge the human or ethical values of the economic order one employs a social philosophy.

The Problems of Ethics and Social Philosophy

The fundamental problem of ethics and social philosophy has already been indicated. It is that of the right relation of the individual to the various social groups, and by consequence that of the right relations of these groups to one another. The first step to the solution of these problems

¹ *Politics*, in the above sense, is commonly called *political science*, to distinguish it from the practical art of politics.

Problems of Ethics

will be to determine what are the salient characteristics of human nature in the raw; that is, of human nature before it has been socialized and moralized. The second step will be to determine in what ways and to what extent the development of individuality is and should be shaped by social influences. The third step and the most important of all is to determine what ideal, that is, what standard of value or good in regard to the worth of the individual as a member of society, is most acceptable to reason. In other words, the central problem of social philosophy is the central problem of ethics—namely, what is the ethical criterion of the social order? What human values are to constitute the basis of our judgment of the social order?

4. Our next problem will be to consider the general nature of society or of the community. A solution of the aforementioned problem in total constitutes the general principles or foundations of the social order. The second part of ethics and social philosophy, the more concrete part, is applied social philosophy. It will consist in the consideration of the main types of social groupings or social institutions, in the light of the principles arrived at in the first part. The chief of these institutions are the family, the civic community, economic institutions, the state, law and justice, education, organized religion, and international relations. Finally we may consider the problem of the meaning and reality of social progress.

Method

The method to be pursued into an inquiry of this kind is the method of science—namely, an analysis of facts, and reflection upon the facts, for the purpose of generalization from them. The facts with which we are concerned herein are biological, psychological and cultural. In other words, we shall consider; first, the actual nature of man as a conscious living organism with a special regard to his social

relationships. Secondly, civilized man is a cultural being; in other words, his nature as a conscious organism is developed and molded through institutions and through the coöperating and conflicting activities of men and groups in his cultural history. All the social institutions embody the cumulative results of the labors of the past generations towards the development of the cultural matrix in and through which the present living generation acts and is acted upon. The institutions of civilization, imperfect though they be, embody humanity's attempts to establish patterns of social organization through which the values, or goods, that are possible of achievement and enjoyment by man, may be realized and possessed. All human institutions are means for the satisfaction of man's persistent thirst for a lasting good. From the standpoint of ethics and social philosophy the most cardinal fact about man is that he is a being who sets up and tries to achieve values. The family, the civic community, education and culture, economic activity, the political state and religious institutions are the foundations and scaffoldings for the home of values. Friendship, love, spiritual culture, the enjoyment of beauty and worship or communion with the highest—these are some of the principal forms of value in which the human soul seeks to quench its thirst for a lasting good.

Throughout this work "spirit" and "spiritual" are used to designate all forms of mental activity, experience and aspiration which are not subordinated to physical and material ends. Pure knowledge, intellectual beauty, disinterested service, friendship and love no less than worship of the Highest, are forms of the realization of spirit.

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Cultural

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Spiritual

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CHAPTER II

CUSTOMARY MORALITY

Every human being is born into and nurtured in a community of some sort, either in a family and a neighborhood or in a foundling asylum. The family in turn is a part of a larger community, the clan or tribe in primitive societies, the city state in the ancient world, the large-scale territorial state in the modern world.

Every community, narrow or wide, small or large, has its prevailing moral spirit, its tone or *ethos* of feeling and conduct. The most powerful and all-pervasive factors in determining just in what directions, to what ends, by what rules of behavior and standards of judgment the individual's native impulses shall be shaped—shall be combined, repressed, suppressed, expressed, refined, harmonized—are the *customs* or modes of behavior in effect in the groups in which the individual lives, moves and has his being. To be moral is to behave in "good form."

Thus in every human community, from a primitive clan to a great modern state and from a fortuitous association of boarders in a summer hotel to a trades' union, certain customs and rules of conduct obtain. These customs express the irreducible minimum of rules of conduct which are binding on the members of the society as such. They may be unwritten or written. Their violations are visited by penalties ranging all the way from death to a shrug of the shoulder and an icy stare. They may be enforced by the police power of the state or simply by the power of a

common or public opinion. They may be obeyed from fear and cowardice, the desire for popularity and good standing, or from mere habit and inertia, sheer inability on the part of the agent to think or do otherwise than what the group dictates. But, in any and every case, custom covers the great bulk of human actions. Thus social morality, in practice, is chiefly what the English call "good form," the French, "savoir faire" and the Germans, "Sittlichkeit."

Thus, the widest-reaching and most pervasive bond of social life is custom or usage (Latin, *consuetudo*, *mos*; Greek, *nomos*; French, *coutume*, *mœurs*; German, *Gebbrauch*, *Sitte*). In early society and indeed in all static forms of society custom includes manners, morality and law. Early morality is group morality, Conduct is moral which conforms to the customs of the group; and the basis of group union in the patriarchal family, the clan, the tribe, the ancient city-state is blood kinship. The first and the most persistent way in which the sense of obligation or duty appears in human life is not obedience on the part of the individual to his private conscience, but obedience to the prohibitions and prescriptions of the group. In W. K. Clifford's pregnant phrase, the individual conscience is the echo of the tribal self. Whatever is believed to be necessary for the well-being of the group is absolutely binding on the individual; whatever is believed to be harmful to the group life is absolutely prohibited. The authority of the group is backed up by supernatural sanctions. The important events of life—birth and death, puberty, marriage, eating and drinking, hunting and war, animal and plant husbandry, the persons and acts of chiefs and priests, the administration of justice, etc.—are hedged about and minutely regulated by taboo and ritual. Monogamy, polygyny, polyandry, communal marriage, religious prostitution, the killing of aged parents, the father's power of life and death over his children, filial piety, female infanticide, head

hunting, scalp taking, animal and human sacrifice, taboos on animal flesh or the bodies of the dead, cannibalism, prohibition of the utterance of sacred names, prohibition of seeing sacred persons—such are a few of the customs that, in societies based on custom, have the binding force of moral obligation. Even in an advanced society, such as our own, the ordinary moral rules operate by the authority and force of common custom. The usages of the community or the group control, directly by public opinion and indirectly by law, the conduct of the individual.

Customs change as established communities change in their economic and cultural interests or as new communities arise with new group interests. Frontier communities, labor unions, street gangs, and even gangs of thieves, develop their own codes of customary conduct. Boys have their codes, and girls different ones. Custom rules in village communities and religious groups. So it goes throughout the gamut of human group life. Under the psychical stress of our participation in the Great War the community sentiment exercised a more rigid and imperious authority over the sayings and doings of individuals.

Law

The common law is based on custom, on long-established precedent. In law, says the *Century Dictionary*, custom means "the settled habitudes of a community such as are and have been for a definite time past generally recognized in it as the standards of what is just and right. . . . In the history of France the term custom is applied specifically to numerous systems of ancient usage which were judicially recognized as binding upon their respective communities before the revolution of 1789, or until the promulgation of the Code Napoleon—as, the custom of Normandy, of Brittany, of Orleans, etc." In English common law authoritative precedent goes back to Richard I. Even the great

system of Roman law, although built up under the guidance of rational principles, was built up on custom.

Laws newly enacted, if not supported by a public opinion sufficiently broad and deep to acquire the force of custom, are dead letters. There are many such laws on our statute books. Even in the most advanced societies the unwritten customs which are embodied in public opinion but not defined in law, are more powerful and pervasive agencies in shaping individual conduct, in repressing and directing feeling-impulse, than are either the rational judgments of reflective individuals or the statutory laws.

The Psychology of Custom

Custom is to society what habit is to the individual. It is social habitude. In so far as the individual's habits of action are shaped and controlled by custom his moral life becomes an echo of the tribal self, an expression of the group spirit. All people most of the time, and many people all of the time, follow without critical thought the prevailing customary code of conduct. It is probably well that this is so, for in any society those who are capable of wisely criticizing the established customs are in the minority. Many customs are frivolous or foolish, some may be even cruel and inhumane; but the presumption is in favor of the customary code.

How does custom exercise such power? It works through gregarious suggestibility and imitativeness, through fear of punishment, ridicule or disapproval, through the impulse of man to go with the herd and his desire for the approval of his fellows. In brief, it works chiefly through that herd instinct which makes the individual sensitive to the voice of the herd and fearful of solitude. It requires either a violent passion or great intellectual independence and moral courage to oppose the herd. Many individuals who are brave as lions in the crowd are cowardly when the crowd

is not with them. It is much easier to challenge convention and accepted opinion in one's study or in the midst of one's admiring disciples than it is to do so in the face of an indifferent or hostile public.

Values and Defects of Custom

The values of custom are: (1) It maintains, with a minimum of conscious effort and friction, that social order and coöperation without which the individual life does not go smoothly. By following the customs of the country the individual's power of coöperation with his fellows is facilitated and his attentive intellectual activity is released for the pursuit of his private concerns; (2) Custom conserves for the benefit of the present generation the funded results of past social experience and reflection in regard to what is socially beneficial and harmful. The presumption is that a long-established usage must have some justification as an instrument for the promotion of individual well-being through the maintenance of social order; (3) The very consciousness of social or moral obligation has its beginning and it is developed in the individual through the expression of the group conscience in regard to what is right and what is wrong. When articles of the group code are regarded as sanctioned by the gods, invariably the case in societies ruled by custom, the feeling of obligation is still further strengthened.

The defects of customary morality are: (1) Many customs are foolish and others are positively harmful. A taboo or a ritual injunction may have originated through a merely accidental concurrence of two events without causal connection. Some disaster or good fortune may have followed some striking act or omission, without there being any causal connection. The belief and the practice that has sprung into being by chance, perhaps aided by the endorsement of some powerful priest or chief, persists through

mental inertia and spreads by the unreasoning force of herd instinct. The group-spirit is notoriously hostile to innovation, since this is always accounted dangerous by the unthinking, and the group-spirit does not think. The group-spirit is equally hostile to anything which opposes or criticizes itself. Intolerance is characteristic of any established group; yes, even of a crowd.

Even to-day in our advanced societies customs persist which have lost all meaning, having arisen in connection with some primitive belief, with totemism, ghost worship; (2) Thus custom is the enemy of progress. It hampers

in
habitation
birth
the development of free and rational individuality. It impedes the discovery and propagation of better ways of doing things. It stands in the way of improvements in law, education, administration. It makes the individual a negatively good self, the passive and unthinking creature of tradition and usage. A moral individual will have regard, in his conduct, to social welfare, but social welfare is best furthered when the individual, acting from social motives, is free and able to give intelligent consideration to the ways and means in which the common good can be best furthered by his own acts, by the contributions his own intelligence can make to the common good; (3) Custom in society is habit in the individual. It makes the agent a smooth running mechanism but does not provide for the solution of new moral problems nor is it a sufficient stay against the uprush of strong passions. In a society in which custom rules, men more easily become the prey of savage and crude mob passions. It requires rational individuality to hold out against the incitements of crowd suggestion.

Moral progress, the evolution from lower to higher morality, is marked by a decrease in the power and all-inclusiveness of custom and an increase in the sense of freedom and scope for the individual to exercise his power of independent and critical judgment with respect to con-

duct. Sir H. S. Maine says truly that society has progressed from status to contract. More recent writers speak of a progress from the level of customary morality to that of personal and rational morality. The Greek philosophers in the period of the enlightenment contrast conduct as prescribed by convention (*nomos*) with conduct dictated by nature (*physis*) or reason.

Unquestionably, moral progress has been in the general direction of the recognition of the reflective individual as the source of moral judgments; in emphasizing *intention*, *choice* and *free volition* as the source of moral principles and maxims. This is the meaning of the emphasis on *conscience*, of the Christian emphasis on the *heart* or *soul* as the true source of right conduct.

Nevertheless, it must be said, in qualification of the progress actually achieved, that while in modern Western civilization there is formally recognized the freedom and responsibility of the individual as the source of moral judgment and action, public opinion and law still exercise a large measure of restraint and constraint upon the individual. In American rural village communities, for example, social opinion interferes with personal habits to a very large extent—frowns upon drinking and even smoking, requires church-going, severely reprobates irregular sexual relations, while it permits freedom in many respects such as is forbidden by law in European countries. In America, the individual is free to indulge in political criticism, to cross and walk along railroad tracks, to make a nuisance of himself on public highways; whereas in European countries all or some of these acts are closely hedged in by law.

In short, in one form or another, custom still rules very largely in the most advanced societies.

The decline of the sacrosanct authority of custom brings the danger of moral and social anarchy, of the rule of blind passion and instinct. But the freedom and ability to

criticize custom in the light of rational principles or to call it to account at the bar of human reason and humane feeling is the indispensable condition of moral progress for the individual and for society.

Custom, as the sole guide to conduct, has the merits and defects of habit in the individual. Good habits enable the self to conserve its energies. Bad habits enthrall it. A life of mere habit is but the life of a feeling machine which can create nothing, make no progress, and which when faced with new problems, is paralyzed by them.

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CHAPTER III

INSTITUTIONS: THE CONSERVATIVE AND THE RADICAL

Institutions

The chief social institutions are organizations or socially established systems on which cluster customs. Thus they are objective embodiments of social purpose and moral instruments. The social philosophy of the idealists, from Hegel to Bosanquet, has done more than justice to their moral significance. Hegel calls them forms of *objective mind*; meaning thereby that they are ways in which mind objectifies itself in the social order for the realization of the good. The good for Hegel consists in the harmony of the desires and purposes of the individual with the social will. Bosanquet calls them ethical ideas. His meaning is the same as Hegel's.¹ Summary

The chief social institutions are: the family, private property, the community or neighborhood, the vocational class, the State, the Church, the school, and finally, one which exists as yet chiefly in promise, though we may regard the League of Nations as its partial fulfillment, namely, the realized or organized idea or ideal of a universal humanity. I will now comment briefly on these institutions.

1. The Family.—The family, of course, is based on the natural instinct of propagation. It becomes the first and it should continue to be the first and deepest school of the good. In it the sex and parental instincts become refined and stabilized. The spirit of love, coöperation,

¹ B. Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*.

thoughtfulness, consideration, and fair play are developed. As Mr. Bosanquet finely says, it is "a natural union with an ideal purpose." That is to say, the ideal purpose, a permanent interest in a comparatively permanent and external life, attaches itself by imperceptible links to "the most universal incident of animal existence," reproduction.

2. *Private Property*.—This is an instrument for the expression of the individual's will as a unity in its dealings with the material instruments of living. "It is the idea that all dealings with the material conditions of life form part of a connected system, in which our conceptions and our abilities express themselves."² Individuality of will means self-direction. A being which can have no property is thus far hampered in realizing his will. It follows from this conception of property that a social order which forces many people to be practically propertyless is thus far immoral.

3. *The Community or Neighborhood*.—The fact that human beings live near together involves a moral relationship. As G. K. Chesterton puts it, our neighbor is a most portentous fact. We choose our wives, but God gives us our neighbors. One of the great losses in the constant shifting population of the modern city is the loss of the neighborhood spirit. This loss is largely responsible for the comparative failure of municipal administration. We greatly need a revival of the community spirit.

4. *The Vocational Class*.—Community of occupation in the service of society is an important instrument of the moral life. A person's vocation involves him in wider relations than the family or the neighborhood; moreover, it enters deeply into his moral individuality as a servant of society. Thus a class or vocational consciousness is a good thing in so far as it develops in the individual that self-respect and communal feeling which comes from a proper

■ *Ibid.*

sense of the dignity of one's vocation as a contributing factor in the life and well-being of society. Unfortunately class-consciousness has largely taken the form of class struggle in our specialized industrial society. The disorders of society will not be alleviated unless this vocational class-consciousness is transformed so that the various classes recognize that their worth lies in the necessity and value of their contributions to the common weal. The principle of the right relation between classes is printed on every American coin. It is *E Pluribus Unum*.

Function
Society

5. The State.—The State is, as Aristotle finely said, a body of citizens united in pursuit of the common good. The ethical function of the State is to be the guardian of the ethical interests involved in the other social institutions: in the family, private property, community, vocation, church, education and the various voluntary associations. It is the indispensable umpire in internal conflicts. The State exists to promote the good life by public acts.

6. The Church.—The Church is more fully and explicitly an ethical institution. It is in the Protestant view a voluntary organization to promote the good life. In the sacerdotal view it is God's ministry to the world. By emotional and intellectual training it aims to reinforce the motives to the good life in the family, the vocation, the State, etc.

7. The School.—The ethical function of the school is deep-going and comprehensive, for the school aims at nothing less than the all-round training of the immature individual to fit him to take his place in society.

8. The Ideal of Humanity.—This is the idea of the human race as consisting in a world of intelligent beings which by virtue of their community of intelligence and of interest have certain common rights and obligations, since beneath their racial and cultural diversities they share in the same fundamental capacities for the good life. This ideal implies that nations in their dealings with other nations or

Eccumenical idea.

with dependent peoples should be guided by the basic and common rights and duties which belong to all the members of the race, as entitled to realize the good life. This principle does not involve the obliteration of nationality or the reduction of all human cultures to one type. It does involve the recognition of each nationality and culture as finding its proper place as a contributing element in the whole life of humanity. The idea of humanity is unfortunately not yet realized in the greater part of mankind.

The institutions as instruments of ethical ideas will be discussed more fully in our last part. I shall conclude this section with the consideration of the respective places of the conservative and the radical attitude towards social institutions.

The Conservative and the Radical

The conservative or institutionalist stresses the historical continuity of social life. He justifies the conservation of the great historical institutions—the family, private property, the State and the Church—and of the customs, beliefs and sanctions which attach to them, on the ground that these institutions have been proved by history to minister to the permanent interests of man. He calls attention to the fact that human nature, in its essentials, has not changed much for better or worse during the period of man's recorded history. He points out that whenever and wherever a stable society, and one which through its stability has been culturally productive, has developed on a fairly large scale, its framework of order has always been found in the great social institutions. The permanence of human nature and the success of the great social institutions in promoting the interests of civilization constitute a fair presumption that institutions which have so survived will continue to be of service to mankind. He cites historical instances to show that the disintegration of the

family, the State, or the Church, or violent attacks on private property have produced social disorder and barbarism. The failure of civilization in central Asia has been due to the failure to establish a permanent form of political life. The downfall of the Roman Empire is traceable to economic disintegration and political weakness.

The institutions of private property, the family and the Church have always found their strongest support in the middle class, and where the middle class is weak, society is unstable. The intelligent conservative does not claim that social institutions in their existing form are perfect. He does not assert that they require no readjustment at the present time to provide for the extraordinary upheavals brought by the industrial revolution, but he argues that, since human nature is imperfect, we cannot expect perfect institutions. He insists we must preserve the continuity of social organization in order to prevent the whole social order from being overturned by the blind passions and ignorant stupidities of human nature. The motto of the intelligent conservative is: In the work of reconstruction let us make haste slowly. At all hazards let us preserve the continuity of the social order.

The radical is an impatient idealist. He sees the failures of the existing social order, he feels intensely the defects, the weaknesses and injustices of existing social institutions. His eyes are fixed on the injuries wrought on human nature by the present order and he dreams of a future in which human nature in all its children shall have a fair chance. In order to bring to pass, as swiftly as possible, this better future, the radical is ready to make a clean break with the past, to overturn any institution that stands in the way of his ideal social order and to put in its place one that he has manufactured in his own mind; and in the making of which he has not been hampered by taking account of any facts of psychology or history that militate against his pur-

pose to establish a millennium concocted in his own brain. The radical greatly undervalues history. He learns nothing from the past experience of the race. His conception of human nature is deduced from the conditions that he thinks fulfill his own desires for human good. He ignores the cardinal fact of history that the social institutions of the present, in all lands in which civilization has been and is progressive, have been built up and improved slowly and laboriously by the continuous work of many generations. The radical forgets that the very opportunity and leisure to criticize and speculate, which is his, is the result of the gradual growth of social order, economic stability, political and intellectual liberty. The extreme radical seeks to make social progress more rapid by starting out to fly in a vacuum.

On the other hand, the conservative is apt to be blind to the profound economic and moral changes wrought in human relationships by the new industrial order; blind, too, to the social, moral and intellectual changes wrought by the spread of the scientific spirit which has undermined the authority of tradition in morals and religion. The radical would make his new wine without providing any bottles, the ultraconservative is trying to put the new wine in the old bottles without improving them. The conservative is right in emphasizing the historical continuity of social order, wrong in hindering its modification to meet new conditions. The radical is right in insisting on the need for readjustment, wrong in attempting to make a clean break with the past. The sound attitude, because the reasonable one, is the mediating spirit of liberalism. The liberal is the opponent both of blind traditionalism and of doctrinaire idealism. He is the proponent of the gradual betterment of our existing social institutions to meet the changed needs of man, by a cautious but open-minded experimentation.

Experimentalist

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CHAPTER IV

THE CHIEF PROBLEMS OF ETHICS

Do customs fail?

The discovery of the inadequacy of custom gives rise to ethical reflection. It will be profitable to glance rapidly at the main developments in the ethical thought of Western civilization, in order to get a proper perspective from which to consider the ethical problems of the present time. Before doing this it is well to ask what are the problems that came to the forefront when human beings became critical in regard to the traditional code of customs which had hitherto obtained in their community; and, hence, began reflectively to inquire as to what are the genuine guiding principles of social conduct. What, then, are the central problems of reflective ethics?

I. The Problem of the Moral Standard

morality

The first is as follows: What are the standards of value, norms or criteria of goodness? By what principles of judgment can human beings determine what aims and motives are good and bad, respectively, for the individual as a member of the community? Moral conduct is always conduct that involves other selves in its consequences. Morality begins in social codes—customs, rules, usages, laws; supported by the sanctions of public opinion, by the power of the community exercised through its authorized agents and by the sanction of supernatural powers—gods and demi-gods. Reflective morality is a thinking consideration of what principles, motives, aims are good, as furthering the welfare of individuals as members of communities. There would be no moral code, customary or otherwise, for

morality

an absolutely isolated individual. No moral problems would exist for him. In fact, he would not be human.

To ask whether an act, a motive or an aim is right or wrong is to ask whether it promotes or hinders the good life for the members of the community taken as a whole. When we speak of an act as right or wrong we have in mind its conformity or nonconformity with some rule or principle of conduct which prescribes what is good and bad for the member of a community. This is true; whether the community be a family, a tribe, a neighborhood, a nation or the entire human race. What specifically is regarded as good and bad will vary with economic circumstances, culture, the width of the communal circle taken into account. But in all cases, a right act is one which furthers the good of some group; a wrong act, one which hinders that particular good.

Of course, the individual agent is always a member of the community and his good a part of the common good. For the individual that is good which permanently satisfies his basic impulses and desires, and that is bad which thwarts the satisfaction of his impulses and desires. But the moral point of view requires that the individual shall, in the satisfaction of his own desires, take account of the desires and the good of other members of the whole community. He may be called upon to sacrifice his own desires entirely for the good of the community. He is often required to restrain his desires and, when he is permitted to satisfy them, he must do so within the limits set by the conception of the common good.

It is clear, then, that the central problem of ethics is this—how shall the common good be conceived, so as to include, in as full and harmonious a manner as possible, the goods of the several individuals who make up the community; whatever be the composition, relationships and numerical extent of membership in the given community?

Thus the problem of the ethical standards of value or good is that of determining the place of the individual in the community. This is the fundamental problem of ethics and social philosophy. All specific ethical and social problems issue from this one. Virtues and vices are specifications of socially good and socially evil characters. Rights and wrongs are specifications of social right and wrong, of justice and injustice. The problems of economic justice, of political justice, of the proper distribution of social authority, of social administration and of education—all are specifications or concretions of the central problem of ethics. These simple truths are often forgotten in the maze of theories, the conflicts of opinions, prejudices, customs. It is often forgotten that the individual becomes a moral self, a reflective and self-determining individual, only as a member of the community. It is often forgotten, on the other hand, that a community consists only of persons in inter-relation; of persons acting on and suffering from one another. The social environment does not create the moral personality of the individual out of nothing. He must be born with the capacities to become whatsoever he may become. And only individuals, persons realize, act and enjoy, the good life. On the other hand, the individual's capacities are shaped, molded, released and directed either in a happy and good manner; or they are thwarted, dammed up, twisted away, by the influence of the community. The weaker the native urges of the individual, the more will he become the passively molded and inert outcome of the moral forces of the community. The stronger the native urges of the individual, the more will he either lead and remold the community's life, or, in unhappy conditions, become a rebel, an alien, a destructive and criminal force in the community.

It is often asserted that ethics is concerned with *the individual* as a moral agent. And so it is. But when it is implied that there is an area of individual good which has

no social reference we must demur. The moral and spiritual individuality of the person comes to fruition only in a favorable community life. Self-respect, self-culture, self-determining freedom—all the moral qualities that go to make up individuality—grow only in a social medium.

We may say that the central problem of ethics is that of the nature and basis of social obligation. A man is moral only in so far as he recognizes social obligations. The very existence of social obligations is evidence of a spiritual, a social principle in human nature. But this means, as Aristotle said, that man is by nature a social being; that he can become truly human only in social relations, and that he who can live well without friends must be either a beast or God. To which we may add that he would be a very low beast or a very inaccessible and empty god.

II. The Problem of Moral Obligation

Outflowing from the first problem is the second basic problem of ethics—the nature of the sanctions of moral obligation. If there be a good life why should one seek it? Why should one seek good rather than evil? What are the sanctions of the good life? We cannot really answer the first question without in principle answering this second question.

Various answers have been given to this second problem: (1) The sanction of the good life has been found in the approval of the community, expressed either through its leaders, its rulers, or through its influential members or through the group spirit. (2) The social sanction has been reinforced powerfully by the supernatural sanction—by the approval of a god or gods and by the reward of a blessed life hereafter. (3) The good life has been endowed with the sanction of utility. It is the life which profits the individual most—in health, economic well-being, good standing with one's fellows and with God. Thus utility may be

regarded as a consequence of the social, political and supernatural sanctions. (4) The authority of the good life has been based on the assumption that only the good are truly happy—that the reward of virtue is not exterior to itself but that virtue is happiness, true well-being a state of blessedness.

We shall find occasion to discuss the question of sanctions when we examine the nature of the moral standard.

III. The Problem of the Place of Goodness in the Universe

The third great problem of ethics is—what is the place of the good life in the universe? How far does the Universal Order permit and sustain the good life? This problem subdivides into two problems: (1) Can man realize the good life? Is he free, in the sense of being able normally to follow out the ideals and aims of goodness and happiness which he sets up? This is the problem of human freedom in relation to the physical and vital forces which center in his being. (2) What is the place of the good life in the universe? Is goodness an episodic and insignificant accident in the course of an unmeaning and insensate physical universe—a merely human phantom? Or is the Universal Order in harmony with the forces in man which seek the good? This is the question which religion tries to answer. It is a fundamental problem of metaphysics. We shall not discuss this problem in detail in these essays, since it has been fully treated by the author in his other works—but we shall consider it briefly at the end.

The present work is limited chiefly to a consideration of the nature of human good and the social conditions for its realization.

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PART II

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INTRODUCTORY

The concept of individuality is the product of many thousand years' travail on the part of man. Its discovery was the most epochal event in man's cultural history, for this discovery has brought a new phase in the social life. In the earlier cultures the native impulses of the human animal were regulated solely by custom and usage, supported by social authority and by beliefs in the supernatural sanctions of the customs. The development of custom was not without its logic. It was not a purely helter-skelter process. It was an attempt to trace causes and effects and to control effects through controlling the causes. But pre-reflective man's belief in the causal orders, or relations of interdependence between the events of his own life and the environment, were based on crude, unanalyzed and uncriticized beliefs in causation both natural and supernatural. So his social customs tended to become cumbersome, incoherent and ineffective. Then came a period in which the customs were simplified and made more consistent or harmonious. This is the period of the great traditional law-givers, of the Code of Manu in India, the Laws of Hammurabi of Babylon, of Solon and Lycurgus in Greece, of Moses in Israel, of Alfred in England. These simplified and more coherent codes of customs became the starting points for new laws and in turn for the recognition of laws as instruments for the regulation of moral personality.

But the explicit recognition of the individual's worth implies more than the rule of law. The full discovery of individuality involves the following principles:

1. The individual self is the responsible and self-determining source of conduct. Every moral act takes its quality from the inner attitude, the intent, purpose or will of the agent.

2. Therefore, to the individual belongs the privilege and responsibility of exercising all his powers of reflection and investigation to determine both the general principles that shall guide his conduct and what is right in each particular situation that arises.

3. It follows that the individual is entitled to the moral nurture that will enable him to judge what is right.

4. Therefore, all customs, laws and institutions must be made instrumental to the needs of reflective and free moral personality. The principle of personality is the principle of moral autonomy. The self-legislative power of the reflective moral will becomes recognized to be the very essence of personality. As Kant put it, "The only thing that is absolutely and unqualifiedly good is the good will." And the good will finds moral principles by reflection upon its own judgments with reference to the problems of conduct that confront it in the actual situations in which it finds itself.

We will confine ourselves here to tracing the emergence of the twin concepts of moral individuality and community in Western thought.¹ One can find in earlier Hebrew and Greek literature, and even in the records of Mesopotamia and Egypt, foregleams of a recognition of the principle of individuality. But it is not until the time of the great Hebrew prophets and the Greek philosophers that the principle begins to be explicitly recognized. The insistent demands of Amos, Isaiah, Hosea, Jeremiah and the other

¹ Interesting though it would be to trace the development of the principle of moral individuality in the thought of India, China and Japan, it would take too much space and would be aside from our present purpose, which is to trace the development of Western ethics.

great prophets for the service of a righteous God, through the practice of the principles of social justice that emanated from the heart or conscience, in the place of merely ritual and ceremonial observances, is the real beginning of the recognition of the inherent value of the principle of personality in Hebrew thought. The prophet Ezekiel gives an even deeper emphasis to the moral responsibility of the individual: "The soul that sinneth, it shall die"; "Son of man, stand upon thy feet and I will speak to thee." With all the Hebrew prophets the ultimate basis of righteousness is the creative, just and holy will of God, revealed in the heart or soul of man, and realized through social justice and mercy.

In the Hebrew prophets the new moral insights are conveyed in concrete and imaginative sayings which claim to be messages conveyed through the prophets from Jahweh, the God of Israel, who is now proclaimed to be the only God.

It is to the ancient Greeks that we owe the foundations of systematic reflection upon the problems of ethics and the social order. They raised and investigated the problems of the standard of the good, of moral values, or the true ends of conduct; of the relation of the individual and the community (the nature of justice) and of the ultimate status of the good. The Greeks discussed and defined all the fundamental ethical concepts—the highest good; the virtues, such as, justice, wisdom, self-control, courage, magnanimity, liberality, friendship, were defined by them. The Greek philosophers did not, like the Hebrew prophets, conceive the relation of ethics and religion in an intuitive and imaginative fashion. The Hebrew prophets proclaim that the true worship of Jahweh is the practice of self-control, justice and mercy. In a much more reflective and systematic fashion the Greek philosophers, starting from the concepts of the good and allied ideas of value, investigate

the relation of values to the nature of things. *They ground religion in ethics and æsthetics.* The Hebrews appeal more to the emotions, the Greeks more to thought or reason. Common to all the Greek thinkers, however they may otherwise vary in the details of their ethical theories, are these conceptions—the good life is a life ruled by thought or reason (*nous*) ; this life is the divine in man ; for in the universe *reason* or *thought* is the ruling principle and it is the good.

The Romans, whose most characteristic feature is regard for the supremacy of law or order in the human world, and in the universe, carried out the leading ethical ideas of the Greeks in the realm of human law and administration. Roman imperical law finds its philosophical basis, its guiding principles in Greek ethics.

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CHAPTER V

THE RISE OF ETHICAL REFLECTION—SOCRATES AND PLATO

In Greek thought the age of enlightenment, the age of the Sophists, was a period of critical reflection upon the authority of the ancestral customs and ancient ordinances. These were challenged, subjected to sharp scrutiny. Unthinking obedience to them was called in question. Over against what was good by tradition, custom or convention (*nomos* or *thesis*) was set the idea of a rational good, of that which commends itself as good to the thought of the individual. Only the latter good is good by nature (*phusis*), for the nature of things is rational and good. Some of the Sophists denied that there is any rational objective standard of good; they recognized no principle of social or moral authority except self-interest or the power of the strong. Others, such as Protagoras, recognized that man possesses the capacity for knowing the objective social good. Protagoras said the gods had implanted in man the power to know what is just.

Socrates

Socrates taught that the man who acts rightly merely in obedience to established conventions or customs is not truly good. Man is good only in so far as, having by reflection discovered what is right, he acts upon his discovery.

Socrates held that no one could consciously and deliberately seek that which he thinks is bad. Vice is ignorance and knowledge is virtue. In saying that virtue is knowledge, Socrates meant by knowledge a personal insight which

the individual has won by sustained reflection upon the problems of right civic conduct. He did not mean second-hand knowledge which the individual has received from others, nor did he mean knowledge derived from the senses. That Socrates believed in a supersensuous intuition as a guide to conduct, seems clear from his faith in his *dæmon* or spirit. Since reflective insight is necessary to true virtue, it is of the utmost importance that one should find the right method of determining what is really good. This seems to have been the only sort of knowledge that Socrates was interested in. The previous philosophers had concerned themselves with physical inquiries. *Socrates concerned himself only with thinking, and getting his fellow citizens to think, about moral and social matters*—to inquire incessantly concerning the nature of piety, soberness, courage, justice and wisdom. To this end he practiced and inculcated the method of inquiry since known as the *Socratic*. It is the art of eliciting by question and answer, and by critical examination of the answers in the light of other relevant data, from the ordinary moral opinions of mankind, more consistent and adequate definitions of ethical concepts of piety, temperance, courage, justice and so forth. Socrates evidently held that a life guided by reflective insight must be self-consistent.

Socrates is accounted the founder of the inductive method of inquiry, since he sought to practice and teach the discovery of *ethical concepts or universals* by a critical examination of particular instances. Beyond this method it is difficult to say how far Socrates went in the direction of Plato's ethical system. Some scholars¹ contend that he held to the doctrine of metempsychosis and to the metaphysical Theory of Ideas, usually attributed to Plato, and that he was essentially a mystic of an ascetic turn, greatly influenced by the Pythagoreans. It seems certain that Soc-

¹ For example, John Burnet.

rates' prime interest was in the soul and that he defined virtue and happiness as consisting in the harmony or health of the soul which follows from a self-consistent knowledge of the goods of life. On the other hand, most scholars are of the opinion that the more elaborate ethical idealism, with its metaphysical background, found in Plato's dialogues is Plato's own development of the seeds sown in his creative mind by his master Socrates.²

Plato

It is, perhaps, best not to try to separate between master and pupil here but to call it as a whole the teaching of Socrates-Plato. Plato's dialogues have probably been the most influential writings on ethics and social philosophy in the entire history of Western thought. This influence is due to their unrivaled combination of profound insight, sweep of grasp and spiritual elevation with a rare beauty and dramatic quality of style. Plato does not, like Aristotle, go into the details of practical everyday social morals. He enunciates great principles. The doctrines advanced in the various dialogues do not form an entirely consistent system. Plato is the very reverse of a dogmatist. He has certain great insights which pervade his writings; but he is concerned to get his readers to share in the quest for reflective insight into the nature of the good life and the social conditions of its attainment rather than to formulate

² Two one-sided schools claim the authority of Socrates. (1) The Cyrenaics, founded by Aristippus of Cyrene who taught that the sole good or end is the attainment of pleasure (*hedone*). They are the first Hedonists. Epicurus and his school gave a further development of Hedonism. (2) The Cynics, founded by Antisthenes, emphasized the rugged independence of the master and taught that the good consists in a self-control and self-dependence so vigorous and complete as to free one from dependence on any external fortunes or goods, money, clothing, good foods, family or friends. Diogenes is the most renowned of the Cynics. What was of value in the Cynic teaching was taken up into Stoicism.

a dogmatic system. This alluring invitation to share in the quest for wisdom is the secret of Plato's perennial charm for those who seek to know and live the truth. Wisdom recognizes the identity of the good and beautiful. The philosopher is the lover of wisdom. All love is the expression of the desire for immortality; it is birth in beauty. The lover of wisdom loves the true and lasting good which is beauty in the inward parts. Love is the child of poverty and plenty; the offspring of desire for the possession of the good and of the knowledge that one lacks it. The lowest love is sensual, the love of beautiful bodies, the desire to attain immortality through the procreation of children. Higher is the love of beautiful souls. The highest love is the love of the eternal essences or ideal forms of the true, the beautiful and the good which are one. "And the true order of going or being led by another to the things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upwards for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is." For there is "beauty, absolute, separate, simple and everlasting which, without increase and without any change, is imparted to the evergrowing and everperishing beauties of all other things."³

For Plato the true and eternal Reality, of which the many and transient sensuous existents are but shadows or images, is an Intelligible Cosmos, a universal and permanent order of being which is the source of all the intelligible orders and relationships that are found in the natural world, as perceived through the senses; and is likewise the source of all the orders of meanings and values found in the spirit of man. Plato's doctrine of the good is thus

³ *Symposium*, p. 211. See also the *Phaedrus*, pp. 244ff. and the *Republic*.

based on a metaphysical idealism or spiritualism. Reality is a spiritual cosmos. It is a living and intelligible order or system. The cosmical spiritual order is the ground of the order of nature. We can know this latter order through sense experience and science, because it is the manifestation of a spiritual or rational system to which our spirits are akin. The soul of man, he says,⁴ is in the very likeness of the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and unchanging.

The eternal archetypal patterns, the *Essences, Forms or Ideas* are the dynamic grounds or causes of all the order and intelligibility, the meanings and values, in the universe. They are not a collection but a system of which the principle of unity is the *Essential Form of the Good*—the Platonic God. The Absolute Good, far from being identical with existence, transcends it in dignity and power.⁵ The good is higher than science and truth. Just as the physical sun is the condition of our seeing all physical objects with the outward eye, although it dazzles us so that we can scarcely gaze at it, so the *Essential Form of the Good* is the universal ground of our knowing, with the eye of the soul, all law, order, meanings and values; although we can scarcely gaze on it directly. So just as the physical sun ministers to the vitality and growth of plants and animals, although not itself vitality, the good endows all objects of rational and spiritual knowledge with their existence, although above them all. The Divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness and the like. There is an absolute justice, an absolute beauty and an absolute good. These three are one. They are the unchanging essences, the essential forms which are seen by the eye of the soul, when it has turned from the ever-perishing images of the sense world to gaze on the true realities. It is through the reason or intelli-

⁴ *Phaedo*, pp. 64-80.

⁵ Cf. *Republic*, pp. 508-509.

gence that we apprehend all universals, all relations, meanings and values. The supreme good is mind or reason, beauty, order, harmony, in the universe. Mind is the king of all things good.⁶ It orders and arranges all things in nature. Absolute being is life, mind, soul.⁷ The soul of man embodies, images, or participates in, the nature of the whole. It is an individual replica of the universe. "The soul is made from the same cup as the world soul." It consists of three parts. The highest is nous, intelligence or reason, which is the divine in man, the reproduction in a sensuous envelope of the cosmic intelligence. Its function is to rule and direct the other capacities of the embodied soul and thus to bring order, harmony, beauty into the life of the soul. The lowest part of the soul consists of sensuous desire (epithumia) or the appetitive part (to epithumetikon).

Intermediate between the intelligence and desire is the spirited part (thumoides), executive energy or vigor of will (thumos). Virtue consists in the exercise of each function or capacity in due measure and proportion and in harmony with the other capacities. The virtue of the life of sensuous desires is *temperance* or *soberness* in their satisfaction. The virtue of the spirited part is *courage* directed by knowledge and good judgment. The virtue of the reason is *wisdom* or *right insight* and *judgment*. It is obvious that the exercise of temperance and courage involve wisdom. Righteousness or justice in the individual consists in the harmonious balance, the due symmetry and order, in the activities of the soul. The good life consists in the continuous ascent of the soul from the sensuous to the spiritual. In this way the soul is true to its heavenly origin and reproduces in itself the supreme good, which is reason, beauty, harmony in the universe.

⁶ *Philebus*, pp. 28-30.

⁷ *Sophist*, p. 249.

Plato is the first exponent of the harmony theory of value. The good life consists in order and harmony in the functioning of the soul's capacities. The soul is just or righteous, in so far as its impulses and desires are expressed in due proportion and harmony. This involves moderation, balance and symmetry. It is identical with beauty in the soul. Socrates is quoted as praying; "O Great Pan, give me beauty in the inward parts!" The desire for beauty of soul is love. It is satisfied through the interfusion and control of the sensuous nature by the intellect or spirit (*nous*).

There is often an ascetic strain in Plato (especially in the *Phaedo*) in which he depicts the body as the prison house of the soul and the good as consisting in entire withdrawal from the world and complete freedom from the clamorous impulses of the senses. Intellect or spirit is regarded as the real essence of man. The true good is the godlike life of entire freedom from desire or passion, a purely spiritual existence. But, on the whole, Plato does not regard the good as the suppression of feeling. It is rather the spiritualization of the sensuous. There are good pleasures and bad pleasures. The value of pleasure does not lie in itself, as pleasure, but in the capacity or function the exercise of which involves pleasure. The pleasant is for the sake of the good, not the good for the sake of the pleasant. It is the *quality*, the *purity*, of the pleasure which determine its goodness. The pleasures of thought are higher, purer and more lasting than the pleasures of the bodily appetites; because thought is a higher function of the soul than bodily appetite. The normal exercise of every function gives pleasure. But when, for example, the pleasures of greed, of ambition and of the search for truth are compared; only the lover of wisdom is a good judge, since he can know the nature of the other two pleasures and he alone can compare these pleasures with the pleasure

of truth seeking.⁸ He alone knows that the one true coin for which all things ought to exchange is wisdom. In the *Philebus* Plato argues that the good is a mixed state of pleasure and intellectual activity. There be no pleasures lasting beyond the moment without mind, and the purest and most enduring pleasures are those that come from the perception of æsthetic harmony and knowledge. The pleasant is for the sake of the good and the latter is order and harmony of soul, which is justice or righteousness in the individual. The function of philosophy or Dialectic is to enable us to attain a vision of the whole, to see all elements of experience in their true right relations, to lift the mind from the fragmentary shifting and unstable life of sense into the knowledge and communion with reality as a system, order or cosmos. *Cosmos* means *order*. It is through intelligence alone that this can be done.

Plato recognizes that moral insight can only be developed out of a good natural disposition by careful training. Therefore, he lays the greatest emphasis on the paramount importance of a proper educational environment for the young. He says that we can expect our citizens to have beauty and justice in their souls only if they are reared in a beautiful and just environment.

Plato's Social Philosophy

For Plato the basic principle of social order is so to conduct the affairs of the community that every soul may develop its spiritual or rational nature, and thus realize to the full its moral capacities. Therefore for him the chief business of organized society is education or nurture. The feelings were to be developed for a moral end. Plato refuses to separate moral, intellectual, æsthetic and religious education. He insists throughout on treating the soul as a unity to be nurtured in its entirety. The intellectual

⁸ Cf. *Republic*, pp. 580ff. Davies and Vaughn's translation, pp. 317ff.

capacities of the soul were to be developed to the same end, and this cannot be achieved without faith in and reverence for the absolute good, God. Social justice consists in the right ordering and conduct of the social life, to the end that all the individual members of society shall become as good as possible. Social justice is realized chiefly through education; to which legislation, administration, and governance are subservient. Righteousness or good in the individual consists in the proper relation between the three great capacities of the human soul; the sensuous, the active, or executive, and the spiritual powers. No capacity is to be eliminated, but the lowest, the sensuous, is to be subordinated to the practical and spiritual powers, and the spiritual power is to control the practical. Thus the good in the individual, that which makes man a spiritual person, is the harmonious functioning of the various capacities of the soul, each in its due place. The preëminent virtue of the *sensuous capacity is temperance or self-control*; of the *executive impulses, moral courage*; of the *spiritual capacity, wisdom*, or a comprehensive and penetrating insight into the relative values of the various impulses of life.

In his *Republic*, Plato gives us his theory of the ideal state or social order. Later in his old age, in the *Laws*, he outlined what he regarded as a practicable system of social philosophy. The present sketch is based entirely upon the *Republic*. Man is dependent on his fellows. In order to realize any good he must live in a community. The state originates in the economic needs of human beings. Men find that they can satisfy these needs best through coöperation. But the economic interest marks only the beginning of social order. In order that the higher goods may be obtained, society must be organized and conducted to educate its members to perform in the life of the whole the functions they are best fitted by natural endowment to perform. The object of the State, Plato says, should be

to make its members, taken as a whole, as happy as possible. The good life for the individual, the life which brings happiness, consists in the harmonious functioning of all his capacities under the guidance of wisdom; but the enjoyment of the good life by the individual is possible only in a good State or community.⁹ A State is good in proportion as it fits and enables the individual to render the social services that he can best render to society as a whole. Thus social justice consists in the coöperation of the members of society in performing the respective duties which, by virtue of their innate capacities, as developed by right education, they are best able to perform. Plato's social ideal is aristocratic in the etymological sense of the word. The State should be ruled by those among its members who have the highest ability and characters. That class which is numerically the largest in the state, the farmers, artisans and traders, who produce and distribute the economic goods necessary for the natural sustenance of all, will not directly participate in the governance of the State. They are to be permitted the incentive of acquiring private property. Inasmuch as their work is not so interesting as that of the other two classes, and, moreover, since they do not participate in government, the influence of the lust for acquisition in their cases will not seriously interfere with their economic services, nay, will rather, if kept within moderate bounds, promote these. The other two classes, the guardians, and the rulers and teachers, are not to have private property. They are to be trained for, and they are to devote themselves unreservedly to, the services of the State. The function of the guardians is the maintenance of public order and the defense of the State against aggressions from without. The third class, the governing class, in the Platonic Republic, consists of the wisest mem-

⁹ For the Greek, state and community were identical. The Greek was a citizen of a *city-state*, a sovereign *polis*.

bers. who are to be the rulers and teachers. His social ideal is commonly called an aristocracy. It would be more accurate to say that, for Plato, the social ideal is a *noocracy*—a community ruled by thought or reason (*nous*). Plato is convinced that the ruling power in the universe is Reason or Spirit. This power is the source of all that is meaningful, orderly and lovely, in human life as in the universe.

A long course of education is laid out, beginning with the elements which are common to all, namely: physical education and the training of the emotions through poetry and music. Upon these first subjects are to succeed the beginnings of science for those who are to serve as members of the two upper classes. At the age of twenty a selection is to be made of those of most promise, and they are to be initiated into philosophy, the science of the true, the beautiful and the good as a living whole. At the age of thirty, a still more rigorous selection is to be made of those who are to fill the highest offices in the State. They are to study the highest wisdom for five years, and then to serve until the age of fifty in minor offices and in military commands. Those who acquit themselves best will then be ready, at the age of fifty, for further training and service in the highest offices of the State. Thus the division into classes in the Platonic Republic is based upon trained capacity for functioning. All members of the State are to have their native capacities developed as far as possible, and the State is to be ruled by wise men or philosophers. A wise man, as Plato understands him, is one who both knows the truth and how to apply it.

Plato's theory is sound and of great practical value in the following respects. (1) In his insistence on the necessity of the highest possible training for officers of State. (2) In his insistence that the most important function of the State is education. (3) In his insistence that the intel-

lectual and moral aspects of education must not be divorced. He is up to the minute in his insistence on the importance of the individual's being well born as the prime condition of his being well educated, and in advocating the same general education for both sexes.

His theory is inapplicable to a modern large State in the following respects: (1) It would not be possible nor, if possible, desirable, to regulate the life of the individual to the extent that Plato would have us do. (2) It is necessary in a modern large State, with its much greater complexity, to have greater freedom of movement and diversification of functions. Religion, science, art and literature are best left in the hands of voluntary associations. (3) The most fundamental weakness of Plato's theory is that by excluding the industrial workers and tradesmen from actual participation in the life or work of the State, he would prevent the development of that *like-mindedness*, that community of interest and purpose, without which the State cannot go on. It is better, at the cost of considerable waste and inefficiency, that all mature members of the State be able to feel that they have an active and responsible part in determining its policies. It would not be possible, and if possible, not desirable, to stratify training, functioning, and occupation in the threefold way that Plato does. It is better to have freer play for individuality, while recognizing the community of nature and interest among human beings.

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CHAPTER VI

ARISTOTLE

Aristotle, in his treatment of the problems of the good and of the social order, confines himself more closely to what is practicable than does Plato in the *Republic*. Like Plato, Aristotle distinguishes between three levels of capacity or functioning in the soul of man, the vegetative or nutritive, the sensitive, and the rational parts of the soul. The good of every kind of being consists in the harmonious exercise of the functions proper to its capacities. The human soul consists, in large part, of impulses that serve nutrition, movement, reproduction and association with other human beings. But the most distinctive capacity of the human soul is the power of reasoning or reflective thinking. It is the function of reason to organize and control the other impulses of the soul. Therefore, says Aristotle, *for man a good life consists in the harmonious activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, in accordance with right reason, and in a life taken as a whole.*

Virtue is a settled habit of acting which has been formed by a series of deliberate choices. Man is free socially in so far as he can act without external compulsion, and he is free psychologically in this sense that if he be a normal individual he is capable of choice. Thus he is responsible not merely for his single acts, but for his own virtuous and vicious habits. The practical moral and social virtues are the chief modes by which reason regulates the other impulses of the individual soul.

With respect to the regulation of appetites and impulses

the great principle is moderation: "Nothing too much." Every social virtue is a mean between two extremes, between an excess and a defect, respectively, in the functioning of the impulse. For example, courage is a mean between rashness and cowardice; temperance, a mean between licentiousness and apathy; liberality, a mean between prodigality and stinginess; high-mindedness and self-respect, a mean between vanity and the lack of self-respect.

There are differences in method between Plato and Aristotle that obscure, at first blush, the basic identity of their ethical standpoints. Aristotle's *Ethics* is a comprehensive, systematic and detailed treatment of the conduct of a Greek gentleman; especially in his picture of the high-minded or magnanimous man (who is, to our way of thinking, a bit of a prig, a rather pompous self-satisfied being), and includes much of what are now called good manners. Aristotle proceeds inductively, collecting and generalizing from particular cases. His ethics give us the most complete and accurate account available of the standards of good conduct that obtained among cultivated Greeks of the time. Aristotle has neither the imaginative creativeness nor the speculative sweep of Plato. Nevertheless, his conception of the good is fundamentally that of Plato; moreover, although he does not relate human good so directly to the cosmic or divine order, Aristotle, like Plato, regards the life of pure intellectual activity (contemplation, *theoria*) as the best and sweetest life for man. Well-being (*eudæmonia*) consists in the life of activity in which the natural capacities, the potentialities of human nature, to use his own favorite term, are realized in a measured orderly or harmonious manner under the guidance of intelligence. In the case of the social virtues action is a mean between two extremes, a balanced activity between two conflicting tendencies. Aristotle is often criticized on the score that the mean is too exact and wooden a conception; but he ex-

pressly says that the mean which is virtuous activity is by no means always exactly the arithmetical mean between the two vices of too much and too little. He says; one must not expect too much exactness in the subject matter of conduct. In the case of the virtues of purely intellectual activity, the *dianoetic* virtues of *prudence* or sound judgment in practical matters and *wisdom* or the supreme synoptic insight, there is no excess possible. One cannot be intellectually too active.

Aristotle's Social Philosophy

Aristotle devotes special attention to the discussion of *justice*. Justice in the broader sense means obedience to all the laws of the State, and in this sense it is identical with social virtue. Justice in the special sense of the term has to do (1) with the relations between persons with respect to the exchange of services, and (2) with personal rights and wrongs. *Distributive justice* has to do with the exchange of services. Its principle is proportionality. The individual is to be rewarded in proportion to the value of his contribution, and he is to be taxed in proportion to the value of his possessions. Corrective justice has to do with injuries and wrongs. The ruling principle here is equality. The penalty for wrong is to be measured by the amount of injury done the person, not by the respective economic status of the injured and the injurer.

There is a good beyond the practical goods of social life. This supersocial good consists in the exercise of the capacity of rational contemplation of the universe, in the unhindered activity of thought for its own sake. This is the sweetest and best of all things, the most self-sufficient form of activity. Therefore one cannot have too much of it. Since God's own life consists in the eternal activity of His own reason, the experience of the exercise of this capacity is the most godlike experience possible to man.

Aristotle makes no sharp distinction between ethics and politics. Politics, or social philosophy, is simply applied ethics. The State or society is a community of similar persons or equals aiming at the best life possible. It is a body of citizens who know how to command and to obey with reference to the best life. Absolute similarity or equality is impossible, but the best State will be one in which the largest number of citizens "possess the gifts of fortune in moderation; for in that condition of life men are most ready to listen to reason. . . . But a city ought to be composed as far as possible of equals and similars; and these are generally the middle class. Great then is the good fortune of a State in which the citizens have moderate and sufficient property; for where some possess much, and others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme."¹

Aristotle calls a *democracy* a State in which the poor and the propertyless rule; an *oligarchy*, one in which the few rich rule; a *tyranny*, an unlimited monarchy. He thinks democracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies, because they have a larger middle class. He says: "The encroachments of the rich are more destructive to the State than those of the people."² His preference is for a *polity*, which is a fusion of democracy and oligarchy with a relatively large middle class. Aristotle does not think that any hard and fast political scheme can be laid down which will be equally applicable everywhere. The best organization of the State depends upon changing conditions, but it is wisest to base the constitution chiefly on the power of the middle class.

Aristotle's social theory is more individualistic than Plato's. Like Plato's, it is based on the Greek city-state.

¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, IV, Section 10ff.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 12.

But in Aristotle's own day the Greek city-states were perishing from internecine warfare. The Greeks, failing to apply successfully the principles of federation and representative government in political life, succumbed to the imperialism first of Macedonia, and then of Rome. With the downfall of the independent city-states, and the rise of the polyethnic and polyglot Empire of Rome, the ideal of the social good had to become at once more universalistic, or cosmopolitan, and more individualistic. The individual had to retreat into a greater measure of self-dependence and take a more universal outlook.

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CHAPTER VII

STOICISM, EPICUREANISM AND NEO-PLATONISM

The ideal of the wise man, who is the truly virtuous man, is common to all the Greek schools of ethical thought. In the cosmopolitan age in which the Greek political life was waning and the Roman Empire was waxing strong the need increased for a universal outlook which was at once more individual. The individual must repose more and more on his own inner strength. The loosening of the traditional and local ties of tribe and city, the launching of the individual in a cosmopolitan welter of races, tongues, customs, cultures, religions, throws the thinking individual back on himself. The social conditions emphasize the need of inwardness, of spiritual poise and strength. Similar things are happening to-day on both a larger and more intensive scale, through the rapid growth of industrialism, which has produced fluidity of movement in our populations, the crowding into cities, the large scale production, the migration of races, wider commercial contacts, the dissemination of knowledge, the spread of democracy and social unrest, the decay of the authority of tradition in State and Church.

Stoics and Epicureans

The need for a life-view at once more inwardly individualistic and more cosmopolitan was met by the Stoic philosophy. According to the Stoic, the good life is one lived in harmony with nature. This means in harmony with the real nature of the universe which is rational and

spiritual. The ultimate reality is the cosmic reason, the world-soul, or world-spirit, the universal indwelling order of things. All things share in the universal order. The cosmic reason or spirit dwells in all things, but it is found consciously in man. All men are offspring of the universal spirit. In all there dwells a spark of the divine fiery essence. The good for man consists in subordinating all specific impulses and desires to reason. The supreme good of man is rational self-control, the rule of reason, freedom from passion or apathy. The Stoic wise man is self-sufficient and imperturbable against all the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. All virtues and forms of knowledge, and particularly wisdom, are a knowledge of what acts one should seek or be indifferent to. Justice is a knowledge of what is due to every one. Besides good and bad acts there are morally indifferent acts, which are nevertheless suitable and fitting, such as filial love and loyalty to friends.

The Stoic emphasizes devotion to the duties of one's station. Moreover, stress is laid on one's duties to all men, for man is primarily a citizen of the world rather than a citizen of Rome or Athens. All men are offspring of the universal spirit. Therefore all men are brothers. The duties of universal justice and philanthropy are based on this principle. "The world is the common father-land of all men" (Musonius). "As Antoninus, my home and father-land is Rome, as a man it is the whole world" (Marcus Aurelius). "Say not, 'O dear city of Cecrops,' say 'O dear city of Zeus'" (Marcus Aurelius).

The nature of things is good. Everything that occurs is for the best, since everything is a necessary part of the universal order. "But that is good for every part of nature which the nature of the whole plans, and what serves to maintain this nature" (Marcus Aurelius).

Through the emphasis on the power of reason and self-

control to make a man independent of circumstances, and on the universal presence of the divine spark in man, the Stoic philosophers deepened and universalized the principle of personality. Rational individuality is elevated to the position of supreme value and power. The principle of individuality burst the bonds of the Greek city-state. In man as such, irrespective of place or station, is seen the potency of free and self-sufficient and rational self-hood. Personality is recognized as the universal criterion and bearer of moral values. For the first time in the history of Western thought the universal nature of rational and ethical individuality or personality is explicitly recognized.

Stoicism had an immense and beneficent influence on ancient thought, an influence which has continued to the present day. It furnished the philosophical basis for the recognition of the natural rights of personality in imperial Roman law. The legal principle that all citizens of the Empire shared in certain common fundamental rights, irrespective of tribal or racial differences, was based on the Stoic law of nature. The task of harmonizing the ethics of the existing worldly order, the principles for the regulation of the natural impulses of man, with the super-world or eternal order of the Kingdom of God was performed by the Christian Church by the aid of the Stoic *law of nature*. Indeed, even in the writings of St. John and St. Paul, we find Stoic terms and Stoic thoughts. The *logos* or word is a Stoic concept. The distinction between bodies terrestrial and bodies celestial is Stoic; also the distinction between body, soul and spirit.

The Stoic's ideal of the wise man is noble and strong, but somewhat hard and self-sufficient. It emphasizes self-control, adherence to duty, calm submission to all outer vicissitude. But it tends towards the suppression of feeling. Its apathy or freedom from passion tends toward a cold and hard-hearted attitude.

The Epicureans sought the same good of imperturbability and independence of mind, not through the suppression of feeling, but through the rule of feeling by thought, by *prudence*. They insisted that the good is pleasant feeling, and the evil pain. But the pleasures of the mind are superior to the pleasures of the body, the former are less intense but far more lasting, and they are pure, that is, free from admixture of pain and especially devoid of painful consequences. Moreover, man is a social being and he who lives moderately and justly is the happier. The Epicureans laid much stress on the value of friendship as a condition of happiness.

Common to the Stoic and Epicurean ethics is the ideal of the wise man who guides his life by thought. Equanimity or imperturbability of mind (*ataraxy*) is the great desideratum. The individual must subdue his passions. Only thus can he free himself from the clutch of external circumstance. Only thus can he achieve happiness. He must develop within himself, and wholly from his own spiritual resources, the power to be moderate, calm and poised; come what may—disaster or success, illness or health, poverty or wealth.

Neo-Platonism

The influence of Plato is present in Stoic ethics. It is still more strongly present in the remarkable religious philosophy of Philo Judaeus.

Traces of Platonism can be found in Neo Pythagoreanism, especially in Plutarch. And, of course, it is evident in the writer of the Gospel attributed to St. John.

But the most striking ethical development of Platonism is that of Plotinus, who was a fellow student and friend of Origen, the greatest philosophical thinker of the ancient Christian Church. Plotinus and Origen do not, in fact, differ much, except that Origen regards God as having

received a special and unique incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth. Plotinus rejects this belief.

Plotinus developed a religious ethic grounded on a philosophical mysticism, and having its culmination in an ecstatic union of the human spirit with the Divine. For Plotinus the universe is an outflow or irradiation from the One—the Ineffable, Inconceivable, Unnameable One who is above and beyond all diversity and change. The One is above our highest notions of goodness and beauty. He is Super-Good and Super-Beautiful. He is also above reason or intellect, since the latter involves the duality of Knower and Known of thought and its objects.

The good of life is mystic union, self-surrender, mergence of the human soul in the One. The civic virtues of temperance, courage, justice and wisdom are the first steps toward the goal. One must entirely control one's appetites and impulses. Then one must practice self-denial until the body is brought into subjection. When this is done through thought and meditation one passes finally into contemplative union with God. By Plotinus the body is not regarded as inherently evil. By his disciples, Porphyry and Proclus, it is so regarded. Thus Neo-Platonism became a dualistic and ascetic mysticism, and as such it passed into Christian thought, notably through St. Augustine.

Summary

To sum up the Greek contributions to ethical thought: There are certain dominant notes that run through them all but have their finest expression in Plato. The work of Aristotle was to systematize and apply in a very concrete and practical manner the great insights of his master, Plato. The work of the Stoics and the Neo-Platonics, and even in some measure too of the Epicureans, was to apply these concepts to the changed social conditions of civilization, to universalize the thoughts of Plato.

There stand out in Greek ethics five great principles that are interconnected.

1. The fundamental insight that *the best life is the life guided by reason*. By reason the Greeks mean thought which determines and defines the true ends or values of conduct (*wisdom*) and which determines the best means for the attainment of these ends (*prudence* or sound practical judgment). It is true, doubtless, that the Greeks over-emphasized the power of reason in human life, but that is a good fault. There is no great danger of human beings ever becoming too reasonable. The chief dangers that confront mankind are either of giving way to impulse or of blindly following habit.

2. The *good life* for the Greeks is *one of activity*, the exercise of the functions that are truly human, the continuous energizing of all human capacities. The contemplative life in Plato and Aristotle is not a state of passive enjoyment. It consists, on the contrary, in the most comprehensive and continuous exercise of the reason or spirit.

3. *The good life is one of harmony, measure, proportion*, in the exercise of one's capacities. There is no doctrine of suppression or repression for their own sakes. The good man moderates or represses his animal impulses and desires in so far as they threaten to hinder him from realizing inner harmony of spirit and living justly as a member of the community.

4. *The good life is a social life*. It can be realized by the individual only in so far as he plays his proper part in the life of the community.

5. *The rational or good life is divine*, just in the measure in which it is rational or spiritual. Reason or Spirit is the divine in man, that which makes him truly human, since it is the capacity which distinguishes him from the animals. The universe is a Rational or Spiritual Order. God is this supreme Spirit of Order. Man, in so far as he reproduces

in himself this rational order, is a microcosm (a universe or cosmic order in little) who thus reflects the macrocosm or universal spiritual order.

These are the permanent contributions of the Greeks to ethical thought. There are aspects of Aristotle's ethics—particularly his picture of the magnanimous man—that are not entirely pleasing to us. There is a strain of selfishness in it. So too in his conception of God. Aristotle's God seems aloof from human concerns—a glorified magnanimous philosopher.

But there is nothing of this in Plato. For him the just man will suffer rather than work evil to any one.

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CHAPTER VIII

BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Christianity has gone through so many transformations, it has meant and still means so many different things to different groups and individuals, that it is not possible in a brief survey to do more than sketch what one regards as the most salient ethical features of Christianity. I shall confine myself, in this and the following chapters, to brief statements of the ethics of the New Testament writers, their successors in the Ancient Church and the scholastic ethics of Western Christendom. I shall not take account of the ethics of the Eastern or Greek Church. I shall not consider the alterations that have been made in Christian ethics by the various forms of Protestantism. I shall take as the source material for this chapter the Synoptic Gospels, the Epistles of St. Paul and the Johannine Gospel and Epistles.

The Gospel or Goodnews of Jesus was presented as a *way of life*, of spiritual attitude and conduct. It is pre-eminently an ethical attitude. But it does not present a system of ethics. It does not follow the Socratic-Platonic method of dialectical reflection and definition, nor the Aristotelian method of inductive generalization. It is not a philosophy in any technical sense of the term. There are in it no definition and classification of virtues, no reflective discussion or definition of the Highest Good.

The method of Jesus is oracular, intuitive, imaginative, parabolic and indicative. In vividly pictorial pithy sayings

and parables He conveys the new way of life. He backs up His teaching by the impress, through His bearing and His deeds, of a marvelous and fascinating individuality. He draws crowds to Him by the magic of His personality. He moves them mightily. He soothes their distressed souls and heals their nervous disorders. Notwithstanding the fragmentary and not wholly consistent records of the Synoptic Gospels, we get through them vivid gleams of a singularly harmonious and dynamic personality. "For he spake as one having authority and not as the scribes" (*Matt.* vii, 29). "Never man spake as this man." After a few years' work as teacher, guide and healer, and above all, as Herald and first Founder of the new way of life, the Kingdom or Realm of God, Jesus deliberately chooses to die rather than either abandon the project of the Kingdom or have it perverted to politico-ecclesiastical ends and be extinguished in one more vain attempt of Jewish fanatics to overthrow their Roman rulers.

His faithful disciples, firmly convinced that He has survived the Crucifixion and is still with them, go on with the work of preparing for the full coming of the Kingdom. They live with the spirit of the Kingdom dominating their souls and in the expectation of its speedy completion. Gradually they cease to expect its complete fulfillment soon; but the way of life that takes its origin from Jesus spreads and is modified, although never entirely obscured, by the later developments of organized Christianity. Here one must admit, considering the matter objectively, one touches a unique and extraordinary individual source of spiritual life in the historic process—a creator of history so unique as to seem metahistorical (beyond history). Jesus was at least a great spiritual creator, an integral and dynamic ethical personality, aflame with love for God and man and utterly devoted to His vision of a new communion or fellowship of human souls.

The pivotal center of Jesus' teaching is the Kingdom or Realm of God. Around this conception everything in the new way of life revolves; to it everything returns. If it is not an ethical system it is a religious ethics—a unique and harmonious union of religious faith with ethical or humanely spiritual insight. Jesus is not a new lawgiver any more than He is a systematic philosopher. He ignores the ceremonial law of His fathers. He does not base His authority on the traditions of the elders. He refers to them but He uses them with the utmost freedom as a kingly creative spirit. It was not many years after His death that Christianity began to become a new law. But certainly in the New Testament the good tidings of the Reign of God are free from that confusion. Jesus does not directly attack or attempt to undermine the Mosaic Law and its elaborations. He simply makes it unnecessary by a humaner, more dynamic and vital attitude. He founds a spiritual community, a voluntary fellowship. This is called the *Realm of God* or *Reign of God*. It is now present and growing in the hearts of men. In the not distant future it will be fully established. Men can realize the good life, the abundant and integral life, in full measure only as members of this Divine community. In it all social distinctions become insignificant. The basic human and spiritual similarities among men are of much greater importance than the differences between them. The community stands apart from the "world" of bargain and sale, of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. In its spirit it runs counter to much that rules in the "world."

The characteristics of Jesus' way of life may be summarized as follows:

1. *The absolute value of the human person*—the soul. "What shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" Nothing is of any account in competition with the life of the soul. If thine eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it

from thee; if thy hand offend thee, cut it off and cast it from thee.

2. *The emphasis laid on inwardness, on the right motives, interests, feeling, attitudes.* Compare the entire Sermon on the Mount, *Matt. v-vii* (inclusive).

Purity, integrity, wholeness are marks of the right inner life. "If thine eye be single thy whole body shall be full of light" (*Matt. vi, 22*).

The individual is to be spiritually free and independent. "Call no man master." This is a corollary of the inwardness of the spiritual life.

3. *Everything else must make way for the furtherance of the right life.* The individual is to be hard with himself, lenient with others, to be concerned with the beam in his own eye rather than with the mote in his brother's eye (*Matt, vii, 3-6*).

4. *The disciple will not allow anxiety for physical goods to interfere with the inner life.* "Are ye not of much more value than many sparrows?" "Consider the lilies of the field" (*Matt. vi, 28, 29*). "Behold the birds of the heaven" (*Matt. vi, 26*).

5. *The disciple will be humble in spirit.* He is acutely conscious of the gap between his own imperfect and erring self and the perfect holiness of God. His attitude is: "Lord, be merciful to me a sinner"; not, "Lord, I thank thee that I am not as other men are."

6. *The true inner life is not a life that simply turns on its own axis.* It is realized only through the practice of kindness, sympathy, fellowship, mutual service and forgiveness of injury.

7. The test of true greatness in the Realm of God is ministration to others: "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me" (*Matt. xxv, 40*). "Whosoever would become great among you shall be your minister, and whosoever would be first

among you shall be your servant, even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister" (*Matt.* xx, 26-28). "He that seeketh his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life for my sake and the Gospels shall find it."

8. The most paradoxical and flagrant contrast between the ethics of Jesus and all previous systems is His insistence that a forgiving loving spirit is the Divine in man. Man becomes Godlike by rising above the *lex talionis*, above the law "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." The disciples are never to harbor ill will, even against these who have injured them. They are to banish from their hearts all lust, greed, envy, malice, uncharitableness. They will be great in so far as they forgive and serve. They will gain their souls in so far as they are ready to spend themselves for the sake of their fellows—feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, visiting the sick, comforting those that mourn. They are not to resist evil but rather to render good for evil. They are to forgive all things. And why? "That ye may be sons of your Father who is in heaven." "Ye therefore shall be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect" (*Matt.* v, 43-48).

Thus for Jesus the Highest Good is godlikeness. This is attained, not by increase of knowledge or imperturbability of mind but by the practice of self-forgetting love and forgiveness. For Jesus the Divine is most manifest precisely in those acts and events which, from the point of view of law courts and business in the world, are most foolish and unjust. The Divine Character is revealed in the sun that shines on the good and evil, the rain that falls on the fields of the just and the unjust; in the bounty of the ever-renewing creative life of nature; in a father's forgiving love for an erring son, in a father's bounty to his children.

The Divine Perfection consists in creating, sustaining and revealing Himself in the Imperfect, God's infinitude is

to find Himself in the finite. The endless richness of His being flows into and fills up the poverty of ours.

From this revolutionary point of view all earthly bargains and activities, all worldly politics and laws are but temporary makeshifts. Unquestionably, in comparison with even the noblest Greek ethics, the Christian ethics involves a transvaluation of values. The Christian disciple is not at all like Aristotle's magnanimous man. Even the wisdom of Plato is not the supreme quality. The quality of self-control is still more exigent, more severe, for the Christian. Absolute continence outside the married state is required. But the most striking difference is that forgiveness, gentleness, humility of spirit, active love or benevolence are elevated to the supreme place above wisdom, justice and courage. The worst sins from the Christian point of view are cruelty, insensibility to the needs of one's fellows, hardness of heart and smug self-satisfaction. The most shining virtues are kindness, sympathy, helpfulness, fellowship, service and humility.

St. Paul's hymn to Christian love in *I Cor.* xiii expresses the very heart of the Christian ethics.

Greater kindness and care for children, for the sick and weak and poor are direct outgrowths of the Christian spirit. The institutions for the relief of pain, suffering, extreme poverty that have grown up in Christendom are the best expressions of the Christian ethics. The elevation of women, the reverence for childhood, the mitigation and abolition of slavery and serfdom and the gradual spread of democratic opportunity for education and the improvement of the common lot are offspring of Jesus' tidings and deeds.

This is not to say that the humanitarian development of pagan Græco-Roman civilization under the guidance of Platonists and Stoics was not moving in the same direction. Indeed the doctrines of the natural rights and moral

equality of all men had borne fruit in a much more human system of law, in the mitigation of slavery, the improvement in the conditions of women and children in the Roman Empire before Christianity was officially recognized. But the most powerful impulse came from the work of Jesus and His successors. Lecky says:- "The high conception that has been formed of the sanctity of human life, the protection of infancy, the elevation and final emancipation of the slave classes, the suppression of barbarous games, the creation of a vast and multifarious organization of charity and the education of the imagination by a Christian type, constitute together a movement of philanthropy which has never been paralleled or approached in the pagan world. The effects of this movement in promoting character have been very great. Its effect in determining character has probably been still greater. In that proportion or disposition of qualities which constitutes the ideal character, the gentler and more benevolent virtues have obtained through Christianity the foremost place. In the first and purest period they were especially supreme, but in the third century a great ascetic movement arose, which gradually brought a new type of character into the ascendant, and diverted the enthusiasm of the Church into new channels."¹ Possibly Lecky exaggerates the direct influence of Christianity in some of these respects. Slavery was accepted by the Mediæval Church. It was not abolished until modern times, and as a result of the democratic movement and the perception of its economic weakness.

To sum up: as Eucken puts it, man's inward world of independent spiritual life brings him into union with God. Plato had broken the power of external fate when he placed the greatness and worth of man in inner power and harmony. But within this remained a still stronger fate, that of the weakness of man's spiritual capacity. Jesus freed

¹ Lecky, *History of European Morals*, Vol. II, p. 43.

man from this by enkindling in him a new power arising from faith in a loving Father—a God like Jesus Himself.

Kingdom of God

The Christian doctrine of the Good has as its background and presupposition the Hebrew prophetic ideal of the kingdom of God. I shall not discuss in detail what additions and transformations this idea received at the hands of Jesus and His immediate successors. Suffice it to say that the Christian idea of the Good is both intensely personal and universally social. The kingdom of God is a community of free persons; morally equal, since they are all sharers in the same vocation—the realization of their divine sonship. On the one hand the Christian ideal is intensely personal. The individual must freely accept the exalted and exacting ideal. He must be ready to subject all his natural impulses, to give up all worldly values and interests, to forsake if necessary his possessions and even his family, and to seek above all else inner purity of motive and aim, absolute integrity of purpose, complete spiritual freedom, to the end that he may become perfect as God is perfect. On the other hand, this personal ideal finds expression in this service of his fellows, in a life of complete goodwill, fellowship, coöperation, forgiveness and forbearance. The individual must be ready not only to forget himself, but to sacrifice himself, if necessary, for the cause of the Kingdom. In this new order of the Kingdom every soul has inherent and infinite value, which value it realizes in unstinted devotion to the community.

Therefore, entrance into the Kingdom involves the dying and rebirth of the natural selfish life into a new life of complete devotion and unselfishness. Life in the Kingdom may involve the renunciation of all good in the present order. The sharpest contrast is set up between this world and the Kingdom. By "this world," Jesus and His disciples

mean the existing social and political order which was soon to pass away; by the Kingdom, the eternal Kingdom which was soon to come in all its fullness on earth. I cannot stop to discuss here the knotty question of how far Jesus Himself really shared the expectation of the early disciples that the Kingdom would come soon in all its completeness by supernatural power. I may say that I cannot see how we can cut out the sayings attributed to Him on the sudden coming of the Kingdom (the *Parusia*) and leave in the passages in which the Kingdom is presented as a gradual growth without being guilty of an arbitrary mutilation of the text. In any case, it is clear that St. Paul and the other Apostles looked at first for a speedy coming of the Kingdom. The present world was hastening fast to its impending doom. "The night is far spent, the day is at hand." Hence, the first Church had a community of goods, hence, the New Testament writers evince no interest in the affairs of the world around them. They care nothing for worldly culture, or commerce, science, art or political life. All these things belong to the present world which passeth away to give place to the eternal rule of God on earth.

Hence, while the good for the first primitive Christian is a social good, it is the good of a community which draws its impetus and guidance from the transcendent and eternal life of God. Patient devotion to the cause of moral purity and integrity as revealed in the life and death of Jesus, an overmastering love for God and the brethren, a dedication even unto torture and death for the spirit of the good tidings, the unique union of steadfast courage with the spirit of humility and forgiveness characterized the early Christians. They manifested almost complete indifference to the affairs of the city or the culture of the Empire. Theirs was a life which boasted that God has chosen the weak things of this world to confound the strong and the foolish to confound the wise and which speaks of faith as the

principal stay of man. Such is the spirit of early Christianity. The attitude of the early Christians towards many things, the voluntary communism and indifference to economic matters, their abstention from political life, their lack of concern for art and science were due to their engrossment with the new order—the daily expectation in which they lived that the coming of the Reign of God in all its fullness was imminent.

In the same faith they readily faced persecution and martyrdom. The exacting standards of sexual continence and poverty, the exaltation of chastity, the insistence on simplicity of life, integrity of work and deed—all these attitudes were strengthened by the faith in the speedy fulfillment of the promise of the *Parusia*.

Beginnings of a Christian Social Philosophy

Nevertheless, it was necessary as time wore on, that the Christians should define their attitude towards the institutions of this world—the power of government, property, slavery.

The first application to the social life, that is the first social philosophy of Christianity, is found in St. Paul's Epistles. The community is like an organism. Ye are all members one of another. "If one member suffer all the members suffer with it; if one member rejoice all the members rejoice with it" (I *Cor.* xii). Thus Paul applies to the Christian community, the organismic concept of society; the lives of the individual members of the group are so interdependent that what each member does or fails to do affects the well-being of all the other members.

What should be the Christian's attitude towards the interests and activities of the social world around him?

1. St. Paul clearly teaches that there is a *natural law*, written in all men's hearts, and recognized by reason, which instructs men in what is right and wrong. This is *con-*

science (*Rom.* ii, 12-14). He agrees with the Stoics in his conception of conscience as a natural light for the guidance of conduct implanted unreservedly in man.

2. He teaches that all men are equal by nature. There is an identical human nature in all men, all men are under the Natural Law of Right (*Gal.* ii, 28; *I Cor.* iii, 11). St. Paul does not express himself clearly as to whether slaves should become free. But he does teach that the distinction between master and slave is of no consequence in the eyes of God (*I Cor.* xii, B; *Col.* iii, ii; *I Cor.* vii, 20-24; *Eph.* vi, 5-9). Masters are to treat their slaves with justice and equity (*Col.* iii, 22, iv, 1). Slaves are to perform their duties faithfully.

3. The Christian is to obey the civil government under which he finds himself (*I Tim.* vi, 1, 2; *Titus*, 9, 10; *Rom.* xiii, 1-7). The civil government is of Divine institution. It derives its sanction from God. The aim of civil government is to repress the evil and encourage the good.

4. There is no evidence of compulsory communism. But the overmastering bond of common dedication to the new way of life involved a voluntary communism. The accumulation of material goods was a hindrance to the life of the soul. Of what use was it when the entire existing order was soon to pass away? Even in the present order the Christian's life was brief and that of a sojourner and pilgrim. The true good is life eternal, life in Christ. The spirit of communism persisted in the Church for centuries.

Paul indeed substituted for the earlier apostolic conception of the miraculous advent of the Kingdom with Jesus returning at its head a Christ mysticism. The man Jesus becomes a symbol for the living and indwelling Christ. The Spirit of Christ is the Spirit of God in the hearts of men. The witness of man's inner experience, the witness of the Spirit, becomes the ground of assurance and the principle of guidance. The ethical qualities embodied in

the life of Jesus are validated by personal experience. The fruits of the Spirit are the proofs of the spiritual quality and supremacy of the type of life in which self-control, purity, integrity, kindness, forgiveness and active love are supreme. The momentous step is already taken by Paul which is carried further with beautiful symbolism in the writings attributed to John. The receding personality of the historic Jesus becomes a symbol of universal ethical and spiritual values which find their real validation not in unique and unrepeatable historical events but by harmonizing and enriching the spirit of man. Their witness is that the Divine life in the soul of man, the life of integrity and harmony, of creative power and love and fellowship are satisfied through these values. Thus the ground is ripe for a synthesis of the spiritual insights of the great Greeks with the dynamics of Christianity.

Pity it is that so often down to the present organized Christianity has been so prone to confound the passing historical symbol with the permanent and universal Life and Spirit, to identify the husk and the kernel, to seek the living amidst the dead, to risk the abiding essence and substance by insisting on keeping it wrapped in the transitory appearance. What the Christian ethics permanently means is that there is a Divine or Supremely Worthful in man which struggles to creative expression in spiritual integrity, kindness, fellowship and love. "The Christian ethics is a wholly religious ethic that holds personality to be fully realized only in God. Therefore, individual morality is an ethics of self-purification and integration for God; social morality an ethics of the union of all God's children in God. For it the final end of individual activity is the personality filled with the content of eternal life and the final end of community activity is the kingdom of Divine Love which triumphs over all worldly law, force and struggle for existence.

"The Christian ethics does not spring from nature. It is an ethics of the Overworld and leads beyond nature. The original Christian ethics springs from the community of God and leads man into the Divine Life. It founds ■ Kingdom of God beyond the Kingdom of this world. In this opposition it has its greatness, through this it overcomes and spans the oppositions of the worldly life."²

"Christianity thus satisfies the profound yearning of the ethical personality towards an eternal content of life and towards a purely personal and spiritual morality. The seeds and beginnings of a higher existence must find fruition through a final return to the Divine Life. Every affirmation of absolute values beyond the relative values of the life of this worldly culture demands a Beyond in the metaphysical sense. Therewith human deeds and the human life-feeling inhale a breath of the supernatural. Only when the conditions for the elevation of personality above nature are present can there be any serious consideration of an ethics which harmonizes and perfects personality. Therefore the acute crisis of Christianity to-day lies here—how can a place be found amidst the enormous development of modern civilization (capitalism and large scale industrialism, technology, class struggle and struggle for self-realization, science and art), for the supreme Christian values of spiritual integrity, inward purity and freedom, and love." ■

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² In this and the preceding paragraph I have given ■ free rendering of Ernst Troeltsch's Summary in his *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, pp. 850-854.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 656-657.

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CHAPTER IX

THE ETHICS OF THE EARLY CHURCH

Pagan Influences

As Christianity spread and increased in the numbers and influences of its adherents inevitably it was affected by the higher features of the civilization of the Roman Empire, and especially by the nobler elements of Græco-Roman ethical culture. The chief of these elements were:

1. The Stoic ethics, with its metaphysico-religious basis. This inculcated self-control and self-sufficiency through the attainment of freedom from passion by the exercise of the individual's rational will. Such a life brought the individual into harmony with the Universal Order, the Cosmic Spirit. The Stoic ethical outlook is at once universal or cosmopolitan and highly individualistic.

2. The Neo-Platonic mysticism, with its ascetic tendencies and its doctrine that the Supreme Good consists in the Beatific Vision, in mystical communion or immediate union of the individual soul with God. Neo-Platonism taught a purely spiritual monism. The social virtues are the lower rungs on the ladder of the ascent of the soul to God; above them are the purificatory virtues which consist in subdual of all fleshly impulses and desires; above these is the contemplative union with the Godhead—the beatific vision, the blessed life.

There is a close kinship between the teachings of Plotinus, the greatest of the Neo-Platonists, and Origen, the greatest systematic theologian of the Ancient Church. Indeed there

is but little difference between their doctrines, beyond the fact that for Origen God is a Holy Will and that He holds that the Logos, the second Divine Being eternally generated from the Father was fully incarnated in Jesus Christ. Plotinus and Origen were fellow students and friends. The influence of Neo-Platonism is very marked in St. Augustine, and through him and the Pseudo-Dionysius (fifth century), so-called because his writings were attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, passed into mediæval theology, ethics and devotion.

3. A third strain that powerfully influences the early and mediæval church is the widespread dualism of soul or spirit and body. One finds traces of this dualism even in St. Paul. Its momentum increases as we pass from apostolic times through the intervening centuries to Tertullian, Lactantius, St. Ambrose and St. Augustine.

In its extreme form this anthropological dualism asserts that the bodily impulses and desires are evil. The body is the prison house or sepulcher of the soul (*soma sema*). Salvation, the attainment of the Life of Blessedness, means release from all the fetters of the bodily life. The body is mortal; the soul alone is immortal. Since the early Fathers of the Church in general regard the Good as consisting in immortal or eternal life for the soul in terms of ascetic dualism; man begins to attain immortality by castigating, subduing and altogether overcoming bodily desires.¹

Tertullian and St. Augustine, it is true, explicitly say that the body by itself is not the seat of evil, that evil resides in the will. Tertullian holds that the spirit is corporeal and has a body. Augustine's practical ethics, like that of Ambrose, amounts to a denial that any ethical good appertains to the bodily life. The life of celibacy is a

¹ Logically inconsistent with this view is the doctrine of the resurrection of the body which was revived as a reaction against Gnosticism.

higher state than the married life. Tertullian holds that for a widower or widow to marry again is to commit fornication. The life of monastic poverty is a higher one than the life of the artisan, agriculturist, or merchant living in the world. The life of complete obedience to one's spiritual superiors is higher than one in which one realizes one's own individuality. Humility, chastity, obedience and poverty are the conditions for entrance into immortal life.

Gnosticism

The Christian Fathers did not go the length of extending this dualism to the universe. They retained the monotheistic faith of the founders. They repudiated Gnosticism² and Manichæism. Gnosticism was an attempt to reconcile the conflict between the harsh and even vengeful attitudes attributed to Jehovah in much of the Old Testament with the gentle and mild ethics of the Father God in the New Testament. This reconciliation was effected by the doctrine that Jehovah was the inferior God, the Creator and Law giver of the Old Testament who had created the world (like the Demiurge in Plato or the Logos in Philo) and was an entirely different being from the spiritually superior God of Jesus. This cosmological dualism was also an anthropological dualism. The body or flesh was evil, created by the Demiurge. The hitherto unknown God revealed by Christ is pure disembodied spirit. Marriage and sexual propagation are evil. The creator God was the author of the Jewish law. The superior and purely spiritual God of Christ and the Gnostics abolished the law and redeemed

² The chief Christian Gnostics were Marcion and Valentinus. The movement, taken as a whole, represents a multifarious development of Persian (Iranian) dualism. The cosmological dualism of two warring world powers was later identified with the Greek dualism of spirit and matter and then with the Pauline dualism of the Jewish law and the Gospel. Marcion embodies the anti-Jewish attitude of Paul carried to an extreme.

man. Gnosticism was a mystery-religion.³ The Church rejected this dualism. Manichæism, originating from the doctrine of the Persian Mani, was a blend of Zoroastrian dualism and Christian Gnosticism. The Manichæans taught that the world was the theater of the conflict of two opposing powers, Light and Darkness, Good and Evil. St. Augustine was first a Manichæan, then a Neo-Platonist, and finally was converted to the orthodox form of Christianity. Manichæism was rejected by the Church.

Nevertheless, Gnosticism and Manichæism (which is a form of Gnosticism) deeply influenced the Ancient Church. St. Augustine's ethics show marked traces of it. The entire ascetic attitude of the Church was largely due to it. Gnosticism was a syncretistic mystery religion; that is, it gathered into itself a whole mass of magical, sacramental, mystical ideas. These influenced the sacramental system of the Church. Gnosticism emphasized the idea of salvation, and this, too, influenced the Church. Finally, Gnosticism impelled the Church, by reaction, to a closely knit organization and the fixation of authority and tradition. Indeed, the more one ponders on that fascinating period when, in the melting pot of the Roman Empire, from, say, the beginning of Alexander's Empire until the sack of Rome (A.D. 410), a period in which Greek philosophy, Egyptian and Oriental dualism and asceticism and mystery religions and all the fantastic cults of that poly-ethnic melting pot, the Roman Empire, melt and mingle, the clearer it becomes that the dominant ethical note of the time was the feeling of the conflict between body and spirit, evil and good and of the helplessness of the individual soul without supernatural aid. The longing for redemption through miraculous acts of Divine power, through the magic of mystery and sacrament and, in finer spirits, the hunger

³ H. G. Wells in his *God the Invisible King* has restated the essential position of Gnosticism.

for a mystical vision transcending the power of reason grew apace. Gnosis means just this ineffable knowledge—an immediate vision of the transmundane order which appears in the Gnostics, the Neo-Platonists and the Christian mystics.

Magical elements soon crept into primitive Christianity. It took up the burden of the mystery religions.

Ancient Christianity ■ Syncretism

The religion of Mithra was the greatest rival of Christianity for the adherence of the citizens of the Empire. It appealed especially to the soldiers and remains of its worship have been found wherever the legions were quartered. Pagan Neo-Platonism succumbed even more quickly and completely to the influence of magic and mystery-mongering. The moral integrity, simplicity and elevation of the impulse that came from Jesus and Paul saved the Church from a worse decline and compromise. The Christian Church that gradually came into being was *syncretistic*, a fusion of Neo-Platonic and Stoic philosophy, Oriental dualism and magic and mystery worship with the humanistic and pure ethical theism of Jesus. The latter never wholly lost its influence; it was never wholly obliterated, although much obscured. Indeed, as one studies the development of ancient Christianity it becomes clear that the two chief respects in which the Gospel lost its purity and simplicity were (1) in the growing dominance of the dualistic asceticism with its withdrawal from the world into the monastic life; its depreciation of the married state, its exaltation of poverty and obedience; (2) in the overemphasis of mystic and magical union with the Godhead which fitted in with ascetic dualism, since fasting and punishment of the body, long meditations and vigils are fitted to loosen the imagination from reality and give rein to all sorts of fantastic fancies. This, of course, is particularly the case when the

sex impulse is thwarted. Many of the mystics revel in erotic symbolism. (3) The influence of the Roman genius for law, order, organization and government is seen in the organization of the Church. Moreover, it resulted in the incoming of legalism, the perversion of the Gospel into a new law. It promoted the establishment of the penitential and sacramental system. It flowered in the establishment of a religion based on the authority of fixed tradition, and demanding absolute obedience in thought as well as in act. St. Augustine, the deeply introspective and idealistic philosopher, the Christian Neo-Platonist, is the author of the complete theory of the supremacy of the Church and the entire subjection of the individual to its authority.

Eastern and Western Christianity

There are certain marked differences of ethical and intellectual tone between Eastern and Western, Greek and Latin Christianity. The Greek Church at first kept much closer in spirit to Greek philosophy. Christ is conceived primarily as one who came to raise man to the Divine, to bring the soul into union with the Godhead. This work is the culmination of the revelations of the Logos through the prophets and Greek philosophy. The eternal life is a life which begins here and now. Immortality is a matter of the quality or attitude of the soul rather than of duration. The Highest Good for man is restoration or elevation into mystic oneness with God. This is very noticeable in Origen, whose ethical tone is scarcely distinguishable from that of Plotinus. The ordinary social virtues are the first step Godward. Of course the relation between God and man is conceived in more affectional and active terms as *love*. Herein the spiritual impetus coming from the New Testament persists. But intuitive union or insight, Gnosis, is higher than faith. Eastern Christianity later degenerated into a magical mysticism.

In the West the first important Christian writer is Tertullian (A.D. 160-220). He is the most influential up to Augustine. Second is Lactantius (circa A.D. 250-330). Both these fathers of the Latin Christianity are North Africans. Both were trained rhetoricians, and write with the special pleading and eloquence of the lawyer. They both evince a passionate energy, an intensity, a devotion, an attitude of hostility towards Greek philosophy, coupled with lack of knowledge of it, both are zealous for purity of life, both show a certain utilitarian coarseness; withal they breathe the spirit of patience, self-denial of bodily passions, and confident and bold faith in the reality of the eternal and blessed life for the individual that was engendered in the Christian.

Tertullian and Lactantius are hostile to philosophy. They, especially Tertullian, tell scandalous tales about all the Greek philosophers. Lactantius calls Socrates the wisest of the Greeks, but a fool. Tertullian criticizes Plato severely. He says that any Christian workman knows far more about God than Plato did. He glories in believing that which to reason is absurd. He criticizes Plato for the doctrine of reminiscence and of the preëxistence and palinogenesis of the soul. He rejects Plato's purely immaterial conception of the soul and of God. To Tertullian the soul is corporeal, the spirit and reason are particular faculties or operations of the soul. The soul is generated and develops with the body, and at death is temporarily separated from it. The Highest Good is immortal life which the soul enters upon after death. All souls remain in Hades anticipating future bliss and torments until the general resurrection and judgment; when they are clothed again with bodies and go to their respective places to enjoy eternal bliss or suffer eternal punishment.

All genuine knowledge in regard to the soul, the Good or salvation and God comes by revelation from God through

the prophets, Christ and the Holy Spirit—none by human reason.

Great stress is laid on sexual purity. Celibacy is a higher state than marriage, though the latter is not evil and is permitted. But second marriages of the widowed are repudiated. The widowed who marries again commits fornication. The Christians are patient, forgiving, mutually helpful, and courageously endure persecution, torture and death for the reward of immortal life. The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church. Tertullian, in his defense of the Christians, eloquently depicts their triumphant virtue and steadfastness in the face of humiliation and persecution.

St. Augustine (A.D. 353-430), writing when the Old Empire is crumbling and facing the Dark Ages, is the prophetic spirit of mediæval Catholic Christianity. All the strains that go to make up mediæval Catholic culture are present in him, although not wholly harmonized.

The specifically mediæval culture is based on a hierarchical system of authority. The Church was the one institution that survived the storms of the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries. It waxed in strength and extent. It was the custodian of culture. It transmitted and applied to the education of the new barbarian elements the culture of Greek and Roman.

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CHAPTER X

THE ETHICS OF SCHOLASTICISM

Scholasticism, the philosophy of the Schoolmen, was the effort to elaborate, explain and defend, in terms of reason, the experiences and interests of the maturing cultural life of Western Europe, within the limits set by the dogmas, cult and organization of the Church.

The Church was the chief culture-bearing and culture-propagating institution. The schools were under the control of the Church. The universities came into existence only shortly before the culmination of mediæval culture.

The Church came into the Western world and led in fashioning mediæval civilization bearing along in its movement many diverse streams of intellectual and spiritual doctrine and tendency. The Church, as it emerged from the many-colored life of the Græco-Roman Empire, wove into its texture many strands.¹ Persian cosmical dualism is seen in the doctrines of devils, angels and dæmons, Manichæistic influence, Egyptian monachism and the despondent world-weariness and world-negation in the ascetic and dualistic emphasis in the monastic life and the vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. Gnosticism left its mark here, too. Neo-Platonism and, chiefly through it, the Aristotelian philosophy were present in the formulation of the credal and theological systems; Neo-Platonism in the persistence and increase of mysticism. The mystery religions are continued in the sacramental system; Roman organization and law in

¹ Hall, T. C., *A History of Ethics within organized Christianity.*

the organization and policy of the Church; Stoicism in the ethics and especially the social and political doctrines of the Church. The whole ecclesiastical and social system of the Middle Ages rests on the principle of a hierarchical organization with a twofold character. *The entire life of man and the whole setting of that life is made to rest on a recognition of two realms, one of which is subordinate to the other one; the subordinate one is the realm of nature, the other and superior is the supernatural realm, the realm of grace.* The guide to the knowledge of nature is reason, the supernatural order is apprehended through faith. Reason and faith are not opposed. The superstructure of faith reposes on the substructure of rational knowledge, and what is first presented through revelation and apprehended by faith can be elaborated, interpreted and defended by reason. God speaks in nature through reason, and in nature and through reason one can know that God exists, that He has created the world and that the soul is immortal (Thomas Aquinas). But only through revelation, as apprehended first through faith, can one know God's redemptive work for man, the nature of the Incarnation, the Trinity and the Sacraments; in short, the entire means of salvation. Since the realm of grace is superior to, and completes, the realm of nature, the Church, the divinely instituted and continuing organ of grace, through all its instruments of doctrine, litany, sacrament and penance, is superior to the worldly political order. The spiritual power is above the temporal power. The Church rules over the Empire and the principality or nation.

Thomas Aquinas

The classic system of scholastic or ecclesiastical ethics, as of ecclesiastical philosophy in general, is that of St. Thomas Aquinas. This system is an extraordinary achievement—a comprehensive, logically elaborated and penetrat-

ing development of ethics, cosmology and theology, in which the faith and rule of the Church appears as the crown of a philosophy which is grounded on the Aristotelian philosophy; Aristotle is for him the supreme authority in natural or rational philosophy, worldly ethics and natural theology. The Scriptures and the Church Fathers are the supreme authorities in the ethics and theology of the truth revealed through Christ. The *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas is the classical and final form of churchly ethics and philosophy. If one accept the division between the natural and the supernatural realms on which it is based there is nothing further to be said in systematic and fundamental philosophy or theology.

The highest good is happiness or blessedness, and this consists in the fulfillment of its proper functions by the soul of man. The soul is an intelligent, sensitive and vital principle. Intelligence or reason is its highest principle. The will is free, the will is identical with freedom. It naturally tends toward the good but has been corrupted by the fall of man. The root of sin is sensuality (*concupiscentia*). Sacramental grace alone can restore the fallen and corrupt nature of men into its Divine image.

Virtue, Aquinas defines as the setting in order of love. It is an operative habit, an ordered disposition of the soul. It is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God forms in us, without use. That is, *virtue is infused in us by God, with our consent, but without any action on our part.*² In other words, the grace of God, bestowed through the sacramental system of the Church, is necessary for the practice of any virtue. Aquinas uses the terminology of Aristotle, but his conception of the Good is far from that of the philosopher. The hands are the hands of Aristotle, but the voice is the

² Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Part II, first part. Second number, Question LV.

voice of the Church. The Highest Good consists in the Beatific Vision of God, attained through mortification of the flesh and complete submission of the mind and will of the individual to the authority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy; in the final step, to the authority of the Pope, who is the apex of the hierarchical system of salvation.

For Aristotle, the supreme good was the harmonious functioning of all human capacities under the guidance of reason or intelligence. For Aquinas, it was the complete withdrawal of the soul from the impulses and images of the senses, to be achieved through chastity and abstinence. For Aristotle the contemplative life was a life of insatiable curiosity and inquiry. For Aquinas, it was a life of complete devotional submission in accordance with the rites and prescriptions of the Church. For Aristotle, the good life, the life of virtue, consists in the harmonious fulfillment of the natural capacities of the individual. For Aquinas, there is no satisfying good and no final virtue without the infusion of the Divine grace from above by miraculous act, and this infusion requires submission to the authority of the Church and conformity to its cultus.

The blessed life of contemplation can be attained even in this world through illumination by supernatural grace. The soul thus enters into a state of rapture. The love of God is satisfied by mystic union with Him. This is true self-realization. It is consummated in the life to come when, by intuition, man knows God as God knows Himself.

Aquinas treats of the moral virtues of Aristotle, *e.g.*, courage, temperance, liberality, high-mindedness, mildness, friendliness, truthfulness; and the intellectual virtues of wisdom, science, understanding, art and prudence. He discusses all these virtues with reference to their dependence on the third group—the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. "The object of the theological virtues is God Himself, who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowl-

edge of reason. The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite, according to the capacity of human nature; the theological virtues, supernaturally. The wisdom which the philosopher (*Ethic VI*) reckons as an intellectual virtue considers Divine things so far as they are open to the research of human reason. . . . Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human wisdom."³ The gifts of the Holy Ghost: understanding, counsel, wisdom, knowledge, piety, fortitude, fear, are regulated by the theological virtues.

Thomas Aquinas regards the State as a means for the realization of the natural end of man—self-expression through coöperation for the common good; whereas, the Church is a means for the realization of the supernatural end of man—the blessedness of union with God. The ultimate source of all authority is God, the Supreme Ruler. From God authority passes to the whole group of individuals. The people, under God, are sovereign. The rulers can be elected by the people. In the interests of solidarity and unity of rule, Thomas Aquinas favors a limited monarchy.

Since the natural end of man is perfected by the supernatural end, the Church is superior to the State. The State exists for the sake of the good in all its members. Only through the life of grace can man be raised to the Highest Good—the *Beatific Vision*.

In his ethics of the economic and political orders, Aquinas reflected the practice of his day. He distinguished between *eternal law*, *the revealed law of God*, and *natural law* which is the eternal law in so far as this is apprehended by the natural reason of man. The details of the social and political life of the world are regulated by this natural

³ Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Part II, Second number, Question LXII, Art. 2.

law. The revealed law is the eternal law made known to man through the Bible, Christ and His successors.

The earthly sovereign of the Kingdom of Grace is the supreme pontiff, the vicar of Christ, the successor of St. Peter. The Pope is to be obeyed before all other rulers. It is the duty of the Pope to see that the duties of the secular ruler are performed so as to enable every man to realize his good. Thus, there is really only one social organization, dominated by the supernatural end of man.

Realism and Nominalism

The metaphysics of Scholasticism, at its height in Thomas Aquinas, is that the individual is real, but only as a member of the hierarchical system of reality. Universals, species, forms or archetypes of being exist through all eternity in the mind of God. They are the patterns or thoughts of God, according to which He creates every kind of being in its own order; for example, humanity, animality, the various species of animals, plants and inanimate entities. The individual is real as sharing in the universals. The universe is an ordered hierarchy of forms which is reflected in the ordered hierarchy of civil and spiritual society. This is called moderate realism, since it affirms the reality, both of individuals and universals in one system. It is opposed to extreme realism, which merges the individual in the universal (abstract pantheism) and to nominalism which asserts that individuals alone are real and universals mere names for abstractions formed by noting the resemblances of the individuals. Nominalism is implicitly pluralistic—denies that there is any unity, system or order in the universe. It is, in its ultimate consequences, pluralistic and in its social consequences individualistic and even anarchistic. Extreme realism has no place for human freedom, abiding personal identity and immortality or the personality of God.

Almost at the very moment when Scholasticism reached its summit it was challenged from within the schools. In 1300, William of Ockham taught at Paris. He rejected both the extreme realism of Averroes and the moderate realism of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Ockham carried out to its logical consequences the doctrine of Duns Scotus that every individual is a unique reality (a *this*) and that the roots of individuality or personality are in the emotions and will, not in the intellect. Ockham is called a *nominalist*, since he held that individuals alone are real and that universals, such as species and types of being, are but names for the similar features which we note in and abstract from the particulars or individuals. In short, universals are conceptual abstractions, conventions of the mind, convenient for arranging, classifying and connecting in the mind the particular things and persons which alone really exist. Laws, relations, forms or types of being have, as such, no reality. They exist only in the things. The universals are mere names or words (sermonism). Such terms as triangularity, spatiality, color, divinity, humanity, beauty, justice are mental abstractions. What exist are particular geometrical figures, reds, greens, God, men and women, pleasing objects and socially approved acts. This doctrine is the opposite of the Platonic realism, which attributes reality to universals or types or being.

This doctrine spread. It is the doctrine of modern British Empiricism. It has its basis in the intuition of the value and reality of the individual, the self, the person; in science, in the assertion of the priority and reality of the particular facts. Marsiglio of Padua, in his *Defensor Pacis* published in 1324, drew the social and political consequences of nominalism. The Church and the State are but associations of the people for the realization of the common good. They are to be governed by representative councils chosen by the people and responsible to them. All the

members of the State and of the Church have a voice in directing their affairs. Church and State are not heaven-descended vessels of grace, not eternal universals but humanly fashioned contrivances for the furtherance of the good life.

Nominalism on its theoretical side is the forerunner of empiricism, of experimental science and rationalism, in the sense in which rationalism means the rejection of the claim of any supernatural or ecclesiastical authority to set metes and bounds to the spirit of free inquiry—a spirit which functions only in individual minds. In its practical aspects, nominalism is prophetic of the new individualism, naturalistic humanism and democracy of modern ethical and political theory.

Mysticism

Alongside the rationalistic systematization of ethics and theology by the great scholastic doctors there runs the current of mystical theology. Sometimes, as in Thomas, these currents mingle. For the Christian mystics the Highest Good, the supreme self-realization, is the ecstatic experience of immediate union with God. This incomparable bliss, the consummation of the soul's life, comes through complete self-surrender. Contemplative union with God, the mystic vision is a state of purely spiritual activity beyond perception and conceptual thought. There is a regular road to its attainment and definite stages are marked out. One begins with the monastic and ascetic life of holiness, with the practice of poverty and the self-denial of all the passions of the body; one practices constant prayer; one passes through thought (*cogitatio*) and meditation (*meditatio*) to contemplation. In the contemplative state, which is the goal of the mystic way, we contemplate God—first, in the corporeal world; second, in our own inner life; finally, we rise into the immediate and ecstatic

vision of God Himself. The chief orthodox mystics are Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugo, Richard and Walter of St. Victor and Bonaventura. Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler and Heinrich Suso are pantheistic mystics and accounted heretics, since they teach the complete mergence of the individual soul in the impersonal or superpersonal Godhead. The Imitation of Christ by Thomas à Kempis and the Theologica Germanica are the most influential devotional expressions of medieval mysticism.

Inasmuch as mysticism rests essentially on the conviction that there is a divine spark in man by the nourishing of which the individual becomes immediately one with the Godhead and, thus far, is a true part of God, mysticism always implies pantheism in the sense that the divine life is present in man and in nature but in a higher degree in man and in the highest degree in him who assiduously cultivates the mystic life. This, it may be noted in passing, is the only form of religiously grounded ethics which is immune from the disintegrating effects of scientific cosmologies. It is untouched by the dissolution of belief in the physical supernatural; since it finds the validation of the supremely worthwhile and satisfying within the self's personal experiences and not without in extraordinary physical or historical occurrences.

The Summary

Summing up the significance of the whole Christian development up to the beginning of the modern thought, the Church as an organization for the propagation of the Christian spirit was bound to effect a compromise with the rest of the world. It did this by the doctrine of a hierarchical order of life. The supreme good of man continued to be the salvation of the soul through faith, obedience, penance and litany. But the secular life was taken over and came under the sway of the Church. Marriage became a sacra-

ment. Industry and trade were moralized and regulated. The materials of classical learning were taken under the Church's wing, preserved and propagated through it. St. Augustine said that the virtues of the heathen were but splendid vices, but even he had to recognize at least lower virtues in these vices. The life of celibacy, monastic poverty and meditation was the most spiritual life, a higher life than life in this world. But this life of the "religious" in the technical sense of the term was only for the minority. To the four cardinal virtues of Plato, the virtues of temperance, wisdom, courage and justice, were added the three Christian virtues of faith, hope and charity. A reconciliation between the interests and claims of the worldly order and the supremacy of the spiritual order was effected through the Stoic doctrine of the *law of nature*, which, as I have said, had passed into the imperial Roman law. The law of nature is the law of man's natural conscience. It is the law of God, known through the natural reason, and thus acceptable to all men. The higher principle of salvation, which is cultivated by the Faith, the Sacraments and discipline of the Church, is a superior spiritual goal, builded upon the natural law through Divine revelation, through the redemptive process. It has been said that the mediæval Christian world manifested a divided spirit, that a dualistic strain runs through it. We see this dualism in the monastic life over against the life entangled in worldly cares, concerned with family, trade, industry, governance and war. We see it in the contemplative vision of God as the life of highest blessedness over against the worldliness of feudal society; the rising spires of the Gothic cathedrals over against the commercial life of the free towns; the quest of the Holy Grail over against the turbulent jousts of the knights in arms. But the Mediæval Church did more than merely set alongside the worldly order the super-worldly order. It did aim to, and largely succeeded in, moralizing

and refining the worldly order, by infusing it with the sense of the inalienable worth of the human soul. It spread and deepened, among the rude tribes which it civilized and moralized, the conviction of the supreme value of the spiritual personality. But in turn the Church was corrupted by the exercise of universal authority, by the use of secular power. In making its treaty of compromise with the worldly life, in affirming its direct control over the worldly life it became secularized. It undertook to regulate not merely the conduct of men in the light of the Gospel through moral suasion and the arousal of faith. It undertook further to set up a system of absolutely binding intellectual authority, a system of thought or belief within which alone the minds of men might move. It set metes and bounds to investigation. It claimed to possess, as the sole custodian of Divine revelation, a complete system of the universe. After a time the rude tribes of Western Europe awakened to the consciousness of the inner and spiritual meaning of human personality, largely through the schooling of the Church. It was no longer unable to restrain the urge of human individuality within the limits which it had marked out.

The social culture of the later Middle Ages (in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries) had an organized and unified character, such as our Western culture has never since seen. As Henry Adams put it, since the fourteenth century European civilization has moved, with increasing momentum, from unity to multiplicity, from harmony to confusion. And it was not the unity of monotony. It was a rich and variegated culture in which all the elements were organized into a vast synthesis. The Gothic cathedrals, the poetry of Dante, the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, the structure of the social and economic life, no less than the church system, are all harmonious constituents in this great cultural synthesis. The whole of medieval

Culture
Synthesis

Unity
Multiplicity

thought and activity was dominated by the working faith that all the processes of nature, no less than the affairs of men, were elements in the realization of one cosmic purpose or end. Everything has its purpose, its end, its meaning and its value as an element in the comprehensive total scheme of the Divine purpose. The history of the universe was conceived as a cosmic drama whose author is God. He created the earth as the dwelling place of man, an imperfect copy of Himself. He created the sun, moon and stars as ministrants to the earth and man. He created plants and animals for man's use. Man fell by disobedience and the second great act in the divine drama was the sending of the Son of God to redeem man from the consequences of his sin. Until the culmination of the great drama by the final judgment and complete conquest of the Evil One and his minions, the conflict between the City of Satan and the City of God would go on in this world.⁴

Thus the dominating principle of the Christian thought and practice of the Middle Ages was teleological and ethical. Everything in belief and conduct was subordinated to the realization of the supreme purpose of creation, which had been temporarily hindered by man's yielding, of his own free will, to the temptations of Satan. This divine purpose is the fulfillment by man of his divinely appointed avocation as a spiritual being, the perfection of the soul in knowledge, virtue and love to God and man; the final step in this perfecting of the soul is that man shall see God face to face and dwell in blessedness forever after in the divine presence. This was a magnificent ideal which, probably, more completely penetrated and controlled Western civilization in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries than ever since then. In it all interests, activities and things

⁴ Compare the beautifully written summary of the Christian story in George Santayana's *Reason in Religion*.

were pressed into the service of the good life. If it be ascetic, monastic, otherworldly, it is with a great end in view. It is motivated by a more exalted conception of the dignity and destiny of man than any naturalistic modern humanism. It makes man only "a little lower than the angels to crown him with glory and worship." If it be an aristocratic ideal, it is such only in the true sense that distinctions of moral and spiritual quality are the only distinctions that have inexpugnable value. The cosmological framework of the classical Christian ethic and metaphysic has been shattered. But can Western culture afford to dispense with its spiritual core—the faith that man is, in part, a self-determining, responsible super-physical being? The only logical alternative is that man is nothing but a chance and transient assemblage of physical particles and that all virtues, vices, ideals, values, choices and resolves, are but chemical ferments.

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CHAPTER XI

THE SPIRIT OF MODERN ETHICS

It is an error, arising from the chronological divisions which are introduced into historical writings to suppose that the modern attitude of mind came into being suddenly, that an intellectual revolution took place suddenly somewhere in the neighborhood of the sixteenth century.

The modern attitude of mind developed slowly out of the mediæval attitude. We say, for example, that the modern attitude is *rationalistic*, whereas the mediæval was *authoritarian*. There is truth in this contrast, but it may easily be exaggerated. In the thirteenth century the great scholastics were already rationalizing the doctrine of the Church. We say that the modern attitude emphasizes the significance and value of the *individual*. But in the mediæval attitude the greatest emphasis is laid on the value of the individual soul or personality. The keen debate over the problem of individualism and nominalism and realism bears unequivocal testimony to this emphasis. We say that the modern attitude is *humanistic*. In other words, it regards the unfolding and enjoyment of all the capacities of the human self as the good life. But in the later Middle Ages the humanism of the Renaissance was already in gestation. Even the democratic movement of modern political thought and action had its foundations laid in the Middle Ages.

With these qualifications in mind we will now consider the general features of the modern attitude. It is *rationalistic* in the sense that no authority is recognized as superior

to the inquiring probing mind operating upon the data of experience. Empirically verifiable data and inferences therefrom are the ultimate courts of appeal. In sum, there are five great forces which have shaped the ethical and social thinking of the modern world: (1) The principle of scientific rationalism; (2) the new humanism; (3) the puritan ethics; (4) the principle of democracy; (5) the industrial revolution.

Scientific Rationalism

The modern spirit rejects the claim of any institution, however ancient its authority or widespread its power and prestige, to circumscribe the limits within which the human reason may operate. The modern spirit does not deny that there is a legitimate sphere in which faith may function beyond the limits of empirically and rationally attainable knowledge. But it cannot accept the claim that these limits are to be prescribed by the acceptance, as the absolute truth, of the cosmology of Genesis and the Ptolemaic astronomy, by the acceptance of physical miracles (or suspensions of natural processes) or by the acceptance of a sudden creation of fixed living species which remain eternally what they are.

The modern spirit holds that all genuine knowledge arises from careful observation and analysis of the data of common human experience, and that all general principles or laws must be verifiable as statements of the ways in which physical bodies, living organisms and minds actually behave. In the Renaissance writers, one feels that boundless faith in the power of science, that is, organized knowledge, to promote the weal of man. Francis Bacon is a true prophet of the modern point of view when he advocates the empirical procedure on the ground that "knowledge is power," and in his *New Atlantis* gives his picture of a Utopia in which human welfare is advanced chiefly by

scientific discoveries and their applications. H. G. Wells is a twentieth century Bacon.

The same principle—that the way to human improvement lies through a careful study of the data of experience and by inferences therefrom—pervades all the important works on ethics and social philosophy of modern times. No appeal is made to Divine Revelation or the authority of the Church to validate the principles of right conduct or social order. Appeal is made only to the facts of human nature. This is true of those who read the facts differently and come to incompatible conclusions. All the modern moralists and social philosophers agree that morals and legislation should proceed by the rational organization of man's native capacities.

Modern ethics in the main is *naturalistic*. This does not mean that in modern ethics there is a failure to recognize the problem of the place of ethical values in the cosmos. This problem is, indeed, one of the main problems of modern philosophy. *But modern ethics, taken by and large, argues from the nature and conditions of the good in human life to the universal or cosmic status of the good.* Modern metaphysics or philosophy of religion is based on ethical considerations, whereas in supernaturalistic systems of ethics both the knowledge of the contents of the good and the ultimate sanction of the good, as well as the power to realize it, are regarded as due to special communications from above the natural human order and transcending the capacity of man to attain by the exercise of his own innate abilities. To put it briefly, from the supernaturalistic point of view, the immanent working and success of the good in the human order is the consequence of *specific infusions* from a wholly transcendent realm. From the *naturalistic* point of view, the *good*, in so far as it can be described as a transcendent spiritual life above and beyond the human order, is *simply more of the same kind which*

is implicated in the immanent good in human life, as the ideal fulfillment of the latter. In other words, for the modern mind there is but one universe of reality which includes in its organic totality several levels of existence—physical things, living organisms, minds of various grades (subhuman, human and presumably superhuman). If by “naturalism” one means materialism, then the modern point of view is not, in most of its exponents, naturalistic. If by “supernaturalism” be meant the recognition of the reality and efficacy and perhaps the supremacy of mind or spirit in the universe, the modern standpoint, in most of its exponents, is supernaturalistic. The sense in which the modern point of view is naturalistic, then, is that there are not two separate worlds—a natural and a supernatural order; there is one living universe containing different levels of existence and value. Man is an organic part of the whole and humane ethics can be developed by considering man in his relations to the other members of the whole—in short, by considering man as a physical vital and thinking member of the one universe.

This is the meaning of *humanism* as a name for the general tendency of modern thought. The good life consists in the development and enjoyment of human powers in this world; in contrast with the view that the supreme good is wholly otherworldly or transcendent, the attainment of the Beatific Vision of communion with God to be enjoyed through some mysterious and miraculous occurrence. Hence, humanism means the same thing as naturalism.

The New Humanism

The modern conception of the good shared by all thinkers is *immanent humanism*. The good consists in the development and exercise of human spiritual powers in a varied civilization. It consists in the perfecting of the natural capacities of man here on earth, through the exercise of

reason, the utilization of the resources of science and worldly culture in education, law, social organization, art and letters.¹

The study of nature and of human nature and the application of their results are the great means to the perfecting of man. Full and harmonious self-realization is the ideal. We may take Goethe as a good example of this ideal. He is a reincarnation of the Greek attitude so finely expressed in Aristotle's *Ethics*. In the days of the Renaissance this conception of the dignity and ideal of humanity was expressed thus by Pico della Mirandola: "Thé nature allotted to all other creatures, within laws appointed by ourselves, restrains them. Thou, restrained by no narrow bonds, according to thy own free will, in whose power I have placed thee, shalt define thy nature for thyself. I have set thee midmost the world that thence thou mightest the more conveniently survey whatsoever is in the world. Nor have we made thee either heavenly or earthly, mortal or immortal, to the end that thou, being, as it were, thy own free maker and natural molder, shouldst fashion thyself in what form may like thee best. Thou shalt have power to decline unto the lower or brute creatures, or to be reborn unto the higher or divine, according to the sentence of thy intellect."²

The belief in the endless perfectibility of man, the possibility of indefinite progress springs out of the new humanism. It gives rise to a whole crop of Utopias or ideal commonwealths in which the directions of progress towards perfections are charted, Campanella's *City of the Sun*, Thomas More's *Utopia*, Harrington's *Oceana*, and Bacon's *New Atlantis* are the chief of these Utopias.

The rationalistic humanism gives rise to the great works on social theory from Hobbes and Locke to the Hegelians

¹ Cf. Paulsen, *Ethics*, pp. 167ff.

² J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance*, "The Age of Learning," p. 49.

and Comteans and to the contemporary socialists and sociologists.

The Protestant Reformation and the Puritan Ethics

The Reformation was the complex product of many causes; economic, social and political, as well as religious and moral. Economically and socially it expressed the increasing power of the town dwellers, the industrial and commercial class, in European life; it prospered most in lands which took the lead in industry and trade. Politically it expressed the growing demand for autonomy on the part of principalities and peoples; it was a popular and nationalistic movement. But it was also a religious movement with specific moral consequences. Religiously it based reconciliation with God, the forgiveness of sins, the sense of being at peace with God and the power to be free from the bondage of sin, on faith alone (justification by faith). Faith is a complete trust in the love of God as made known through Christ and absolute submission to His Will. In the attitude of faith the individual recognizes his own powerlessness to help himself and is saved by his trust in God through Christ. Faith is an immediate personal experience of one's relation to God as that of a weak and erring child to a loving father. It is essentially a Christ mysticism. Luther, the greatest figure among the reformers, was a mystic. Since this personal experience is the basis of the religious life and is open to all, no intermediary is required between the individual soul and God. In the mediæval Catholic system the priest, through the conduct of the holy offices, the church services, the administration of the sacraments, the confessional and penitential system and absolution, was the intermediary between the layman and God. Luther, by proclaiming the universal priesthood of all the faithful and defining the Church as consisting of the communion of the faithful,

does away with the entire system of mediatorial ecclesiasticism. He substitutes for the hierarchical order a democratic community, in which the minister is simply the appointed leader and trained teacher.

A further consequence of the Reformed teaching is the breaking down of the wall of separation between sacred and secular occupations. All human relationships are, when carried out in a Christian spirit, equally sacred. Life in the family, the civic community, the industry, trade or other worldly vocation are just as moral, afford as good occasions for the conduct of the spiritual life as do the so-called "religious vocations." The ascetic (celibate monastic) life is rejected. So too, the entire penitential and fasting system is abolished. Appealing to the authority of St. Paul and of his Master, Luther proclaims "the freedom of a Christian man." There is no virtue in abstaining from particular foods on particular days nor in indulging in them. There is no virtue in castigations of the flesh, nor in other penances. Calvin, on the other hand, did set up a rigorous system of church government and regulation; the various Protestant bodies had systems of discipline.

The Reformers were at one with the humanists in rejecting the celibate and monastic life and in proclaiming the moral value of worldly activities and relations; they differed from the extreme humanists in retaining the emphasis on the subjection of the sensuous desires and the self-regarding impulses to reason and duty, which is common to the best Greek ethics and the traditional Christian system. In short, the Reformers retained the moral austerity of the New Testament.

In their conceptions of the relation of Nature to God, of human nature, of miracles and of the person of Christ, the Reformers did not differ from the mediæval Christian beliefs. They were not friendly to the new science nor

to the philosophical interpretations thereof. Giordano Bruno was no more acceptable to the Protestants than to the Catholics. Indeed, neither Luther nor Calvin had any respect for reason. Luther abused it in vigorous terms; Calvin admitted it to function only within the premises supplied by faith. Unwittingly they prepared the way for modernism by basing religious authority on the immediate spiritual experience of the individual. But they reprobated the heretical Socinians as vigorously as did the zealous champions of Catholicism the whole Protestant movement.

The Puritan way of life was a distinctive ethics and, indeed, the most widely influential of all in the development of the modern capitalistic and industrial society of Northern Europe and North America. It is, perhaps, still the most popular type of practical ethics in these lands; particularly in the United States. In Protestantism it sprang chiefly from Calvinism, though the Lutheran movement also contributed to it. The Counter-Reformation in the Roman Catholic Church was also an expression of the Puritan spirit. Negatively, Puritanism means the rejection of the naturalistic humanism of the Renaissance. The Puritans not only retained but stressed the Augustinian doctrine of the innate depravity, natural corruption and spiritual powerlessness of man. Man can be redeemed from his natural misery and sinfulness only by the miraculous grace of God freely bestowed on those who are elected to salvation. Positively, Puritanism is characterized by three things: (1) Intense preoccupation with the salvation of the individual soul from sin and eternal damnation. Although predestined to election by grace, man is free to accept or reject the gift. Protestant Puritanism rejects the notion that any intermediary, priestly or sacramentarian, can be allowed between the individual sinner and God. Man can be saved alone through faith

in the redeeming grace of Christ as God. The individual finds God in Christ and makes his peace with Him, through consciousness of sin, repentance and faith. Thus Puritanism is intensely individualistic. On the other hand, since access to Christ is mediated through the Scriptures, Puritanism regards the Bible as the infallible final authority in all things that appertain to faith and morals (Luther took a more independent position than Calvin in this regard). In the direction of life, the Puritan oscillates between two poles—his personal experience and the attempt to derive a code of morals from the Bible. The latter, of course, led to a petty regulation and censoriousness that is incompatible with “the freedom of a Christian man” in Luther’s sense. (2) The Puritan emphasizes in the strongest manner, the subjection of all impulses to reason, to duty. The greatest stress is put on self-control, responsibility, discipline, fidelity to one’s task. The good life is the rationally ordered life of sobriety, faithfulness and diligence. (3) Industry, diligence and thrift in secular work, are ways of serving God. The distinction between sacred and secular business is broken down. One serves God and insures his own salvation by devotion to one’s worldly business. Not only honesty and diligence in work, but frugality and thrift are duties. One ought to labor hard and save, because it is God’s will that every one shall work. These teachings, together with the powerful impetus to personal responsibility, individual freedom and initiative imparted by the Puritan spirit, were influential factors making for the development of capitalistic industrialism. Furthermore, notwithstanding Calvin’s own attempt to set up a state-church or theocracy in Geneva, Calvinism, even more than other forms of Protestantism, by its very stress on the direct accountability of the individual soul to God, stimulated the movement for political liberty, and, indirectly for economic freedom. Taken as

a whole Protestantism, stressing as it did the right and duty of the individual to seek direct access to God and to follow his conscience, as enlightened by Christ, made for political and intellectual liberty.

The Reformers were not more tolerant than their opponents. But the very splitting up of the Church, the controversies and conflicts between the various parties eventually made for toleration. The placing of the Bible in the hands of the laity led to popular education. All the Protestant groups alike appealed to the Bible; the interpretation of the sacred book required the use of human reason. The principle of private judgment had to be recognized and this is the principle of rationalism. Thus, notwithstanding the fanatical intolerance and persecuting zeal of most of the leaders of the Reformation, the movement, taken in its entirety, did advance the recognition of the right and authority of the individual reason and conscience. It was bound to do this, since, in the last analysis, it could appeal to nothing else.

The Rise of Democracy

The fourth great characteristic of modern ethical and social theory is the development of the democratic spirit. Ancient humanism was aristocratic, modern humanism is democratic in tendency. From Locke to Rousseau and from Rousseau to J. S. Mill and Mazzini there is a clear line of progress in the increasing recognition of the rights of all human beings to participate in the opportunity for self-realization. Equality of opportunity for rational self-realization of personality is the basic principle of democratic humanism. Its genesis and growth in modern thought are due to the following factors: The Christian emphasis on the infinite value and dignity of every human soul. This is found in mediæval thought, but not carried out owing

to the overweight of feudalism in worldly life and in religion. The Protestant Reformation liberated this Christian principle from its mediæval setting. The great influence of the Stoic doctrines of natural law and natural rights in the human order contributed to this movement. Mechanical inventions, especially the invention of printing, geographical discoveries and the expansion of trade all contributed to it.

Even before the Protestant Reformation, revolts of the oppressed peasantry drew part of their inspiration from movements of religious reform—the English revolt of 1381 from the teachings of John Wycliffe, the Bohemian peasant uprising from John Huss. “The Lollards had been heretics and reformers; the Hussites were Bohemian Lollards; both had revived the fundamental Christian doctrine of the equality of man. . . . The secret of Luther’s great success lay in the fact that he declared, dogmatically and crudely enough, the essential equality of man. The whole system of penance implied that the right to sin was measured by the means to pay for it. Between man and God stood the hierarchy of the Church, with various degrees of powers to absolve from sin on payment of a price. Luther offered to every man the right which princes already claimed, the right to be answerable to God only. . . . If one discovery more than another is the permanent contribution of the sixteenth century to the history of public morality, it is this establishment of the idea of personal worth. In the sphere of religion it was formulated as the doctrine of justification by faith, not by penance. In the system of morality it leads to the demand for righteousness as an inward quality, and at the same time to a clearer idea of obligation as essentially the direction of the will to keep the law in fear of God and in love of mankind. The result may not have proved so excellent as the ideal, but in this doctrine was contained the essence of the idea of freedom

and the root of democratic government.”³ The English Independents in the seventeenth century carried out this movement in demanding the entire freedom of religion from the state. Not attaining complete freedom at home they founded New England. The Levelers, political radicals, demanded universal suffrage.⁴ The ideas of freedom and equality passed from religion and philosophy into politics and continued to bear fruit—in the English and French and American revolutions and in the spread of democratic ideas and practices in the nineteenth century and after.

On the other hand, few of the leaders of the Protestant Reformation departed from the scholastic ethics in the direction of a more humanistic ethics. All of them retained, more or less, the dualistic supernaturalism of the mediæval church and held to the belief in man’s innate depravity. Luther sympathized deeply with the proletariat, but he was very severe against the peasants’ revolt, as were also Calvin and Zwingli. Calvin established a theocracy in Geneva. He was as uncompromising in his view of the supremacy of the “True Church” over the state as was any scholastic. Luther vacillated and was inconsistent in his views on the relation of Church and State. All the reformers were prevented from taking a more humanistic attitude, since they all substituted the authority of the Infallible Book for the Infallible Church and built dogmatic systems thereon. On the whole, it must be said of the German, Swiss and English reformers that against the Papacy they maintained the direct God-given rights of princes to rule. None of them was democratic in his social theories with the partial exception of William Tyndale in England. But the general effect of Luther’s influence was to affirm the essential moral equality of all Christians and to justify the natural human

³ G. S. Brett, *The Government of Man*, pp. 211–212.

⁴ See G. P. Gooch, *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century*.

interests. The daily task, whatever it be, is sacred. His weight was thrown on the side of a nonascetic humane ethics. Still to have said to Luther: "Ye believe in God, believe also in the nobility of an ethical humanity," would have startled and aroused him, no doubt, because he was still hampered by Augustinianism with its heathen estimate of the relationship between God and man.⁵

There is a great difference between Calvin and Luther. As Hall says, Calvin's ethics is based, like that of the Mediæval Church, on the authority of the Church, and he holds that the Church ought to call in the State to protect pure doctrine. So Calvin delivered the heretic Servetus to the State for punishment. "The glory of Protestant ethics as founded by Luther and developed by Kant is the autonomous, democratic, unpriestly character stamped upon it. All men should be kings and priests to God. . . . In the last analysis, for Luther the soul must stand alone for truth and trust that it will not be forsaken. In the last analysis for Calvin the soul finds out which Church has the Sacrament and the Word and wholly submits to it. . . . The vital principle of a real Protestant ethics is the logical and thorough-going acceptance of the relative character of all judgment. As the moral character of any judgment depends upon the motive, and only God can know the motive, we can only apply the objective," and ask in utilitarian terms for the ultimate effect of any action; but for the agent the moral attitude and not the outcome is the determining element.⁶

⁵ T. C. Hall, *History of Ethics Within Organized Christianity*, p. 483. This book and Ernst Troeltsch, *Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, are the two best histories of Christian ethical and social thought from a liberal point of view.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 527-528.

The Industrial Revolution

The most portentous fact in modern society, after the revolution in thought which got under way in the sixteenth century, is the rise of the *Industrial Revolution*, which began about 1750 in England and now encompasses the Western world and has invaded the Orient. The rise of large scale industry furthered scientific rationalism and democratic humanism in two ways: (1) It accustomed ever-increasing numbers of human beings to work with the forces of nature through ever-changing machinery. This produces an alert mental attitude, one of restless inquiry. (2) It loosened long-established habits and customs in industry and social relations. The worker no longer works at the same work and in the same way and same place as his ancestors. He is on the move both physically and mentally. He associates with large bodies of his fellow workers and learns to find common problems and common interests. Industry is a great rationalizing and democratizing agency.

But the tremendous power wielded by the owners and operators of the large-scale industries brought a new peril to the ideal of democratic humanism. How can human beings achieve and maintain a fair opportunity for spiritual self-realization if they are dependent for their sustenance and conditions of labor on the will of employers organized into powerful aggregations of capital and industrial plants? A plutocratic feudalism might take the place of the customary feudalism of the Middle Ages. The only remedy at hand was the organization of wage earners, first, as separate trades and then as a whole. This organization has carried with it grave moral dangers, some loss of the sense of individual responsibility and initiative, the increasing influence of mass feeling and class prejudice. Organization of industry for advancing democratic humanism is

necessary. Its dangers are materialism, and the rule of class interests and class antagonisms.

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CHAPTER XII

ETHICAL THEORIES OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

Naturalistic and Humanistic Schools

All specifically modern systems we take to be naturalistic and humanistic. The main lines of cleavage between them are in the main as follows:

With regard to the *source of our knowledge of right and wrong*, ethical schools divide into *nativistic* and *empirical*. For the nativists, of whom Cudworth, Clarke, Shaftesbury, Adam Smith, Butler and Price are good examples, ethical knowledge results from the development of innate moral capacities. This tendency of ethical thought is commonly called *intuitionist*. I prefer not to use the latter term on account of its misleading connotations. It seems to be taken to imply that these intuitions are always clear and certain and require no reflection, whereas a nativist need not hold that the deliverance of the moral consciousness is either instantaneous or infallible.

Indeed the nativists may be properly divided into two groups: (*a*) intuitionists and (*b*) sentimentalists or affectionists. The intuitionists argue that man has a native rational faculty of judging or perceiving immediately the ethical distinctions of right and wrong, good and bad. Examples of this school are Cudworth, Clarke, Butler and Price. The sentimentalists hold that the innate moral capacities are feelings or sentiments. These moral feelings develop, of course, in the individual. But they are native,

not engendered from nonmoral impulses. Cumberland, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith are sentimentalists. As a matter of fact, Cumberland, Hume, Smith, and even Shaftesbury and Butler to some extent, are empirical in their methods. Hume and Smith, in particular, trace the development of the moral consciousness in the individual from the innate capacity of *sympathy*. Indeed, the attempt to classify English ethical writers as either nativists or empiricists is misleading in many cases. Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston and Price are the only out-and-out intuitionists. All the other writers of any importance admit that our moral ideas are in part derived from experience of the effects of actions.

Empiricists hold that our knowledge of moral ideas is derived wholly from sensory and emotional experiences, that originally were nonmoral. Moral ideas arise by abstraction and compounding of simpler ideas. There are no specific innate moral powers. The simpler ideas are engendered by sensations and feelings. Empiricists fall into *pre-evolutionary* and *evolutionary*. All Empiricists before the middle of the nineteenth century are pre-evolutionary. Good examples are Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, John Stuart Mill.

Evolutionary empiricists hold that moral ideas have been engendered in the evolution of man from lower forms of life as instrumental ideas or guides to preserve the species and the individual as a dependent member of the species. Good examples of evolutionary empiricists are Herbert Spencer, Leslie Stephen and Samuel Alexander.

Ethical schools divide along another line according to whether the individual or the group is regarded as the supreme standard of moral value. This line of division is not so sharp as the previous one. Since the central problem of ethics is the right relation between the individual and the group, ethical thinkers cannot usually ignore either term,

though they may emphasize the one or the other. On the whole English ethical philosophy tries to balance the two terms. But Thomas Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville and Herbert Spencer are *individualists*. John Stuart Mill is not to be classified in either group.

The *Socialists*, in general, make the group the standard of value, though they are not always consistent. The idealistic school of T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, J. S. Mackenzie and others, balance the two interests. They insist, like Plato and Aristotle, though in a more democratic spirit, that the individual apart from the community is either a moral nonentity or a moral monster. The individual comes into his own moral inheritance only as a member of the group nourished on its traditions and sharing its life. On the other hand they insist that the individual is the bearer and enjoyer of moral values and therefore that in his spiritual nature he transcends the group and can realize supersocial or nonsocial values.

Development of English Ethical Theory

The richest and most significant development of ethical theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries took place in Great Britain.

It is characterized in general by two qualities: (1) It shows the tremendous influence of the conception of *natural law*, known through the human reason, as the basis of ethical knowledge and social theory; this doctrine came down, as we have seen, from the Stoics and the Roman lawyers and played an important part in mediæval thought. In the naturalistic or rationalistic attitude of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries its influence was dominant. It was reënforced by the rapid success of the mechanical or mathematical philosophy. (2) English ethics shows, in its most influential exponents, an empirical temper of mind.

Ethics is grounded on a descriptive psychology of human impulses and desires.

THOMAS HOBBS (1588-1679), who by reason of his clear-sighted and thorough exposition of a naturalistic rationalism in ethics and social theory is the true founder of modern ethics and social theory, bases his theory of the State, of law and morals,¹ on two great principles: (1) An egoistic psychology of human desire or motivation; (2) the possession by man of a power of reasoning which enables him to see that a social authority must be set up to control his natural boundless egoism in order that human beings may enjoy that order and peace without which they cannot attain the goods of life. Hobbes does not, as he is often represented as doing, reduce the principles of morals and legislation to arbitrary enactments of the sovereign power. He deduces these principles from the nature of reason. He revives the doctrine of natural rights and the social contract theory of the origin of the state. Hobbes' influence was powerful and continues down to the present; Locke, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Rousseau, Kant and Fichte all show traces of his influence. For example, the chief difference between Hobbes and Rousseau is their psychology of desire. Whereas Hobbes regards man as naturally egoistic, Rousseau regards him as naturally altruistic. Bentham's *Principles of Morals and Legislation* breathes the same spirit as Hobbes, though Bentham assumes without argument that men will naturally desire the greatest happiness of the greatest number and John Stuart Mill takes the same position.

Hobbes eagerly embraced the new mechanical conception of nature and applied it in a thoroughgoing fashion to man and human conduct. He aims to put ethics and politics on as exact a foundation as the new mechanics put astronomy and physics. All that exists is matter and all that

¹ His principal works are *De Cive* (1641) and *Leviathan* (1651).

takes place is the consequence of the motion of material particles. Man is a machine. His desires and aversions are the consequences of motions in his own body. Man, like all other bodies, seeks to preserve his own state of being (the first law of motion) and is repelled by whatever interferes with that state. Endeavor towards anything is appetite; endeavor away from anything is aversion. Whatsoever a man desires he calls good; whatsoever he has an aversion to or hates he calls evil; whatsoever he is indifferent to, he contemns and calls vile and inconsiderable.

Man is moved entirely by the impulse of self-preservation. He seeks and considers good only whatsoever preserves and augments his own being.

In the state of nature, the condition of the natural man antecedent to the establishment of government (a condition which Hobbes does not say ever existed) the unrestricted and unlimited desires of each and every person for aggrandizement leads to "the war of all against all." The only primal natural right is "the right of every man to everything—even to another's body." Each man is by nature a ravening beast to his fellows, *homo homini lupus*; his life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." In the original anarchical condition of mankind force and fraud rule; the very notion of right and wrong, justice and injustice, are unknown in it. But man also has the power of reason which leads him to see that peace, security and the performance of covenants will follow upon the establishment of an absolute sovereign power. Once this power is established by the law of nature which is the law of reason, rules of social conduct, which all are applications of the principle, "*Do as you would be done by*," are put into effect.

Hobbes uses the term *law of nature* in two contradictory senses: (1) as the instinct of ruthless self-assertion; (2)

as the source of social principles of justice, peace and even benevolence.

Hobbes' significance in the development of ethics and social philosophy consists: (1) In the fact that he attempted a naturalistic and psychological or anthropological grounding of social theory. He bases his doctrine on an analysis of human nature, actually one-sided and ignoble but provocative of further debate. (2) He wrote with great clearness, force and eloquence.

The effect of Hobbes' writings was to raise acutely the central problems of ethics and politics. These are: (1) Are human impulses primarily egoistic or altruistic or a mixture of both? (2) What is the arbiter between impulses? Is it an innate power of discernment (conscience) or are our moral beliefs and judgments the results of custom, convention or social expediency?

JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704) in an *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* denies that there are any innate practical principles (moral ideas) except the desire for happiness. All desire happiness. Happiness in its full extent is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and misery the utmost pain.² Each one desires his own pleasure. But man is naturally a social being and the moral laws are imprinted upon the individual mind as the common conditions of social life. There are three laws: (1) The divine law, the rule which God has given whereby men should govern themselves; (2) the civil law, the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of these who belong to it; (3) philosophical law, the law of opinion or reputation. *Virtues* are these actions which in a society are judged praiseworthy and *vices* those actions which are judged blameworthy. Thus the measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed *virtue* and *vice*, is this approbation or dislike, praise

² John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chap. XXI, p. 42.

or blame, which, by a secret tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies, tribes and clubs of men in the world, whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims or fashions of that place.³ Thus the immediate sanctions of moral laws are social customs and the power of the state. The final sanction is the will of God.

Locke holds that the state of nature is a state of peace and good will. But there is no established law and no impartial judge to apply it with power to support his decision. Then by social contract the government, a body politic, is formed. In the state the legislative power is supreme. It is chosen and appointed by the people. But the laws of nature do not cease to hold. The supreme power has no right to enslave, destroy or designedly impoverish the subjects. It cannot take the subject's property without his consent, nor levy taxes without the consent of the majority.

The people is the final judge of the acts of the legislative or executive.

RICHARD CUMBERLAND, in his *A Treatise of the Laws of Nature* (English translation by John Maxwell, 1727), replies to Hobbes that man is naturally social and that he finds his true happiness as an individual by the practice of benevolence. He says: "The greatest Benevolence of every rational agent towards all forms the happiest state of every and of all the Benevolent as far as in their power and is necessarily requisite to the happiest state which they can attain and therefore the Common Good is the Supreme Law."⁴ "There is no power in men greater by which they may procure to themselves and others a collection of all good things than a will to pursue every one his own Happiness together with the happiness of others."⁵

³ *Ibid.*, Chap. XXVIII.

⁴ Cumberland, *Laws of Nature*, Chap. I, p. 41.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

All mature men acknowledge: (1) That the good of all rational beings is the greatest Good; (2) that in promoting this the good of individuals is contained; (3) that the mind is naturally fitted to be a member of the greatest society. "Good is that which preserves or enlarges or perfects the Faculties of any one thing or several."⁶ . . . The Law of Nature is a Proposition proposed to the observation of or impressed on the mind with sufficient clearness by the Nature of Things from the Will of the first Cause which points out that possible action of a rational agent which will chiefly promote the Common Good and by which only the entire Happiness of particular persons can be obtained."⁷

In his view of the origin of man's ideas of benevolence and of the common Good, Cumberland is an empiricist. The laws of nature are learned from experience.

RALPH CUDWORTH, in his *Eternal and Immutable Morality* (1731), argues that the distinctions between good and bad, right and wrong are eternally fixed in the nature of things and man has the power by thought of discerning these principles.

He says: "Things are what they are not by will but by nature. Omnipotence cannot by mere will change a thing. God can make things at will, but when they exist they are as they are."⁸ . . . Certain things are by nature Good and just, other things by accident.⁹ . . . No positive commands make anything good or evil which nature hath not made such before."¹⁰

Cudworth misunderstood Hobbes who, while he holds that society is artificial, *deduces* the principle of right by rational procedure and holds that they are laws of nature.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

⁸ Cudworth, *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, II, p. 374.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 376.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 377.

They are eternal and unalterable; therefore above the sovereign whose business is to enforce them in political society. He says that there is an eternal rule of reason in regard to what is right, etc.

SAMUEL CLARKE (1675-1729), *Discourse upon Natural Religion* (1706), takes much the same views as Cudworth. He argues that there are eternal relations, fitnesses and proportions of things. Moral distinctions belong to these. Good and evil, right and wrong, fitness and unfitness of being practiced, are part of the eternal and necessary nature of things. They are known with the same clearness, certainty and necessity as that we know that two plus two equals four. For example, I know that I ought to do for another what in like case I would have him do for me, with just this mathematical certainty.

RICHARD PRICE (1723-1791) likewise maintains that morality is eternal and immutable and that its rules are discerned by a rational principle in man. He admits that the dictates of mere reason being slow and weak, men need the aid of the instinctive determinations of feeling. He says: "In contemplating the actions of moral agents, we have both a perception of the understanding and a feeling of the heart; and the latter, or the effects in us accompanying our moral perceptions, depend on two causes. Partly, on the positive constitution of our natures: but principally on the essential congruity or incongruity between moral ideas and our intellectual faculties."

SHAFTESBURY (1671-1713) in his *Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit*, part of his *Characteristics*, gave a more careful psychological foundation for ethics. Man is moved to act by three kinds of affections, two that are natural or normal, and certain unnatural or abnormal affections. Man is naturally social. He realizes his end in social relations. The natural affections are, then: personal or private and social or public affections. The former impel men to seek

private good, the latter public good. The unnatural or abnormal affections are antisocial; such as delight in cruelty. In addition there are reflective, or rational affections, by which man develops feelings of approval and disapproval of good and bad conduct respectively. This is the *moral sense* or conscience which is natural and akin to the æsthetic sense by which man feels things to be beautiful or ugly. Shaftesbury emphasizes measure, harmony, proportion as qualities of the good. In this respect and in his emphasis on the social nature of man he recalls Plato and Aristotle. No impulses are bad in themselves but only when they are too strong, so that they are carried out in the wrong time, place and circumstance and to the wrong degree. *The feeling or perception of what is fitting is conscience.* Good, the health of the soul, consists in the harmonious coöperation of the individual with the species through socially minded action. Good is realized by the coöperation of the individual in the family, the community, the State and the life of humanity. Virtue is love of order and beauty in society. The prevailing of the rational affections constitutes virtue. Goodness has regard to the system of the species. It is whatever contributes to the preservation and welfare of the human species. Public interest and true private interest coincide.

JOSEPH BUTLER (1692-1754), Bishop of Durham, in his *Sermons on Human Nature*, gives a theory of ethics which does not differ essentially from Shaftesbury except that he lays more stress on conscience and affirms it to be a faculty of unerring judgment in regard to good and bad. Butler's theory is much more clearly and symmetrically developed than Shaftesbury's. There are, says Butler, two chief sets of impulses or propulsions in human nature—rational self-love and benevolence. "There is a natural principle of *benevolence* in man; which is in some degree to *society* what *self-love* is to the *individual*. Benevolence and self-

love normally coincide in their issues.”¹¹ The several other passions, such as desire of esteem from others, love of society, as distinct from affection for the good of it, indignation against successful vice, have a tendency to promote both public and private good. Thirdly: “There is a principle of reflection or conscience in man by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper and action. The conclusion is that *it is as manifest that we were made for society, and to promote the happiness of it, as that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and private good.*”

Self-love leads man to attain his own happiness, benevolence or the social propulsions leads him to virtue. Conscience is the supreme authority. Men are a law unto themselves in so far as they obey their consciences. Conscience is the superior principle “which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer of them, accordingly. . . . It is by this faculty, natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law unto himself.”¹² The obligation to obey conscience is the obligation to follow the law of one’s own higher nature as a moral being. Butler thinks that conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always leads us the same way. Duty and self-interest are perfectly coincident, for the most part, in this world; if we take account of the future life, entirely so. Virtue is rewarded with happiness in the end. Butler appeals to immortality and a Higher Power to promote the

¹¹ Sermon I.

¹² Sermon II.

interests of our species, and to bestow happiness on human society. The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. "Every quality of the mind, which is *useful* or *agreeable* to the *person himself* or to *others*, communicates a pleasure to the spectator, engages his esteem, and is admitted under the honorable denomination of virtue or merit."

DAVID HUME (1711-1766) derives moral judgment from sympathy. "The mind of man," he says, "is so formed that it immediately feels approbation or disapprobation. Virtue is whatever mental action gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation." The principal foundation of moral praise lies in usefulness. Nothing, he says, can bestow more merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in any eminent degree; a part, at least, of its merit arises from its tendency to promote pleasure.¹³

There is no other test of virtuous action than the pleasure it conveys and, being benevolent, men find pleasure in the pleasure of others. *Hume* is a Hedonistic nativist.

ADAM SMITH (1723-1790) is also a nativist. He traces out in his *Theory of the Moral Sentiments* the development in the mind of the individual of an "Ideal Spectator," "Ideal Man within the Breast," or "Great Inmate" who is the judge of right and wrong. The development of the "Ideal Spectator" takes place through the power of sympathy. Smith supplements the doctrine that benevolence is as natural to man as self-love by giving a psychological theory of the development of moral judgments. Hume had based moral judgments on the feeling of sympathy, and had invoked the impartial spectator. Smith gives a social-psychological account of the genesis of the impartial spectator. Sympathy is the innate capacity out of which grows

¹³ *Principles of Morals*, Section II, Part II.

the sentiment of approbation and disapprobation. Smith does not regard utility as the sufficient criterion of moral value. *Propriety* is his word. We approve, he says, reason and understanding, self-control without reference to their direct social utility.

We first judge the acts and motives of others accordingly as we sympathize with them. Then we come to pass judgment on our own conduct. We do this by forming in our breast the conception of an "Ideal Man," the "Great Inmate," the "Ideal Spectator." In other words, we set up the image of an ideal self, distinct from our actual self, and judge the latter by the former. The "Ideal Spectator" arises in our minds through social contact. A human creature growing up in isolation would never form it. Just as we sympathize with others only through the feelings that their actions and suffering arouse in ourselves so we think of ourselves in terms of our recognition of the approbation and disapprobation of others. Thus our idea of a better self is stimulated into reality by the give and take of social intercourse. This ideal self then becomes the Impartial Spectator to which we appeal in judging conduct whether our own or another's.

Smith is important in two respects: (1) In giving the outlines of a social psychology of moral judgment; (2) in making the distinction between *utility* and *propriety*. The latter means for him what inherent dignity, worth or value as belonging in personality means for later writers.

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CHAPTER XIII

SPINOZA'S ETHICS

BARUCH (BENEDICT) DE SPINOZA (1633-1677), one of the greatest figures in modern philosophy, in his *Ethics*, in certain respects resembles Hobbes. Like Hobbes he starts from the self-preservative effort or endeavor of every being, the *conatus in suo esse preserverare*. This endeavor is the foundation of ethics. Whatever furthers the endeavor to preserve one's being is good; whatever hinders it is bad. For man in the state of nature, as for all other beings, a thing is good because it is desired, hence what men call evil is due to erroneous ideas as to what will really satisfy their endeavors to preserve and develop their own beings. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.¹ The more every man endeavors, and is able to seek what is useful to him—in other words, to preserve his own being—the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power or virtue.² No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavor to preserve one's own being.³ Thus virtue is nothing else but successful action in accordance with the laws of one's own nature and the foundation of virtue is the endeavor to preserve one's own being and is

¹ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part IV, Prop. XIX.

² *Ibid.*, Prop. XX.

³ *Ibid.*, Prop. XXII.

therefore to be desired for its own sake. Virtue is identical with the perfecting of the individual. Virtue is self-activity and power. But most men, Spinoza holds, do not understand wherein the preservation and development of their own being really consist. They are moved by such passions as avarice, ambition, anger, envy, lust, hatred, remorse, hope, fear, repentance, humility. All these affections are *passions* since in them the reason has no part. In giving way to his passions man is passive. He is in bondage to things other than his own mind. On the other hand, to understand anything is to be freed from bondage to it.

The *good* consists in activity. The greater the degree of activity the greater the degree of approach to perfection and the greater the degree of power and reality possessed by the self. The activity of the mind is directly proportional to the degree in which man understands the causes of his passions and so becomes their master. A passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it. *The power of the mind is the power of reason.* Freedom consists in rational insight. Freedom is the rational self-determination which comes about through the possession of a clear and distinct insight into the causal interdependence of all things and of the dependence of the endless sequences of causes and effects on God. The passions are bad because their operation means a decrease, even to the point of cessation, of the activity and power of reason. The completion of the understanding of things consists in an intuitive knowledge (*scientia intuitiva*) by which the mind understands that whatsoever exists, ceases to exist, or comes into existence, is in accordance with the nature of the whole; that is, follows from the Divine nature. For Spinoza the fragmentary and ever-changing succession of events is the expression of the eternally perfect cosmic order which is identified by him

with God or nature. This insight Spinoza calls seeing all things *under the form of eternity*; in other words, knowing and living by the knowledge that every event in time is the necessary expression of the eternal order which is the self-existent and perfect reality—Spinoza's God.

The more a man is guided by reason and sees all things under the form of eternity the more active, the more nearly perfect and real he is, in body as well as in mind. Since bodily processes and mental processes are parallel, the greater the degree of mental activity and perfection, the greater the degree of bodily activity and perfection and *vice versa*. There is a self-respect and honor arising from reason. The life of reason is pleasurable, and therefore pleasure, as the emotional concomitant of bodily perfection, is good. Spinoza is no ascetic. It is good for man to refresh himself with fruits and flowers, to enjoy the good things of the earth and to indulge in wholesome recreations. For whatsoever improves the body improves the mind and *vice versa*.

Moreover, while the passions above enumerated divide men, engender social conflicts and disorders, the life of understanding or reason unites men. The development of the life of reason is accompanied by certain emotions (not passions) which are social and lead men to live in harmony and pursue a common good. Such emotions are love, high-mindedness, courage, justice, equity, honorable living. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions, they can be contrary to one another.⁴ In so far as only men live in obedience to reason do they *always* necessarily agree in nature.⁵ The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.⁶ The good which every man, who follows

⁴ *Ibid.*, Prop. XXXIV.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Prop. XXXV.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Prop. XXXVI.

after virtue, desires for himself, he will also desire for other men, and so much the more in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of God.⁷

Thus the rational life, the life in which the individual orders his thoughts and impulses by clear and distinct ideas, in which he recognizes that everything that happens follows from the nature of the whole, active nature (*Natura Naturans*) or God, by the same necessity that it follows from the nature of a triangle that the sum of three interior angles equal one hundred and eighty degrees, is the life of freedom, self-respect, imperishable blessedness. He who lives by this insight finds nothing to condemn in nature or man. He is free from envy, malice, hatred, contempt, lust, fear. He desires only that his own life shall be in harmony with the eternal order of the whole. Therefore, he will not be angry or envious of any man, but will rather desire that all men shall enjoy the same freedom from fear, the same joyous serenity, the same superiority to all vicissitudes of fortune, the same glad recognition of their dependency on God which gives the greatest degree of activity, power and blessedness that man is capable of. In so far as the mind understands all things as necessary it has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto.⁸ He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he understands himself and his emotions.⁹ This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind.¹⁰ It cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy; contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love.¹¹ This love, the *intellectual love of God*, is

⁷ *Ibid.*, Prop. XXXVII.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Part V, Prop. VI.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Prop. XV.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Prop. XVIII.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Prop. XX.

eternal.¹² For it is the feeling that accompanies the insight into, and the acquiescence in, all things as seen by intuitive vision under the form of eternity. Moreover, it is the activity of that part of the mind which is eternal as being the concept in the mind of God of the human mind. Therefore the intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God whereby God loves Himself, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves Himself.¹³ Our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love towards men. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue; it is virtue itself. It is true happiness now, through rational insight and self-direction. He knows himself one with God, through being, in however humble a degree, a fragmentary expression of the universal and eternal Divine Life. One who loves God will not desire that God love him in return.

Spinoza's unique union of intellectualism and mysticism breaks through the bonds of his stiff geometrical method and culminates in an ardent piety in which thought and feeling are fused in the conviction of the unique and incomparable worth of the life, in which intelligence and love are one and this one is the divine in man and in the universe.

Since God is the eternal ground of the whole order of nature there must be in God a concept or idea which expresses the essence of the human body and which, therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence of the human mind; this something is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God;

¹² *Ibid.*, Prop. XXXIV.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Prop. XXXV.

this something, which appertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Therefore, the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.¹⁴ Thus in so far as the human individual lives rationally, in so far as he directs his life in conscious and willing harmony with that insight into the dependence of all things on God, in other words in so far as the individual thinks, feels and wills in the light of that intuitive insight which consists in seeing all things under the form of eternity, he enjoys blessed immortality now. True immortality is not a continuance in existence but a quality of being which consists in the intellectual love of God. The substance of the self is eternal.

Thus in a manner unique, though reminiscent of Aristotle and the Stoics, Spinoza presents an ethics in which the highest good is rational self-perfection, power and joy consisting in the self-activity of reason, a self-determining life attained through a rational insight into the eternal perfection of God as the self-existent ground of nature which expresses itself in all finite forms of existence but most fully in the wise man. The wise man lives in harmony, in fellowship and coöperation, for the realization of the same good in other selves. He loves the eternal ground and enters into perfection of both mind and body for he who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal.¹⁵ The free man has no cause to fear death. He thinks on nothing so little as on death. His constant meditation is on life. "Reason leads death in triumph and the work done for reason is done for eternity" (Renan).

Spinoza's is a classic form of an ethics of reason which culminates in a rationalistic religious mysticism. He was

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Prop. XXIII.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Prop. XXXIX.

rightly called "the God-intoxicated man" (by Novalis). Goethe says of him: "How boundless is the disinterestedness conspicuous in every sentence, how exalted the resignation which submits itself once for all to the great laws of existence, instead of trying to get through life with the help of trivial considerations, and what an atmosphere of peace breathes through the whole book!"¹⁶

In his political philosophy Spinoza is democratic. The state is founded on the united power of the many. Its function is to provide to men free scope for their mental and bodily activities. The individual should have freedom of thought and speech. Religion should be private and free. Religion rests not on truth but on piety; its function is practical: by symbols and pictures to strengthen men's impulses to live by justice and love. The prophets spoke through symbols to this practical end. Divine wisdom was immediately revealed in Jesus who was the only man capable of perceiving matters of piety and conduct which are neither contained in the first principles of philosophy nor can be deduced therefrom.¹⁷

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¹⁶ Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 328.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

CHAPTER XIV

UTILITARIANISM

The utilitarian theory is descended from Cumberland, Hume and Smith in its emphasis on the general happiness and its assumption that the individual cannot attain happiness unless he aims at the happiness of others. It is descended from Aristippus, Epicurus, Locke and Hume in its hedonistic presupposition that the only measure of happiness is the surplusage of pleasure over pains.

WILLIAM PALEY and JEREMY BENTHAM are the first important utilitarians. JEREMY BENTHAM (1748-1832) was a philosophical jurist, a man of genial and altruistic nature, who through his work, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, had a great influence in legislative reform in Europe and America. Bentham calls his philosophy "utilitarianism." J. S. Mill thought he was the first to use the word in this connection. The principle, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," was used by Francis Hutcheson and Cardinal Beccaria.

Bentham is a hedonist. The only test of the goodness of an act is the quantity of pleasure it yields; and the only test of the badness of an act, the quantity of pain it yields. Pleasure is the principle of utility. Nature has placed man under the control of two sovereign masters, pleasure and pain. Since quantity of pleasure is the criterion of good, all pleasures are on the same level. "Pushpin [a game] is as good as poetry." Bentham constructed an

exhaustive table of human motives and formulated a calculus of pleasures in the following lines:

Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure;
Such pleasures seek, if private be thy end,
If it be public, wide let them *extend*.
Such *pains* avoid, whichever be thy view,
If pains *must* come, let them *extend* to few.

In formulating the general criterion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, Bentham laid down the democratic principle: "Every one to count for one and no one for more than one." Bentham assumes, without proof or argument, that man will always find *more pleasure* in furthering the pleasures of others than in seeking his own private pleasures when there is incompatibility between the two. Bentham was a philanthropist by temperament. His greatest importance is as a critic of social institutions and laws. He tested all laws by their bearing on human happiness. Late in life Bentham confessed that he had been disillusioned in regard to the altruistic impulses of humankind in general.

J. S. MILL (1806-1873), the most influential English philosopher of the nineteenth century, gave the most widely influential statement of the utilitarian ethics in his essay entitled *Utilitarianism* (1861). He says the word was suggested to him by John Gault's novel *Annals of a Parish*. Mill's father, James Mill, had already developed the doctrine without using the name. John Stuart Mill was much influenced by Auguste Comte, the authority of the work, *Positive Sociology*. Comte regards ethics as a part of sociology, the science of society. This science, as he conceives it, abandons all theological and metaphysical doctrines. Sociology studies by the methods of empirical or positivistic science the correlations between all social phenomena in the present and the past in order to arrive at empirical laws which will guide men in the reconstruction

of the social order. Comte formulates a law of social progress, the one sure instrument of social progress is intellectual progress. This consists in every field in the abandonment of personal wills and abstract metaphysical entities as principles of explanation and the discovering by experiment and observation of laws of empirical sequence. But Comte recognizes that the altruistic feelings must be developed to supply a dynamic of progress. He sets up a religion of humanity which supplies the requisite dynamic and direction by cultivation and worship of the Idea of Humanity.

Mill argues that the criterion of good conduct and good motives is the greatest happiness on the whole, which is equivalent to the greatest happiness of all. As Bentham said, each is to count as one and no one as more than one. The only demonstration he gives of this principle is that every one desires happiness for himself, therefore for all the happiness of all is what is desired.

The only proof for Mill that a thing is desirable is that it is what is actually desired. Mill thinks it self-evident that what every one desires is happiness or pleasure.

He holds that there are intrinsic differences of quality or worth in pleasure and not merely quantitative difference. Herein he differs from Bentham. Mill says: "Better a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." His appeal here is to competent judges. The man who prefers intellectual and æsthetic pleasures to sensuous is a competent judge because he knows both kinds and deliberately chooses the former as befitting the dignity of man. There is a principle of *dignity* in man by which the differences in the quality of pleasures are determined.

The ultimate sanction of conduct is in the conscientious feelings of mankind. Conscience is a mass of feeling which develops in social life. Social feelings are as natural to men and as effective as egoistic feelings and are

strengthened in their felt desirability by education and social life. Thus moral feelings are not innate but are developed out of the natural social feelings by social education.

Thus, goods that were originally indifferent but served our primitive needs come by association to be felt as desirable for themselves. Thus, the social virtues come to have what appears to be an intuitive self-evidence. The social feelings of mankind come, through the development of racial experience, to approve those actions which are for the common interests of all and to condemn those actions which are inimical to the common interests.

Summing up the development of English ethical thought up to the rise and spread of the doctrine of evolution it shows the following features: (1) A recognition of the value of the individual; (2) a recognition that the individual can attain happiness only in so far as he does his part in the social order; (3) the recognition that man possesses the power of moral judgment—moral sense, conscience, the impartial spectator; (4) in some form or other all the writers recognize that happiness is essential to the Good. Butler and J. S. Mill recognize most clearly that happiness involves the exercise of the individual's power, that it consists in the fulfillment of function.

Summary and Criticism

English ethics, in the main and with the partial exception of Shaftesbury and Butler, thus far is defective in its failure to consider thoroughly the nature of the self or personality and to offer a constructive theory of mind. This defect is especially evident in the Hedonists and Utilitarians.

Hobbes regards the soul or self as the product of the movement of a material complex and thought as simply a kind of mechanical calculation. This notion is inconsistent with the power which he attributes to reason in the recog-

nition of natural rights, the formation and conduct of government. It is not even consistent with the principle of egoistic self-assertion, for the latter presupposes that the self is a self-conscious unity which endeavors to assert itself.

Locke regards the mind as a *tabula rosa*, a blank sheet of paper, on which impressions are made. All moral ideas are derived from sense experience and social custom. This view, of course, fails to account for the origins and changes of social customs. Still less does it account for the individual's formation of ideals of self and of conduct and his sense of responsibility to ideals. Locke thinks that there is a general agreement among men as to the virtues and vices. Curiously enough he adds that the true sanction of virtue is the will of God. However, he thinks that reason can establish the principal rules of morality which are ordinarily derived by education from custom. Indeed Locke attributes to the self the active power of thought. He says it is possible but improbable that a "certain system of matter" might think.

Hume denies that we have any knowledge of the self as a continuous self-identical active being. He derives all our knowledge from associations passively formed between sense impressions which come from we know not where and leave copies in the mind. Yet he attributes to the self the propensity to feign or imagine relations, such as the causal relation, and the continued existence of objects in the absence of our perceiving them. Hume attributes the chief rôle in the formation of the belief in a world of persons and things to imagination motivated by feelings. He bases ethics on the feeling of sympathy. This is the ultimate source of our sense of social obligation. On the other hand, "the chief spring or actuating principle of the mind is pleasure or pain." Sympathy generalized by thought yields *public utility* as the first universal standard of moral-

ity.¹ Thus the idea of justice arises from the generalized feeling of sympathy, because men are naturally sympathetic. Self-interest and justice may be made to coincide. The fundamental inconsistency in Hume's account of social morality lies in the fact that while, on the one hand, he treats the self as merely a shifting bundle of impressions, ideas and feelings, a passive product of experience, and regards reason as the "slave of the passions," on the other hand, he cannot give an account of the development, from the feelings of pleasure, pain, self-interest and sympathy, of the idea of a social good and social obligation without attributing to the self the active and permanent power which frames and holds to ideals of individual and social good, of duty, responsibility and a better self.

Indeed the entire Utilitarian school regards the self as being merely the passive sum total of impressions, ideas (copies of impressions) and feelings, which are associated or happen together by contiguity, repetition and similarity. John Stuart Mill calls the self a series of feelings which is aware of itself as a series; in other words, a self is a series of feelings which can be conscious of itself as continuous and identical through change. But such an admission involves a further admission—that the self is an active power; capable of reflection, of constructive imagination and thought; able to form ideals and to seek, by voluntary effort, to realize them; in other words, a self-active, self-determining and, in some measure, creative spiritual power. If the self be all this, then we can account for the development and transformation of ethical ideals and the influences which they exert in man's moral history. A sound theory of ethics and social philosophy can be developed only from a sound theory of the self as an active and rational power or personality. This defect in English ethics is supplied by the idealists.

¹ R. A. P. Rogers, *A Short History of Ethics*, p. 185.

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(See also references to Chapter XII.)

CHAPTER XV

THE ETHICS OF GERMAN IDEALISM

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

What was lacking in English ethics up to the latter third of the nineteenth century was an adequate psychological and philosophical theory of the nature of the moral self in relation to the historical social order. This lack was supplied by the so-called idealistic ethics of which the first great exponents were F. H. Bradley and Thomas Hill Green. They were much influenced by Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel.

Immanuel Kant based his theory of knowledge on the activity of an organizing power in man which takes up the materials of sense experience, analyzes and synthesizes them and *so builds up a significant world out of the succession of sensory stimulations by its own rational activity*. Man is the law giver of nature, in the sense that the laws, relations and orders which he finds in nature he finds there because his own mind is active in connecting and interpreting the data of experience.

As a practical or moral agent, man is the law giver in the moral realm. The principles of right conduct are derived from man's activity as a rational moral will. As a moral being man is self-legislative, autonomous. The rules of morality all have the source of their authority, as well as of our knowledge of them, in the ethical or spiritual character of the human self.

Kant assumes that every man has a conscience or practi-

cal reason which, if he will listen to it, will tell him unequivocally and always what is right and wrong. The only thing that is absolutely good is the good will, the will that acts from a consciousness of duty. If a man tells the truth and keeps his contracts because it pays, the man is not good though the results are good. To tell a lie even to prevent a murder is morally wrong. Kant sets up a complete contrast between duty and inclination. The law of duty, the categorical imperative, is unconditionally binding. It is not imposed from without. Conscience is autonomous, self-legislative. The law of duty is the law of man's spiritual nature. In obeying it man is realizing his spiritual self; in disobeying it he is destroying his spiritual self. Since the moral law is not dependent on the idiosyncrasies of the individual nor on external circumstances it is universal in form; it is binding on all rational beings. Its formula is: "Act so that thou canst at the same time will that the maxim of thy action should become a universal law." If the maxim of an action cannot be universally willed without destroying itself the principle is not moral. Suppose, for example, one is in great financial distress and cannot borrow money without agreeing to pay it in a certain time and one knows one cannot pay it at all but borrows with promise to pay; if this maxim were universalized it would be self-defeating.

The will is determined by an end and the moral will by an absolute end, an *end-in-itself*. This end is Humanity. "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or that of any other, in every case as an end withal and never as means only."

Since every rational being, as rational, is a universally legislative will, the society of rational beings constitutes a kingdom of ends, a community of rational beings in harmony since they are guided by the same universal principles of action.

Each individual is to aim at his own moral perfection. The highest good is happiness combined with moral worth. Since moral worth can be realized only by the self-determining individual acting in obedience to the moral law within him, each one can in relation to others only aim at their happiness and at the external conditions which may aid them in realizing their moral worth. Although Kant does not recognize any moral value in action done from inclination he is somewhat of a Utilitarian, since he holds that happiness is an element in the good. Indeed, one of his chief arguments for immortality and God is that they are necessary postulates of the faith implied in morality, that the moral perfection of man can be realized, and that this perfection in the measure in which it is realized will be productive of happiness.

While Kant insists that "duty for duty's sake" is the supreme principle of morality, that the will is good only when it acts from reverence for the moral law, he does not deny that duty and inclination may often agree. Indeed he says that "it is a very beautiful thing to do good to men from love to them and from sympathetic good will." The *supreme good* (*Supremum Bonum*) is the conformity of the will with the categorical imperative of duty. The *Highest Good* (*Summum Bonum*) is the union of virtue and happiness. The virtuous should be the happiest. The pith of Kant's ethics can be best given in his own words: "Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror but merely holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind, . . . a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly counter work it; what origin is worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the

inclinations; a root to be derived from which is the indispensable condition of the only worth which men can give themselves?

"It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself (as a part of the world of sense), a power which connects him with an order of things that only the understanding can conceive, with a world which at the same time commands the whole sensible world. . . . This power is nothing but *personality*, that is, freedom and independence on the mechanism of nature. . . . So that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own personality as belonging to the intelligible (supersensible) world. It is not then to be wondered at that man, as belonging to both worlds, must regard his own nature in reference to its second and highest characteristic only with reverence, and its laws with the highest respect. . . . Man is indeed unholy enough, but he must regard humanity in his own person as holy. . . . Man alone, and with him every rational creature, is an *end in himself*."¹

Kant's ethics are formal and abstract. He has an exalted conception of the self as having absolute value and being capable of self-determination in the light of rational ends. But he ignores the fact that it is in the concrete impulses and feelings that the dynamic materials of conduct are found.

In insisting on purity of motive, Kant is led to rule out the consideration of consequences from the motivation: I ought to do that which I believe to be best under the given circumstances. If by telling a lie I can prevent a murder, then my motive is good and the good purpose, *in these circumstances*, of preventing a murder is better than the formal conformity to the abstract law: "Do not lie."

¹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Book I, Chap. III (translation by T. K. Abbott).

G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831)

Kant's influence in subsequent ethics was chiefly through his doctrine that the self is an active, rational, synthetic principle. Fichte developed from Kant a striking system of ethical idealism in which the development of rational individuality, in the service of universal ends, is made the key to the understanding of the universe.

Hegel starts from the idealistic doctrine, that mind is the key to the meaning of the universe. The destiny of mind in the individual is to realize full self-consciousness or freedom through harmony with the mind of the whole—the divine idea which is manifested unconsciously in nature and comes to consciousness in man.

Hegel's most significant contribution is perhaps his social philosophy or social ethics. The individual develops his true ethical nature only in society. The destiny of mind is to become conscious of itself, to become rational, self-knowing and self-determining. Reason is social. The self develops through the union of self with others in the family, friendship and public life, the life of the community and the State. This is the sphere of *objective mind*, mind objectified in social institutions.

In order that the individual may become self-knowing and self-determining he must consciously will the good. The stage of development which Hegel calls morality (*Moralität*) is that in which the individual has become conscious of himself as this particular person and so acts freely; that is, from within, with purpose and responsibility. This is conscience, the autonomy of the will, the sense of duty. Kant does not get beyond this. Conscience as a formal abstract universal consciousness which wills nothing in particular is bad.

Kant sets up, says Hegel, an absolute contrast between duty and inclination the *ought-to-be* and the *is*. Man, in order to act rightly, must act entirely out of reverence for

the moral law; from a pure sense of duty, not from inclination. But duty is, by Kant, conceived abstractly as the pure and empty form of universality. Kant overlooks the fact that it is our concrete specific desires and impulses in the concrete and specific situations in which we find ourselves in our own stations in our own community that determine what are our duties. Conscience must have a content and it gets its content from the concrete life of the individual in the particular community in which he lives. Since the pure practical reason has no specific content, since, in its bare abstractness, it stands apart from the desires and impulses of the empirical self, "duty for duty's sake" does not tell us what are our duties. Therefore, the individual, if he follows his abstract sense of duty, will be just as likely to identify the command of duty with his own subjective caprices or passions, and, regarding his own private wishes as identical with the good will or "pure" intention of duty, act unethically; that is, in conflict with the social will. The abstract consciousness of duty or goodwill may, since it is empty of specific duties, turn into the bad.

The true function of conscience or personal rational will is to be the organizing principle of the individual's actual desires and impulses, with regard to his place in his own community. The individual is to be a conscious self-determining whole, a concrete self, as a member of the organized whole of the social life. It is society which makes the individual's conscience a concrete reality. It is one's station as a member of one's own people (in family, community, state and humanity) that specifies one's duties. The individual is transformed from a human animal, he is moralized, he becomes rational and a person, only through conscious participation in the system of social culture into which he is born and in which his spirit matures. This is what Hegel calls the realm of *objective spirit* or *objective mind*. It is spirit as objective to the natural or biological

man and making demands upon the latter. It is the objective spiritual structure in harmony with which the individual develops or becomes a spirit. It is the entire system of social culture—of customs, rules, laws, institutions, traditions and purposes which constitute the *spirit of a people*. The *Volksgeist* has developed historically. It is objective to the individual, who is at first a mere biological subject—a young animal, with feelings, desires, impulses, not yet civilized or moralized but capable of becoming a person through developing in the process of social nature into a self-determining and loyal member of the social system of culture, by the assimilation of which he has grown into the stature of a free person.

Thus the individual realizes himself, his natural capacities become a consciously organized system of purposes and ends, only as a member of some actual social order. The individual finds his true freedom, since freedom and rational will mean the same thing, in the willing performance of his functions as a member of a community. The standpoint of abstract morality, of the autonomous will which acts from a sense of duty, the *good will* in the abstract (Kant's standpoint) is a transitional stage in the development of the individual from unreflecting impulsive action and blind social conformity into the concrete standpoint of *social ethics*. At the latter standpoint, the individual freely wills and realizes his true self; in willing those ends which express the social spirit of his family, his community, his people.

The State or nation is the fullest and richest realization of the ethical idea. The highest duty of the individual is to be a member of the State. As a citizen the individual attains most fully his substantive (*actual*, not abstract) freedom. The State is the ethical whole and the realization of freedom. The State is the spirit which abides in the world and there realizes itself consciously. The State is

one living mind. The individual finds his true being, attains his ethical status only as a member of the State.

The most significant contribution of Hegel to ethics is his insistence that the concrete reality of the moral life of the individual is to be found only through his participation in the social life of his people and time. On the other hand, there are two serious defects in Hegel's doctrine:

1. His exaggeration of the moral functions of the State. He was greatly influenced by ancient Greek thought and practice. Hegel overlooked the fact that, whereas for the Greek, community, school, State and Church were one, in the modern world this immediate unity of social groupings is impossible by reason of much greater complexity of interests and affiliations and, therefore, of much greater differentiation of functionings; as well as by reason of the vastly greater territorial extent of the modern State. It would be ridiculously untrue to the facts as well as subversive of a deep and rich moral life to assert that a citizen of the United States of America could enter wholly into the substance of the moral life by being a good citizen and nothing more. Hegel had an overpowering sense of the value of organization. He subordinated the individual and all other social groups, including the Church, to the State.

2. There does not seem to be any place in Hegel's theory for progress through the initiative of individuals—no place for the prophet or moral genius who brings to men in general new spiritual insights. If the individual's whole duty is to live in harmony with the moral customs and spirit of the community, how can moral progress ever get under way? It is only through individuals who go beyond the customary morality of their group that new moral insights are announced and steps taken towards their acceptance. If Hegel is right, Socrates and Jesus and all the other members of the great company of ethical and spiritual leaders

have been highly immoral and their persecutors highly moral. If the individual's entire moral vocation is to bring his consciousness into complete harmony with the communal customs, the moral life is bound hand and foot to mass tradition. It becomes wholly institutionalized and the possibility of moral advance for either society or the individual is nullified. Hegel admits that the spiritual life of man is not satisfied and exhausted in the moral order of the State. Art, religion and science go beyond morality and satisfy the spiritual interests that cannot be comprehended in any social organization. But Hegel fails to see that even the moral life of the individual carries him beyond the actual social and political ethos and structure. In this respect Hegel is an inverted scholastic. He makes the political State not merely in fact but by right the dominant and all-inclusive power in the world of action. In such a scheme, thoroughly carried out, morality would become wholly conformity to a tyrannical bureaucracy, art and science would lose their souls and religion become merely a refuge from the emptiness and ineptitude of the mechanized life of action.

SCHLEIERMACHER, in his *Ethics*, emphasizes the sacredness of personal peculiarity, of individuality. He embodies in his theory the ideal of *universal culture*, of *the all around and harmonious development of personality*, which Goethe lived to realize in his own person. This ideal of the full and harmonious development of spiritual individuality was shared by all the leaders of German literature—by Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Goethe, Wilhelm von Humboldt and the Romanticists. Some of the latter went to extremes in advocating a disregard of social conventions. But the principle was sound—the all-sided spiritual development of the individual on a cosmopolitan cultural basis. These men echo the *harmony theory of values*, advanced by Plato and restated by Shaftesbury in his *Characteristics*. Shaftes-

bury influenced the ideals of life of the great German writers more than any other foreign writer.

SCHILLER greatly admired Kant; but he criticized Kant's doctrine that an act is not morally good if it be done from inclination and that the agent is not a virtuous person if he acts rightly because he likes to, and not purely out of reverence for the moral law. Schiller says:

The friends whom I love I gladly would serve,
But to this inclination incites me;
And so I am forced from virtue to swerve
Since my act, through affection, delights me.

He says Kant's answer must be:

The friends whom thou lov'st, thou must first seek to scorn,
For to no other way can I guide thee;
'Tis alone with disgust thou canst rightly perform
The acts to which duty would lead thee.

Kant's æsthetic theory gave the impetus for Schiller's philosophy of art. Art, says Schiller, is the daughter of freedom; it is at once our state and our need. Art is the expression of the play impulse. In the creation and enjoyment of beauty the sensuous and the ideal are harmonized. And, ethically, the highest type of individual is the *beautiful soul* in which there is a spontaneous harmony of feeling-impulse and duty. Thus the beautiful soul is one in which the æsthetic and the moral nature are completely harmonized. The beautiful souls are those in whom the moral sense has gained such control over all the feelings that it may without fear abandon to the affections the government of the will, and never run the danger of contradicting its decrees. Hence it is not really this or that particular act which is moral in a beautiful soul, but the entire character. Schiller says that Kant was right in making duty and morality wholly independent of inclination. "However," says Schiller, "though I am thoroughly convinced

that the association of inclination with a free act proves nothing in regard to the pure *dutifulness* of that act, I believe that one can infer from this very fact that the *moral perfection* of man depends upon the part which inclination plays in his moral conduct.”²

GOETHE was led to the study of Kant by Schiller. Goethe found in Kant's theory of the genius, as the creative spirit that works unconsciously like nature to express and enjoy values, a satisfactory theory of artistic creation. Goethe as an ethical philosopher was much influenced by Spinoza and Shaftesbury. His *Wilhelm Meister* is really a discussion of the values of human life cast in the form of a story. His doctrine of the three reverences (reverence of man for what is below him—nature; for what is around him—man; and for what is above him—the Divine) is an ethical philosophy in a nutshell. *Faust* is an epic of the soul's struggle between the enticements of the senses, the longing for limitless power and the obligation to one's fellows. The solution is that the soul is satisfied only through some form of service useful to humanity. Goethe emphasizes the necessity of individual renunciation, or limitation in order to attain satisfaction that lasts beyond the fleeting moment, “Thou must renounce.” “In limitation only is there strength.” Goethe's *Sprüche in Reimen und Prosa* are rich in wise ethical maxims.

It is very significant that the development of idealism in Germany coincided in time with its first great creative outburst in literature. Lessing and Herder formulated philosophies of the spiritual development of humanity that closely resemble those of Fichte and Hegel. Schiller and Goethe lived in spiritual intercourse with Kant, Fichte and Hegel. The Romanticists found in Fichte, but especially in Schelling, the philosophical basis of their humanism.

² Quoted from Paulsen, *Ethics*, p. 203. Schiller is right but his view hardly follows from Kant's theory.

That, says Windelband, "was the golden Day, in which with us, as once before in Greece, Truth shone with the light of Beauty."³

The idea of the beautiful soul, the harmoniously developed personality, expresses the ethical ideal of the Romantic school. The good life is one of rich, harmonious and free personality. The literature and the philosophy of this period, from Herder to Goethe and Hegel, worked in common to develop a deeper sense of the organic interdependence of man and man. Both literature and philosophy were pervaded by the sense of the continuity and community of the spiritual life in humanity. Indeed the ideas of *humanity*, of *a continuous historical development* and of the *spiritual interdependence of man and man* were common property of German philosophy and literature.

The recognition of the continuous historical development of the human spirit and of the interdependence of men meant the abolition of the abstract one-sided individualism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It involved an emphasis on the value of tradition and historical development.

A peculiar form of idealistic ethics, determined by his personal idiosyncrasy, is that of ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. Starting from Kant and Fichte, Schopenhauer argued that the ultimate reality is *will*. This at first appears in the physical world as a blind striving towards *individuation*. It appears in the vegetable and animal world as the sentient impulse of organized individuals. It attains more specific individuality in man as self-conscious individuality. But this whole evolution towards richer, more sentient conscious and reflective individuation is a tragic blunder. "All Life is Striving; All Striving is Suffering; Therefore all Life is Suffering." Man, with his acutely sensitive and reflective individuality, is the most miserable of all beings. He that

³ *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, Bd. II, p. 407.

increaseth individuality and knowledge increaseth sorrow. To try to preserve and develop one individuality is to doom one's self to increasing misery.

The only virtues are pity and self-denial or the renunciation of the will-to-live. *Pity* or *sympathy*, in which one forgets one's own miseries in the contemplation of those of others; *renunciation of self* through art, speculation, the practice of charity, celibacy. Since life is suffering it is a sin to reproduce one's kind. Catholicism is nearer the truth than Protestantism since it exalts celibacy. Buddhism is the only religion which has seen the whole truth. Redemption is *Nirvana*—the extinction of suffering by the drowning of individuality in the Lethe of the unconscious and impersonal whole. So Schopenhauer interprets the Buddhist doctrine of redemption as the cessation of individuality by the extinction of all the fires of selfhood and the passage of the self out of self into the fathomless ocean of unconscious and will-less being—the peace that passeth all understanding.

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CHAPTER XVI

IDEALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLISH LITERATURE

There is much truth in the Hegelian philosophy of history as an incessant dialectic movement or evolution through contradiction and the overcoming of contradiction which again breaks out at a higher level. The spiritual, social and political history of Western European civilization has moved in a zigzag fashion from one type of organization of thought and life through the center of indifference (to use Carlyle's phrase) to its opposite, and then back again on a different plane to the opposite of the last opposite. The elaborate hierarchical organization of the Middle Ages disintegrated into nationalism, particularism, and finally into an individualistic rationalism which rejected the authority of tradition and historical institutions, which proclaimed the natural rights of all men in the court of reason and made its social rallying cry universal liberty and equality of opportunity—liberty of action, of opinion, of speech. This movement recognized a common vocation in all men, to be realized through liberty and equality inspired by fraternity.

The French Revolution was the legitimate child of the rationalistic individualism of the eighteenth century grown strong and pitted against the unyielding structure of political and ecclesiastical absolutism. But the French Revolution issued in a new absolutism as do all extreme movements.

No sooner had the anti-traditionalist rationalism and individualism borne its revolutionary fruit than thought, as well as political and social life, began to swing towards a new emphasis on the organic interdependence of individuals, the historical continuity of the generations and the necessity and value of the institutional and customary social order. This was emphatically so in the case of Hegel, and the German Romanticists. In a different form it appears somewhat later in Auguste Comte's scheme for the reorganization of society.

In England Edmund Burke is the first powerful voice raised on behalf of the value of a common tradition or system of community life rooted deep in, and drawing nutriment from, the past; and consequently, as against revolution, of the necessity, for the social and moral health of a people, of its continuous slow, historical development.

By the great poets and prose writers of the last quarter of the eighteenth and the nineteenth century these thoughts were made current coin in English literature. The sense of the spiritual unity of man and nature were strong in Blake, Burns, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Shelley and Tennyson. Coleridge and Wordsworth were at first enthusiastic partisans of the French Revolution. To them it was the roseate dawn of a new era of universal human happiness and perfection; to be achieved through liberty, equality and fraternity. Wordsworth wrote of it thus:

Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven.

The enthusiasm of Coleridge and Wordsworth for the French Revolution soon cooled. Wordsworth was afterwards called by the partisans of liberty, "the lost leader."¹ And they both, in their mature social philosophies, emphasized the importance of the continuity of social institutions

¹ Cf. Robert Browning, "The Lost Leader."

as the indispensable instruments for the expression of the interdependence of living men and of the successive generations. Without becoming reactionists they became decidedly conservative. Thomas Carlyle later became the most powerful exponent of the social philosophy of idealism; the central tenet of which is that the State and all other social institutions are instruments for the spiritual, even more than for the material, culture of individuals. Matthew Arnold, with his persistent and lucid advocacy of the need of higher intelligence (*Geist*), and more widespread culture (knowledge of the best that had been thought and said) to be achieved through a better state supported education, emphasizes strongly the cultural or ethical functions of the State. John Ruskin, a disciple of Carlyle, starting from his gospel of beauty, stresses the growth of ugliness, the decay of craftsmanship, through the system of machine production and criticizes political economy and *laissez faire* as a gospel of human "ill -th," not wealth. William Morris held similar views.

The Oxford movement in religion was related to this organic and historical conception of man, since it stressed the idea of the Church as a living organism, an historically continuous spiritual whole. This was a swing away from the individualism, both of the rationalistic deists of the eighteenth century and that of Protestant Evangelicalism. John Henry Newman was led, through the belief in the historical continuity of the church as a living spiritual organism,² to the conclusion that the Roman Catholic Church was the only Christian body in the West which had preserved its historical continuity.

While the rise of the Industrial Revolution was generating new social problems, in regard to the conditions of labor and of urban life, and English thought was rapidly

² Cf. John Henry Newman, *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*.

passing into a historical and more or less organic and evolutionary conception of man's life as an ethical and spiritual being, there was in gestation a new and revolutionary conception which tended to reduce man as an individual organism and the whole organic life of society to an episode in a physiologically, and in the last analysis chemically, determined process of blind change; neither originating from nor controlled by any ethical or spiritual agency. This is the biological conception of man as an animal and of all animal life as a chemical fermentation blindly arising in the cosmic welter of physical centers of force.

The advent and acceptance of the doctrine of biological evolution with its emphasis on the prodigal wastefulness of life, the ruthlessness of the struggle for existence and the absence of any ethical or spiritual factors in natural selection as the chief method of survival—all this seemed to reduce to the status of illusory subjective sentimentalism the belief that nature is pervaded and controlled by a spirit akin to the human spirit.

This movement of thought, from an idealistic pantheism which traced the development, through nature and the history of humanity, of one increasing purpose, to the shattering conflict and doubt engendered by the rise of biological evolution is reflected in the poetry of the nineteenth century. I cannot do more here than call attention to a few of the most influential literary presentations of idealism in England. Their work preceded in time as it far exceeded in influence the writings of the academic philosophers.

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE (1772-1834) was the founder of the philosophical criticism of literature in England. His philosophical views were at first Unitarian and materialistic. Then he passed into a speculative pantheistic idealism in which he found even a speculative doctrine of the Trinity. He was much influenced by Plato, Ploti-

nus, the neo-Platonists and other writers, also by the mystical devotional writings of Robert Leighton. Coleridge expresses his indebtedness to Kant and to Schelling. In fact, there are long passages of his writings that are free translations from Schelling. This is especially true of his *Biographia Literaria* and *Aids to Reflection*. Coleridge's poetry is suffused with the spirit of Romantic Idealism; see especially his *Hymn to Nature*, *Hymn Written in the Vale of Chamouni*, and *Hymn to the Earth*. He writes:

For I had found
That outward forms, the loftiest still
Receive their finer influence from the
Life within;

He prayeth best, who loveth best
All things both great and small,
For the dear God, who loveth us,
He made and loveth all.

THE ANCIENT MARINER

For Coleridge the practical or moral reason is the supreme guide to life, in distinction from the *understanding* which enables us only to generalize and calculate. Reason, in its moral use, leads us to recognize the supremacy of spiritual feeling. Reason is the divine in man. It is the power of intuitively grasping speculative truth. In its highest activities and its richest results the reason is the creative or productive imagination (the *Esemplastic Power* or *Primary Imagination* is his technical phrase). Imagination is distinguished from Phantasy or Fancy. The latter is but the random associative play of imagery. The Productive Imagination weaves, from the images of memory (or experience), an ordered vision of life. It discovers and gives body to the Ideas or archetypal forms of Nature and Human Life in Society. "Primary Imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human per-

ception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I *am*." ³

Coleridge is the intellectual father, along with Frederick Denison Maurice, of the Broad Church School in the Church of England. Coleridge's test for the validity of any religious or theological doctrine was *does it find me*; in other words, the immediate witness of spiritual experience.

In his social philosophy Coleridge holds that reason takes a middle ground between radicalism and conservative reactionism. Social institutions are not perfect nor unchangeable, but they are necessary and must be improved gradually. In examining any social institution critically, one should ask, first what is the Idea, the Purpose, or End of the Institution; second, how far does it in its existing form realize its *idea*?

WILLIAM WORDSWORTH (1770-1850) was much stimulated by Coleridge's conversation. Indeed the stimulation was mutual. Through Coleridge Wordsworth was probably influenced by German Idealism. Certainly Wordsworth's world-view may be best described as an idealistic pantheism. For him, as for Bruno, Boehme, Spinoza, Fichte and Schelling, nature is the living garment of Deity; nature is the utterance of the Divine Spirit to the human spirit. He writes:

For I have learned
To look on nature, not as in the hour
Of thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes
The still, sad music of humanity,
Nor harsh nor grating, though of ample power
To chasten and subdue, and I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,

³ Samuel Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*.

And the round ocean and the living air
 And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
 A motion and a spirit that impels all thinking things, all objects
 of all thought
 And rolls through all things.

 LINES WRITTEN A FEW MILES ABOVE TINTERN ABBEY

Nor less I deem that there are Powers which of themselves
 our minds impress.
 That we can feed this mind of ours in a wise passiveness.

He finds a great healing power in communion with nature. This is, perhaps, Wordsworth's best known thesis:

When the fretful stir,
 Unprofitable, and the fever of the world,
 Have hung upon the beatings of my heart,
 How oft, in spirit, have I turned to thee,
 O sylvan Wye!

Nature never did betray the heart that loved her; 'tis her
 privilege
 Through all the years of this our life, to lead us from joy to
 joy.

Communion with nature also has positive moral teaching
 for us.

One impulse from a vernal wood
 May teach you more of man,
 Of moral evil and of good
 Than all the sages can.

Sweet is the lore which nature brings;
 Our meddling intellect
 Misshapes the beauteous forms of things.
 We murder to dissect.
 Enough of science and of art;
 Close up these barren leaves;
 Come forth and bring with you a heart
 That watches and receives.

"The Ode on the Intimations of Immortality" sums up the best in Wordsworth's philosophy. The soul is divine in origin.

Not in entire forgetfulness
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory, do we come
From God, who is our home.

The cares of life and all the burdens of this world tend to obscure those

Obstinate questionings of sense and outward things.
those

High instincts before which our mortal nature
Doth tremble like a guilty thing surprised.

Wordsworth does not mean literally that in the human soul at birth there exist full-grown all the feelings, images and aspirations that will later come to consciousness and expression in it. What he is insisting on is that these "high instincts" are the truest qualities in man. With the Ode may be compared the following:

We live by admiration, hope and love ⁴
Unless above himself he can
Erect himself, how poor a thing is man.⁵

The struggles of this life should only strengthen this immortal nature in us.

We will grieve not, rather find strength in what remains behind:

In the primal sympathy
Which having been, must ever be,
In the soothing thoughts that spring out
of human suffering,
In the faith that looks through death,
In years that bring the philosophic mind.

⁴ "Excursion," Book I, p. 763.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Book II, pp. 330-331.

Thus soberly, through loyalty to the best in us, he can still enjoy—

The innocent brightness of a new born day,
The clouds that gather round the setting sun
Do take a sober colouring from an eye,
That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality.

In the "Ode to Duty," Duty is called "Stern Daughter of the Voice of God" that yet dost wear

The Godhead's most benignant grace,
Nor know we anything so fair
As is the smile upon thy face.
Flowers laugh before thee on their beds
And fragrance in thy footing treads;
Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;
And the most ancient Heavens, through Thee,
Are fresh and strong.

But Wordsworth does not rank those

Who ask not if thine eye
Be on them; who, in love and truth,
Where no misgiving is, rely
Upon the genial sense of youth;
Glad Hearts! Without reproach or blot;
Who do thy work, and know it not;

as morally inferior to these who act consciously from a sense of duty. He is not an ascetic rigorist. He has a place of honor for the "beautiful souls."

Wordsworth's philosophy of nature does not imply insensibility to the life of humanity. He lays just as great stress, if not greater, on the joy that comes to us through the simple elemental human affections and the daily round of duties.

He preaches the supreme importance, for happiness, of fidelity to one's own highest values; of fidelity to duty and obedience to reason. The happy warrior is one who is loyal throughout life, come what may, to the best instincts of his youth, one who "makes his moral being his prime

call"; whose "law is reason," and who "through the heat of conflict, keeps the law in calmness made," who "plays in the many games of life, that one when what he most doth value must be won"; and who

Is yet a soul whose master bias leans,
To homefelt pleasures and to gentle scenes.

Wordsworth insists on the harmony of the human mind and nature; her voice proclaims

How exquisitely the human mind
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less
Of the whole species) to the external world
Is fitted—and how exquisitely, too
Theme this but little heard of among men—
The external world is fitted to the mind;
And the creation (by no lower name
Can it be called) which they with blended might
Accomplish.⁶

Wordsworth holds that nature and man coöperate in the process of creating the world of experience, of feeling and action, of beauty, achievement and happiness.

For the discerning intellect of man
When wedded to this goodly universe
In love and holy passion, shall find these
A simple produce of the common day.⁷

Like the child which, with its ear to the sea shell has
Mysterious union with its native sea
Even such a shell the universe itself
Is to the ear of faith; and there are times, I doubt not, when to
you it doth impart
Authentic tidings of invisible things; of ebb and flow, and ever-
during power;
And central peace, subsisting at the heart
Of endless agitation.⁸

⁶ Wordsworth, "Excursion," Preface to edition of 1814, ll. 63-71 (from "The Recluse").

⁷ *Ibid.*, ll. 52-55.

⁸ "Excursion," Bk. IV, ll. 1140-1147.

Amidst the vicissitudes and mutabilities, the sorrows and losses of life, duty is secure and leads us to rest on the Divine.

Possessions vanish, and opinions change,
And passions hold a fluctuating seat;
But, by the storms of circumstance unshaken,
And subject neither to eclipse nor wane;
Duty exists;—immutably survive,
For our support, the measures and the forms,
Which an abstract intelligence supplies;
Whose Kingdom is, where time and space are not,
. . . Thou, dread source,
Prime, self-existing cause and end of all
That in the scale of being fill their place;
Above our human region, or below
Set and sustained.⁹

Wordsworth's doctrine of the communion of the human spirit with the Forms of Nature is strongly reminiscent of Plato. In the spiritual meaning of these Forms, for the upbuilding of the soul of man, Wordsworth finds the ethical and humane fruit of science, which, viewed otherwise, "murders to dissect."

And further:

By contemplating these Forms
In the relations which they bear to man,
He shall discern, how, through the various means
Which silently they yield, are multiplied
The spiritual presences of absent things,
Trust me, that for the instructed, time will come
When they shall meet no object but may teach
Some acceptable lesson to their minds
Of human suffering, or of human joy.
So shall they learn, while all things speak of man,
Their duties from all forms; and general laws
And local accidents, shall tend alike
To rouse, to urge; and, with the will confer
The ability to spread the blessings wide

⁹ *Ibid.*, ll. 69-82.

Of true philanthropy. The light of love
 Not failing, perseverance from their steps,
 Departing not, for them shall be confirmed
 The glorious habit by which sense is made
 Subservient still to moral purposes
 Auxilar to divine . . .
 Science, then,
 Shall be a precious visitant; and then,
 And only then, be worthy of her name;
 For thee her heart shall kindle; her dull eye,
 Dull and inanimate, no more, shall stand
 Chained to its object in brute slavery;
 But taught with patient interest to watch
 The processes of things, and serve the cause
 Of order and distinctness, not for this
 Shall it forget that its most noble use,
 Its most illustrious province, must be found
 In furnishing clear guidance, a support,
 Not treacherous, to the mind's *excursive* power.
 So build we up the being that *we* are;
 Thus deeply drinking in the soul of things,
 We shall be wise, perforce; and, while inspired
 By choice, and conscious that the Will is free
 Shall move unswerving, even as if impelled
 By strict necessity, along the path
 Of order and of good. Whatever we see,
 Or feel, shall tend to quicken and refine;
 Shall fix in calmer seats of moral strength,
 Earthly desires; and raise to loftier heights
 Of divine love, our intellectual soul.¹⁰

Thus, as Sir Leslie Stephen puts it, the ethical theory that underlies Wordsworth's teaching of the transformation of instinct into reason is: "We must start from the postulate that there is in fact a Divine Order in the universe, and that conformity to this order produces beauty as embodied in the external world, and is the condition of virtue as regulating our character. . . . And, on the other hand, our instincts are not a mere chaotic mass of pas-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, ll. 1230-1274.

sions, to be gratified without considering their place and function in the scheme of things. They have been implanted by the Divine Hand, and the harmony which we feel corresponds to a real order. To justify them, we must appeal to experience, but to experience interrogated by a certain definite procedure. . . .

"The instrument, in fact, finds itself originally tuned by its maker, and may preserve its original condition by careful obedience to the stern teaching of life. . . . The great primary emotions retain the original impulse, but increase their volume. . . . The reason, as it develops, regulates, without weakening, the primitive instincts. All the greatest, and therefore most common sights of nature are indelibly associated with admiration, hope and love; and all increase of knowledge and power is regarded as a means for furthering the gratification of our nobler emotions. . . .

"Thus we come to know how the Divine order and the laws by which the character is harmonized are the laws of morality."¹¹

Wordsworth thought long and deeply upon social and political matters. In the *Prelude* and the *Excursion* he advocates national state-controlled education as the indispensable condition by which all the members of the human community can build up their moral beings. He makes a noble plea for economic justice. He has an exalted conception of the ethical significance of nationality.

Wordsworth is one of the most philosophical of all English poets. His naturally reflective bent of mind was immensely stimulated by his intercourse with Coleridge, who was the most richly endowed mind of nineteenth century English writers.

One may quarrel with Wordsworth's panpsychistic or spiritualistic conception of nature. One may question his

¹¹ L. Stephen, "Wordsworth's Ethics," in *Hours in a Library*, third series.

faith that nature never did betray the heart that loved her. One may contest his thesis that nature and the human mind are exquisitely fitted together, although an evolutionary conception of the mind affords plausible support for this thesis. If the mind has evolved from more rudimentary forms it is a fair contention that, in this process, the mind has become more adequately adapted to its environment.

But of the truth of Wordsworth's great doctrine that

By love subsists all lasting grandeur,
By all pervading love;

and that

This spiritual love acts not nor can exist
Without imagination, which, in truth,
Is but another name for absolute power and clearest insight,
amplitude of mind,
And reason in her most exalted mood.¹²

Of the profound truth of this doctrine of the spiritual nature in man, it seems to me, there can be no doubt.

In the following passage Wordsworth restates, in his own simple and grand way, the doctrine common to mankind's greatest sages from Plato.

Imagination having been our theme,
So also hath that intellectual love,
For they are each in each, and cannot stand
Dividually.—Here must thou be, O man!
Power to thyself, no helper hast thou there;
Here keepest thou in singleness thy state;
No other can divide with thee this work;
No secondary hand can intervene
To fashion this ability; 'tis thine,
The prime and vital principle is thine
In the recesses of thy nature, far
From any reach of outward fellowship,
Else is not thine at all.¹³

¹² *The Prelude*, Book XIV, Conclusion, ll. 169-170 and 189-192.

¹³ *Ibid.*, ll. 206-218.

The poet SHELLEY, with his passionate polemic against tyranny and "that anarch custom," his crusade for liberty, his doctrine that "the great secret of morals is love, or a going-out of our nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person; not our own," belongs to this company. For him Beauty and Love are one, and supreme power belongs to them. Browning who "saw Shelley plain," says of him: "his noblest and predominating characteristic is his simultaneous perception of Power and Love in the absolute and of Beauty and Good in the concrete, while he throws from the poet's station, between both, swifter, subtler and more numerous films for the connection of each with each, than have been thrown by any modern artificer of whom I have knowledge."¹⁴

While Shelley was still a school boy at Eton he made a vow to be "just, free and mild" and to serve his fellow-men. "He dreams of an age of mental light with the law of love and beauty for its principle."¹⁵

As a prophet Shelley preaches insistently *liberty, equality, fraternity or love and intellectual light and beauty* as the supreme values of human life. "Love and its eternity; mercy, forgiveness, and endurance as forms of love; joy and freedom, justice and truth as the 'results of' love; the sovereign right of love to be the ruler of the universe, and the certainty of its victory—these were the deepest realities, the only absolute certainty, the only center in Shelley's mind" (Stopford Brooke).

To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite,
To forgive wrongs darker than death or night;
To defy Power, which seems omnipotent;
To love and bear; to hope till Hope creates

¹⁴ Quoted by Oliver Elton, *A Survey of English Literature*, Vol. III, p. 367.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 183.

From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
 Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;
 This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be
 Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free;
 This is alone Life, Joy, Empire and Victory.

PROMETHEUS UNBOUND

Life may change, but it may fly not;
 Hope may vanish, but can die not;
 Truth be veiled, but still it burneth;
 Love repulsed,—but it returneth!

Yet were Life a charnel where
 Hope lay confined with Despair,
 Yet were truth a sacred lie,
 Love were lust—if Liberty
 Lent not life its soul of light,
 Hope its iris of delight,
 Truth its prophet's robe to wear,
 Love its power to give and bear.

HELLAS

What are numbers, knit
 By force or custom? Man who man would be
 Must rule the empire of himself, in it
 Must be supreme, establishing his throne
 On vanquished will, quelling the anarchy
 Of hopes and fears, being himself alive.

POLITICAL GREATNESS

He apostrophizes Greece, where Liberty first appeared

Greece and her foundations are
 Built below the tide of war,
 Based on the crystalline sea
 Of thought and its eternity;
 Her citizens, imperial spirits
 Rule the present from the past,
 On all this world of men inherits
 Their seal is set.

HELLAS

The metaphysical background of Shelley's humanitarian and democratic idealism is a pantheistic idealism. God is

the spirit of the universe. Two supremely perfect expressions of Shelley's mystical faith are: in "Adonais,"

The One Remains, the
Many change and pass;
Heaven's light forever shines, Earth's shadows fly;
Life, like a dome of many-colored glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity;

and in the "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty,"

The awful shadow of some unseen Power . . .
Spirit of Beauty . . . Thy light alone
Like mist o'er mountains driven,
Or music by the night wind sent,
Through strings of some still instrument,
Or moonlight on a midnight stream
Gives grace and truth to life's unquiet dream.

ROBERT BROWNING (1812-1889), who produced the richest body of English dramatic poetry since the Elizabethan age, expresses an ethical attitude which is a robust though rather naïve form of idealism. Browning is really much more a psychologizing moralist than a philosophical poet. He lays great stress on the value of striving, of development, of growth.

Grow old along with me!
The best is yet to be,

.

He fixed thee mid this dance,
Of plastic circumstance,
This Present, thou, forsooth, would'st fain arrest;
Machinery just meant
To give thy soul its bent,
Try thee and turn thee forth, sufficiently impressed.

RABBI BEN EZRA

While man knows partly, but conceives beside,
Creeps ever on from fancies to the fact,
And in this striving, this converting air,

Into a solid he may grasp,
 Finds progress, man's distinctive mark alone,
 Not God's and not the beast's; God is, they are,
 Man partly is and wholly hopes to be.

A DEATH IN THE DESERT

And in this striving changing life, the attainment of the good sometimes consists in giving expression to impulse, to passion.

Each life's unfulfilled, you see,
 It hangs still, patchy and scrappy;
 We have not sighed deep, laughed free,
 Starved, feasted, despaired,—been happy.

And nobody calls you a dunce,
 And people suppose me clever;
 This could but have happened once,
 And we missed it, lost it forever.

YOUTH AND AGE

Stake your counter as boldly every whit,
 Venture as truly, use the same skill,
 Do your best, whether winning or losing it,
 If you choose to play—is my principle!
 Let a man contend to the uttermost
 For his life's set prize, be what it will!
 The counters our lovers staked was lost
 As surely as if it were lawful coin,
 And the sin I impute to each frustrate ghost
 Was the unlit lamp and the ungirt loin,
 Though the end in sight was a crime, I say,
 You of the virtue (we issue join)
 How strive you? *De te fabula.*

THE STATUE AND THE BUST

There are flashes struck from midnight,
 There are fireflames noondays kindle,
 Whereby piled up honors perish,
 Whereby swollen ambitions dwindle,
 While just this or that poor impulse
 Which for once has played unstifled

Seems the sole work of a life time
Which away the rest have trifled.

CHRISTINA

He ventured neck or nothing—heaven's success
Found, or earth's failure:
"Wilt thou trust death or not?" he answered, "Yes,"
Hence with life's pale lure!"
That low man seeks a little thing to do
Sees it and does it.
This high man, with a great thing to pursue,
Dies ere he knows it.
That low man goes on adding one to one,
His hundred's soon hit;
This high man, aiming at the million,
Misses an unit.

THE GRAMMARIAN'S FUNERAL

The supreme value of life for Browning consists in the emotional interpersonal relationship of love; the love of man and woman, the love of friends, the love of some ideal end.

For life, with all it yields of joy and woe,
And hope and fear, believe the aged friend,
Is just our chance o' the price of learning love
How love might be, hath been indeed, and is!

A DEATH IN THE DESERT

I saw Aprile—my Aprile there!
And, as the poor melodious wretch disburthened,
His heart, and moaned his weakness in my ear,
I learned my own deep error; Love's undoing
Taught one the worth of love in man's estate,
And what proportion love should hold with power,
In his right constitution; love preceding
Power, and with much power, always much more love.

PARACELUS

Browning interprets the significance of the Christian religion as consisting in the faith or insight into the supreme value of love. See especially *Christmas Eve* and *Easter*

Day. He affirms his faith in the value of the insight, while skeptical as to the sacred history.

So the all great were the all loving too,
So through the thunder comes a human voice saying,

O heart I made, a heart beats here;
Face, my hands fashioned; see it in myself
Thou hast no power nor mayst conceive of mine,
But love I gave thee, with myself to love,
And thou must love me, who have died for thee!

EPISTLE OF KARSHISH

Browning holds that evil is transmuted into good. He does not offer this simply as a deduction from a general principle. Perhaps the most interesting feature of his poetry is the way in which, taking many and diverse characters and situations, he shows how if men but will, "sudden the worst turns the best."

So the faith may be justified experimentally that

All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of good shall exist;
Not its semblance, but itself; no beauty, nor good, nor power
Whose voice has gone forth, but each survives for the melodist
When eternity affirms the conception of an hour
The high that proved too high, the heroic for earth too hard,
The passion that left the ground to lose itself in the sky
Are music sent up to God by the lover and the bard;
Enough that he heard it once; we shall hear it by-and-by.

ABT VOGLER

Reason cannot prove that this is so, but human effort, aspiration and love make it reasonable to have faith that it is so. This faith is rooted in feeling and intuition, not in objective demonstration.

MATTHEW ARNOLD (1822-1888) emphasizes the supremacy of the ethical and spiritual life in man over nature's life thus:

With aching hands and bleeding feet
We dig and heap, lay stone on stone;

We bear the burden and the heat
 Of the long day, and wish 'twere done,
 Not till the hours of light return,
 All we have built do we discern.
 Then, when the clouds are off the soul,
 When thou dost bask in nature's eye
 Ask, how *she* viewed thy self-control,
 Thy struggling, task'd morality—
 Nature, whose free, light, cheerful air,
 Oft made thee, in thy gloom, despair,
 And she, whose censure thou dost dread,
 Whose eye thou wast afraid to seek,
 See, on her face a glow is spread,
 A strong emotion on her cheek!
 "Ah, child!" she cries, "that strife divine
 Whence was it, for it is not mine?"

MORALITY

Notwithstanding this profound difference between man and nature Arnold believes in a stream of tendency *not* ourselves which makes for righteousness.

ALFRED TENNYSON (1809-1892) also deserves mention as a philosophical poet. He especially concerned himself in *In Memoriam*, his most important philosophical poem, with the problem of preserving faith in man's identity and power of choice as an ethical and spiritual being and in the immortality of the spirit in man, in the face of the new evolutionary doctrines, the general import of which Tennyson grasped quite clearly. Tennyson believes in the validity of ethical intuitions and mystical experiences.¹⁶ In his spirit man is in quality identical with and holds communion with a vaster spirit, the Cosmic Spirit. Sometimes, as in *The Higher Pantheism*, Tennyson writes as if this Cosmic Spirit pervaded nature, but that man's spirit is a distinct existent in relation to the cosmic spirit. At other times he

¹⁶ He believed in the validity of his own mystical experiences. See his *Two Voices*, and William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 383-384.

writes in a more pantheistic strain and seems to regard the human spirit as literally a part of the Divine Spirit. Tennyson does not unequivocally say whether he regards the Cosmic Spirit as a distinct person or self-conscious being. He was an ardent admirer of Spinoza and probably regarded this question as beyond the power of determination. He proclaims his faith in the supremacy of love, in spite of all appearances to the contrary. Tennyson was not so much a systematic thinker as a mind keenly sensitive to the currents of contemporary thought and able to express his own spiritual struggles, difficulties, hopes and faith, in beautiful verse. He is the most adequate reflection in literature of the cultivated Victorian liberal conservative, struggling to preserve the ethical content of the traditional morality in the face of the advancing tide of scientific materialism.

A naturalistic idealism, or humanistic pantheism is found in the writings of Algernon Charles Swinburne and George Meredith. The former in his poems, *Hymn of Man* and *The Pilgrims*, gives eloquent utterance to a purely humanitarian idealism. There is presented an ideal of progress through union in self-sacrifice.

GEORGE MEREDITH (1828-1909), in his poems and novels voices a sense of the mystical oneness of man and nature, an optimistic faith in the betterment of man through the development of more intelligence. "More brains, O Lord, more brains!" is what is needed. Nature, when we really understand her, is right and wholesome. Man must be obedient to nature, not her slave. He must know himself and be honest in his thinking.

THOMAS CARLYLE (1795-1881) was the prose writer who was most effective in making current in England the spiritual philosophy of idealism and who exercised the widest influence. His ethical and social philosophy is most fully stated in *Sartor Resartus*, *Heroes and Hero Worship*,

and *Past and Present*. Carlyle was much influenced by Schiller, Goethe and Fichte; *Sartor Resartus*, which is Carlyle's spiritual autobiography, traces the development of ■ soul through youth, romantic love, religious doubt and negation (*the everlasting no*) to spiritual idealism (*the everlasting yea*). The everlasting yea, the positive position finally reached, is that man seeks not happiness but spiritual development. "The only happiness a brave man ever troubled about was happiness enough to get his work done." "We must construct our theory of human duties on a greatest nobleness, not on a greatest happiness principle." He calls Bentham's utilitarianism a swine's philosophy. Its measuring principle is the greatest possible quantity of hog's wash. Carlyle preaches the nobility of work. The goal of life is social and moral freedom. The soul is of supreme value.

The great man, the hero, is the instrument of progress, the organ of spiritual advancement, the true symbol of divinity. He cannot lead who has not first learned to obey. Carlyle does not believe in pure democracy. His social philosophy centers around an aristocracy of character, noble persons who are fit to lead and govern. There must, he thinks, be organization and control. Emphasizing as he does the paramount ethical value of the individual character, the principle that the most gifted and noblest are to rule by serving their fellows, Carlyle rejects economic and political individualism, the doctrine of unrestricted competition or *laissez faire*. He preaches a sort of economic socialism as the condition for individual spiritual development. There must be a juster distribution of the products of industry, the workers must have security of employment and the means of livelihood. Government must therefore control industry and it must organize and conduct education to insure it to the workers. He emphasizes the necessity for loyalty and the spirit of coöperation. A more

eloquent and stirring appeal to the leaders of industry to carry into effect the socialization and humanization of industry cannot be found than Carlyle's in *Past and Present*. He says, "Isolation is the sum-total of wretchedness to man. To be cut off, to be left solitary; to have a world alien, not your world; all a hostile camp for you; not a home at all, of hearts and faces who are yours, whose you are! . . .

"Awake, ye noble workers, warriors in the one true war! All this must be remedied. . . . Cease to count scalps, gold-purses, not in these lie your or our salvation. Even these, if you count only these, will not long be left. Let buccaneering be put far from you; alter, speedily abrogate all laws of the buccaneers, if you would gain any victory that shall endure. Let God's justice, let pity, nobleness and manly valour, with more gold purses, or fewer, testify themselves in this your brief life-transit to all the eternities, the Gods and the silences. It is to you I call; for ye are not dead, ye are already half alive; there is in you a sleeping dauntless energy, the prime matter of all nobleness in man. Honour to you in your kind. It is to you I call; ye know at least this, that the mandate of God to His creature is: Work! The future epic of the world rests not with those that are near dead, but with those that are alive, and those that are coming into life."¹⁷

He draws a vivid picture of the conquests of industry over the brute forces of nature and appeals to the leaders to conquer the problems of industrial organization for the common good. He suggests that perhaps this humanization of industry can only come to pass when the workers have a joint and permanent interest in the industries. He is certain that it will come only with permanence of contract. He appeals to the landholders to justify their holdings by making them serve the common good. In the same spirit

¹⁷ Thomas Carlyle, *Past and Present*, Bk. IV, Chap. IV.

he insists that the man of genius is he who serves his fellows best.

Carlyle was the most powerful and influential voice in his day calling for a juster social order amidst the iniquities engendered by the Industrial Revolution. He was the foremost prophet of the movement towards social justice. The imaginative power and eloquence and persistence of his preaching had a tremendous influence upon generous spirits. That power has not yet vanished.

The most influential of Carlyle's disciples was John Ruskin, who turned his eloquent though turgid style unweariedly toward the humanizing of economic and social life. In a series of essays, notably in *Unto this Last*, *Munera Pulveris*, *Ethics of the Dust*, and *Fors Clavigera*, Ruskin attacked the political economy which treated man as subject only to the motive of economic gain. Political economy, he says, is the science of human and social welfare. Its true object is the furtherance of justice in human relations.

Many of the constructive social measures so powerfully urged by Ruskin have been put into effect in England. Such are: a national state-controlled system of education, both general and technical, a fair wage scale, and old age pensions.

The *Christian Socialists* under the leadership of F. D. Maurice and others took the same general stand as Ruskin.

Bradley and Green

F. H. BRADLEY (1846-1924) was the most subtle and brilliant of English philosophers of the past one hundred years. His *Ethical Studies* (1875) was the first English work in which the doctrine of self-realization through participation in the life of the community was systematically and acutely expounded. Bradley represents the *harmony theory of value* with emphasis on the social relations of the individual. He says, in *Ethical Studies*, "Man is a

social being: he is real only because he is social. . . . The mere individual is a delusion of theory; and the attempt to realize it in practice is the starvation and mutilation of human nature, with total sterility or the production of monstrosities (p. 170). . . . We have found ourselves, when we have found our station and its duties, our function as an organism in the social organism" (p. 48). First in the community is the individual realized. Nevertheless, man is more than social. If he were not, he would not be much better than the beasts. "Unless we have intense life and self-consciousness in the members of the State, the whole State is ossified (p. 170). . . . The ideal self has a three-fold content, the social reality, the social ideal, and the non-social ideal" (p. 250). The standard of the good is self-realization. This is achieved through: (1) doing one's duty in one's station in one's society (the social reality); (2) contributing to the improvement of the social organism; and (3) satisfying one's spiritual impulses through the cultural interests of art, science and religion.

All mortality is the systematization of the self by the realization therein of the ideal self as will; such ideal taking its concrete content from: (1) the objective realized will of an actual community; (2) the not-yet-realized objective will of the community which is actually imperfect but is moving towards the better fulfillment of its purpose—the provision for its members of the instruments for the realization of their spiritual selfhood; and (3) an ideal, the content of which cannot, without going beyond morality, be realized as objective will.

The good life, in the full sense, is the union of comprehensiveness and harmony in action and experience by the self. This is true individuality. The moral life is the indispensable substructure of a life which passes beyond the moral, since the individual as spirit is more than social and can only find fulfillment in the contemplation of beauty,

the attainment of truth and in that union and consummation of the experience of beauty, truth and goodness which is religion.

"All morality, all identification of the will with the ideal, demands the suppression of the self in some form; and so, though self-realization, it yet at the same time is self-sacrifice" (p. 276). The good self is a harmony, a subordination of specific impulses into an organic system. The bad self is a unity of a sort; but it is not a truly harmonious whole even in principle; it is not an organic system or individual. The bad self is a collection or group of particular impulses, habits and desires; it is a collection of special and not harmonious centers without any single center. The bad self is not a self, since it is not at one with itself (p. 272). "A purely evil self is a sheer impossibility. . . . To hate good is to hate oneself, and no one can hate himself altogether (p. 273). . . . The good self satisfies us because it answers to our real being. It is a harmony, it is subordinated into a system; and thus, in taking its content into our wills and realizing that, we feel that we realize ourselves as the true infinite, as one permanent harmonious whole. Hence, its content is one with itself and one with our own felt nature" (p. 271). Thus the good is the concrete organic harmony of impulse, desire and habit. It is no sum of units of action and feeling, no mere quantity or collection. The good is the qualitative perfection of a comprehensive and balanced spiritual life or personality which develops by passing through devotion to the actual social order and the ideal social order into the quest for and enjoyment of beauty, truth and spiritual perfection in the universe.

It is a pity that the *Ethical Studies* has remained so long out of print. It is by far the ablest exposition of the idealistic theory of ethics in English. Bradley, in the judg-

ment of the present writer the greatest of English philosophers, died in September, 1924, aged seventy-eight.

T. H. Green (1836-1882), in his *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1883), gives an outline of moral theory, a metaphysics of ethics. Man is a reproduction in time of the eternal consciousness which is the ground of the whole system of nature. Nature, as an intelligible order, is the system of data bound together by a network of *relations*. Since the human mind progressively apprehends these relations in knowing nature, the human mind must be essentially akin in structure to the intelligence which is the source of the orderly system of nature. The human person is an expression of the activity of the Divine mind. The good is always a quality of persons. Only persons have value in themselves. Man can be conscious of a personal good only if he knows himself as a personality. This means a self who transcends the time series of mere natural events. The will is the self realizing itself, the ideal of a better state conceived by reason. Nothing is a motive until it has been identified in thought with the self. An act of will is one in which a self-conscious individual directs himself to the realization of some idea, as to an object in which for the time he seeks self-satisfaction. Self-satisfaction is not the same as pleasure, though it is attended with pleasure. Self-satisfaction is the realization of some capacity of the self. The perfection of the soul is the good.

The natural individual, the human animal, becomes a person only through society. It takes society to make a man's conscience. The ideal is a society of persons in which all members are enabled to perfect their souls, realize their selfhood through devotion to the common good.

From this point of view Green, in his *Principles of Political Obligation*, made a valuable contribution to the philosophy of the State. This we shall consider in discussing the problem of political authority.

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CHAPTER XVII

BIOLOGICAL ETHICS

The rapid development, after the publication in 1859 of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, of the evolutionary theory of the ascent of man from a lower species, *pithecanthropus*, the manlike ape, of the ascent of man's simian ancestors from still lower species, and ultimately of the whole ascending series as stages in the evolution of life from primordial unicellular organisms, has had a wide and deep influence on the humanistic or social sciences. It has produced a large crop of biological ethics. Of these we select for fuller discussion only Herbert Spencer. Other important evolutionary ethicists are Leslie Stephen and Samuel Alexander.

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) published two large volumes, called *Principles of Ethics*, as part of his *Synthetic Philosophy*. If ethics is to be based on biology, as Spencer would have it, it follows that ethical impulses, ideas, motives, criteria and sanctions must be determined in terms of the adaptation of the organism to the physical environment. This is a moving adaptation to an environment in unstable equilibrium. All life consists, says Spencer, in the adjustment of internal relations to external relations. A good impulse or a good act is one which enables either the individual as such, or the species to which the individual belongs, to adapt itself to the physical conditions of existence. It is not clear, from Spencer's writings, how he solves the question as to whether the good is for the individual or the species. With a very optimistic faith that the

law of evolution, as he conceives it, is a beneficent providence which in the end solves all difficulties, Spencer tells us that evolution is working towards the harmony or equilibration of egoistic and altruistic impulses.

Progress towards rectitude of conduct is progress towards duly proportioned conduct.¹ Evolution in conduct is towards a moving equilibrium. The ideally moral man is one in whom the moving equilibrium is perfect physiologically, one in whom the functions of all kinds are duly fulfilled. Pleasures are the correlatives of actions conducive to the welfare of the organism.² What makes life desirable is a surplus of pleasures over pains. Good conduct is conduct that is conducive to a surplus of pleasures over pains. Gregariousness establishes itself because it profits the variety in which it arises; partly by furthering general safety and partly by facilitating sustentation.³ Creatures which become gregarious become sympathetic in degrees proportional to their intelligences. Thus man passes by virtue of his intelligence from blind gregariousness to conscious sympathy and power of coöperation. Thus he passes, too, from egoism to an altruistic sentiment of justice by the media of fears of retaliation, group reprobation, political authority and Divine vengeance. Thus are produced and handed down through the nervous structure the sentiments appropriate to the social life.⁴ Man has evolved and is still evolving towards a fuller and freer sociality.

Other things being equal, acts are good which conserve the self; other things being equal, acts are good which favor the bringing up of progeny; other things being equal, acts are good which further the complete living of others.⁵

¹ Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, Vol. I, Part I, Chap. V, ¶ 26.

² *Ibid.*, Chap. VI, ¶ 33.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Part IX, ¶ 259.

⁴ *Ibid.*, ¶ 265, etc.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Chap. III, ¶ 15.

Evolution brings to pass a harmony among these three types of good acts.

The good is happiness and happiness consists in pleasure—"life is good or bad according as it does or does not bring a surplus of agreeable feeling." "Sentient existence can evolve only on condition that pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining acts." Pleasure is the sign of healthy functioning of organs and organisms and pleasure as such increases the vital powers and so prolongs life, whereas pain lowers vitality. Thus pleasure is in the long run good, both biologically and ethically, though sometimes its indirect consequences may be injurious to life. In the course of evolution pleasure-giving, self-preserving and race-preserving acts coincide.

Individual Good and Social Good

Spencer holds that feelings and sensations are the ultimate elements of consciousness. Feelings may be either immediate sensations, or ideal (representative) feelings referring to a possible future (*e.g.*, hope, fear). By the compounding of simple elements there arise complex ideas which have reference to the future and control the immediate impulses. In this way arises the capacity of man to prefer a remote good to an immediate one. This is the *sense of obligation*. For example the authority of a remote good, such as the idea of honesty, coerces the immediate desire for gain which by itself alone might lead to dishonesty. This authority of the future over the present is not unconditional. The present should not always be sacrificed to the future; but in so far as it should be, this is because sacrifice of an immediate good to a remote good promotes life.

In the course of evolution the sense of obligation will diminish. Morally good actions will come to be performed spontaneously, through the immediate pleasure they give to

the agent. *The good is length and breadth and intensity of life.* Breadth of life consists in the fullest possible exercise of different capacities.

Sociologically, the good is the furtherance of the "life of the social organism," which thus takes precedence over the lives of its individual members. Thus sacrifice of the individual is often necessary to further the preservation of the species.

But here again, in the long run, through the operation of that omnipotent and benign providence, the law of evolution, the opposition between individual good and social good will disappear. Society evolves (like everything from the cosmos to the amoeba) from the simple to the complex by concomitant differentiation and integration. Differentiation means here specialization of individual and group functions and integration means coöperation of the differentiated elements of society. The law of the simpler and more uniform societies is *centralization*, exemplified in military and ecclesiastical control. As society becomes more industrialized it becomes more differentiated, and authority becomes more *decentralized*. Society will evolve further in this direction, until the authority of the group will be exercised only to safeguard the rights of the individual. The functions of organized political society will grow less and less. The freedom of the individual will grow more and more. Through the expansion and deepening of sympathy and the inevitable progress of society in individual freedom, a complete harmony will be finally established between the egoistic and altruistic impulses.⁶ Thus, through the beneficent operation of the law of evolution, Spencer's Kingdom of God will be realized on earth. By meddlesome political and industrial regulations man may halt this progress towards the completely spontaneous harmony of feeling and action of the individual with his fellows; but he cannot

⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Chap. XIV, especially ¶ 97.

permanently stay the march of the evolutionary process towards the millennium when the individual will derive the most exquisite happiness from voluntarily promoting the happiness of his fellows.

Spencer's Social Theory

Notwithstanding that Spencer likens society to an organism and regards its changes as subject to the same laws as the evolution of organisms from the amœba to man, Spencer is an individualist in social theory. Society has evolved and is still evolving, by increasing differentiation of functional groups, from the simple to the complex. Social evolution is towards increased freedom for the individual. Early society was militaristic or centralized in control. As society becomes more industrialized it becomes more decentralized in its control. The proper sphere of the state is to protect the individual in the enjoyment of his rights.⁷ "All embracing state functions characterize a low social type." Corporate action may rightly be used to prevent interference with individual action beyond such as the social state itself necessitates.⁸ The incorporated mass of citizens has to maintain the conditions under which each may gain the fullest life compatible with the fullest lives of fellow citizens. "A man's liberties are none the less ag-gressed upon because those who coerce him do so in the belief that he will be benefited."⁹

Spencer does not believe even in state-conducted education for citizenship. This, he thinks, works towards uniformity and a passively receptive attitude of mind.

Spencer has an unshakable faith that things work themselves out for the best by the operation of natural laws, Therefore it is vain, useless and evil to attempt to interfere

■ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Chap. XXVI, ¶ 366.

■ *Ibid.*, Chap. XXV, ¶ 361.

■ *Ibid.*, ¶ 366.

with or suspend the operation of natural law in human society. That is what happens when man endeavors by his own efforts through state action to correct the ills of human society.

Spencer ignored entirely the increasing centralization of economic control brought about through the increasing scale of industrial and financial organization and the consequent need of public control through state action. His supreme dogma, the law of evolution, blinded him to the cardinal fact that industrial development, with its increasing centralization of power and control, forces enlarging public control as the only means of preserving that minimum of economic equality of opportunity, without which individual freedom is an empty phrase. For of what value is freedom, to speak, to think and to vote, if one lives in economic bondage?

Criticism of Spencer

Spencer's reconciliation of nativism and empiricism in ethics by the hypothesis that moral ideas and feelings which are innate in the individual have been acquired in the process of racial evolution through the accumulation of useful experience depends upon the truth of an assumption which is both unproved and superfluous—the assumption, namely, that *characteristics acquired during the lifetime of the parents are transmitted to the offspring* and thus are gradually increased. It is like saying that several generations of typists will finally result in babies who would be expert typists from birth. Moreover the hypothesis is both gratuitous and in conflict with the facts of social life. Changes in moral ideas and sentiments sometimes take place quite rapidly in history. The history of Western culture, since the Homeric Age, is but a moment in the history of man, if the human species has existed for at least 500,000 years. What great changes have taken place in moral ideas and

sentiments? Even a century may result in significant moral changes.

The child of European or American parents, nurtured from birth in Chinese society, would have Chinese moral standards. The moral sentiments of the individual are shaped by the social culture in which he is nurtured. It is the living and effective tradition that makes our consciences for us in the concrete. Hegel, the greatest of the German idealists, saw this. Spencer and the biological ethicists in general missed it.

The survival of the fittest is not obviously an *ethical* standard. It means, biologically, that those who survive are adapted to survive—a truism. Since adaptation to environment determines survival, and there are many kinds of adaptation, this does not afford an ethical criterion.

It is true that social coöperation and honesty are good for the individual and for the group. But a man who is very scrupulously honest or altruistic may not prosper and his children may have a hard time. The individual who sacrifices wealth or power or life for ideal ends is not moral, *if morality consists in adaptation to the given environment*. The fact is, that the evolution of human morality has been the result of the continual transformation of the social environment of tradition by moral heroes, prophets, seers, saints and lovers of their kind. Moral progress consists in the creation and re-creation of the cultural environment which thus reacts upon the average individual and lifts him to a higher moral level.

Spencer describes the good as a moving equilibrium, an evolution towards greater complexity; which he defines further in terms of increased length and breadth (comprehensiveness or variety) of life; which in turn involves an increasing surplus of pleasures over pains. He has a conception of individuality, or personality as the end; but he conceives the whole process as the inevitable working out

of the blind law of evolution. He fails to distinguish between the distinctive features of social development and biological evolution and between biological evolution and physical change. For him the law of evolution is the God in the machine, the Universal Providence which, in its inevitable march, is realizing the good. This law of evolution is assumed to be the universal law of progress.

There is no good reason to suppose that the egoistic and altruistic impulses will achieve the complete harmony for which Spencer looks. Indeed the division of human impulses into the two classes of egoistic and altruistic is altogether too simple a notion of the psychology of conduct. Man has certain impulses that are predominantly self-referring, and certain impulses that are predominantly other-referring. But so-called egoistic motives are often those which arise from interest in a smaller and more intensive group, such as the family or the vocational groups. The most difficult problems of human conduct arise from these conflicts of group interests. As groups and group-affiliations increase the problems increase.

LESLIE STEPHEN (1832-1904), in *The Science of Ethics*, presents an evolutionary ethics in a less pretentious strain than Spencer. Developing the analogy between a society and an organism, Stephen finds the criterion of moral conduct and, therefore, the basis of social obligation to be whatsoever promotes "the health of the social tissue" or "social organism." "The social evolution means the evolution of a strong social tissue; the best type (of conduct) is the type implied by the strongest tissue." But, apart from the dubiousness of the analogy between a human community and an organism, he fails, like other biological ethicists, to define just what constitutes a strong social tissue. It all depends on the *ends* or *values* which the social tissue should promote. Sparta was a strong social tissue for making war; so was the pre-War German Empire.

Athens was a strong social tissue for the development of a many-sided creative spiritual life. The United States is a strong social tissue for the exploitation of the earth and the mechanical production of material goods; not so strong for the production of cultural goods.

A social tissue is a system of relations between self-conscious individuals and, in order to determine its value, we must ask and answer the question; what type of individuality is most desirable to be developed? No answer to this question can be found in animal biology. It is a human and cultural question.

Over against the attempts to deduce an ethics and social philosophy from the laws of biological evolution should be set the utterances of a competent biologist and vigorous thinker, Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895). He says that the cosmic process is not in harmony with the ethical process in man; that "social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another which may be called the ethical process, the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest in respect of the whole of the conditions which exist, but of those who are ethically the best." Nature is "morally indifferent; the practice of that which is ethically the best—what we call goodness or virtue—involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to a success in the cosmic struggle for existence; . . . the history of human social progress is the story of the steps by which men have succeeded in building up an artificial world within the cosmos."¹⁰ A similar view is expressed in Bertrand Russell's *The Free Man's Worship*. Neither of these thinkers face the extreme paradox implied in the assertion that man, a being who is the offspring of, and dependent on, the cosmos for all his

¹⁰ T. H. Huxley, "Evolution and Ethics" (Romanes lecture), in *Collected Essays*.

qualities, can develop a type of spiritual life that is not only out of harmony with, but in direct contradiction to, the cosmos. This is the paradox of paradoxes.

Limitations of Biological Ethics

Evolutionary biology has made two valuable contributions to ethics.

I. It has given the most plausible description of the genesis and function of those innate capacities which are the raw materials of man's moral life—the innate impulses of self-preservation, sex and philoprogenitiveness, gregariousness, and sympathy, curiosity and thinking. These impulses are biologically useful, and the species most endowed with them in a balanced way will most easily persist and tend to dominate. Negatively, biology proves that our moral sentiments are not innate, that morality, like art and religion, are the products of social culture. *Our biological impulses are neither moral nor immoral.* They are *a-moral*, the raw dynamic materials of morality, which arises only through the operation of group-control of impulses and therefore is a product of social culture.

II. Thus evolutionary biology has cleared the way and prepared the ground for a genuinely social-historical outlook in ethics. But this outlook can only be profitable if the fundamental distinction is recognized between mere biological evolution and the cultural development of human societies. Thus the biological-evolutionary outlook affects our attitude on two questions:

I. It reënforces the principle of coöperation or sympathetic group feeling and action, as of paramount importance in the life of civilization, by showing that as this principle has increased in effectiveness the survival value of the species or group has increased. On the other hand, there is danger of a fallacious application here. A community of human beings is a community of beings whose

vocation is to become self-directing agents—in short, rational individuals. No analogies drawn from the behavior of bees or packs of mammals have any real value in determining the nature and limits of group control and individual freedom among human beings.

2. When we consider how long has been the process of evolution of human nature from subhuman nature, our attitude towards social abnormalities and social aberrations in human conduct must change correspondingly. We must safeguard the interests of the group. But we must recognize the very narrow limits of individual responsibility. We must recognize that many socially evil acts are atavisms, sports, throwbacks, outbursts of impulses once useful in the evolutionary process of adaptation, and now, in their more excessive forms, harmful to the individual and the group. We are gaining insight into the natural causes of human aberrations, human folly and crime. With that insight go pity, prophylactic measures in education and social hygiene, unremitting endeavor to facilitate a more normal biological inheritance and a more suitable physical, social and educational environment for the individual in the community. Innate depravity is either a defective biological inheritance or a fair inheritance warped by bad social conditions. Sometimes it is both. But evolutionary biology yields no concrete and positive conception of human values. It gives us no satisfactory definition of the good life. It cannot do this, since the good life is one that is realized in civilized human society, and the ethical values and standards must be derived from the consideration of the actual achievements, meanings and promises of human culture, of mind or spirit creating culture and finding itself realized in the social structures of civilization—in nurture and education, in economic activities, in the fellowship of minds, in art and literature, in science and religion.

Nor can the sanctions of the good lie behind man's cul-

tural and spiritual life in any mere biological survival and adaptation. The sanction of the good must be found in the realization of the rational and spiritual life of civilized mankind, incarnated in the race's spiritual pioneers, path-breakers and pace-setters.

Frederic W. Nietzsche (1844-1900)

Nietzsche was not a systematic nor a consistent thinker. He was a writer of poetic, vivid, rhythmic German prose. He may be regarded as a biological ethicist, since he exalts instinct, struggle, strength and is the herald of a higher stage in the evolutionary ascent—the superman.

His influence has been widespread, especially upon young writers and the educated youth in general. This influence is partly due to the beauty and vigor of his style. He belongs to the literature of power. His influence is also in part due to the mordant vigor of his attack upon certain main tendencies of modern industrial civilization. Because of his rhapsodical and aphoristic manner and the wealth of metaphorical expressions he uses, Nietzsche has been misunderstood. He did not glorify brute strength in itself, nor did he intend to glorify war in itself. Nietzsche's chief significance consists in the vigor and persistence of his assaults on the leveling, vulgarizing tendencies of modern society. He holds that the prevailing ethics of European society is the cult of indistinction, of commonness, of vulgarity and worse. Its master impulse is gregariousness. It is the morals of a herd mind. It preserves the foolish, the weak, the botched and drags down the wise, the strong and noble. It is a morality of slaves, of the herd of domesticated animals, of the low average mass of men. All morality is an expression of the will-to-power, and the traditional morality is the voice of the will-to-power of the common herd, of the sufferers, the botched and the weak. The whole of the morality of Europe is based on values

which are useful to the unthinking herd.¹¹ All good is the instinctive expression of the will-to-power. Originally good meant *noble, powerful, able to rule, to lead*. Originally *virtue* meant *strength, manly vigor*. There were originally aristocratic races (the Aryans) who, by their energy and daring, ruled over the smaller dark-haired stocks (the Semites and primitive Mediterranean stocks). The latter increased and multiplied; and they in their own instinctive will-to-power invented this new morality which exalts repression, pity, self-sacrifice, the suppression of the individuality of the strong minority on behalf of the weak rabble. The Jews, always being defeated and buffeted about by stronger races, cunningly invented the Christian moral system and thus the modern European world has been debauched and undermined, its vigor sapped, through the influence of four Jews—Jesus, Peter the Fisherman, Paul the Pharisee, and Mary.

Christianity is the most powerful instrument of racial degeneration ever devised by the common herd, although Buddhism is a good second to it. The greatest injustice is the assertion of the equality of all. "Injustice does not consist in unequal rights, but in the claim to equal rights. What is bad? Everything that springs from weakness, envy, revenge. The anarchist and the Christian are the same in origin." Therefore democracy, socialism, communism are all wrong; for they all prevent the rise and development of individuals possessing exceptional strength and mental distinction and their motives are envy and fear. "Pity is bad, renunciation and self-sacrifice are bad; for their ultimate effects are the perpetuation and increase of the foolish, weak and botched and the extinction of the wise, strong and noble."

The course of human evolution has been arrested and turned back by this gigantic conspiracy of slaves. Nature

¹¹ Nietzsche, *Will-to-Power*, p. 226.

ruthlessly sacrifices countless numbers to produce a few and high types of organism. The masses, in all the ages, exist only to produce a few great individuals. The sole use of average humanity is to produce a new type—the *superman*. The best men are the strongest in body and mind. The goal of the life process is the creation of a race of heroes. The only way to this goal is through struggle, through conflict. It is in this sense of struggle that Nietzsche's sayings, "War is better than peace," and "a good war justifies any cause," are to be taken.

"What is good? Everything that increases the feeling of power! What is bad? All that springs from weakness! What is happiness? The feeling that power increases—that obstacles are overcome. Not contentment, but more power; not peace, but conflict; not virtue, but ability. The weak and foolish should perish. . . . I value a man according to the quantum of power and fullness of his will."¹² The conscious will is but the partial expression of the unconscious will (the body). All perfect action is unconscious and not deliberate.¹³ Our most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us concerning the highest values, are judgments emanating from our muscles. Ideas and sentiments are the expressions of bodily instincts.

Nietzsche does not entirely exclude pity. The superman will pity the foolish and weak for having the wrong values. He will be harder with himself than with his weaker fellows; he will aim at distinction, fineness, nobility of soul. Therefore he will exercise rigorous self-control; he will practice self-discipline and develop his powers to the utmost. He will be the true aristocrat. He will practice *noblesse oblige*. He will rule the weak and foolish sternly because such rule is for their own good. It is for their own good since the race will degenerate further, unless it be led and

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 304.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

ruled by a natural aristocracy. Absolute equality is the wildest and most dangerous of dreams. The leadership and rule of a natural aristocracy is the only basis of human progress. This is the one positive outcome of Nietzsche's rhapsodical, one-sided and violent polemic against the traditional morality. This is what he means by the *transvaluation* of all values (*Umwertung aller Werten*).

Nietzsche is always exhorting his readers to aim at excellence, at distinction, at nobility. He has given vigorous and fascinating expression to the deep dissatisfaction of gifted natures with the mechanical vulgarity, the deadly uniformity, the lack of distinction and individuality, the commonplaceness and soullessness of contemporary life in the great industrial society. He proclaims the unbounded right to self-assertion and self-development of the exceptional creative individual.

Nietzsche, with all his exaggerations and paradoxes, is a significant and valuable protest of the creative spirit against the cheapening, leveling trend of modern overorganization, of the mechanization of life. The spirit in man rebels against being drawn into and lost in the wheels of economic and social machinery. Perhaps it is harder for the exceptional individual to preserve and express his spiritual individuality to-day than it was before the rise of industrialism to supreme power.

Nietzsche is an idealist protesting against the drowning of individuality and spiritual creativeness in a machine age.

Negatively his philosophy is an annihilating critique of the weakness of modern society. Positively it is an optimistic and idealistic philosophy of which the very heart is the absolute necessity, for the progress of man, of recognizing, honoring and making effective, distinctions of individuality, of value, of rank and leadership, in the cultural or spiritual life of man. Nietzsche has been called the archindividualist. But he himself says, "My philosophy

aims at a new order of rank, not at an individualistic morality." ¹⁴

Nietzsche's picture of the superman is vague and shadowy. He regarded the man of genius as the embodiment of the ideal, for example, Julius Caesar, Napoleon Bonaparte, Goethe.

He is wrong in supposing that Jesus denied the value of distinctions or taught the complete equality of all men. He is inconsistent, and even incoherent, in reducing truth to the behavioristic expression of instinct and desire and then proposing a standard whose central principle is the recognition of distinctions of rank in spiritual values. If everything is instinct, then the instinct of the gregarious herd to hold down the genius is just as good as Nietzsche's heralding of the genius, just as good as the attempt of the individual to rise above the crowd. Nietzsche proclaims the will-to-power, but he does not tell us what kind of power is more excellent. His attempt to forecast the superman ends in nebulosity. Biting and bracing as a critic, Nietzsche fails as a constructive thinker on cultural matters.

While Nietzsche's theory of truth and of value are thus inconsistent, his criticisms of our modern society are very largely justified, but he is partially wrong as to the causes. It is true that we have done little to prevent the perpetuation of diseased and anæmic types of being. It is true that distinction of spiritual values is not recognized in our commercialized society. It is true that we are largely ruled by the vulgar, the commonplace, the unintelligent. It is true that democracy will perish from the very complexity and difficulties of its problems, if we do not recognize the true leaders, experts, humanistic administrators, teachers, social scientists. If democracy cannot develop sufficient intelligence and nobility of character to select and put in the place of

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

leadership persons of more intelligence and nobility, then we are lost.

But Nietzsche is partly wrong in regard to the causes. Partly, no doubt, the absurd fallacy of complete equality is responsible. But more than this is the fact that our present society's activities are mainly incited and directed for profit, not for service. As Mr. R. H. Tawney has so well put it, the motive which receives chief emphasis in our society is the acquisitive, not the functional. We are incited to work, not that we may perform a worth-while function in the maintenance and improvement of the social order, but that we may acquire as much wealth as possible. The chief mark of distinction in our society is *power*, but *money power*. What Nietzsche would have the permanent standard is spiritual power, power of will and mind, intellectual and æsthetic power. Not the dogma of absolute equality but the effective working dogma that the acquisition of the common standard of exchange value, money, is the supremely worthwhile activity—this is the chief cause of the present plight of society.

There are striking resemblances between Nietzsche and Whitman, and no less striking differences. Both of them emphasize the values of personal force, of freedom, of the strong individuals. But, whereas Whitman is fascinated by the confused spectacle of democratic humanity, Nietzsche is repelled by it. Whereas for Whitman the strong individual needs and fulfills himself in the manly love of comrades and in other forms of love, for Nietzsche the emphasis on distinction becomes a veritable disease. The great individual is above his fellows and isolated from them in soul. He will pity them but he does not need them and cannot love them. Surely Whitman's is the healthier note.

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CHAPTER XVIII

EMERSON, WHITMAN AND JAMES

Ralph Waldo Emerson

Ralph Waldo Emerson is still, without doubt, the most distinguished figure in American literature. Sprung of Puritan ancestry and upbringing, he united with the ethical earnestness of the Puritan an exceptional sweep and penetration of mind, a unique power of pithy oracular utterance and a cheerful and winning spirit. The great influence of his voice and pen testify to the alert mind and the spiritual hunger of the America of his day. Emerson read very widely in oriental and classical as well as in modern literature. He is a Platonist by nature. There is a striking similarity between his fundamental insights and those of Fichte. Whether he knew Fichte's writings at first hand is doubtful. Through his friend and spiritual brother, Carlyle, and through F. H. Hedge,¹ he was touched by German idealism; perhaps also through Coleridge. At any rate the time was ripe and Emerson in America, like Carlyle in England, preached an ethical idealism. Emerson gives a characteristically American and even Yankee form to his ethical idealism.

Emerson writes as an oracular seer. He does not argue

¹ Hedge was a pioneer in the study of German literature and philosophy in the United States. The pioneer teacher of transcendental idealism in America seems to have been James Marsh at the University of Vermont, a disciple of Coleridge. See Marjorie H. Nicolson, "James Marsh and the Vermont Transcendentalists," *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 34, pp. 28-50, also W. Riley, *American Thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism*.

nor deduce. He announces his intuitions dogmatically and aphoristically and with an abundance of homely metaphors. He is an intuitive rather than a systematic thinker. Nor does he care for consistency which he calls the hobgoblin of little minds.

The core of Emerson's doctrine is the presence of the divine in the individual soul. God is the universal soul, the over-soul, the cosmic spirit. Nature is the organ through which the universal spirit speaks to the individual and strives to lead back the individual to it. As a plant upon the earth so a man rests upon the bosom of God. The world proceeds from the same spirit as the body of man. It is a remote and inferior incarnation of God, a projection of God in the unconscious. Nature is unconscious spirit. The universe is represented in every one of its particles. Thus is the universe alive, all things are moral.²

Emerson has little use for politics and little conception of the value of the organized life of the state. He thinks that state governs best which governs least. He is an idealist with a message for the individual. He would base society on character and love, on men's ethical natures. A man, he says, has a right to be trusted, to be loved, to be revered. The power of love, as the bond of the community, has never been tried. He would have it tried.

His message is to the individual, but to the individual as a member of the whole. The secret of the world, he says, is between Person and Person. "Ineffable is the union of man and God in every act of the soul." The beginning and the end of his gospel is the divinity of the individual as a member of the whole, an incarnation of the Divine. The simplest person, who, in his integrity, worships God becomes God. "The one thing in the world, of value, is the active soul." ■

■ Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature."

³ "The American Scholar."

Self-reliance is the fundamental virtue. "A man is relieved and gay when he has put his heart into his work. . . . The great man is he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude. . . . The fact which is the up-shot of all history is that there is a great and responsible thinker and actor working wherever a man works. Every new mind is a new classification. Let us not rove; let us sit at home with the cause. Let us stem and astonish the intruding rabble of men and books and institutions by a simple declaration of the divine fact. Bid the intruders take the shoes off their feet, for God is here within." ⁴ "An institution is but the lengthened shadow of one man."

So for Emerson, there is properly no history but only biography. Nothing done in the past has any deeper sense than what is done to-day. "All inquiry into antiquity is the desire to do away with this wild, savage and preposterous *there* and *then* and introduce in its place the *Here* and *Now*. . . . Man is the compound of time and the correlative of nature. . . . History is the action and reaction of nature and thought." ⁵

Thus all refers to the soul of man. The infinitude of the soul consists in the fact that there can be no excess of love, knowledge and beauty.

While Emerson's appeal is always to the soul, and the soul is an individuated expression of the cosmic soul, the individual soul finds its health and progress in the sense of its oneness with the Infinite and Eternal World-soul—the Over-soul. "That unity, that over-soul within which every man's particular being is contained and made one with all other souls; that common heart of which all sincere conversation is the worship, to which all right action is submission. . . . We live in succession . . . in particles.

⁴ "Self-Reliance."

⁵ "History."

Meantime within man is the soul of the whole; the wise silence; the universal beauty; the eternal One. We see the world piece by piece, as the sun, the moon, the animal, the tree; but the whole, of which these are the things and parts, is the soul." The soul "has no dates, nor rites, nor persons, nor specialties, nor men. The soul knows only the soul, the web of events is the flowing robe in which she is clothed. . . . I am somehow receptive of the great soul and thereby I do overpass the sun and the stars and feel them to be the fair accidents and effects which change and pass."⁶

Walt Whitman

Walt Whitman, school teacher, carpenter, printer, journalist, war nurse, clerk, big rough-bearded rover, in externals is in striking contrast to Emerson the gentle, refined home-keeping New England scholar and Lyceum lecturer. Their styles are very different. Emerson's poetry suffers from excess of reflection, is somewhat bloodless, lacks flow, force and exuberance. Whitman's poetry is turbid, torrential, irregular, barbaric, often a mere catalogue of names. But underneath these differences is an identity of spirit—the emphasis on self-reliance, on individuality and the same mystic pantheism or cosmic idealism which finds life and soul everywhere.

Whitman is *par excellence* the poet of American democracy, although Americans in general have not so acknowledged him. He broke through the conventions of poetic form and the genteel tradition as to fit subjects for poetry. The fact is that since the great days of Emerson, Whitman, Thoreau, Hawthorne and Melville until now America, as a whole, has been æsthetically and intellectually provincial. Its popular literature has been mostly a pale imitation of traditional English literature. Whitman is recognized

⁶ "The Over-Soul."

abroad as the authentic bard of American democracy. He is the self-elected poet of America and the future and he makes good the claim. Because of the formlessness of his verse, because of his lack of discrimination in expression and selection in material, his significance may be overlooked.

He has a definite *credo*, an ethics and religion. His *credo* may be expressed in two phrases: (1) the supremacy of the individual soul over all institutions, social mechanisms and traditions; and (2) the realization of the soul through comradeship, love.

One's self I sing, a simple democratic person,
Yet utter the word Democratic, the word *En-masse*.

* * * * * *
Of life immense in passion, pulse and power,
Cheerful, for freest action formed and the laws divine,
The modern man I sing.

* * * * * *
Produce great Persons, the rest follows,

* * * * * *
How dare you place anything before a man!

* * * * * *
I swear I begin to see the meaning of these things,
It is not the earth, it is not America who is so good,
It is I who am great or to be great, it is You up there, or any
one,

It is to walk rapidly through civilisations, governments, theories,
Through poems, pageants, shows, to form individuals.
Underneath all, individuals,

I swear nothing is good to me now that ignores individuals.
The American compact is altogether with individuals,
The only government is that which makes minute of individuals,
The whole theory of the universe is directed unerringly to one
single individual, namely to *you*.

* * * * * *
I am for those who have never been master'd
For men and women whose tempers have never been master'd

For those whom laws, theories, conventions, can never master.
I am for those who walk abreast with the whole earth,
Who inaugurate one to inaugurate all.

BY BLUE ONTARIO'S SHORE

Charity and personal force are the only investments worth
anything.

SONG OF PRUDENCE

And I will not make a poem nor the least part of a poem, but
has reference to the soul. Because having looked at the objects
of the universe I find there is no one nor any particle of one
but has reference to the soul.

STARTING FROM PAUMONOK

Wisdom is of the soul, is not susceptible of proof, is its own
proof

* * * * *

Is the certainty of the reality and immortality of things, and
the excellence of things;
Something there is in the float of the sight of things that pro-
vokes it out of the soul.

SONG OF THE OPEN ROAD

Where the city of the faithfulest friends stands,
Where the city of the cleanliness of the sexes stands,
Where the city of the healthiest fathers stands,
Where the city of the best-bodied mothers stands,
Where the great city stands.

* * * * *

All waits or goes by default till a strong being appears,
A strong being is the proof of the race and of the ability of
the universe.

Where he or she appears materials are overaw'd,
The dispute on the soul stops,
The old customs and phrases are confronted, turn'd back or laid
away.

SONG OF THE BROAD AXE

All parts away for the progress of souls,
All religion, all solid things, arts, governments,
All that was or is apparent upon this globe or any globe, falls

into niches and corners before the procession of souls along
the grand roads of the universe.

Of the progress of the souls of men and women

Along the grand roads of the universe, all other progress is the
needed emblem and sustenance.

Forever alive, forever forward,

Stately, solemn, sad, withdrawn, baffled, mad, turbulent, feeble,
dissatisfied,

Desperate, proud, fond, sick, accepted by men, rejected by men,

They go, they go! I know that they go, but I know not where
they go,

But I know that they go towards the best—toward something
great.

SONG OF THE OPEN ROAD

But I paint myriads of heads, but paint no head without its
nimbus of gold coloured light.

To You

In short, for Walt the supreme meaning and trend of
all things is towards the production of souls, of persons
and of great persons. He holds that nature shares in this
trend. It is the drift of the cosmic forces no less than the
criterion of the social process.

In this broad earth of ours,
Amid the measureless grossness and the slag,
Enclosed and safe within its central heart,
Nestles the seed perfection.

* * * * *

All, all for immortality,
Love like the light silently wrapping all,
Nature's amelioration blessing all,
The blossoms, fruits of ages, orchards divine and certain,
Forms, objects, growths, humanities, to spiritual things ripening
Give me, O God, to sing that thought,
Give me, give him or her I love this quenchless faith,
In Thy ensemble, whatever else withheld, withhold not from
us,
Belief in plan of Thee enclosed in time and space,
Health, peace, salvation universal.

Is it a dream?

Nay, but the lack of it the dream,
And failing it life's love and wealth a dream,
And all the world a dream.

SONG OF THE UNIVERSE

The other and complementary aspect of Whitman's spiritual message is fraternity, comradeship, friendship, love—the necessary medium for the development of the soul. Democracy to him means free scope for the realization of personality and the realization thereof through comradeship.

I will sing the song of companionship,

* * * * * *

I will write the evangel-poem of comrades and of love.

* * * * * *

Each is not for its own sake,

I say the whole earth and all the stars are for religion's sake

[By religion he means the bond of personal comradeship.]

My comrade!

For you to share with me true greatness, and a third one rising
exclusive and more resplendent,

The greatness of Love and Democracy, and the greatness of
religion.

STARTING FROM PAUMONOK

Yet underneath Socrates clearly see, and underneath Christ the
divine, I see,

The dear love of man for his comrade, the attraction of friend
to friend,

Of the well married husband and wife, of children and parents,
Of city for city and land for land.

THE BASE OF ALL METAPHYSICS

Come, I will make the continent indissoluble,

I will make the most splendid race the sun ever shone upon,

I will make the divine magnetic lands,

With the love of comrades,

With the life-long love of comrades,

I will plant companionship thick as trees along all the rivers
of America, and along the shores of the great lakes, and
all over the prairies,
I will make inseparable cities with their arms about each
other's necks,
By the love of comrades,
By the manly love of comrades.

FOR YOU, O DEMOCRACY

Through all Whitman's divagations, through his tiresome, tasteless catalogues and jumbles of words and phrases, and through his noble swelling rhythms, there beats the fervent and strong pulse of a mystic faith or insight, a supreme valuation of life. The meaning of democracy, of America, of the present and the future, is the realization of personality through free comradeship. Whitman includes all souls distorted, botched and weak, no less than symmetrical, fair and strong in the sweep of his all embracing sympathy and love. He affirms and reaffirms his faith in the essential goodness of the universe.

Whitman teaches that there are elective affinities between individuals, selective matings, discriminations. Nevertheless he seems sometimes to carry out his doctrine of the *identical worth* of all souls, all experiences, all physical facts, to the point of denying or overlooking the significance of moral, æsthetic and intellectual distinctions of value and individuality. Setting out to announce the worth of all souls and their right to free play and development, he often appears a leveler to the extent of proclaiming the identical significance of all souls, all qualities, good and evil alike, all experiences, fair and ugly alike, all deeds, noble and shameful alike. His all-inclusive tolerance and charity sometimes appear a lazy indifference to all distinctions.

But Whitman is not really blind to distinction. He does not mean to merge all differences in the welter of the commonplace and mediocre. He celebrates the strong person-

ality. There is an aristocratic strain in Whitman, but he differs from Nietzsche and similar hard aristocrats in that he holds that the greatest strength of personality, the noblest worth and highest distinction of soul, can be realized only through comradeship, through love. The essential burden of Whitman's message is very much that of Christ. Whitman is an uncouth democratic mystic. All his poetry is pervaded by a mystic sense of the unity and value of life amidst all its vanities, oddities and even meannesses. Democratic individuality or personal force and *camaraderie* are for him the two poles of the Universal Life.

His vision of the march of democracy toward more perfect men and women is overarched by the mystic rainbow of the Divine. He belongs in the company of the idealistic and pantheistic mystics.

Whitman regarded himself as the prototype and herald of a new race of men and women to appear in the Western world—a race of vigorous-bodied, rich-souled, noble-minded, affirmative, and exuberant personalities; a race full of physical and psychical energy, free from inhibitions, living intensely throughout the whole gamut of their capacities, a democracy of various and colorful individuals pulling together through free comradeship. "Fullness of living, grasping of opportunity, sympathy with man as man, the response to the booming chords of a continent open to all, the dynamic energy in the breast of the man who says, 'I can do that,' 'I can be that,' were caught at the very moment of hope by Walt Whitman."⁷

Whitman's vision of the democratic race of superior individuals has not been realized in America or elsewhere. On the contrary, the craze for a superior machine-made civilization has cast a blight over our cultural life. Since Whitman's day America has gone in wholeheartedly for mass production and standardization. There is indifference, if

⁷ *The Saturday Review of Literature*, Vol. II, No. 26, p. 505.

not positive hostility, to distinction, to marked individuality and variety. Everything is being standardized—manners, dress, amusements, recreations, literature, the drama, art, education and opinion. We have produced the fastest moving (in the mechanical and economic senses) and physically most prosperous and comfortable civilization extant, the most common schooled, one of the most literate and perhaps one of the most poverty-stricken in mental and spiritual creativeness. All the more reason is there for insisting on the significance of Whitman's message *now*.

Emerson, Whitman, and Lincoln—these mountain peaks of spiritual individuality—rebuke us and renew our courage and hope for democracy. If democracy could in a simpler age produce such men, can it not produce many such when we turn in disgust, as we are now turning, from the glut of standardized machine-made mediocrity and organized mental flatness to a concern for fullness and variety of mental life?

William James

With these three should be named William James. The basic undertone of his whole philosophy is emphasis on the sacredness, the unique and incomparable finality of the individual. James's ideal for America is that democracy here means a freer field for the individual. His rejection of the block-universe theory in metaphysics and his passionate insistence on the meaningful reality of change, on the dramatic character of life, have their roots in the same basic intuition.⁸ His deep appreciation of the varieties of religious experience springs from the same source. In what molds men into the same patterns—fixed institutions,

⁸ Cf. especially: "Great Men and their Environment" in *The Will to Believe*; "The Social Value of the College-Bred" and "Stanford's Ideal Destiny" in *Memories and Studies*; *Talks To Teachers on Psychology*.

unyielding dogmas, logical skeletons—James has no special interest. For him the significance and value of life is in the individual experient.

Salient Features of James's Philosophy

The following passages express the salient features of James's philosophy of life:⁹

1. *The social and ideal nature of the self.*

A tolerably unanimous opinion ranges the different selves of which a man may be "seized and possessed," and the consequent different orders of his self-regard, *in an hierarchical scale, with the bodily Self at the bottom, the spiritual Self at top, and the extracorporeal material selves and the various social selves between.* Our merely natural self-seeking would lead us to aggrandise all these selves; we give up deliberately only those among them which we find we cannot keep. Our unselfishness is thus apt to be a "virtue of necessity"; and it is not without all show of reason that cynics quote the fable of the fox and the grapes in describing our progress therein. But this is the moral education of the race; and if we agree in the result that on the whole the selves we can keep are the intrinsically best, we need not complain of being led to the knowledge of their superior worth in such a tortuous way. . . . In each kind of self, material, social, and spiritual, men distinguish between the immediate and actual, and the remote and potential, between the narrower and the wider view, to the detriment of the former and advantage of the latter. One must forego a present bodily enjoyment for the sake of one's general health; one must abandon the dollar in the hand for the sake of the hundred dollars to come; one must make an enemy of his present interlocutor if thereby one makes friends of a more valued circle; one must go without learning and grace, and wit, the better to compass one's soul's salvation.

Of all these wider, more potential selves, the potential social self is the most interesting, by reason of certain apparent paradoxes to which it leads in conduct, and by reason of its con-

⁹ All the passages which I quote will be found conveniently arranged in their contexts in *The Philosophy of William James*, selected, with introduction, by Horace M. Kallen.

nection with our moral and religious life. . . . All progress in the social self is the substitution of higher tribunals for lower; this ideal tribunal is the highest; and most men, either continually or occasionally, carry a reference to it in their breast. The humblest outcast on this earth can feel himself to be real and valid by means of this higher recognition. And, on the other hand, for most of us, a world with no such inner refuge when the outer social self failed and dropped from us would be the abyss of horror. I say "for most of us," because it is probable that individuals differ a good deal in the degree in which they are haunted by this sense of an ideal spectator. It is a much more essential part of the consciousness of some men than of others. Those who have the most of it are possibly the most religious men. But I am sure that even those who say they are altogether without it deceive themselves, and really have it in some degree. Only a non-gregarious animal could be completely without it. Probably no one can make sacrifices for "right," without to some degree personifying the principle of right for which the sacrifice is made, and expecting thanks from it. Complete social unselfishness, in other words, can hardly exist, complete social suicide hardly occur to a man's mind.¹⁰

2. *The significance of the individual.*

I am against bigness and greatness in all their forms, and with the invisible molecular moral forces that work from individual to individual, stealing in through the crannies of the world like so many soft rootlets, or like the capillary oozing of water, and yet rending the hardest monuments of man's pride, if you give them time. The bigger the unit you deal with, the hollower, the more brutal, the more mendacious is the life displayed.¹¹

Wherever a process of life communicates an eagerness to him who lives it, there the life becomes genuinely significant. Sometimes the eagerness is more knit up with the motor activities, sometimes with the perceptions, sometimes with the imagination, sometimes with reflective thoughts. But, wher-

¹⁰ *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 313-317. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Henry Holt and Co.

¹¹ William James, *The Letters of William James*, Vol. II, p. 90. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Little, Brown and Co.

ever it is found, there is the zest, the tingle, the excitement of reality; and there is "importance" in the only real positive sense in which importance ever anywhere can be. . . . And now what is the result of all these considerations and quotations? It is negative in one sense, but positive in another. It absolutely forbids us to be forward in pronouncing on the meaninglessness of forms of existence other than our own; and it commands us to tolerate, respect, and indulge those whom we see harmlessly interested and happy in their own ways, however unintelligible these may be to us. Hands off: neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed to any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from the peculiar position in which he stands. Even prisoners and sickrooms have their special revelations. It is enough to ask of each of us that he should be faithful to his own opportunities and make the most of his own blessings, without presuming to regulate the rest of the vast field.¹²

The Sacredness of Individuality. I wish I were able to make the second [essay in this volume], "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings," more impressive. It is more than the mere piece of sentimentalism which it may seem to some readers. It connects itself with a definite view of the world and of our moral relations to the same. . . . I mean the pluralistic or individualistic philosophy. According to that philosophy, the truth is too great for any one actual mind, even though that mind be dubbed 'the Absolute,' to know the whole of it. The facts and worths of life need many cognizers to take them in. There is no point of view absolutely public and universal. Private and uncommunicable perceptions always remain over, and the worst of it is that those who look for them from the outside never know where. The practical consequence of such a philosophy is the well-known democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality—is, at any rate, the outward tolerance of whatever is not itself intolerant. Religiously and philosophically, our ancient national doctrine of live and let live may prove to have a far deeper meaning than many people now seem to imagine it to possess.¹³

¹² William James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology*, p. 234. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Henry Holt and Co.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Preface, pp. v-vi.

Surely the individual, the person in the singular number, is the more fundamental phenomenon, and the social institution, of whatever grade, is but secondary and ministerial. Many as are the interests which social systems satisfy, always unsatisfied interests remain over, and among them are interests to which system, as such does violence whenever it lays hand upon us. The best Commonwealth will always be the one that most cherishes the men who represent the residual interests, the one that leaves the largest scope to their peculiarities.¹⁴

The first thing to learn in intercourse with others is non-interference with their own peculiar ways of being happy, provided those ways do not assume to interfere by violence with ours. No one has insight into all the ideals. No one should presume to judge them off-hand. The pretension to dogmatize about them in each other is the root of most human injustices and cruelties, and the trait in human character most likely to make the angels weep.¹⁵

3. *The ideal and the actual.*

But what, exactly, do we mean by an ideal? Can we give no definite account of such a word? To a certain extent we can. An ideal, for instance, must be something intellectually conceived, something of which we are not unconscious, if we have it; and it must carry with it that sort of outlook, uplift, and brightness that go with all intellectual facts. Secondly, there must be novelty in an ideal,—novelty at least for him whom the ideal grasps. Sodden routine is incompatible with ideality, although what is sodden routine for one person may be ideal novelty for another. This shows that there is nothing absolutely ideal: ideals are relative to the lives that entertain them. To keep out of the gutter is for us here no part of consciousness at all, yet for many of our brethren it is the most legitimately engrossing of ideals. . . . The significance of a human life for communicable and publicly recognizable purposes is thus the offspring of a marriage of two different parents, either of whom alone is barren. The ideals taken by themselves give no reality, the virtues by themselves no novelty. And let the Orientalists and pessimists say what they will, the

¹⁴ William James, *Memories and Studies*, p. 103. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Longmans, Green and Co.

¹⁵ William James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology*, pp. 265-301.

thing of deepest—or, at any rate, of comparatively deepest—significance in life does seem to be its character of progress, or that strange union of reality with ideal novelty which it continues from one moment to another to present. To recognize ideal novelty is the task of what we call intelligence. . . . Culture and refinement all alone are not enough to redeem life from insignificance. Ideal aspirations are not enough, when uncombined with pluck and will. But neither are pluck and will, dogged endurance and insensibility to danger enough, when taken all alone. There must be some sort of fusion, some chemical combination among these principles, for a life objectively and thoroughly significant to result. . . . The solid meaning of life is always the same eternal thing—the marriage, namely, of some unhabitual ideal, however special, with some fidelity, courage, and endurance; with some man's or woman's pains.—And, whatever or wherever life may be, there will always be the chance for that marriage to take place. . . . In this solid and tridimensional sense, so to call it, those philosophers are right who contend that the world is a standing thing, with no progress, no real history. The changing conditions of history touch only the surface of the show. The altered equilibriums and redistributions only diversify our opportunities and open chances to us for new ideals. But with each new ideal that comes into life, the chance for a life based on some old ideal will vanish; and he would needs be a presumptuous calculator who should with confidence say that the total sum of significances is positively and absolutely greater at any one epoch than at any other of the world.¹⁶

4. *The importance of nurturing and recognizing superior persons.*

The world . . . is only beginning to see that the wealth of a nation consists more than in anything else in the number of superior men that it harbors. In the practical realm it has always recognized this, and known that no price is too high to pay for a great statesman or great captain of industry. But it is equally so in the religious and moral sphere, in the poetic and artistic sphere, and in the philosophic and scientific sphere. Geniuses are ferments; and when they come together as they have done in certain lands at certain times, the whole population seems to share in the higher energy which they awaken.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 292–295, 300.

The effects are incalculable and often not easy to trace in detail, but they are pervasive and momentous. From the bare economic point of view the importance of geniuses is only beginning to be appreciated. How can we measure the cash-value to France of a Pasteur, to England of a Kelvin, to Germany of an Ostwald, to us here of a Burbank? One main care of every country in the future ought to be to find out who its first-rate thinkers are and to help them. Cost here becomes something entirely irrelevant, the returns are sure to be so incommensurable. . . . Geniuses are sensitive plants, in some respects like prima donnas. They have to be treated tenderly. They don't need to live in superfluity; but they need freedom from harassing care, they need books and instruments; they are always overworking, so they need generous vacations; and above all things they need occasionally to travel far and wide in the interests of their soul's development. Where quality is the thing sought after, the thing of supreme quality is cheap, whatever be the price one has to pay for it.¹⁷

The notion that a people can run itself and its affairs anonymously is now well known to be the silliest of absurdities. Mankind does nothing save through initiatives on the part of inventors, great or small, and imitation by the rest of us—these are the sole factors active in human progress. Individuals of genius show the way, and set the patterns, which common people then adopt and follow. *The rivalry of the patterns is the history of the world.* Our democratic problem thus is statable in ultra-simple terms: Who are the kind of men from whom our majorities shall take their cue? Whom shall they treat as rightful leaders? We and our leaders are the x and the y of the equation here; all other historic circumstances, be they economical, political, or intellectual, are only the background of occasion on which the living drama works itself out between us. In this very simple way does the value of our educated class define itself: we more than others should be able to divine the worthier and better leaders. The terms here are monstrously simplified, of course, but such a bird's-eye view lets us immediately take our bearings. In our democracy, where everything else is so shifting, we alumni and alumnae of the colleges are the only permanent presence that corresponds to the aristocracy in older countries. We have continuous tradi-

¹⁷ William James, *Memories and Studies*, "Stanford's Ideal Destiny," pp. 363-366.

tions, as they have; our motto, too, is *noblesse oblige*; and unlike them, we stand for ideal interests solely, for we have no corporate selfishness and wield no powers of corruption.¹⁸

All our arts and sciences and institutions are but so many quests of perfection on the part of men; and when we see how diverse the types of excellence may be, how various the tests, how flexible the adaptations, we gain a richer sense of what the terms "better" and "worse" may signify in general. Our critical sensibilities grow both more acute and less fanatical. We sympathize with men's mistakes even in the act of penetrating them; we feel the pathos of lost causes and misguided epochs even while we applaud what overcame them. Such words are vague and such ideas are inadequate, but their meaning is unmistakable. What the colleges—teaching humanities by examples which may be special, but which must be typical and pregnant—should at least try to give us, is a general sense of what, under various disguises, superiority has always signified and may still signify. The feeling for a good human job anywhere, the admiration of the really admirable, the disesteem of what is cheap and trashy and impermanent,—this is what we call the critical sense, the sense for ideal values. It is the better part of what men know as wisdom. . . .¹⁹

These are pithy expressions of the only social philosophy that an intelligent man can take seriously.

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¹⁸ William James, *Memories and Studies*, "The Social Value of the College-Bred," pp. 316-324.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 316-324.

CHAPTER XIX

THE ETHICAL OUTLOOK

The Greek and the Christian Ideals

We have surveyed the Greek, the Christian and the modern ethical concepts and ideals. What of the present and the future?

Ethical systems supposed to derive their authority and their content from systems of dogma assumed to be validated by isolated intrusions, by way of miraculous events and superhuman personalities from a supramundane realm; in other words, ethical systems which claim to be special revelations, have no compelling authority for minds imbued with the standpoint and methods of modern science and humanism.¹ Any system which, like the ancient and mediæval Christian system, starts from the initial assumption that God is a Being beyond the natural universe and man a being who cannot really know what is good, much less possess, the capacity to become virtuous except God reach down to him by a special revelation, by special acts of grace and by a miraculous infusion through sacraments and dogmas—is under suspicion by the mind imbued with the spirit of scientific method and humanism. Such a mind cannot admit with St. Augustine that the natural virtues are but glittering vices.

The point of view of humanism is that the good life con-

¹ I have said "supposed" to derive their content, because to a historical student it is evident that the content of Christian ethics is largely of Greek origin and in part, too, of Oriental origin.

sists in the development and harmonious functioning in all the activities of mental-historical culture, of the rational capacities of man. This fulfillment or energizing of function presupposes and expresses itself in a community which is ordered to further the good life. Harmonious energizing of one's capacities is the ethical maxim of humanism. The good or happiness is the *energeia psyche kat' arete kat' orthon logon en Bio teleio* (Aristotle), *the energizing of the soul according to virtue and right reason throughout the whole of life*. In all the above respects our humanistic ethics of to-day is the lineal descendant of Greek ethics. It is the legitimate offspring of the ethics of Plato and Aristotle. However, it would be a great error to suppose either: (1) That the humanism of to-day has no specifically Christian elements in it; or (2) that there is any irreconcilable opposition between Greek ethics and the ethical spirit of Jesus. Other factors besides Greek ethics influenced mediæval ethics. These we have sketched already.

If one consider what are the specifically Christian contributions to our ethical consciousness in the light of the history of ethics, we shall find them to be in part Greek, too, and we may regard them as universally human.

1. The ascetic note, the insistence on self-discipline and temperance, the subjection of fleshly impulses to the life of reason or spirit: this is a striking note of Plato's ethics, of Aristotle and the Stoics, even of the Epicureans. Indeed, as Dean Inge puts it, it is hard to see why a people who so highly regarded athletic discipline, and to whom Heracles and Theseus were heroes, should be represented as a sensuously self-indulgent people. In certain respects the Greek conception of self-control differed somewhat from the modern in the places where it puts the emphasis. Self-control and moderation with regard for time and circumstance, rather than abstinence, is the Greek ideal.

2. The value of suffering as a means of spiritual development: this note is decidedly stronger in Christian ethics than in Greek ethics, in part, because of the confident Christian faith in immortality, but chiefly because of the influence of Jesus and Paul. The voluntary death of Jesus has made a lasting impression on Western civilization. But Plato's conception of the suffering wise man anticipates the Christian conception. And the figure of Socrates, tried and executed for fealty to his spiritual mission, is an almost equally moving one. The great writers of Greek tragedy, Aeschylus and Sophocles, deal with the problem of unmerited suffering, much as did the writer of the book of Job.

3. It is said that the Greeks knew not the idea of sin, since this implies belief in a Perfect Holiness by which man measures his own weakness and recognizes his own wickedness. And it is true that the Christian conception of God's Holiness brings out, by contrast, a keener sense of human shortcomings.

The Christian Ideal of Holiness

There can be no doubt that the Christian ideal of goodness or holiness is deeper and more intense than any other. Christianity emphasizes two things in regard to the spiritual life: (a) the absolutely spiritual character of God; (b) the vocation of man is nothing short of the greatest possible spiritual likeness to God. The Christian pattern as embodied in Jesus is flawless in integrity, devotion, love. The Christ idea is the symbol of certain aspects of the highest human ideal. But here again Plato's conception of God as the Perfectly Good is in principle at one with the Christian conception.

It is sometimes asserted that the idea of duty or obligation was foreign to Greek ethics. This is absurdly false.

The concept, if not the word, is very marked in Plato. The word is prominent in Stoic ethics.

4. It is part of the Christian ethical conception that the vicarious suffering and death of the just and innocent redeems men from evil. The just man voluntarily sacrifices himself for his sinful fellow men and his vicarious suffering becomes the instrument of redemption. Men are at once rebuked and uplifted by his act. Jesus is the unexampled embodiment of this principle. The Christian thus believes that the Highest and Divinest shows these qualities by suffering with and for men. Here again Plato anticipates the Christian view. There is no disharmony. The Christian doctrine is the fulfillment of Platonism.

5. The Christian ethic is charged with a deeply optimistic outlook. Notwithstanding all human frailty and wickedness the Christian believes in the final triumph of justice and love. Thus faith in the supremacy of the moral and spiritual values gives hope and courage.

This optimism is based on the conviction that the eternal life, the enduring life, is the concern of the Supreme Power in the cosmos. The same great argument runs through the dialogues of Plato.

6. The most immediate and marked change in spiritual climate, when one passes from Greek ethics to Christian, is the paramountcy in the latter of the tenderer spiritual qualities. Christianity ennobles the emotional life in these respects: (*a*) The individual is good only in so far as he is humble and self-forgetting in spirit; (*b*) The greatest emphasis is laid on forgiveness, love, the spirit of fellowship, compassion. In contrast with the hardness and striving for self-sufficiency of the Stoic are the tenderness, compassion, humility and spirit of self-sacrifice of the Christian. Jesus and His true disciples put the gentler virtues in the foreground.

On the other hand, as Dean Inge well says, Seneca,

Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius seem half Christian. It cannot be questioned that the Christian faith gave a stronger impetus to the humanitarian tendencies of Greek philosophical culture. With its emphasis on the supremacy of the things of the spirit over the impulses of the flesh, its placing of the supreme value in the life of inward purity, integrity, love, the spirit of fellowship and self-forgetting service, it gave a new depth and intensity to the ethical spirit of Platonism. Above all else it was the firm conviction of the triumph of the Christlike life, the faith that this is the eternal Life in which man may participate, that gave to Christianity its pristine vigor. It is this conviction that still imbues it with an unexampled power to suffer and to do.

7. Finally the humanism of Plato (and Aristotle, too, in lesser intensity) implies the recognition of the transcendence of the sensuous by the spiritual in man. There is more in man than appears on the surface. Man's life begins on earth immersed in the sensuous. It rises out of the sensuous to the spiritual plane. This spiritual vocation brings him into communion with a Higher, with a transcendent, spiritual order.

What then of the future? This follows: *The improvement of the human lot, the realization by man of a deeper, richer, more satisfying and better integrated life depends on the development, by the dynamic of goodwill and the light of intelligence, of the capacities resident in human nature. In the light of history and science we must put our faith, not in any intervention from supramundane sources, but in the development and functioning of the spiritual powers immanent in human nature.*

Humanism

We shall be delivered from plague, pestilence and famine, from battle and from murder, from ignorance, superstition

and disease, from all the other remediable ills of human life, only by the concerted endeavors of the intensest intellectual energies, guided by devotion to making real the ideal of a better humanity. We shall be saved, as a race, if saved we are to be, by the godlike in man subduing man's own lower nature and mastering physical nature to its purposes. This is the ethical religion of humanity.

Unless man has the conviction that, as a uniquely worthwhile and responsible individual, he is more than a mere cog in the natural and industrial mechanism, modern civilization must go to smash, because of the forces which make for practical materialism, class struggle and the submergence of spiritual individuality. Jesus' ideal of the Reign of God has great significance here. It was a forecast of the ethical religion of humanity. It is conceived as a commonwealth of free and self-respecting persons living in fellowship. But the central principle in it is that man is a free and responsible member of an *Eternal Order*, that he is a child of the Eternal, that the Eternal is the Supreme Ethical Purpose which is expressed in the creation and development of free persons living in and for the spiritual values of integrity, purity, self-forgetting devotion to the absolute best, in communion with the Eternal and in the expectation of continuous progress toward spiritual perfection, as children of the Eternal into whose presence they come through service of spiritual values. If the modern man throws away this belief in an eternal life realized in devotion to and quest of the higher values of truth and spiritual perfection, if he be content to regard his own spirit as a mere result of mechanical forces, a transitory by-product of a blind dance of atoms, may not his social life degenerate into the hardness, rottenness and selfishness of an egoistic and class struggle for material goods alone, a struggle the more terrible and destructive because weaponed with the cunning devices of science? May not all the em-

ployments of man's leisure and powers of surplus production become ministrants merely to his senses? May not literature, art, journalism, theaters and movies become mere panderers to an animality that will be rotten and terrible, because, unlike the natural animality of the beasts, it will have degraded in its service the power of reason and of imaginative creative visioning, which man alone possesses among the animals, and the possession of which prevents him from becoming a mere animal? If he decline by refusing to live for ultimately spiritual values, man falls lower than the beasts that perish. For reason, imagination, spirit, are the most human, and, in man, the powers by which he comes into communion with and service of the superhuman values. *Corruptio optima pessima.*

PART III

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF
ETHICS

CHAPTER XX

MAN'S PRIME MOVERS

The logical starting point for ethics is a survey of the innate tendencies of human nature; that is, of original human nature before it has been modified by social nurture. The distinctions made between "nature" and "nurture," "instinct" and "training," the "innate" or *a priori* and the "acquired," features of human conduct all bring out these differences.

It is easy to make this distinction, but difficult to carry it out in detail. For example, when by intelligence tests it is sought to measure the inborn intelligence of children of various ages, how is one to separate the inborn powers from the acquired habits which already have given a specific training and bent to these powers? It is often urged against certain proposals, such as the socialization of industry, that they are contrary to human nature and therefore impracticable. But what *is* contrary to human nature? Is not "human nature" here the nature of man as it has already received a certain "set," by the molding power of the social environment in which the living generation has been nurtured? The comparative history of human societies shows a great and bewildering diversity of types of social organization and rules of conduct in regard to property, industry, marriage, personal rights and liberties, etc. One finds various forms and degrees of communism and tribal coöperation as well as various forms and degrees of individualism. One finds in regard to marriage, limited polygamy, poly-

andry, group marriage, as well as monogamy. In certain peoples the aged and helpless are killed or left to die. In others female infanticide has been practiced. The young were trained to lie and steal from the enemy in ancient Sparta. In Borneo head-hunting is a moral obligation. One need not go on with the enumeration of varied and contrary customs and practices. It suffices to say that one must be very careful not to assume that a certain mode of behavior or of social judgment which is in vogue in one's own community is the unchangeable expression of a conate impulse or instinct and that any different mode, with reference to the same subject matter, is of necessity contrary to human nature.

Again, it is assumed offhand with jaunty cocksureness that certain qualities are native to certain races—to the white and yellow races, respectively; or to the Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranean stocks of Europe, respectively. For example, it is said that the Nordic race is enterprising, individualistic, given to seafaring and adventure; whereas the Alpine stock is of a stay-at-home, sedentary, agricultural and coöperative type. The truth is, rather, that peoples living on or near the shores of the Baltic and the North Sea on rather poor land and in a cold and dreary climate would feel the urge from hunger, desire for booty and the opportunity afforded by the sea to become Viking adventurers and pirates.

Human nature, at the outset of its social career, consists of certain innate dispositions or tendencies to perceive, feel and act in more or less specific ways, and of certain non-specific or general tendencies which become specialized through social training. These congenital powers are the prime movers of human conduct and the raw materials of human personality. All education or nurture, whether physical or moral and intellectual, consists in the organization and fixation into habits of the innate tendencies by ap-

propriate physical and social stimuli—*repressors, inhibitors and directors in the way of patterns of action, feeling and thinking.*

Every native disposition is psycho-physical; in other words, it involves at once the bodily or physiological processes and the concomitant psychical or mental processes. This is not the place to consider the metaphysical problem of the ultimate relation of the mental and physical. It will suffice us for the present purpose to take as our working hypothesis the *concomitance* of mental processes and bodily processes. Since we are concerned here primarily with the problems of human valuation and the organization of human ends as directors of conscious activity, emphasis will be laid chiefly on the sentient and conscious aspect of the parallelism.

Meanings of Terms

A good deal of confusion prevails in the discussion of man's prime movers, or natural dispositions to feel, act and think; because of the lack of agreement among writers as to the meanings of the terms used to designate them—such terms as *instinct, impulse, feeling, emotion, desire, and sentiment*. I shall use these terms in the following senses:

Impulse-feeling, in the inclusive sense, is the name for all the native tendencies to act and feel. *Impulse*, in the narrower sense, is a single or simple reflex tendency to act in response to a stimulus, the tendency not involving a well-defined perception or emotion; examples are sneezing, coughing, winking, defensive movements such as shrinking back, striking out, running away, etc.

Instinct is a term used rather loosely and in a variety of senses. MacDougal, in his *Social Psychology*, defines instinct as follows: "An inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and pay attention to objects of a certain class, to experience an

emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least to experience an impulse to such an action."

In his *Principles of Psychology* (Vol. II, p. 384), William James defines instinct as: "A faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance."

Thus, according to MacDougal's definition, flight, repulsion, pugnacity, and sex reactions are instincts; but imitativeness, suggestibility, sympathy, the play impulse, are not instincts; whereas according to James's definition the latter, too, are instincts. Whether we shall narrow instinct down to *specific innate tendencies* to perceive, respond to and feel in specific ways in response to specific stimulations; or include under the term *the more generic innate tendencies* is a matter of choice. It seems to me more in harmony with the prevailing usage, and not confusing, to employ the term *instinct* in the more restricted sense.

I shall use the term *instinct* to cover inborn powers or dispositions to perform specific actions without first learning how. And, on the other hand, I shall use the term *capacity* for innate powers to learn how to acquire various kinds of ability. For example, a duckling swims, a chick pecks by *instinct*. They do not have to learn how. A boy has *capacity* to learn how to ride a bicycle, drive an automobile, skate, or speak and write a language. Animal behavior is determined almost entirely by instincts.¹ Human behavior is determined chiefly by native capacity, as molded or shaped by the action of the social environment and of

¹ Animals, however, easily learn certain things. Young wild animals and birds easily become tame and fearless in the presence of human beings; domesticated animals easily become wild. The higher animals can be easily trained. But the range of things they can be trained to do is small and the period of educability brief.

the individual's own intelligence. The fact that man is a suggestible and self-conscious being, susceptible to social stimulation and possessed of the inventive and creative power of intelligence, means that the native powers of man are vastly more plastic than the native powers of animals. This greater plasticity of man applies to his specific instincts, as well as to his general capacities. The question has been argued whether man has more or fewer instincts than the animals nearest him in the scale. I think he has not fewer instincts, and he has more capacities. As Lloyd Morgan puts it: "There is probably more unlearned ability in man than there is in any other organism, as there is more innate capacity for learning new forms of behavior."

Whatever be the phylogenetic relation between men and the anthropoid apes, man is very different in his original nature from his so-called simian cousins. The true nature of any living organism, namely, that which it has in it to be, can only be understood in the light of that which it has become and is becoming. In the light of what he has become, and is becoming, man is a being of plastic capacities, endowed with the powers of productive imagination and creative intelligence, who realizes his true nature in systems of social culture; through the medium of language, customs, arts and sciences, philosophies and religions, which he has created or discovered; which are expressions of his creative intelligence or spiritual urges; which at once express his never-dying striving for more life and fuller, and in their concrete forms are the indispensable conditions by which he realizes more life and fuller.

Man Not a Machine

Man is never merely a mechanical *bundle* of capacities and instincts. His native capacities are capable of all sorts

² See Lloyd Morgan, *British Journal of Psychology*, Voll. 12, Part I, pp. 1-30.

of complications, sublimations, irradiations. His instincts and capacities may even lapse, if they do not find occasion for expression at the suitable time. They may become perverted, twisted, or submerged, by failure to find the right mode of expression. Man is preëminently the educable animal, because of the great plasticity of all his native impulses. Man has many more native dispositions than has any other animal, and these dispositions are capable of multiform complexities and variations, produced by the individual's reactions to the variety of stimuli and patterns of responses which obtain in human society.

In attempting to enumerate and describe the innate tendencies of human nature the chief difficulty lies in the fact that the student, in considering his own nature and that of his fellows, is already a creature of *habits*. His original tendencies have already been canalized. Therefore he is in danger of identifying human nature as he knows it with all its habits of reactions in behavior and feeling and ideation, as the original human nature. Even adult human nature is subject to change. This we could all see by comparing the behavior of adults before and during and after the Great War. How much more changeable then is the human nature of a newborn baby?

The temptation of those who confuse habit and native tendency is to suppose that man is born with a very definite set of impulsive tendencies which cannot be altered by the environment. The opposite fallacy is to suppose that the infant individual is capable of indefinite development by environmental influence, that human nature can be almost completely changed, regardless of its determinate biological inheritance. The truth lies somewhere between these extreme views. As James wisely said, instincts (he used the term in an inclusive sense) are transitory. Whatever their originating causes, instincts normally issue in habits. This purpose once accomplished, the instincts as such have no

raison d'être in the psychical economy, and consequently fade away. There is a happy moment for fixing each impulsive tendency in a useful direction. There is an unhappy moment for thwarting or twisting an impulsive tendency in the wrong direction. Fear, pugnacity, self-assertiveness, artistic capacity, sex love and intellectual capacity, may be caught and developed in the happy way or may be thwarted, twisted or suppressed; to the great loss of the community and the unhappiness of the individual.

On the other hand much time and energy may be wasted on the attempted development of a capacity that is not there. You cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. There are impassable limits to individual development set by the innate or inherited nature of the individual.

We must admit, I think, that the career of the individual is predetermined largely in the chromosomes of the fertilized ovum.

In enumerating the chief native springs of human conduct, and commenting upon the social bearing of these, I want it understood that I am not attempting an exhaustive list. I shall enumerate only those native dispositions that seem to be of primary importance for the theory of human values, and the social order.

The question of the number of distinct native human dispositions is one of the most debatable and debated questions in biology, psychology and sociology. It is a very important problem, since on the answer to it must depend very largely our educational policy. It were useless and foolish, nay, a crime against humanity to attempt to eradicate a strong native instinct. Such attempts inevitably result in mental and social disorder. Education must be concerned with the cultivation, the refinement and organization of the native impulses into socially useful and individually beneficent interests and purposes.

On the other hand, it is a dangerous undertaking to

attempt to block genuine progress in human education and social adjustment by asserting that every interest or activity which functions now in our own social order has its unchangeable basis in a distinct and unmodifiable instinct. Men speak of the *acquisitive instinct*, the *property instinct*, the *instinct of pugnacity*, as though these were ineradicable and even immitigable elements of original human nature, capable of very little modification. But, even in our present society, many individuals scarcely manifest these so-called instincts at all.

Again, the so-called *constructive instinct* is simply a manifestation of the impulse of *self-expression*, which is not specific but takes on manifold forms according to the environing social situations and stimuli. I conclude that *man has but few, if any, instincts in the sense of unlearned and ineradicable dispositions to do specific things, and that he has much innate capacity to respond to a great variety of stimuli*. Man is, up to mature manhood, very plastic, susceptible to suggestion and imitative. He has, in his intelligence, the most plastic capacity possessed by any animal.³ Many of the instincts attributed to man⁴ are the habits of reaction engendered by the response of his plastic being to the stimuli.

Human Instincts

There are but four well-marked instincts in the sense of specific innate tendencies to act and to feel. These are: (1) The instinct of *self-preservation*, with all its variations of self-defense, flight, repulsion, self-assertion. This instinct culminates, under appropriate nurture, in the sentiment or organized attitude of *self-respect*, which involves self-control and self-direction—the moral essence of indi-

³ We refuse to accept Bergson's antithesis between intelligence and intuition.

⁴ By Wm. McDougall, for example, in his *Social Psychology*.

viduality. (2) The *sex instinct*, which is concerned with the continuance of the species. It is accompanied by a unique feeling—a form of tender feeling. (3) The *parental instinct* is a true instinct, though its native strength varies much and it is more easily modified or sublimated by the influence of cultural conditions. It is accompanied by a unique tender feeling, which is enhanced by the weakness of the young. Filial feeling is the reciprocal of parental feeling and of the care exercised by the parents. (4) The *gregarious instinct*, the instinct to seek the companionship of one's kind. The recognition of who are members of one's kind changes. It grows from those who are blood-kin to those who are neighbors, to those who speak the same language and have the same traditions and customs, to those who are members of the same political state or of the same church; finally, it includes all human beings, or perhaps even all living beings. But, in all its forms, it is the innate tendency to fraternize with those who share in the same type of life, interests, outlook. The emotional aspect of gregariousness is the original of the feeling of intellectual or imaginative sympathy—*with-feeling, fellow-feeling*. The depth and range of mental sympathy depend upon the depth and range of recognition of fellow-feeling. One has more fellow-feeling for the members of one's family or for those who think, feel and believe with oneself on fundamental matters of interest. The interests that are regarded as fundamental may be therefore profession or business, art or science, politics or religion. But family feeling or love is a deeper and intenser feeling than sympathy. It is tender feeling which fuses with sympathy.

Some writers argue for instincts of *humility* or *self-abasement* and of *obedience to leaders*. I do not think these are true instincts. Self-abasement is a social consequence of the original weakness, or the weakening under adverse social conditions, of the instinct of self-assertion.

The impulse to follow a leader is the product of gregarious feeling, coupled with the absence of self-assertion. In its more developed forms it presupposes conscious recognition of the necessity of a leader for the purpose in hand and of the presence of the quality of leadership in the person followed. The influence of *prestige suggestion* is very great in leading human beings as members of a clan, a crowd or a state to follow dominant personalities.

Human beings differ in the native strength of their instinct of self-assertion; they are more and less sensitive to the voice of the group and fearful of isolation. Moreover social conditions determine very largely whether a man shall have any opportunity to assert himself as a leader. A leader of thought may have no occasion to lead in public affairs. A man who is a subordinate in a large business establishment may show qualities of leadership in the woods, in a post of danger, where there are few.

Capacities

In addition to the congenital specific ways of responding to specific kinds of stimuli there are certain nonspecific congenital tendencies, capacities to respond to a greater variety of stimuli. The chief of these capacities, from the social point of view, seem to me to be the following:

1. Suggestibility.
2. Imitativeness.
3. Self-expression.
4. Organic sympathy.
5. Feeling of obligation.
6. Thought, intelligence or rationality.

1. *Suggestibility*

By this I mean the tendency of human individuals to accept propositions, practical or otherwise, to act or refrain from action at the suggestion of other individuals without

reflective consideration of the grounds of their acceptance, or of the desirability, wisdom or rightness of so doing.

Man is a highly suggestible animal, even more suggestible than he is rational. This is especially the case with children who, not yet having formed definite habits of action, are very responsive to suggestion, or when they are in a contrary mood, to contrary suggestions. The spread of fashions in dress, speech, conduct and even emotions are due chiefly to suggestion, not to rational imitation. In fact, imitation, which has been made the basis of social life by Tarde, Baldwin and others, is, in many of its forms, really a form of suggestion. For the deliberately conscious or rational adoption by an individual of a fashion of dress, speech or conduct from other individuals is the result of an act of choice, and where imitative action does occur without deliberation it is a result of suggestion. Suggestion works, of course, only where the individual to whom it is made has either an innate or acquired tendency to carry out the act suggested. What I wish to bring out here is: (1) Action from suggestion is distinct from rational imitation. It is nonvoluntary imitation. (2) Suggestibility is a general or nonspecific tendency to do a great variety of things for no other reason than that they are suggested by others.

Professor McDougall's definition of suggestion seems to me adequate. He says: "Suggestion is a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance." Individuals differ greatly in their degree of suggestibility. The most suggestible, of course, are persons in a state of hypnosis, sleep or nervous disintegration, those deficient in organized knowledge and insight, those deficient in individuality and self-assertiveness. Little children are highly suggestible. The two forms of suggestion which have become most potent in

modern society are those of the printed page and the movie. Mass suggestion or crowd suggestion has always been a potent agency. But, as crowds have increased with the rapid growth of urban population and the multiplication of societies and groups, the power and range of mass suggestion has increased. This is true even of university students. The printed page—and more recently the moving picture—confronts one everywhere, and the great substitutes for thinking which many people use to-day are the *ipse dixits*, the “I say so’s,” of the newspapers and the popular magazine. The suggestive power of ancient institutions, such as the Roman Catholic Church, or of prominent and influential personages are great. This “prestige suggestion” as McDougall calls it, is a chief source of the authority wielded by institutions and individuals. An individual eminent in physics or chemistry or politics will be quoted as a great authority on psychology or philosophy.

2. Imitation

The innate tendency to imitate other persons, which has been used by Tarde and others as a sort of universal key to social organization, is a blanket name for a variety of tendencies. One does not consciously imitate unless one has an impulse or desire to achieve a certain end; then one imitates processes by which one observes that other persons achieve the same end. For example, I have never had any strong impulse to imitate a tightrope walker, or one who shoots the whirlpool rapids in a barrel; but when I see a good golfer at play I have sometimes an overmastering impulse to imitate him because I am a poor golfer and want to be a good one. *Per contra*, if I see an individual fail and make himself ridiculous, I have an impulse to do the opposite. Young people imitate their heroes and heroines. This is imitation through “prestige suggestion.”

Again, the physiological and psychological process of

sympathy, what McDougall calls "the sympathetic induction of emotion," which has its roots in similar specifications of the instinctive dispositions on the part of individuals, leads to imitative actions. Other imitative actions are due to the ideo-motor and impulsive character of human nature. By this I mean that every one has tendencies, whether native or acquired, to feel an act in a certain way so that the observation of that type of action in another suggests it to oneself.

I have already referred to deliberative or self-conscious imitation. This occurs when we deliberately adopt some admired person as our model or hero. Thus, voluntary or deliberate imitation is not due to an imitative impulse. Involuntary imitation is not distinguishable from suggestion.

3. *Self-Expression*

The innate tendency towards self-expression varies in degree but it is present in all individuals. It might be regarded as a mode of self-preservation, but this would be unduly stretching the meaning of the latter term. We are psycho-physical beings and impulsively seek to express our feelings and ideas. I think that language, play and art of all forms are due to the combination of this instinctive tendency with gregariousness and self-assertion. According to Herbert Spencer, play is the expression of a surplus of nervous energy. According to Karl Groos, "play is the anticipatory preparation for the serious business of life." Play tendencies represent the rapid ripening of innate capacities which are useful for biological adaptations. This theory is probably in part true. It may be reconciled with Spencer's theory of surplus nervous energy by saying that the surplus nervous energy is present wherever there is a high degree of innate adaptive power, but it will not fully account for human play or the development of the fine arts. Man is an ideo-motor and a social being.

He must express himself, and he craves most strongly to do so in the actual or imagined presence of his fellows. It seems to me therefore that the higher forms of play and the fine arts and letters are primarily instruments of social expression. The impulse of rivalry or emulation also enters strongly into play, less so into the arts. Self-expression is one of the strongest of our native impulses.

4. *Organic Sympathy*

The emotion of sympathy may be distinguished from fellow-feeling, the emotional concomitant of gregariousness. Fellow-feeling is the emotion aroused by the perception of beings in whom we recognize a fundamental and interesting likeness to ourselves. I have, for instance, a fellow-feeling towards members of my own people or nationality, especially if I meet them in a foreign country. I have a fellow-feeling for the members of my own profession, Church or political party. I have a fellow-feeling towards university men. I have a vaguer fellow-feeling for human beings in contrast with nonhuman beings. Thus fellow-feeling involves both likeness and contrast.

Organic sympathy, on the other hand, is a native tendency of the organism to be aroused to feel for another being without any imaginative reconstruction of his state of feeling. This is a sort of organic resonance aroused by the sight of experiences that appear very painful or very pleasurable.⁵ There can be full sympathy only in so far as one can form an idea of how another feels and thinks and thus can reproduce in oneself a similar ideational and affective state. Imaginative or intellectual sympathy presupposes possible similarity of

⁵ This is what McDougall calls "the sympathetic induction of emotion." It is quite different from the mental or intellectual sympathy which is otherwise called fellow feeling and is the affective aspect of gregariousness.

thought and feeling. The act of sympathy presupposes an imaginative reconstruction. There are native differences in individuals in this regard as in others. There are differences that result from differences in the whole ideational and emotional set which arise from differences in the interests and habits developed. It is impossible for one who is not a scholar, by either native interest or training, to sympathize with a scholar.

5. *Feeling of Obligation*

Individuals differ in their native capacity to develop a sense of obligation or duty. Some are born to be very conscientious, others to be moderately conscientious, others to have little sense of duty. This capacity, from which develops under suitable conditions the sense of obligation, is educed by varying conditions. To the majority it comes with the increased social sensitiveness of adolescence, to some not until later, when they are sobered by some crisis in their own lives or the lives of their families and friends.

As we shall see, presence of this native capacity to feel obligation, to become conscientious or have a strong sense of duty, is the psychological basis of the doctrine that the feeling of obligation, the conviction that one ought to do one's duty simply because it is one's duty, is the innate and sufficient basis of ethics.

6. *Capacity for Thought*

Capacity for thought, for reproductive and creative imagining and reasoning. This is quite as truly a native impulse as any other. It varies much in the individual. It has its own organic accompaniments. It is capable of being developed in a variety of directions. By thought and imagination I mean the power to analyze, discriminate, generalize and organize or synthesize into new images and con-

cepts the materials supplied by experience. Thought or reason is part of man's native endowment and the most important of all his capacities. It includes reproductive and creative imagination as well as the power of abstract thinking.

The native tendencies—the prime movers of human nature—are never mere mechanical motor impulses. They are motor tendencies—inborn impulses to react to the environment. But action is always accompanied by feeling. It arises and ends in an affective process. It is always accompanied by cognition. It begins in a dim or vague perception which changes into a more definite perception as action is carried out. The result of action is a perception which leaves a memory image. Images are compared and general ideas are formed. Thus beliefs and expectations arise.

At first indefinite and vague, cognition becomes definite and clear through action. Ideas in regard to persons, things and relations are built up in the process of human behavior. The development of the human individual is just as much a cognitive and affective or emotional development as it is a motor development.

We distinguish, for purposes of analysis and description, between "motor impulses," "feelings" and "ideas." But we must not be misled by this distinction into the supposition that muscular movement is prior and basic, feeling and thought merely subsequent and derivative. The self is a living whole all through its career. Movement, feeling and thought are aspects of this whole. A human self cannot be moved by pure thought alone. There is no such thing. But on the other hand, a self is never a set of merely mechanical reflexes. We have no sufficient grounds for saying that in man thought or feeling are merely products of muscular movement, nor for saying the converse.

The self is an organic unity from the beginning of his

career. He becomes that reflective self-determining unity which is called a person or rational and social individual, through the organization of his native tendencies; first under the guidance of the social patterns of belief and conduct, and second under the guidance of the growing sentiment of self-respect and the formation of ideals or personally formed purposes and values.

All feelings or affective states are immediate or basic psychical exponents of the ways in which the individual organism is affected by external stimuli or by the repression, suppression, or expression of its own dynamic tendencies. Feeling is the difference, the meaning that any experience has for the individual psycho-physical organism. Therefore feeling is the very matrix, the mother liquor of selfhood.

Pleasure and pain are the simplest and most general affective qualities. They are not psychical complexes but attributes or qualities of psychical complexes, indicative of what agrees or disagrees with some impulse, appetite, interest or habit of the individual. Thus their range is as wide as the range of psychical life. There are the pleasures and pains of muscular activity and rest, hunger, thirst, sex, ambition, art, play, intellectual activity, social intercourse, self-assertion, self-sacrifice, communion with God. Pleasures and pains indicate what the self is and is becoming since they indicate in what interests and activities the self is satisfied or dissatisfied.

The term *emotion* is somewhat loosely used. The best usage is as follows: An emotion is the feeling which accompanies the inception, progress, satisfaction or thwarting of either a single innate impulse or of any complex disposition built up from innate impulses. An emotion is, in short, a single process of the affective and conative life. It is simply the inner or felt aspect of a single mode of behavior. A primary emotion such as fear, anger, sex-

feeling or parental emotion is the affective concomitant of a specific native form of activity. A secondary emotion, such as romantic love, love for a friend, sorrow, joy, sympathy in the sense of feeling for another, indignation, reverence, intellectual emotion of wonder, is the affective concomitant of a more complex form of behavior which has been built up by the organization of several native tendencies.

It is not necessary for our purpose to discuss the question whether emotion is a by-product of muscular behavior or not. Whether we run away because we feel afraid or feel afraid because we run away. I may say that I think we do both. We run away from incipient fear. If we escape successfully our fear dies out. If we fail we become more afraid or if we become too afraid we may fail to escape. Emotion seems to me to exist chiefly as an incitement to action or to restraint of action whenever this is better for the organism and as an urge to the completion of action. We feel emotion only when some capacity of the organism is seeking expression or when the well-being of the organism or some communal group to which it belongs is in danger.

The *sentiments* are the highly organized dispositions or permanent attitudes of the individual to feel and act in specific ways in specific situations. The sentiments have been built up by the interaction and fusion of the native feeling-impulses with specific complexes of ideas which represent, in images and concepts, established habitudes of thought and action. Examples of the sentiments are *self-respect, romantic love, family affection, friendship, reverence, admiration, patriotism, the intellectual sentiment or love of knowledge, the æsthetic sentiments* of beauty, grandeur, sublimity, the *ethical sentiments* of justice, integrity, honesty, self-control, sympathy, service of others.

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There is a voluminous literature in the current controversy over instinct. At the two extremes are those who hold that man has many specific instincts and those who deny that he has any, asserting that all so-called instincts are habits arising from conditioned reflexes. Representatives of the former view are: William James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, Chaps. XXIV; William McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, 8th ed., Chaps. II, IV, X, XIV; supplementary Chap. II.

Representative of the opposite view are: John B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, Chap. VIII; Floyd H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, Chap. III; L. L. Bernard, *Instinct*.

Various mediating positions are found in: Albert G. A. Balz, *The Basis of Social Theory*; John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*; Irwin Edman, *Human Traits and their Social Significance*; W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and its Remaking*; C. C. Josey, *The Social Philosophy of Instinct*; E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, Vol. I. See also James Drever, *Instinct in Man*; W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*; and Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, Chaps. I-VI.

I take a mediating position. I do not think it a plausible contention to identify all instincts with habits and thus to regard man, at the outset of his career, as an indefinitely plastic organism, capable of indefinite molding. To assert, for example, that there are no specific and persistent sex and parental instincts seems to me to fly in the face of overwhelming evidence. On the other hand, McDougall and others exaggerate both the fixity and the number of instinctive dispositions.

Further references will be found in Allport and Bernard.

CHAPTER XXI

NEW LIGHT ON THE INDIVIDUAL

While the line of progress in ethical thought and its applications in social practice has been, in Western civilization, in the direction of a fuller and more general recognition of the worth of the individual and, consequently, the enlargement of opportunity for the individual, it is only quite recently that the complex nature of the individual has begun to be fully appreciated. In the older works on ethics, with the exception of Plato and Aristotle, Shaftesbury and Butler, the complexity of the individual is scarcely recognized. It seems a curious phenomenon when we look back from our present vantage ground to find such simple and abstract conceptions of man in the ethic of Kant as that which appears in his sharp opposition of duty and inclination, reason and feeling and his doctrine that man knows always what is right and can do it if he will. Butler and the English ethicists generally have a keener appreciation of the complex economy of human nature and the part played by feeling impulses in the determination of conduct. Hegel sees, to the point of exaggeration, the social nature of personality. He has little appreciation of the biological foundations of conduct.

To-day, thanks chiefly to biology and biological psychology, we see that our ethical doctrines and practical precepts must be reconstructed. Without going into details or overburdening this chapter with references I shall sketch the new conception of human nature from which a scientifically grounded ethics must start.

Man inherits, as a consequence of the long evolution of the life-urge which has reached its most conscious and most complex expression in the human organism, a considerable number of innate *impulse-feelings*, of *instincts* and *capacities* or biological tendencies—all of which at some time in his long developmental history must have begun to be of signal value in enabling the organism to adapt itself to its surroundings and to increase and multiply.

Man is a dynamic being more variously and supplely dynamic than any machine. He is, first and last, a complex living organism consisting of a very elaborate mechanism of powers to respond to environmental stimuli. He is quite plastic, which means that his impulses may be developed into automatic habits of action in a considerable variety of ways to meet a variety of situations. All these innate drives or mechanisms have been developed and improved as instruments to promote the life-urge of the individual and through the individual the life of the species. The native impulses of man are at first *unconscious*. When the appropriate situation or stimulation arouses one of them to action he becomes conscious of it. As he satisfies the impulse a *desire* emerges which reinforces the impulse by a consciousness of its end or outcome. He forms by repetition a habit; or rather that habit becomes an element in the *self*, *which is the whole complex of his impulses transformed in the manners determined by the physical and social environment*. But the environment too is complex. The social situation may thwart or repress a given impulse; for instance, a fear impulse, an anger impulse, a self-assertive impulse or a sex impulse. Then the impulse, which was on the way to satisfaction, may be repressed, either temporarily or permanently. If the impulse be very strong and the repression permanent its repression may produce a psychosis, which will become a division in the personality—a divided self. *The life-urge in man seeks wholeness,*

integration, harmony. But suppression or repression are necessitated by the moral customs and rules, which are the accepted conditions of a stable group life. Every self must suffer repression of some of its impulses. If the repression persists it becomes *suppression* and suppression is dangerous to the integrity of the individual life—the individual life-urge which is the self. There is only a difference in degree, not in kind between the repressions which normal individuals must suffer and the suppressions which lead to a divided personality (schizophrenia). Disordered personalities, the multiform insanities called dementia præcox, etc., are only extreme and fixed cases of what occurs to all of us every day.

The happy way, the way that furthers social adaptation, of the primitive impulses, is that where and when, in their primitive forms their satisfaction is socially undesirable for the individual in his given situation, the impulses shall be *sublimated*. Sex impulse, in sublimated form, becomes an impetus to creative art and to various social ends. The impulses of anger, and self-assertion can be sublimated into righteous indignation, courage to fight for justice, self-respect and self-control.

Education is the community's method of socializing the individual. It is the instinctive sources of psychic energy which are, in the last resort, the raw materials of the whole educational process. The way in which the material is handled determines the subsequent life history of the individual concerned.

The dynamic material, we have seen, is never destroyed. Repression does not annihilate the impulse, but merely forces it to seek an indirect or substitutive outlet. It is the business of education to guide the choice and formation of that outlet. It is essential to the interests of the community, of the social setting, which is a necessary condition of self-development, that the energy belonging to instinctive

impulse be utilized to the utmost in channels which subserve social ends. As Ernest Jones has expressed it: "The weaning of the child to external and social interests and considerations, which is the essence of sublimation, is perhaps the most important single process in the whole of education."¹

Ethical theory and ethical practice must be based on man's actual nature. The ethicist must clear his mind entirely of the dualistic notion that certain impulses are, in themselves, good or bad. He must get rid of the idea that that action only is morally good that is performed from a conscious and deliberate choice of certain ends and all other action is bad. He must recognize that human conduct is almost entirely the result of: *first*, the *unconscious impulses* which constitute the organism's life-urge its dynamic being; and *second*, of *habits* formed, *interests* and *ideals* developed, by the interaction of impulse and environmental stimuli. He must recognize that the struggle between good and evil, right and wrong, is the expression of the conflicts which arise between the innate impulses, which are the self at the outset of its career, and the social patterns of conduct. He must recognize that the social patterns may be good, as furthering the sublimation and integration of the native impulses, thus leading to the development of a harmonious and well-adapted self; or that they may be bad, because they are survivals from a past in which biology and psychology, human and natural, were not understood and that they may thwart the integrity of the self, thus injuring the individual and subtracting from the psychic wealth of the community.

In view of the new knowledge of man summarized above, the ethical doctrines of the past are inadequate. Their difference in adequacy is one of degree. Neither hedonism

¹ *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, p. 608, quoted from Israel Levine, *The Unconscious*, pp. 146-147.

nor rationalism and asceticism are valid, although hedonism perhaps has more truth in it than rationalism. The theory of self-realization is too subjective, in its classical forms, but it comes nearest to being an adequate theory. It requires less modification to become adequate.

The previous outline raises the question whether, from the point of view of scientific ethics, there is any place for the concepts of moral freedom and responsibility. The possibility of an *ethics*, in distinction from a *social mechanics* of human conduct, presupposes that there is possible for man a power of choice and therefore that the individual is a responsible being. But, if the individual is at the highest level of his being nothing but a complex mechanism of unconscious impulses which have been involved in the long blind trial and error process of evolution; and second, as a social product, is but the passively molded resultant of the action of social situations on his innate drives, is it not sheer nonsense to speak of moral freedom and responsibility? Before we discuss this question it will be best to consider in some detail the organization of the self.

The error to which those who think they find a complete clue to human conduct and nature in biological analysis are most prone is that of reducing the self to a bundle or collection of reaction-patterns—whether instincts, impulses, reflexes, or systems of electrons makes no essential difference. *The self is at all stages in its career, and whether normal or abnormal, sane or insane, a living unity or integral whole which strives, both consciously and unconsciously, to maintain and enhance its integral wholeness. The fundamental principle of selfhood or personality is the dynamic principle of organization.* This principle can be recognized even in the compensatory delusions and other defense-mechanisms of the mentally disordered. It follows that one cannot adequately conceive the activity of the self in terms of such wooden patterns as mechanical stimulus

and response. A self is divided by the whole diameter of being from a penny-in-the-slot machine. The thorough-going mechanistic psychologist wears a pair of fashionable mental blinders which prevent him from seeing any self, even his own, as it really works.²

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² The significance of *Gestalt-Psychologie* lies just here, in its recognition that in cognition and action the self functions in terms of totalities.

CHAPTER XXII

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

All the original dispositions of the self and all their modifications, refinements and elaborations have social reference. They are the concrete substance of rational and social individuality, or personality.

Thus impulse-feelings are built up into complex systems of *desires* which have their bodily basis in habits of behavior. The physical environment imposes certain modes of behavior. The social group imposes many more definite modes of behavior and restraint of behavior upon the individual because it has become the group tradition that the accepted action patterns and patterns of inhibition are conducive to the welfare of the group. The individual conforms, since he is endowed with that sensitiveness to the voice of the group which is manifested in gregariousness and suggestibility. Moreover, as we have seen, action for the welfare of the group is already implanted deep in the individual through the very instincts which have to do with the continuance of the species. The beginnings of social morality are found in sex impulses and the capacity for parental care.

But such social patterns would never arise, nor would the individual ever question their value, were there not a further capacity in the human individual—the power of reflective thinking or reasoning. Reflective thinking includes the capacity to form new imaginative constructions, as well as conceptual or abstract notions, by the breaking up and combining into new patterns of the routine of ex-

perience which is restored through reproductive imagination or memory. Thought includes creative imagination, generalization, reasoning and creative conception.

This power of creative imagination and thought is the greatest power that man possesses. Through it he alters his physical environment and through it he creates and re-creates social environments. Thought is thus the most powerful and far-reaching instrument for human adaptation to the conditions of existence—the surest means for the expression and satisfaction of the life-urge in the individual and the species.

Impulse-feelings and the desires and aversions that arise from them are specific and distinct from one another. They may conflict or they may reinforce one another.

The fundamental problem of conduct, at the level of self-consciousness or reflective thought, is the organization or integration of man's native capacities, his impulse-feelings, his desires or interests, in a manner that shall further fullness and harmony of life for the individual as a member of the species. Fullness and harmony of life require adaptation to the given physical and social conditions of existence; adaptation of the individual as a member of the natural cosmos; adaptation of the individual as a member of human society.

There are two aspects to the integration of life. The individual must attain harmony with himself, he must learn to integrate his own impulses and he must, as a self-integrated individual, function in the human community. These two aspects are, in fact, inseparable, but for purposes of consideration we may, provisionally, abstract from the social reference and look at the problem from the point of view of the individual. This abstraction will do no harm if we bear in mind that it is an abstraction. We begin with the individual, since a community or society is made up of individuals in interplay.

The impulses of human nature are not all on the same level. They have not the same value for the furtherance of the life-urge. The lowest are the nutritive impulses; having to do with food, drink, shelter, physical self-preservation, bodily health and comfort. The satisfaction of these appetites is the necessary condition for the functioning of the higher impulses and they must be honored in so far as the sacrifice of the individual life is not necessary to the furtherance of the life of the community or the race.

Higher than the physical self-preserved impulses are those involved in reproduction and the care of the young; sex and parental activity and feeling. These are higher than the impulses of individual self-preservation, since they mark the beginnings of social life and action. In satisfying them in fitting circumstances the individual is serving the race-life.

Higher than the impulses that are concerned with physical reproduction are the distinctively social impulses which are expressed in coöperation, friendship, the spirit of fellowship, justice and fair play. These are higher since they have a wider scope than sexual and parental impulses, bring the individual into wider relations with his fellows and on a superindividual basis.

The native impulses of man are capacities to form habits, that is, acquired automatic modes of reaction to stimuli. Instincts are transitory and plastic or modifiable by the patterns of reactions impressed in the growing individual by his physical and social environments. The individual is educable because he is born with several plastic capacities. In so far as, through the determination of the directions and paths which the impulses take under the stress of the reaction patterns imposed upon him by his physical and social surroundings, the individual becomes a creature of habits, of secondary automatisms, his educability becomes narrowed down through the very process of education itself.

As a *habit-forming* organism the human individual is potentially educable in a considerable variety of ways. As a *habit-controlled* organism the individual has lost the power of further educability. An individual who is a complete set of habitudes is no longer capable of growth; nor, indeed, of any change except degeneration. Therefore, as James so well says, it is necessary to keep the faculty of effort alive by a little *gratuitous exercise* every day; by doing something more than is called for by running smoothly in the daily groove of routine existence. To become a mere creature of good habits is only less bad than to become the slave of bad habits. A life wholly controlled by habit is an unintelligent life. It is an arrested life, incapable of adaptation, progress, creativeness.

Meaning of Self

The self is never, not even in its earliest and crudest stage of development, a mere bundle or collocation of instinctive impulses. The most rudimentary self is a sentient organism. Its primary capacities are phases of its organic life. They are not factors mechanically juxtaposed and sometimes interacting. They are functions of the conscious self as a whole. Division or dissociation of the self is a later result of the failure of the organism to maintain its unity and to integrate itself in the presence of competing stimuli which evoke conflicting responses. The history of a normal self is the consentaneous differentiation and integration of functions.

The living individual consists of a specific complex of powers which are plastic and, therefore, modifiable by the circumstances of their exercise. In sum these powers constitute the life-urge, the vital impulse which is the potency of a personality. The vital impetus is not pushed or driven from without to function; but the specific directions and

outcomes of its various functioning are conditioned by physical and social circumstances.

The common matrix of selfhood, the aspect of experience which constitutes the internal unity and continuity of the self is feeling. It is in feeling that the self knows itself in all its varying shades and degrees of unity and disunity, of harmony and disharmony. From the vague elemental stirrings of a single desire, such as hunger or sex, through all the complex and delicate shades of feeling, up to the most refined and exalted sentiments of love, devotion, loyalty and self-sacrifice to persons, communities or impersonal causes; feeling makes the desire, the purpose, the ideal, the individual's own; and makes the self what it is in whatsoever relationships it may realize and express itself. Thus in feeling and self-feeling, which is just feeling reflected upon, or self-consciousness, all impulses, desires and aims interpenetrate. Whether a self loves or hates, strives or rests, fears or hopes, aspires heavenward or falls in the mud, its attitude is a feeling-attitude. The self lives in its feeling-attitudes. While self-consciousness, the power of taking note of its own feeling-attitudes, is the most characteristic mark of selfhood, self-consciousness is never consciousness of a vague and abstract or pure self. It is always consciousness of a system of specific and concrete attitudes.

The power of forming, through reflection, memory and productive imagination, free images and ideas, is the condition of development of the idea of selfhood from out its native dispositions. Hence reflection and memory, the power to disengage, reproduce and put together in new combinations the emotionally significant elements of original experiences, are conditions of the development of the idea of selfhood. The development of this idea is the indispensable condition of the growth of personality. A congenital idiot does not become a person, because he is devoid

of the powers of reflection and memory. The burnt child dreads the fire. Why? It has impulsively reached for the light. Its successful reaching results in a painful experience. It forms a fusion of light and warmth images with a feeling of pain. The image of the former qualities carries the latter as part of its meaning. The perception of a similar object reproduces the feeling of pain. Thus an impulse is transformed into an aversion. The child desires and seeks lumps of sugar. Why? The impulse to grasp and put in its mouth any object, when carried out on the square white object, results in a pleasurable feeling. The image of the sensory qualities of the object is fused with an agreeable feeling. The perception or memory of similar objects arouses the feeling. Thus, through the formation of images and their fusion with feelings, instinctive impulses are transformed into desires.

Desire and Imagination

A desire is essentially a power consciously to crave and seek an object, in the absence of the object. A desire, in distinction from an impulse, involves the presence in consciousness of the incipient feeling of a satisfaction and an image of the situation that would produce satisfaction. As the range of the self's power to form and reproduce images increases, so increases the range of its desires. A self's capacity to desire is bounded only by its powers of reproductive and productive imagination. These powers, in turn, are limited, not only by its original vital capital, but by the range of environmental occasions which summon that capital into use. A self which has considerable power of reproductive imagination, but which is deficient in that power of mental analysis and synthesis which constitutes productive imagination and conception, will be limited, in the actual wealth of its desires, by the limitations of its immediate environment. A self, endowed with a fertile

productive imagination, will imagine and conceive objects of desire far beyond the range of the immediate environment. The inventor, the discoverer, the creative and organizing genius in industry or statecraft, the poet and artist, the philosopher, the prophet, the saint—indeed, every one who re-creates, and in any degree enhances, the human heritage of culture, is able to do so because his desires take wing beyond the brute facts of the immediate environment; and the wings of desire are the power of creative imagination and conception. Genius is distinguished from mediocrity, the creative contributor to human culture is distinguished from the clodhopper, not by the fact that the genius is less moved by desire than the clodhopper, but by the fact that in the case of the genius desire soars beyond the actual and immediately pressing circumstances borne aloft on the wings of creative imagination and conception.¹

¹ I suppose that this notion is the basis of Jung's conception of the *libido* in his book *The Unconscious*, and of the whole Freudian conception of the self. Where this conception seems to me to be at fault is in the attempt to find in every sort of desire a metamorphosis of sex. I would not underrate the power of sex; but it seems to me a poverty-stricken conception of personality to ignore the fact that the desires for power, knowledge, constructive work, social recognition, richness and harmony of inner life, union with the nature of things, beauty, etc., are just as original and irreducible motives of self-realization as sex. The capital error of the Freudians lies in assuming that, because sex is a powerful influence which is often driven underground by the social conditions of civilized life, and because working underground it unconsciously produces pathological aberrations; therefore, sex is the mainspring of all desire. The Freudians have built their conception of personality too exclusively on the observation of neurotics. The healthy self has many other ways of realizing itself than through sex. In an exaggerated fashion, Freudians have brought to attention a principle not discovered by them—namely, that the roots of man's conscious life are in his native and at first unconscious dispositions, which flower and bear fruit normally, through the integration of the personality in a favorable social environment. Man's unconscious psychophysical life is the crude stuff of his personality. The integration and harmonious functioning of his native dispositions, in

"'Tis more life and fuller of which our nerves are scant."
A great teacher is reported to have said: "I am come that ye might have life and have it more abundantly."

Factors in Self-Organization

The two prime factors in the integration of the self are (1) the reflectiveness, thoughtfulness or rationality, including creative imagination of the individual, and (2) the influence of other selves.

1. Thought or reason is a genuine native disposition of the self. Like the other native dispositions, it varies greatly in its strength, fineness of discrimination and range. There is a marked difference in the original capacities of individuals to imagine and think constructively. Some are born with a power of forming and retaining concrete imagery, but with little power of analysis and generalization. Others are born with great powers of analysis and generalization, but are defective in the power of concrete imagination. The highest mental endowment is the balanced combination of these two powers. Some individuals are born with but little of either power. The direction that these powers shall take depends in part on the correlative powers of the sensory and motor organs, especially eye, ear and hand; in part, on the stimuli furnished by the physical and social environment. Because of these differences in native endowment, the best social order is one which affords the most abundant opportunity for the development and exercise of diverse powers. We are here concerned with the general conditions of the development of personality with respect to the vocation which is common to all men, namely, the moral life. But it should be recognized that the development of the person, with respect to his part in the common

the genial atmosphere of a social culture, is the making of a personality. Through a bad hereditary twist or bad social conditions, or both, human personality goes awry.

social life, is conditioned upon his initial possession of the power to think as well as to form free images. The moral education of differing individuals should be conducted in different ways. The individual weak in power of analytic and generalizing thought can be trained through concrete imagery. Some are born to be vessels of gold, others to be vessels of silver and others, alas, to be vessels of clay.

2. The second great factor in the organization of the self is the influence of other selves. The developed individual has many facets to his personality. He is many selves in as many social relations. There are: his family self, business self, play self, friendship self, private self. He shows different aspects of selfhood to different friends, business associates, wife or children, etc. The practical problem of personality is to get all the partial selves to work together as one going concern. The development of the complex selfhood takes its color from the individual's social environment. The growing self comes to know itself in contrast and relation to other selves. The child, in the expression of its impulses, its appetites, gets different reactions from mother and father, from brothers and sisters, from school fellows, playmates and teachers. It meets with approval and disapproval, reward and punishment, opposition and coöperation. It leads and is led, through the development of free images and ideals in literature and history, in fiction and the news. It meets in imagination other selves who become to it heroes or heroines. During adolescence the individual becomes more acutely conscious of its own selfhood and of social relations. Bashfulness, timidity, anxious concern for clothes, manners and speech, display or coyness in the presence of the other sex; such are some of the principal features in the development of self-consciousness and of the consciousness of other selves, which are two aspects of the same process. The individual interprets himself to himself in the light of his observation of others. He tries

to see himself as others see him and especially to become like the Other whom he admires. In turn, of course, he interprets the inner meaning of the behavior of others in terms of his own actual or imagined feelings and ideas. He enlarges the meaning and powers of his own personality by imitating the deeds of others. Under the motives of fear, desire for approval and reward; and, at the highest level, of the motive of reverence or admiration for a hero or for an abstractly conceived ideal of life, his selfhood shrinks or expands, is inhibited or quickened in action, in proportion as his inner life grows in significant content by the growth of his activities. And vice versa, the individual's power of interpreting the inner meanings of other lives grows too. No man is a hero to his valet, is an old saying. In so far as it is a true saying it is not, wisely remarked Hegel, because the hero is not a hero but because the valet has the soul of a valet. Most of the tragedy, and the comedy too, of human life is due to the inability of human beings to understand the souls of others; and this sheer inability is due to the fact that the inner world of one's soul is a different world from that of another soul. If the weakness of aristocracy be that it cannot interpret the feelings and aims of the herd, the weakness and difficulty of democratic government lies in the inability of the mass of men either to conceive what they should aim at and how, or to grasp and thus to value the disinterested aims of great leaders who are genuinely aiming at the common good. There seems to be no salvation for human society in this world without the development of a like high-mindedness in the generality. Like-mindedness without high-mindedness results in demagogues leading a mob of average sensual human beings. High-mindedness in the leaders, if it be too high for the commonality to appreciate and follow, leads to schisms in the body politic.

Overemphasis on Social Atmosphere

The influence of the social atmosphere in determining the character of the individual, has been, of late, over-emphasized. When for example J. M. Baldwin says that the individual is a social product rather than a social unit, or when C. H. Cooley argues that it would be sounder to substitute for Descartes "I think, therefore I am," "We think, therefore we are," these writers come dangerously near an account of the self parallel to the economic system of those islanders who were said to live by taking in one another's washing. The development of the self is a slow growth and it is conditioned by the social medium. Nevertheless the native individuality is the most potent determining factor in the growth of the self. And the reflective or rational individuality becomes more potent in the later stages of the process. For the end or ideal of personal integration is the attainment of a reflective well-organized individuality who steers himself, not by the compass of reward and punishment or of popular approval and disapproval, but by the light of an ideal of free personality to be lived in the service of the objective good—in the service of justice, truth, beauty, loyalty.

More concretely, we may say, that the highest stage in the integration of personality is one in which the self chooses to live, not by the average standard of the mass, but in reverence and loyalty to the highest patterns of noble personality which he can find in history and literature. If the self were a social product all selves reared and living in the same social medium would be alike. But they are not. Similar individualities grow in different social media, and markedly different individualities emerge from the same family. It is neither a fact, nor is it desirable, that all individuals in the same general type of society should be stamped out of the same die, run in the same mold. Subject in varying degrees, according to the strength of its

innate individuality, to the influence of social patterns, the proper destiny of the human self is to become a rational and, therefore, a free and self-respecting individual center of feeling, insight and action. Rational standards, common moral aims, enable individuals to work together and for the common good. But that is not because reason or the idea of a common good obliterates or transcends individuality. It is because reason and moral imagination, which is sympathy illumined by rational insight, enable men to see that the highest good for each is a rich and progressive individuality realized in a social order in which "each for the joy of the working" and "each in his separate star" can "paint the thing as he sees it for the God of things as they are."

The practical effect of taking the doctrine that the self is a social product, and of ignoring the native individual differences of men, would be to turn society and all its works into a huge factory for producing standardized human machines. Many features of our present industrial order and educational system seem to have just this effect. I say, with all the emphasis that I can command, that the justification of social order, the true meaning of human development, lies in the production of free and rational individuals, able to choose and to follow, in the light of reflection, ideals of personality which they themselves have formed by consideration of the common facts of life, and under the guidance of the inspiring examples of personality furnished by history and literature; in short under the guidance of the instructed moral imagination.

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CHAPTER XXIII

CONSCIENCE

There has been a long drawn-out debate between the empiricists and the nativists in regard to the origin of our knowledge of right and wrong, the empiricists holding this knowledge to be entirely derived from accumulated experiences of what has seemed useful to the individual or the group and the nativists holding that this knowledge is due to an innate capacity for moral discernment or intuition.

This debate is only a special case of the general debate as to the sources of knowledge. The problem does not differ in principle from the question as to the sources of our knowledge of mathematical, logical and scientific principles. In all cases the principle for the settlement of the debate is the same. Man is born with certain general capacities for feeling, imaging, conceiving and acting. The specific directions that these capacities take are determined by his social nurture. Individuals differ in the relative strength of their innate capacities and these innate differences are the sources for the differences in knowledge and power shown by individuals living in the same social environment. On the other hand individuals, otherwise alike or even equal in their native endowments, differ because of differences in social nurture.

The capacity for the development of moral insight and feeling is more general in human nature than the aptitude for musical development or the development of other artistic or scientific aptitudes; for moral insight and feeling are developments of the fundamental and common impulses of

human nature. The proper nurture of these universal innate impulses is necessary for the living together of men.

An examination of some typical forms of intuitional theory will serve to introduce a consideration of the genesis of conscience.

Æsthetic Intuitionism

Some moralists, for example the third Earl of Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson, regard the faculty of conscience as a moral sense or form of feeling, analogous to the sense of beauty. Thus moral goodness is the perception of beauty in the sphere of the affections. The source of moral knowledge is an intuition akin to æsthetic intuition. A somewhat similar view may be found in the writings of Mr. G. E. Moore and in Mr. A. K. Roger's *Theory of Ethics*. The element of truth in these views is that the mature individual has developed, as a result of the interplay between his native feelings and the social environment in which he is nurtured, a set of moral habitudes in feeling and judgment. His sentiments of sympathy, love, reverence and obedience to the dictates of the group have been developed and given a certain bent by social education. As Thomas H. Green says, a man needs a society to make a conscience for him. But, the individual's conscience is not made for him by society out of nothing. Man is born with the capacities and powers of sympathetic feeling, tender emotion, suggestibility, imitativeness, self-feeling, reflection and imagination. When the mature individual makes a moral judgment his native feelings have already been shaped, refined, fused together and charged with ideas as to right and wrong which are the resultants of the continuous interaction of his native endowment with the social patterns of conduct in which he has been nurtured. He is immediately aware of his feelings and ideas on matters of conduct, but not aware of their origin.

Rationalistic Intuitionism

Other moralists, the *rational intuitionists*, of whom Kant and Joseph Butler are the most illustrious modern examples, regard conscience as a rational or reflective faculty of moral judgment. Kant says: "Conscience is not a thing to be acquired, and it is not a duty to acquire; but every man, as a moral being, has it originally within him. . . . When, therefore, it is said this man has no conscience, what is meant is, that he pays no heed to its dictates. . . . An erring conscience is a chimera." Again he says: "All moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely *a priori* in the reason." Joseph Butler says: "There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart as well as his external actions; which passes judgment on himself and them; pronounces determinate some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly, and which, if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always, of course, goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence; which shall hereafter second and affirm its own." Human nature is a system of active principles, a kind of social economy, in which conscience, the principle of reflection, is "the supreme ruler, the principle of judgment, direction, superintendency. . . . Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority; it would absolutely govern the world."¹ Other examples of rational intuitionists are Ralph Cudworth, Henry More and Wordsworth—in his "Ode to Duty."

The element of truth in rational intuitionism is its emphasis on reason or thought as the necessary condition of moral judgment. The intuitionists bring out clearly the

¹ Butler's *Sermons*, II, ¶ 19.

principle that, at the highest level of moral development, the level of personal or reflective morality, right conduct requires the activity of thought.

Our knowledge of the striking differences to be found among social groups in regard to questions of right and wrong, together with our knowledge of the differences in attitude to be found in members of the same group, make it impossible to admit that conscience is an innate unvarying and unerring faculty of moral insight.

Moral Consciousness

Conscience is moral consciousness; in other words, it is the thinking self deliberating and choosing on matters of conduct. Its judgment is the prelude to or the beginning of voluntary action. It is not the same as action. A conscientious person may lack prudence or vigor in execution. A person may have executive vigor and lack discrimination in moral judgment and sensitiveness to moral issues.

Conscience is a development from innate capacities, just as the power of mathematical reasoning, æsthetic sensitiveness, or any form of manual or intellectual skill are developments of innate capacities. The individual is not born with the ready-to-use power of moral feeling and judgment.

Conscience includes both feeling and moral judgment. It is simply the individual's psychical organization focused upon the determination of good and evil, right and wrong. Conscience is the total consciousness of the individual directed upon matters of social conduct. It has two distinguishable but inseparable aspects—form and content. Looked at universally, without regard to the varying judgments as to what specifically is good or right, conscience means the feeling of obligation, the sense of duty and the judgments of approval and disapproval of acts and motives. All normal human beings are alike in possessing these feelings and in making judgments thereupon. They differ

in the fineness of discrimination in their moral judgments and the strength of their feelings of obligation. Two individuals reared and living in similar social environments will differ because of innate differences in these respects. Differences of nurture of course produce differences in the development of feelings and judgments.

The contents of conscience consist of the specific types of conduct that are held to be right and wrong. The individual gets his first ideas and attitudes in regard to moral matters from the groups in which he has membership—from his family, his community, his vocational group, his club or gang, his people. (The chief obstacle in the way of a universally human ethics is that there is no social and cultural organization of the race and no universal ethical institution in which men can be nurtured in the principles of universally human ethics. The individual, said Hegel, *Concl* is suckled at the breast of the universal ethos. This is not yet true. The individual is suckled at the breasts of several special ethoses—the ethos of this family, this club, this sect, this nation. The effective realization of a universal ethics must wait upon the development of a universal church to nurture men in the religion of humanity.) *

Genesis of Sense of Duty

The feeling of obligation has its genesis in the activation and organization of the social impulses. The feeling of obligation is a further emotional generalization of the tender feeling, sympathy, fellow-feeling, which are brought into play through living together in the family; through working together, playing together, worshiping together, in the family, the community, the vocational group, the church, the nation. Tender feeling and sympathy or fellow-feeling are thus deepened and extended as the range of one's common interests increase. Resentment at injury done to one's fellows plays a part. The sensitiveness of the individual,

not only to the overt rewards and punishments meted out by his fellows but, as well, to their smiles and frowns plays an important part. The power of social authority is reinforced by the supernatural sanctions of the tribal gods or god.

It is in social relations that the sense of individuality develops. The individual becomes aware of himself as a distinct being through social contacts. The very sense of self-respect, which is so important an aspect of the higher phase of conscience, is a socially conditioned consciousness. To feel self-respect is to feel one's own worth as a member of a human group.

It is not necessary here to trace out in detail the psychological process of the expansion of moral consciousness through the extension of the range of human sympathy from the narrower to the wider groups. It may be remarked, parenthetically, that the next great step in the moral development of the race, and a step that is imperative if the race is not to destroy itself, is the establishment of institutions by which the individual and the lesser group consciences will be led to feel, think and act in terms of an intelligent sympathy which will embrace the human race and find common purposes in the realization of universally human values.

The contents of a man's conscience, we have said, are determined first by the eduction in the individual mind of the social values and imperatives current in the moral tradition of his people, time and culture. Thus far the individual conscience is the reflexion of the inherited and prevailing customs, rules and opinions of social groups. This may be called the actual social conscience, if it be not forgotten that it exists and acts in individuals—preëminently in those who control the transmission of tradition through education. Social conscience conserves the values in belief and action which the funded experience and deeds of the

group-life, throughout its history, indicate to be essential to the welfare of the group. The moral experiences of the group, thus funded and transmitted, are entitled to serious consideration. A critical attitude towards moral tradition is one not to be lightly undertaken or propagated. Such an attitude is always attended by the danger of reversion to unregulated impulse, to the rule of mere passion, which spells social chaos.

Nevertheless, moral progress takes place only when some individual or individuals, exceptionally dowered with moral imagination and sympathy, with intellectual penetration and constructiveness and with moral courage and faith born of these qualities challenges the traditions of the elders and becomes a moral innovator, a creative genius in the moral realm. Gotama Buddha, Zoroaster, Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Jesus, Paul, Socrates, Plato are names that come at once to mind in this connection. But long before them there must have been unrecorded moral geniuses who broke through the crust of custom into the upper air of more humane and reasonable principles of conduct. The reputed early lawgivers—Confucius, Solon, Lycurgus, Manu, Moses—were creators in that they simplified and systematized the customs of their peoples.

Moral Individuality

Conscience at its best
Conscience, in the highest sense, is the rational moral individuality which transcends the actual social conscience and, thus, is the creative and progressive factor in moral progress. The individualization of conscience premises strong social feelings, since its discoveries always are directed towards the conditions of a more ideal society. An individual with strong social feeling but without intellectual initiative will not prove a moral leader. The sources of moral initiative are intense social feeling, vivid imagination and penetrating intelligence compacted into one.

Since the moral innovator transcends the group code, in the direction of a finer and richer life, whereas the ordinary mind is entirely controlled by the group code, the latter finds it difficult to distinguish between the moral genius and the criminal; just as in nonmoral matters the pedestrian mind cannot distinguish between the genius and the insane. This is the tragedy of moral development. Socrates and Jesus are executed as antisocial; Shelley is execrated.

The moral imagination of a genius in this order does not work in a vacuum. His most far-reaching intuitions are not shot out of the blue. They have their social antecedents, their traditional backgrounds. Jesus starts from the groundwork of Hebrew prophetic ethics, Buddha from the Vedanta, Socrates from the moral traditions of Athens. By virtue of the sensitiveness and sweep of his moral imagination and the penetrative power of his intelligence the moral genius is able to envisage the ideas of human relationships in new, finer and more comprehensive and harmonious combinations; and thus to conceive a richer and larger whole of human life.

In individuals who possess in preëminent degree the capacity for imaginative reconstruction and conceptual generalization the feeling of obligation becomes strongly attached to ideal values. The thinker feels an overmastering obligation to discover and propagate the truth; the artist feels an equal obligation to embody new forms of beauty and so communicate to others his own deep sources of spiritual joy.

The Moral Law

The process of generalization goes so far, in thinkers of the abstract type of intelligence (such as Kant), that there arises the notion of reverence for the moral law as the universal condition of the life of spiritual selfhood. The moral law is conceived to be absolutely universal and un-

varying. We have an instance of this attitude in Kant's dictum that those actions alone which are done out of pure reverence for the moral law are good. This is simply the final step in the process of generalization which begins in the effort to form concepts of more specific moral values—of justice, wisdom, temperance, courage and so forth. The moral law, conceived as a pure and abstract universal, is held to be the inclusive and unifying substance which embraces and sustains all specific duties and virtues.

So conceived, the moral law is an abstract universal hypostatized. It does not tell us what is good in any specific case. It is an abstract universal set up as the supreme reality. The sense of duty is a categorical imperative. It means that all other considerations ought to give way to loyalty to the humanly best. But to feel reverence for the moral law as the paramountcy of the best in conduct and motivation does not tell us what is good, better, best; what is bad, worse, worst in any actual and concrete human situations. Duty is an empty phrase except it be specified in duties; good is a hollow word until it is concentered in goods.

What we need are methods of determining what are our actual duties and how they are to be fulfilled; what specifically the moral law is in this and that particular situation. We must conceive the moral law as a concrete universal, a social system demanding loyalty here and now. The moral question always is: What is justice now between man and man; what is wisdom for me here to-day; what is courage; what is integrity; and so forth?

In order to answer these questions better than custom, tradition and law answer them we need intelligence. We need it first, to interpret tradition so as to devise better modes of conduct. We need it, second, to devise social conditions or means that will better further human goods. It is necessary to form concepts of human values that are

adequate to present situations and to devise means for their realization. The moral law *as such* is an abstraction that offers no guidance here. Here as elsewhere in thought-directed life, concepts without percepts are empty. *Good must be specified in goods, value in values.*

The chief trouble with moral theory is that it is generally left in the realm of pious abstractions. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. A theory of ethics which does not take account of actual social conditions and which fails to indicate *how*, by the application of the most intelligent goodwill, social conditions may be made better instruments for the more intensive and extensive realization of human goods, is futile and irrelevant to the real moral life. It is worse than useless, for it serves to divert intelligence from the practical problem of realizing the good life here and now and deludes men with high-sounding but hollow words. The final issue and test of an ethical theory are its economic, political and educational philosophies.

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CHAPTER XXIV

THE ETHICAL MEANING OF FREEDOM

We shall consider here the question of the freedom of the will in its ethical bearings. This is the point of vital interest in the problem. Therefore, we can with profit ignore all arguments which prejudge the question of moral freedom by starting with assumptions in regard to the nature of the universe as a whole. To argue, for example, that man cannot be free in any respect, because the universe is a closed system and the career of the human self therefore an absolutely predetermined process; whether such assumption take the form of the doctrine of the absolute omnipotence of a transcendent God or of some other absolute, such as a world machine or a world mind is to start from the wrong end. We do not know what the universe is in its entirety. We must interpret the whole in terms of the part and, in view of man's restless activity in the alteration of nature and the making and remaking of cultures, it is a sheer assumption to say that the whole must be of such a character that man is but a mechanical puppet. Precisely this assumption is made by the fatalist, whether theological or materialistic. Fatalism we rule out of our discussion, since we center this discussion in the nature of the human self as the creator and bearer of culture. We know much more in regard to the behavior of selves than we do in regard to the universe as a whole.

A Critique of Mechanism

According to a current fashion in psychology, namely, mechanistic behaviorism, the conduct of man is just as wholly determined by a mechanical configuration of physical elements as is the behavior of a steam or gas engine. The human organism is merely a complicated machine which responds with reflex actions when stimulated in certain ways, just as an engine responds to certain physical stimuli. The most complex part of the human machine is the cerebral cortex, through which the path of the reflex travels. It is the transmission system of the human automobile. In the cortex certain highly complex reactions take place which further complicate the reflexes: by the holding up, and switching off into new connections, of the reflex tendencies; through the irradiation of cortical processes by which one sort of peripheral stimulus starts a reflex which originally required a different sort of stimulus. In this way mechanical habits are formed, just as a gas engine forms certain habits.

What those who mistakenly regard the subjective or introspective evidence as revealing something unique in the self; namely, deliberation, valuation, the formation of plans and ideals of action, the choice of alternatives in conduct in the light of certain values embraced by the mind—all these subjective images, ideas, ideals, values and the accompanying, motivating feelings are merely the echoes of the mechanics of behavior reverberating through the speech reactions of the epiglottis and through the muscular system. If the mechanistic behaviorists' account of the self be the ultimate truth, then we should, since it is silly to harbor outmoded superstitions in the presence of scientific knowledge, dismiss from our vocabularies all ethical concepts. We should expunge such words as virtue, duty, responsibility, right and wrong, the good and the bad, moral progress and retrogression. We should go farther and dismiss

from our social conceptions such notions as self-development, social responsibility, guilt, merit, praise and blame. For all these words denote ideas now meaningless in the light of the scientific knowledge that man is naught but a machine which moves when the engine's transmission, gears and wheels are in physical interrelations and when fuel comes into it from the physical environment. All talk of improvement through the scientific study of man and nature, all talk of the duty and the value of rational insight and systematic knowledge must cease; for these too are mechanical movements and are the inevitable by-products of the blind and meaningless arrangements of physical elements. The mechanist overlooks the contradiction involved in the assertion that a being who incessantly originates, propagates and changes ideas and beliefs about himself, his relations to his fellows and to the universe, moral, legal and political systems, manners and customs, arts, sciences, religions and philosophies is nothing but a machine. The whole story of man's cultural activities is a refutation of mechanism. But mechanistic behaviorism is a sheer rationalistic dogma that gains its plausibility from the general prestige of physical science. It is rationalistic dogma; for it carries into a sphere in which they are not relevant, and, therefore, have no practical usefulness, concepts that, although even there they are abstractions from the total concrete reality, have a closer approximation to the reality in the inanimate order and the lower phases of the animate realm than they have to the case of human behavior. The less individuality, the less integration or organization of differences, the less complexity of life anything has the more nearly adequate to a statement of its behavior is a mechanistic or materialistic one. Even physical systems are more than mechanical. As we rise in the scale from simple physical systems through plants and animals towards man—in short, towards more individuality—the more in-

adequate mechanism becomes. It is an *a priori* dogma which ignores the good empirical facts that human beings do recognize themselves to be responsible beings capable of initiative and choice, do approve and disapprove their own and others' acts and motives, do feel and sometimes obey their sense of obligation, do form or embrace ideals or plans of action and live by them and reproach themselves when they fail.

Volition

The volitional development of the individual takes place by a process of integration of the various impulses and capacities which constitute the original nature of the self. This integration is achieved subject to stimulation and inhibition by social patterns. The self has many facets to its nature as a kinetic or impulsive being. The central problem of education, the problem of self-realization, is that of integration as a member of the community. If we look at the integrative process from the point of view of the nervous system then the process of integration is the building up a unity of conditioned reflexes and of coördinated systems of conditioned reflexes.¹ The central nervous system is the integrative physiological agency of the organism. The same principle holds good if we start from the side of conscious experience, of volition and behavior. Looking at the matter either way, the self-realization which is self-determination is expressed always in the measure of integration of the self's original dynamic tendencies. The more integrated the self's impulses are the more of a

¹ A conditioned reflex is a reflex produced by the irradiation of a cortical process in itself insufficient to produce a certain reaction and the reawakening of a cortical process which has been associated with it and which is adequate to produce the reaction. For example to tell a child to perform a certain action may be insufficient and become sufficient when associated with punishment or approval and reward.

self it is and the freer it is. Freedom as the goal of self-development is present in all sorts of degrees, from that lack of integration which constitutes dementia to fullest integration which is the highest sanity. Sanity and insanity are of course social concepts. The world of reality from which the demented person takes flight is the social world.

Our starting point is empirical. We shall consider man primarily as he manifests himself in the social cultural life in which alone are the human characteristics developed and enjoyed. We have to ask what does actual experience reveal. We put aside then, as irrelevant, the question of the origin of the self, a question to which only various highly speculative and very uncertain answers could be given. Empirically, the human self is a psychophysical organism; it is a being which acts from impulses and feels and reflects upon these impulses. It responds to stimuli coming from the physical and social environments in certain more or less specific ways. These ways of responses are at first simply innate dispositions of the organism—reflexes, impulses and instincts. The self acts from impulses or appetites. In the course of its interaction with the environment the self becomes self-conscious. It becomes aware of its own impulses, and aware, in feeling and imagery, of their consequences. It builds up a system of desires and habits. It forms purposes. It sets up and pursues ends. Self-consciousness is the self-discovery of the individual in his uniqueness, his freedom and responsibility as an agent. It is coming to one's self. From the standpoint of conduct, the capacity of the self to attain a reflective and value-controlled organization of aims is its basic power. Thus the self develops into a voluntary agent. Will means the conscious and purposive activity of a self.² The reality

² The term *will* should never be applied to blind impulses and instincts. Will is actual only when a self wills and a self wills only when it knows itself as striving.

of the power of self-determination is the first postulate of ethics. The specific directions, the habits, purposes and ideals of action are the joint resultants of the self's innate nature in interaction with its social and physical environment.

The self, as will, then is always a conscious and more or less organized or integrated going concern, which includes a variety of partial selves or specific complexes of impulses, ideas and feelings. There can be no question that the normal self is a self-active, self-determining concern. It is true, of course, that the degree of self-determination or self-activity (that is, of internally initiated activity) varies much. Some selves are much more dynamic or self-determining than others. Every self varies much in its degrees of self-determination. When I am performing purely habitual actions, I do not need to reflect, to deliberate, to choose. It is only when some juncture of affairs arises, to meet which habit is inadequate, that the question of deliberation and choice comes in at all. But even the habits of a self have been formed in this individual self. They are constituent parts of him. Therefore, habitual action is, in a broad sense, self-determined action. The habits are habits of the self; in building them up he has been forming himself.

Determinism and Indeterminism

We are concerned here only with the question what sort of determination is implied in the moral life. If there be moral agents, socially responsible and capable of deliberation and voluntary action, there must be self-determination. The recognition of this proposition is the indispensable starting point for any discussion of the problem of ethical freedom. The power of self-determination, the capacity of the self to envisage ends, to form purposes in terms of values, is presupposed in the very existence of the moral

point of view. Of course, we must admit that, through unfortunate heredity, with, and sometimes without, unfortunate nurture, there are some selves who never achieve integration; others whose integration is lacking in dynamic quality. The principle that the self is a developing and self-integrating psychophysical totality is the common background of the *indeterminist* and the *determinist*. Where they split is over the question as to what is involved in self-determination. The indeterminist argues that there can be no moral responsibility, no accountability, no genuine morality, unless the individual is always free at the instant of choice to choose either the course he does choose or some other. He holds that in voluntary action, if it is to be moral, there must be an inexplicable fiat of will, a fresh creative act which does not follow from the antecedent habits and behavior of the self.

The determinist holds, on the contrary, that whatever line of conduct the individual may elect to follow, he could not have done otherwise. He could have made no other election. In every case whatever be willed it could not have been otherwise. I may think that now, facing two diverging roads, it is a matter of indifference, of unpredetermined volition, which road I shall take. I think this because I am aware only of my hesitation and deliberation and unconscious of the motives which are even now determining unequivocally which way I shall choose. Whichever it be it could not be otherwise. The argument from the consciousness of being undetermined, says the determinist, is an argument from ignorance.

The determinist argues that, if there were no continuous sequence in the self's volitions, moral education and self-development would be meaningless. An individual might at any moment reverse his whole previous record and character. Continuity and consistency in the sequence of the individual's volitional life is implied in the concept of edu-

cation as a process of forming good habits, making right connections.

To this the indeterminist replies that if there be always an inevitable sequence in volitions then the door is closed to hope. Moral reformation and moral improvement become impossible, unless the self be free to alter its choices, to shift the ends which it follows, to rearrange its scheme of values.

If the self cannot free himself from his acted past, if he can in no way reshape, in the light of newly recognized values, the directions his innate impulses have taken through past reaction, then it is unjust to praise, blame, punish or reward. No, says the determinist, social approvals and disapprovals are precisely factors in bringing to pass a moral change. We may forgive but we must not condone acts that are socially harmful. Praise and blame, rewards and punishments, are society's methods for moral education or at least of restraint where education fails. It is the group's proper business to mold the individual to its liking by whatever forces will achieve this end. From the standpoint of thorough-paced determination the moral individual is a product of the group-machinery. Whatever in him is not the echo of the tribal conscience is the stubborn survival of a natural "sport" or congenital variation, a peculiarity due to the combinations effected in the chromosomes.

The facts of human conduct weigh heavily in favor of determinism. It is meaningless to think of acts occurring without motives or to suppose that volition is the result of a mysterious caprice or sheer contingency. The individual cannot free himself from his past. In so far as that is actual it is the chief part of his present personality. However, it is not the past as past, but as part of the living present motivation, that determines choice. A self never is anything more than the habits and tendencies which have been formed plus the still persisting native urges, which

may thus far have been repressed and so have remained submerged below consciousness and overt behavior because the environmental stimuli have never been adequate to call them forth; in fact they have been inhibited. The individual's powers of choice and action are defined and therefore limited by his original nature—his inborn reflexes, instincts, capacities and aptitudes. Using the term *capacity* for whatever power to do is inborn, it is a truism to say that the individual's career is circumscribed by his original capacities. It is further circumscribed by the ways in which the environment affects the original capacities dampening or submerging some and starving out others, giving specific direction and bent to others. To say this is but to say that the individual is always, at any stage in his career, limited } as to the things he can choose to do and to refrain from doing.

On the other hand, the individual's nature is plastic. At the beginning it is very plastic. This plasticity decreases with advancing years, as the individual becomes more and more a system of habits of feeling, thinking and acting. The individual is in part self-determining in the sense that his volitions, his habits, his ways of thinking, feeling and doing, are the expressions in his character and career of his original dispositions.

Freedom of Self-Determination

But the individual is not, so long as he remains a fairly well organized self, a fixed quantum. He can change. He can improve and deteriorate. And his improvement or deterioration again are the resultants of the fusions or clashes of character and circumstance with reflective thinking. He may succumb, after a fairly long period of social-moral action, to the persistent call of certain temptations and go to pieces. On the other hand the individual may, after a period of moral disorder, pull himself together.

What he will do in the way of overcoming or succumbing to temptations depends on the balance between character and circumstance as modified by reflective intelligence. So long as there is capacity for resistance and conquest of temptation the individual is free. When the capacity is entirely lost he has lost his moral freedom.

Moral freedom, then, does not consist in the power to choose capriciously. It has all sorts of degrees and the more an individual becomes capable of choosing the right and incapable of choosing the wrong way, the freer he is as an ethical self. Moral freedom is not the power to choose anything and everything, regardless of antecedent choices. Such a freedom is a chimera and would, if it were real, be the greatest hindrance possible to the right life.

It is reflective thinking, the power to weigh ends, to judge competing interests in terms of the larger and more permanent goods, to look at possible desires, which are possible motives to action, objectively and impersonally, the power to see this interest and that interest in the light of a social good or in the light of a more lasting good for the individual that constitutes true freedom. The freest man is he who is able to look at his own possible choices in the light of a good for others, of a good for the family, the national community and for the larger human community. The free man must have a sympathetic imagination, the ability to put himself in the place of others and to put others in his place.

The individual cannot become morally free if he is a creature of strong, narrow, egoistic passions or of purely sensual nature. On the other hand, if he be sympathetic and socially minded he becomes freer the more his feelings for and with others are enlightened by thoughtfulness, by the imaginative foreshadowing and reflective comparison of values for persons.

The moral self grows by reflective choosing, by weighing

his interests in the light of the social whole and the super-social spiritual order. The measure of freedom that is his is determined by the union of imaginative sympathy with power of good practical judgment. Freedom does not consist simply in an uprush from the deeper level of the life impulses, as Bergson maintains. True freedom consists, as James rightly says, in the capacity of the self to hold in the center of consciousness a thought, an ideal of value, which the self chooses to emphasize until it dominates and crowds out all incompatible ideas and impulses; and so all the warmth and dynamic of the core of selfhood supports it and makes it go. The thought of an action which we thus choose to attend to, which we dwell upon, which we recall our minds to and come back to from wanderings in other directions, is so chosen because it is in the line of duty, in the line of our deepest and strongest affections, of our inner peace, harmony and self-respect and promises further peace, self-respect, satisfaction in short, to our better natures. Moral conflicts are real and the freedom which we affirm and actualize in solving them is the freedom of thought, of reason in its practical applications.

In regard to matters of conduct, reasoning or reflective thinking is just the power of seeing and weighing ends and means; of determining the good for oneself and others; of comparing and choosing between goods and of determining what are the best means; that is the means which will further the good ends to be sought. Over and above character as the system of habits resulting from past reactions and choices and the system of impulsions that have not yet been formed into habits is this power of reflective deliberation and choice. This it is that, in a normal self in normal conditions, finally weighs the scales in motivation. If one acts simply from habit, one's choices are not choices but predetermined channels. If one acts from the sudden uprush of a subconscious impulse, one again does not choose.

But, if in a situation calling for the weighing of aims and interests, one reflects and chooses in the light of a principle of value one is acting rationally and freely. One is then most fully self-determining, since the truest, the most permanent, self is the self as reflective, as formulating or embracing and holding to ideal standards or principles.

The most free man is the man of principle, the man who cannot act in critical situations merely from habit or from a blind impulse. Thus there are all degrees of moral freedom from its absence up to the freedom of him who always controls his choices by reference to objective social and spiritual ends. The freest man in this sense is he who cannot choose the lower egoistic or antisocial interests.

*activity
freedom* { Freedom, as capacity to develop into a reflective self-determining moral agent, we may call the psychological potentiality of moral freedom. This psychological freedom is not equally present at birth in all. There are degrees of psychological freedom, since it means the original capacity to become a social ethical being. Some are born with little of it, perhaps some with more, others with a moderate amount and some are rich in this capacity.

Realized moral freedom is simply the development of a character rich in sympathetic imagination and generous passion for others guided by reflective judgment as to ends and means.

There is no indeterminism, if indeterminism means that man is ever able to act entirely contrary to the ways in which his original nature has taken shape and direction. There is indeterminism, if this means that the individual may continue sufficiently plastic so that he may, through reflection, be led to mend his ways. But this indeterminism means only that the self is a complex and plastic being who, as he attains self-conscious direction, has the power of molding his own acts and habits by imagination and reason. The degree of determinism that is true of a normal

self as we understand it, does not exclude the capacity for moral growth. If by determinism be meant the notion that the individual is never more, in his volitions, than the necessary and transitory resultant of forces that converge there and then to constitute his action, we reject it as inconsistent with man's nature as an ethical, cultural and spiritual being. There is teleological or value-controlled self-determination.

Responsibility and Punishment

It may be objected that, if one could not have done otherwise than one did, if there be not an indeterminable factor in volition, then punishment is never justifiable.

On the contrary, if capricious, unmotivated, uncaused choices ever take place, punishment is never justifiable. For there is then no continuity in the self. In punishing a person one is not punishing the self who did the deed. There is, in such case, nothing that one could call *character*. In punishing *A* for an act *X* to-day and in praising him for an act *Y* to-morrow, as well as in punishing him for the act *X*₁ the day after, one is not dealing with the same self. Selfhood, personality, character, responsibility are all meaningless if indeterminism be true. There is then no moral order; punishment and reward are useless, and all the work of moral education and self-training are vain, if there be no continuity in the self. The truth is that character is destiny and character is developed by the interaction between the native springs of personality and the totality of the environment.

The vindictive theory of punishment is a stupid survival from the days of savagery. It expresses simply the blind passion of resentment, uncontrolled by any reflection. The individual wrong-doer has a right to be treated as a responsible being in so far as he has the capacity to understand and feel the bearing of his wrong-doing on the lives of others and on his own character and future.

The proper objectives of punishment are: (1) To protect the social order by deterring individuals from violating that order; and, if they violate that order, to awaken them to a sense of the consequences of their actions; if need be to deprive them of the social liberty which they have shown themselves unfit to use. There are, doubtless, cases where capital punishment is justifiable on the ground that the criminal is so hopelessly confirmed that restraint will have no beneficial effect on him and his execution may have a salutary influence on others. (2) To educate the individual into the need and value of conduct in harmony with the social order. In brief, punishment has two aims which should, so far as possible be united in the treatment of the criminal—the protection of the social order, and the reformation of the criminal into an attitude of social conformity and coöperation.

It is not only the right of society to take whatsoever steps are necessary for its own protection. It is the duty of society to endeavor, by all possible methods of reëducation to enable the individual to become a responsible member. Delinquency and criminality are due in varying proportions to: (1) unfortunate heredity; and (2) lack of proper educational and other social influences in the plastic period of life. There are many and complex causes of crime, besides the imbalance that may be inherited. Some of these social causes are: lack of proper home life and environment; lack of facilities for healthy play in our cities; political corruption; overemphasis on money and the enjoyments it brings or the general materialism of our life; lack of the right social training in the schools.

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PART IV

ETHICAL PRINCIPLES

CHAPTER XXV

RATIONALISM

Introductory

If there were no conflicts among the desires of the self-conscious individual there would be no occasion for him to reflect upon rules and principles of conduct. If there were no conflicts between the desires of different selves in the same community there would be no occasion for social rules or laws whether customary, legally enacted or moral, no occasion for governments, courts and police forces. Mankind would be in that blissful condition of innocent and unconscious harmony which is the ideal of some philosophical anarchists. Sin comes by the law—moral and legal. Where there is no law, whether of human opinion and enactment or of divine revelation, there can be no transgression. Law, social and moral, is a social necessity since there is some truth in Hobbes' conception of the "state of nature"; that is, the state of man antecedent to the establishment of social order, as being the war of all against all. It is true, in all probability, that human beings are never found in the Hobbesian state of nature, though the Woodveddahs of Ceylon, the Andamanese and other dwellers in savage Edens approach to the limit of lack of social order. "Man's unsocial sociableness," in Kant's pregnant phrase, drives him into relations with his fellows and makes it difficult for him to get along with his fellows. Indeed, it is often quite difficult for a man to get along with himself. Aristotle said that by nature man is a social animal, mean-

ing thereby that man can realize his true nature only in social relations; but Aristotle omitted to add that man is equally by nature a difficult social animal. Rivalry, self-assertion, suspicion, envy, jealousy, uncharitableness, are just as real elements in human nature as their opposites.

What Is Morality?

Every code of morality is a system of rules or principles for social conduct. No line of demarcation can be sharply drawn between manners and morals. In fact, good manners have their basis in the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you." Politeness, obligingness and consideration for others are moral qualities. Indeed, the history of morality shows that all moral codes and legal codes which have their justification in the fact that they express the moral minimum of rules of justice that can be defined, applied and enforced by organized social authority, derive from customary systems of social conduct which have grown up and slowly improved in the evolution of social order.

It is frequently said that, since conduct is the whole of human life in its active and deliberate aspects, a system of morality should regulate all man's conduct. Ethics, the theory or science of morals, is therefore, the science of human conduct in its totality. I demur to this extension of the idea of morality to cover the whole of human conduct. It can only lead to confusion in thought, and in practice to that meddlesome impertinence of the censorious busybody which leads him to try to regulate the private affairs of everybody else—a pestiferous form of Puritanism which is very rife to-day. Historically, morals (*mores, sitten, ethos*), is a set of rules or principles for the regulation of the obviously social relations of human beings. The Stoics were right in regarding a number of matters of conduct as morally indifferent. There is a fine art of life,

the practice of which appertains to the individual but which does not fall wholly within the scope of morals. A large part of the fine art of life belongs to the private, the purely individual aspects, of personal conduct. Happiness, the pervasive and continuous feeling of well-being that comes to an individual from the harmonious exercise of his mental and bodily functions, is largely the result of the successful practice of the fine art of private living, of course under suitable external conditions. A person may be morally good and not very happy, or good and happy. I am not even sure that bad men are not sometimes happy. If I do not neglect my social duties it is morally indifferent whether I find my recreation in bridge, golf, music or poetry, or partly in each of these. Because I happen to enjoy poetry I have no right to condemn my friend who gets his recreation in bridge in the winter and golf in the summer, as morally delinquent. It is morally indifferent whether I spend my spare cash as a bibliophile, a philatelist or an art collector; provided it is really cash that I can spare from the support of my family. Thus there is a large and important field of conduct that does not under normal circumstances come within the purview of the moralist.

But it may be said one owes duties to oneself. Is it not one's duty to develop and exercise all one's powers to the full? Does not the highest good consist in the all-round perfection of our natures? Yes, in so far as this is possible within the limits set by morality. Self-perfection is identical with moral goodness in so far as it contributes to the improvement of the social order, to the social wealth of humanity. We all must limit ourselves, deny ourselves the fruition of some powers in order that we may discharge our moral obligations. The writer might have become a good long-distance runner or an expert mountain climber and explorer. But he had to limit himself because the development of these powers was incompatible with the exercise

of other powers in the discharge of his social obligations. "Make the most of yourself" is not, when taken in isolation, a moral rule; but "Make the most of yourself subject to the performance of your social obligations" is a moral rule. I conclude that the theory of morals has to do primarily with the formulation of the principles of conduct that should govern social relations; and that those private and personal matters of conduct that do not bear directly on our conduct toward our fellows belong to that part of the art of living with which the moralist has concern only in so far as private conduct may trench on social conduct or in so far as the area of morals may be illegitimately extended, as it often is, into an unwarrantable interference with a man's private concerns, which are nobody's business but his own.

If all desires could be harmoniously satisfied, both social morality and ethical reflection would be unnecessary. If the moral systems enshrined in moral tradition, in custom and law, were all-sufficient and unerring, there would be no need to engage in reflection upon the problem of a moral standard. But, as we saw in previous chapters, customary and traditional moral systems are insufficient in any developing society. Therefore reflection upon moral principles, the enterprise of formulating a rational moral standard is imperative. How can we find a suitable moral standard and what is it?

Rationalism

The rationalists are right in insisting that reflective moral conduct is rational conduct. When Kant said: "Act only as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature,"¹ he brought out clearly the function of reason in presenting motives for conduct in an impersonal and hence a social light. In this aspect Kant's doctrine is akin to that of Adam Smith in

¹ Abbott, Kant's *Theory of Ethics*, p. 38.

his theory of the *impartial spectator*. Describing the good man, Smith says: "He has never dared to forget for one moment the judgment which the impartial spectator would pass upon his sentiment and conduct. He has never dared to suffer the man within the breast to be absent one moment from his attention. . . . With the eyes of this great inmate he has always been accustomed to regard whatever relates to himself."² Smith holds that the idea of the impartial spectator is formed through intercourse with others.

Kant holds that there is nothing which can be called good without qualification except a good will. "A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, . . . but simply by virtue of the volition, that is, it is good in itself." "An action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim from which it is determined."⁴ "Duty is the necessity of acting out of respect to the law." But many inhuman actions have been done out of reverence for the moral law. Push a right to an extreme and it becomes a wrong, *Summum jus, summa injuria*. The Inquisition, religious persecutions, the barbarities of war, all have been justified on the Kantian principle. The unbending application of an inflexible rule, which takes no account of special circumstances, may be as immoral as the attitude which leads the individual always to make an exception in his own case. Good conduct may be on the side of feeling, special circumstances. Right and wrong cannot be determined without taking consequences into account. Conduct in obedience to a law is not necessarily good conduct. Notwithstanding "the sublimity and intrinsic dignity of the command of duty," the "Categorical Imperative," its un-

² Smith, *The Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, Part III, Chap. IV, p. 200.

³ Abbott, *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, p. 9.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

bending application, regardless of the subjective impulses, may be cruel and inhumane. If man is moralized through obedience to social rules and laws, it is equally true that social rules and laws are made for and by man for the promotion of human well-being. Kant really supplies the corrective to his own harsh formalism in his great maxim.

{ "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thy own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means merely."⁵ To this I would add—never treat humanity as means only to preserving the dignity and sublimity of an abstract and formal law. In his conception of the moral ideal as a kingdom of ends or commonwealth of free moral personalities, Kant formulated the true principle or moral standard.

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⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

CHAPTER XXVI

HEDONISM AND UTILITARIANISM

Hedonism in its crassest form argues that, since the only end that men actually do seek is pleasure and the only thing they seek to avoid is pain, therefore the moral standard is the greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain. Since the individual is a member of society he cannot attain the maximum of pleasure without taking account of the feelings of others. He must, to some extent, give or allow pleasure to others in order to attain pleasure for himself.

The psychology of Hedonism is false. It rests on an equivocation in the word pleasure. When, for example, I say, "I shall be pleased to do this," I may only mean that I am willing to do it. I may not perform the act with any keen anticipation of pleasure; indeed I may anticipate more pain than pleasure. We act to satisfy concrete desires, but, when in a healthy state of mind, we do not first sit down and balance up the anticipated pleasures and pains of so acting. The doing of an act, the satisfaction of a desire, is normally pleasant, but we do not usually act in order to get the pleasure as such. We act from an impulse, a desire, an aversion, or a sense of duty. The proposition that, in considering his future conduct, man always or even usually weighs the prospective pleasures to be derived from competing possible acts is absurdly out of tune with the facts. A drunkard does not usually sit down in a calm moment and balance the pleasure of getting drunk minus the painful after effects against the pains of sobriety minus the

pleasures of economic efficiency and social well-being. He is overmastered by a craving which becomes irresistible in the face of the prospect of its satisfaction. He may, up to the very instant of embarking on its satisfaction, be well aware of the more permanent and pervasive, though gentler, satisfactions of sobriety. He may approach the satisfaction of his craving with hesitancy and even dread. But so strong is this impulse that he cannot balk it. It finally shuts out completely the emotional interests of sobriety. The case is similar with the gourmand and the sexual debauchee. Action is due to the power of either a habitual craving or a sudden impulse.

Nor does the temperate person usually put from him the temptation to indulge in harmful satisfactions as a result of the careful weighing of prospective pleasures and pains. He too acts to satisfy either habitual interests or occasional impulses. He is moved by affection and duty, by self-respect and ambition; by the craving for knowledge or beauty; and by the impulse to express and realize himself in constructive activity. Even in play one normally aims at some sort of achievement, at the attainment and expression of some sort of skill which is an enrichment of one's personality. In sum, normal human beings act from impulse and from habitual interests, not from carefully forecasted anticipations of pleasures. Pleasure is, as Aristotle put it, like the bloom on the fruit; normal and healthy functioning is pleasurable, but the end is some specific and concrete achievement, or as in art or play, the exercise of our faculties. It may be both. When we enjoy work "for the joy of the working" there is our truest happiness. Hedonism is, in its egoistic form, antisocial. The individual who would make the enjoyment of the maximum amount of pleasurable sensation the governing principle of his life would be led to evade all social obligations and responsibilities that did not clearly contribute to the enhancement of

his own pleasure. Moreover, Hedonism can have no place for the recognition of qualitative differences in pleasures—of higher and lower, nobler and baser pleasures.

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism finds a social principle by recognizing that as a center of pleasurable feeling each individual is to count for one, and no one for more than one. Utilitarianism sets out from the same psychological premises as Hedonism. But it finds a principle of social obligation by recognizing that, as a center of pleasurable feeling, each individual is to count for one and no one for more than one. The social standard of good is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" or the happiness of "the aggregate of all persons." John Stuart Mill, the most famous exponent of the doctrine, offers the following proof: "Each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons." But the aggregate of all persons is neither an agent in the production nor a subject for the consumption of happiness. It is an abstraction which can neither think, feel nor will anything. So the question arises—why should one seek the general happiness, especially if to do so in a given instance means to sacrifice an immediate prospect of individual happiness? Why should one forego the pleasing prospect of one's personal and private good for an abstraction? Mill replies that the sanctions for unselfish action are to be found in the conscientious feelings of mankind, in the consciousness possessed by every one that he is an integral part of society. This feeling is natural and operates in every mind of well-developed feelings "in proportion to the sensitiveness and thoughtfulness of the character." Thus Utilitarianism is made consistent with the ideals of self-sacrifice and the nobler forms of stoicism. "In the golden rule of Jesus we read the complete spirit of the

ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbors as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality."

Mill also holds that there is a difference of quality in pleasures. The pleasures that have higher quality are to be preferred, even when attainable only in lesser quantity, to those of lower quality. The pleasures of the mind take precedence of the pleasures of the sense. There is a sense of dignity in man, so that a man dissatisfied is better than a pig satisfied and within the human range a Socrates dissatisfied is worthier than a fool satisfied.

In passing from the individual's concern for his own happiness to his concern for the happiness of others, Mill commits a simple logical fallacy which does more credit to his heart than to his head. It is true that a morally healthy person will find happiness in furthering the happiness of others. But if one start from the assumption as axiomatic and therefore self-evident that all that an individual ever does or can desire is his own pleasure, it by no means follows that the individual will always find more pleasure in furthering the pleasure of others than in seeking his own private and unsharable pleasure. If my own happiness is my only proper concern, then I need not consider the happiness of others at all except in so far as I am sure that by so doing I shall really enhance my private happiness. Mill indeed employs the Christian and Kantian standard that each individual is an end-in-himself, that is, has inherent worth. But such a conception of value is not deducible from the principle that pleasure is the sole standard. From the latter principle quantity of pleasure is the sole measure of goodness. To appeal, as Mill does, to a sense of dignity is to appeal to something quite other than a purely hedonistic standard. It is to appeal to the worth of man as a moral self, a rational and spiritual person. For if the individual spirit has inherent value, since that value

inheres in the self as a self-conscious, self-determining being, I ought to recognize and treat every other person as a center of spiritual value. Otherwise I am denying in others what I affirm in myself. Reverence for the spiritual individuality of man is the very heart of morality.

In Utilitarianism the transition from egoistic to altruistic Hedonism is made by the ambiguities which lurk in the words "pleasure" and "happiness." In so far as I am a free man I do what pleases me and this means simply that I do what I will to do. It by no means follows that what I always will is to attain the greatest possible amount of pleasure. The word "happiness" is very equivocal. It may mean pleasure as such, regardless of its quality and relations, or it may mean the purer, more equable and lasting satisfactions of a life guided by reason and altruistic motives and directed towards social and supersocial spiritual ends.

Sidgwick's Utilitarianism

Henry Sidgwick modifies Utilitarianism by the introduction of intuitive arguments. His central thesis is that the only ultimate good is the pleasure of some sentient being. All other qualities are valuable only "on account of the desirable conscious life." What makes conscious life desirable is pleasurable Feeling. He holds that Ethics is based on certain rational axioms or self-evident principles. These are: (1) the axiom of Justice or Equality; (2) the axiom of Rational Self-love. He says, with regard to the first axiom: "I find that I undoubtedly seem to perceive, as clearly and certainly as I see any axiom in Arithmetic and Geometry, that it is 'right' and 'reasonable' for me to treat others as I should think that I myself ought to be treated." This is another way of stating that the basic principle of ethics is that every person has intrinsic worth. The principle cannot be deduced logically from the standard as

pleasure—the first premise of Hedonism that every one always does and therefore ought to seek his own maximum of pleasure. If we begin by granting that each individual is of inherent value we might, unless we go farther and inquire wherein that value consists, conclude that as a pleasure-seeking being each is counted only for one and no one for more than one. But the question would remain—as a center of pleasurable feeling alone and regardless of the qualitative dignity of the experiences in which the individual finds the greatest quantity of pleasure, are all individuals of absolutely equal worth? I think that reflective common sense would answer, no.

Pleasure is not a principle for the organization of character. It is a state of feeling, and feeling, by itself, has neither substantive existence nor standard of estimation. Feelings are qualities of concretely organized and dynamic mental structures. The form of conscious life that is inherently worthful is that of a concrete organized and dynamic reflective individual or person.

Pleasure and the Good

Pleasure is a good, not the good. It is undoubtedly a powerful motive to human action. The good man is one who takes pleasure in good acts, experiences and achievements. Therefore pleasure cannot be the criterion of the good. We must find some other criterion to determine who is the good man. If pleasure were to be our criterion we would have to say always—the more the quantity of pleasure experienced the more good. To admit differences in quality is to invoke some other standard. Moreover, it is clear that pleasure as such cannot furnish a principle of social obligation.

It is a narrow and sour-faced conception of the good which would deny that pleasure is a good. Normally, pleasure is the sign of the healthy functioning of some

capacity of man; pain, the sign of disorder. Our impulses or energies (to use Aristotle's term) are the energies of conscious, feeling, thinking beings. Therefore their exercise, under favoring conditions and within the limits of their healthy activation, gives pleasure. The impulses are reinforced by the pleasures attending their exercise and become desires. The pleasures of eating, of physical play and work, of mental work and play, of social life—all reinforce the impulses and strengthen the incentives to exercise the capacities. Thus pleasures, in the form of happiness or continuous satisfaction of human capacities, are good, since they accompany and enhance the realization of our human powers. But pleasure as such fails to define wherein consists the realization of human powers as goodness.

Happiness I have defined as the pervasive and continuous satisfaction which results from the harmonious functioning of one's powers, from the continuous satisfaction of one's basic interests. In this sense it seems to me a constituent of the good life, but, inasmuch as it is a fluctuating state of mind, elusive and dependent on external vicissitudes in interaction with the incalculable nuances of the individual life, it does not supply a sufficiently objective standard for moral conduct. It is a criterion of the good, but not the most satisfactory way of stating the moral standard. Happiness is too subjective and emphasizes too much the reference of the individual in conduct to his own states of feeling. The best way to gain happiness is not to seek it but to direct one's activity towards the achievement of concrete ends. In so far as the individual successfully and continuously achieves the concrete goods of life, in so far as he finds self-respecting satisfaction in work that is recognized and rewarded as having value to society as contributing to the maintenance and advancement of civilization, and in personal relationships, he will be happy. Thus happiness consists in the harmonious and continuous feeling

which results from the exercise of the individual's powers in a manner which brings self-respect and interpersonal harmony.

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CHAPTER XXVII

SELF-REALIZATION OR ENERGISM

The supreme problem of human life is the organization and energization of the main interests or impulses and desires of the self as a member of society. Any activity which satisfies an interest or desire has value thus far. All values, in the last analysis, are values in and for selves. Economic activities and their products, mechanical processes and their products, social institutions and laws, even maxims of conduct, have *instrumental or contributory value* in so far as they further the achievement and enjoyment of values by selves. The values of bodily health and efficient activity in work and play have moral value as contributing to the enrichment and harmonious satisfaction of the psychical life of the self. On the other hand the values which arise from human association, namely, comradeship, friendship, love and sympathy, are not means to the satisfaction of any ulterior values, they are *intrinsic or immediate values* since in them the self finds realization by the satisfaction of its intrinsic nature. These latter values are their own excuse for being.

So, too, the enjoyment of æsthetic values; the contemplation of natural beauty and sublimity and the contemplation of these qualities and other æsthetic qualities, such as tragedy and humor, in the works of art and literature have intrinsic value inasmuch as they enable the self to escape from the tedium of monotonous striving, of distracting and exhausting toil, from the mean and the meaningless, the

sordid and boresome features of everyday life. Through the experience of beauty and the other æsthetic qualities the self escapes into a freer and fresher atmosphere. It is relieved and purified by the contemplation of a beautiful, picturesque, humorous or tragic spectacle which is presented to it as a self-complete whole, sufficient in itself and without any ulterior aim. Similarly, when the intellect is engaged in the apprehension and enjoyment of truth, whether it be in regard to nature or man, without being driven by any motive other than the satisfaction of the impulse to know and understand, the self experiences intrinsic value in the satisfaction of its nature as rational. Similarly, in the highest form of religious experience and philosophical contemplation the self finds intrinsic satisfaction in the consciousness of its harmony with the nature of things as a whole.

Self-Realization

The doctrine of self-realization, as a moral standard, is that the test of the goodness of any act or experience is to be measured in terms of its contribution to the realization of the true self, the larger and enduring life of the individual. Thus the idea of the true self is the moral standard and ideal and therefore the measure of all values. The larger self may be called the ideal personality in contradistinction from the merely natural or empirical individual. Thus the self-realization theory is identical with the doctrine that the good consists in the development and enjoyment of personality.

Aristotle thought that the good for man consists in the effective and continuous functioning or energizing of his capacities as a rational being, since rationality in his highest capacity. Thus Aristotle's view, which is frequently called *energism*, is in principle the same as the self-realization theory. Kant's doctrine that persons should be treated as

ends in themselves and as members of the kingdom of ends or moral community of persons is an expression of the same doctrine. The self-realization theory has been most fully expounded by modern idealists such as Hegel, T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, James Seth, W. R. Sorley, J. S. McKenzie, and Warner Fite. It is the idealistic theory.

From the hedonistic standpoint the self is but a succession of feelings, impressions and ideas. It lacks a permanent unifying principle. The sentient self appears rather as the passive echo or by-product of bodily processes than as the guiding and controlling principle of life. Hedonism in ethics is the logical consequence of the mechanistic or materialistic metaphysics of selfhood. For the idealist or self-realizationist, on the contrary, the self is essentially a permanent, purposive, organizing, spiritual principle. The doctrine of self-realization is sometimes misunderstood by silly people to offer a justification for the indulgence of immediate sensuous impulses without regard to their present or future, larger and more permanent consequences to the indulger and to society. The doctrine is really the antithesis of this. The self that ought to be realized is never actually fully expressed in any single moment of experience.

Moral Personality

Self-realization consists in the control and organization of the natural impulsions and desires from moment to moment by the spiritual principle regarded as the permanent, rational, organizing principle which aims continuously at the achievement of larger rational and social values. The moral personality is realized in the individual, in so far as he continuously transcends his mere biological selfhood in the service of larger aims and more enduring communal values; in the service of the family, the community, the

state and the common cultural life of humanity; in the service of social order, justice and progress; in the service of art, science, letters, education; in widening the area and deepening the quality of human enlightenment, rational self-control and everything, indeed, which makes for spiritual culture. Not length and breadth of mere life, as Spencer puts it, but length and breadth, richness and harmony of *spiritual life* is the standard in the service of which the deeper and permanent principle of individuality is realized. The ideal is well expressed in the words of Goethe, "Thou must join a whole or make one," and "Wilt thou penetrate into the infinite, thou must grasp the finite on all sides."

The individual is, of course, always the unique and responsible center of moral action and the bearer of moral values. Every intrinsic value is as such an aspect of a personal life, of life in a community of persons. The individual, as a rational or spiritual being, must recognize the presence and intrinsic worth of all other individuals, even though many of these be only potential persons. Self-realization is essentially a democratic standard since it is based on the recognition of the presence in all normal selves of the same fundamental and intrinsically worthwhile qualities of rational or spiritual capacity.

All human beings are made in the same divine image, however the image may be blurred. Every individual is a particular spark from the divine fire, although the spark may be hidden and smoldering. Thus the good does not consist either in the cultivation and enjoyment of one's interests as an exclusive and private self nor in the complete suppression of one's selfhood.

The highest good is a life lived in and for the commonwealth of moral persons, as a loyal and freely coöperating member of the community of selves, of the *Beloved Community*, to realize which is the true ideal of humanity (Josiah Royce). The individual is moralized, he realizes

his true selfhood, by his free and active loyalty, not simply in maintaining the existing social order, but more especially in striving to improve the economic and cultural conditions of human life; so that thereby human selves may be enabled to rise to the higher levels of free and rational self-determination and the enrichment of the spiritual value of life. Thus the deepest spring of moral action is loyalty to a spiritual ideal that is both social and individual. It involves the service of human institutions and human culture as instruments for the fruition of spiritual life in the multitudinous lives of human beings, present and to come.

The good life is one in which the individual manfully bears his part in the work of civilization. The work of civilization is carried forward and improved through social institutions. Institutions are instrumental to the good life in so far as they give to all members of society the opportunity to realize and enjoy a more harmonious and richer spiritual life. This life is realized in so far as the random impulses and fluctuating desires of the natural individual are organized to function in the service of self-control, harmony, breadth and comprehensiveness of life; in so far as they are subordinated to the fulfillment of justice, order and progress in intelligence, good will, fellowship, love and beauty.

The perfecting of the individual by the energizing of his distinctively human capacities as a member of society is Plato's idea of the good. Goodness or virtue for him consists in the due and harmonious satisfaction of the sensuous and spiritual capacities of man under the guidance of reason. *Self-control*, the virtue of the bodily desires and *fortitude*, the virtue of the will, are impossible of achievement without *wisdom*, the virtue of reason. The life of goodness is possible only in so far as the individual is educated to perform and does perform the functions which by nature and nurture he is best fitted to perform in the

economy of society. The good life is a life dominated by objective, social and spiritual interests. Only in so far as private interests are brought into harmony with the objective interests is the truer self, the enduring spiritual principle, being used to organize the individual's interests and thus itself being realized in the specific circumstances of time, place and station in life in which every individual finds himself and either realizes his true self in the service of objective ends or suppresses and perhaps destroys his true selfhood by living a life of slavery to every random impulse and imperious desire of the flesh.

Self-Realization and Duty

The self-realizationist interprets duty as being not subjection to an abstract and formal law, but the subjection of the particular impulses and desires of the moment to the more objective and permanent interests and values which are embodied in the concrete occasions or demands of the social and cultural life in the midst of which the individual finds himself. There is not duty in the abstract but there are specific duties. My immediate duties, for example, are to support and educate my family by teaching; it is my duty to teach as well as I can and to investigate to make myself as good a scholar as possible in my field. It is my duty to be a good neighbor and a good citizen and to strive, so far as I can consistently with the discharge of my more immediate duties, to promote the progress of society in my own nation and in humanity in the direction of social and international justice and peace and to further the increase of rational insight into and service of the social and cultural conditions of human progress. Since I have formed certain convictions as to wherein human progress consists, it is my duty to endeavor to increase the prevalence of these conditions.

If I were a farmer it would be my immediate duty to

support my family and to further the economic welfare of society by increasing the production of grain, vegetables and live stock and to discharge the duties which fall upon me as a neighbor, a citizen and a human being in the order of their nearness and urgency. Duties, in the concrete, are obligations to further human values. Thus one may illustrate the self-realizationists' doctrine of duty by the following maxims stated in terms of value: (1) In individual or private reference: (*a*) Choose the course of conduct which promises the more inclusive and lasting value, the one which will minister best to the progressive organization or harmony of the self, the interest which will afford the most continuous and comprehensive satisfaction; (*b*) choose the course of conduct which will promote the higher and purer values, for example, choose the cultivation of the intellectual and æsthetic powers in preference to bodily ornamentation and indulgence. (2) In social reference: (*a*) Choose the line of conduct which will minister to the more lasting, deeper and more comprehensive values of other persons; (*b*) other things being equal, choose to further the interest of the larger group; (*c*) do not sacrifice the more concrete and deeper interests of nearer groups such as the family, the neighborhood and the nation to vague and shadowy abstractions. It is my duty to be interested in the welfare of the Chinese, but I have no right to let my children starve or grow up in ignorance while I try to advance the cause of the Chinese. As T. H. Green said there is no highway to universal good which does not pass along the common road of the good husband and father and the honest citizen.

One of the chief weaknesses of Hedonism is that it sets up an abstraction as the good. Since feeling is always a momentary state of a self, the maximum of pleasure or the greatest happiness can never be actual for a self. What is actual is a succession of more and less agreeable states

of consciousness. The pleasure theory does not afford a principle for the organization of conduct. The greatest happiness of the greatest number, or the greatest happiness on the whole is not as a social criterion of conduct entirely without value. It emphasizes the desirability of measuring the effects of conduct and institutions in terms of the general welfare. But the greatest happiness, on the whole, can be felt by no one, and the greatest happiness of the greatest number is not a state of being of which any clear conception can be formed.

It is quite impossible for an individual to determine with any degree of accuracy the respective amounts of happiness which he has enjoyed on the successive days of the past month. It would be still more impossible for any one to determine the comparative amounts of happiness enjoyed by the inhabitants of the United States on any two different days. The self-realizationist finds in the organization and progressive development of personality the permanent ground of happiness. The harmonious activity of the powers of selfhood under the direction of objective rational and social aims is for him the lasting condition of genuine happiness. The individual who is constantly asking himself, "Am I happier than I was an hour ago, yesterday, or last year, how can I be happier to-morrow or next year?" will never be happy. The individual who devotes himself to honest and useful work and who aims at fulfilling his duties from day to day with his thought and will set on these aims will be happy in so far as he devotes himself thereto. Of course life is imperfect and subject to vicissitudes. Illness, failure, bereavement, the treachery of friends, lack of social recognition for one's work, cannot be avoided; but there is a recourse from these griefs and pains in the devotion of the will to worthy and objective ends. This way lies the pledge of whatever happiness the individual can gain.

Self-Respect and Respect for Others

Self-respect is an indispensable condition of happiness. The person who does not respect himself cannot expect to win the respect of others. He cannot respect himself if others do not respect him. He cannot respect himself and win the respect of others unless he performs a serviceable social function. The loafer, the tramp, the parasite, the sybarite, neither respect themselves nor are respected by others. When Robert Burns said, "Oh wad some power the giftie gie us to see oursel's as ithers see us," he doubtless had in mind this mutual implication of self-respect and the respect of others. The popular judgments do not go far astray in this matter. When an able and promising young person comes to an untimely end, the feeling of regret expressed is an unconscious testimony to the soundness of the idea of self-realization. When people pity or condemn more likely an individual who has wasted his life the same principle is in the back of their minds. When they express regret that untoward circumstances have thwarted the life promise of an individual or that he has sacrificed a worthy career to a family that is unworthy of the sacrifice, the same principle is in their mind even though they may admire the spirit of the sacrifice.

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CHAPTER XXVIII

SOCIAL HUMANISM

Self-Realization and Self-Sacrifice

The theory of self-realization recognizes the necessity for self-denial, self-limitation, self-sacrifice. The higher good is not attained without the sacrifice of lower goods. The young person who sets out upon the career of training himself for a learned profession or for the cultivation of artistic propensities must forego or postpone many joys; he must postpone marriage, he must forego many pleasant social activities. He may have to content himself with shabby clothing, poor food and little recreation. Every one who chooses a career shuts himself off from the possibility of satisfying a number of desires. The scholar, for example, who elects the vocation of a teacher must forego forever the pleasures of affluence, of popular fame and power and of much travel. No doubt he wins compensating joys, but Goethe's words, "Thou shalt renounce," are true of every one who elects to lead an honest and worthy life. Those who would serve worthily and win their own self-respect as well as the respect of others whose respect is worth having must renounce the fleshpots of Egypt.

The doctrine of self-realization, in this respect, is identical with the Christian ethics. "He that will be great among you, let him be the servant of all, for the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto but to minister. He that seeketh his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life

for my sake and the gospel's, shall find it." This means that the way to self-realization is the way of self-denial, self-limitation, self-sacrifice. Now, is it not a paradox to say that self-realization is won through the sacrifice of self even to the uttermost? How can we say that the person who sacrifices a worthy career or foregoes marriage to devote himself to the care of a dependent parent or of his younger brothers and sisters is realizing self: How can we say that the captain who goes down with his sinking ship after the passengers have all been put in life boats, the men who died on the *Titanic* for the sake of the women and children, or the millions of soldiers who died in the mud and cold in the late War, in sacrificing themselves for their respective causes realized their true selves? Over some British graves in Flanders is the following epitaph: "That your to-morrow might be better these have given their to-day." The to-morrow has come, is it better?

In the meantime, those who gave their to-day are being forgotten. The world seems to have slumped back into a selfish and unintelligent scramble for bread and the circus. How did they realize themselves? For what far country did they sacrifice life? It is doubtful whether most who died in the War were conscious of the end for which they died. But this doubt would not invalidate the moral principle involved in their acts, if indeed permanent and objective values were realized by their sacrifice. The men who, hating war and loving the life of the cultivated scholar, loving their sweethearts, wives, children and friends, yet went forth voluntarily from England, France or the United States, to die in the mud, to perish from shells, poison gas or trench fever, did not achieve self-realization unless the spirit of man is immortal. Self-realization through ultimate self-sacrifice is a contradiction in terms unless the spiritual essence of personality survives death. Thus the doctrine of self-realization is not a complete and consistent

theory on any other interpretation of the universe than the spiritual one which makes the natural order subservient to the spiritual order.

I cannot here enter into a discussion of the problem of immortality. There does not seem to be any conclusive empirical evidence of immortality. The so-called communications from the spirits of the departed to the living have still too dubious a character, and even if true, they do not shed any very encouraging light on the state of personality after the death of the body. The immortality of the personal spirit¹ seems to me a postulate or implication of the doctrine that the moral standard consists in the realization of the higher selfhood through the service of objective, social and cultural or spiritual values.

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I think it better to define the moral standard as consisting in the expression of the spiritual self or personality through the service of the objective, social, spiritual structures that are embodied in the cultural life of humanity—in the service of the communal life; in the family, the neighborhood and community, the vocation and, through these, in the service of the nation and of the more universal interests of humanity that are embraced in the cultural and spiritual values embodied in education, literature, art and science. May we not say that the individual who serves in any honest and thorough way the maintenance and improvement of the cultural life of humanity, of the progress and perpetuity of humanity's spiritual life, through any forms of activity by which that life is furthered, is obeying the highest moral standard? While he realizes himself as a distinct and permanent center of spiritual life, he expresses his true self in the furtherance of the good life in

¹ I have said "personal spirit" to emphasize the fact that there are no values except in and for selves.

human society. The supreme moral standard then is: Whatsoever promotes the progress of human society through the achievement and conservation of spiritual ideals and values and their augmentation in the future. Whatsoever furthers progress now can do so only by ministering to the conservation and enrichment of the present spiritual order.

The condition of future progress is conservation of the fruits of progress up to the present. The living generation finds its values immediate to itself, but the living generation is a link in the chain of the generations. It is the present bearer of the future of the race. Its task is to sustain and enlarge the social order, the heritage of spiritual culture, without which humanity lapses into barbarism. The supreme principle of the good is not mere individual perfection. It is the service of perfection, dedication to the progressive ennoblement of humanity. Thus the furtherance of justice, freedom, truth, culture in human society is a higher moral principle than the realization of the life of the individual; the latter is fulfilled and expressed through the service of the former. The efforts of a people in the control of nature, in education and culture, in the maintenance and improvement of their civilization have their own immediate moral values—of honest work, integrity, justice, freedom and loyalty to great causes. These immediate moral values are in turn the conditions without which the moral values of human culture cannot be preserved and enriched for future generations. We labor and we die for the future generations, but our labors and our deaths are worth while as contributory factors in the continuing, spiritual movement of human culture—that is, they are worth while if the spiritual culture of man has a permanent place in the nature of things.

We must either assume the supremacy in the cosmos of a spiritual order which is in very truth, however imper-

fectly, embodied in the mental and spiritual development of the human race or we must accept the alternative that, ultimately, all is vanity that is done under the sun. All the values for which humanity has striven and in which it has found its deepest joy shall finally tumble into the abyss of utter nothingness. Our choice lies between a moral nihilism for which the human race is a cosmic blunder, on the one hand, and on the other hand faith in the enduringness and supremacy of a psychical life which is progressively realized in the life of humanity, through the growth and fruition of personalities in fullness and harmony of action and experience; in understanding, fellowship, sympathy and the enjoyment of beauty and love. Nevertheless, whatever be the future of the individual or the race, these values are good in their own right as they are lived. Immediate value belongs only to living experience.

The Principle of Humanism

In short, the fundamental principle of control in human conduct is the harmonious integration of the dynamic capacities or energies of human nature. Since it is the prime conditions of harmonious integration that the wider, deeper and more permanent interests of the self shall be preferred to the narrower, shallower and more transitory interests, the principle of harmonious integration involves a hierarchical organization of interests. The values or conditions which arise from the satisfaction of interests constitute a scale or hierarchy, since some interests are wider and more permanent than others.

An act is good if it satisfies an interest and at the same time either promotes or does not hinder the satisfaction of interests that are at least equally wide and deep and equally permanent. A motive or intent is good if it aims at the satisfaction of an interest in the right way. An act is bad if it either thwarts an interest or, in the satisfaction,

of an interest, prevents the satisfaction of other interests that are at least equally wide and deep and permanent; or, still worse, wider and more permanent interests. In every case the criterion is this—how does the act or the intent to do the act contribute to the furtherance of the harmonious system of interests?

Our criterion involves subordination of the more isolated transitory and superficial interests to the more comprehensive, pervasive, permanent and deeper interests. It involves the principles of measure and proportion as guiding criteria which Plato stressed so much.

Is our principle individualistic or collectivistic? It is both. It is collectivistic, inasmuch as we recognize that the harmonious integration and energizing of human interests can take place only through a community life that is organized and conducted precisely to further this end in all its members. The individual who will not contribute his part to the furtherance of the economic substructure and the cultural superstructure of a good community life defeats himself as well as thwarts the lives of others. The aim of the community, as Plato said, should be not to make any one individual happy by himself but to make all members as happy as possible. We can go further and say that the individual can not be made truly happy, as we have defined happiness or welfare, without regard to the social conditions of the common weal. The human individual is so constituted that it is impossible for him to realize and enjoy in a harmonious and continuous fashion the basic interests of his being except as a contributing member of the community life. "He that seeketh his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life shall find it," is a profound psychological truth and a paramount ethical principle. The individual who refuses to marry or embark on any other social adventure because of its risks fails to realize his true individuality. In order to be truly human

we must, as Goethe put it, join a whole or make one. To this one may add in qualification that we do not have to make a whole, all we have to do is to take the whole in which we find ourselves, the life of the community, and make it a better instrument for the organization of harmonious individuality on the part of its members. As a member of the family, as a friend, a comrade, as a contributor to the economic sustenance of the community, as a furtherer of its cultural wealth, the individual realizes his personality.

On the other hand, our criterion is individualistic, since it finds in the development and enjoyment of harmonious, intelligent, self-determining individuality on the part of all its members the true measure of the value of the community life. As one surveys the panorama of life one finds that increase of individuality on the part of its members is the true criterion of the place of any living species in the scale of evolutionary development. In the lower invertebrates there are commensal communities—plant and animal communities not made up of distinct individuals, but having common roots and branches. In the societies of ants, bees and wasps, while the individuals are distinct organisms, they are wholly subordinated and merged in the life of the society. In the vertebrates, the individual, while he mates as an individual, is the creature of the instincts or emotions which rule the pack or herd. The same is true, though in lesser degree, of the more primitive human communities.

The recognition of fuller scope for the exercise of self-determining individuality in human societies first appeared through military rule, priest craft and the administration of customs and laws. The ethical significance of democracy as a social creed and policy consists in this—it is the express recognition of the universal right of human beings to the development of harmonious individuality or self-determin-

ing personality. There is no inconsistency between democracy in this sense and genuine mental aristocracy. On the contrary the one implies the other, for the realization of the fundamental aim of democracy requires leadership, guidance, initiative, creativeness. The true aristocrats in a democracy are those who serve the universal aim of the realization of individuality by the exercise of their super-average powers. The attainment and enjoyment of individuality is possible only through a community life rich in opportunity for the attainment by all its members, up to the limit of their capacities, of cultural goods. It is the function of exceptionally endowed individuals to enrich the cultural goods and to further their distribution to all who can assimilate and use them. The richer, the more vigorous and progressive the cultural life of the community the more various and manifold will be the enjoyment of harmonious individuality by its members.

CHAPTER XXIX

VIRTUE AND CHARACTER

Introductory

The Latin word for virtue originally meant manly vigor, courage and capacity. The Greek equivalent of the term meant excellence of any kind just as *good* meant *useful*, *fit for something*, and also *straight*, in contrast with the *bad*, meaning *crooked*.

In the development of ethical reflection among the Greeks stress was laid on the intellectual and æsthetic conditions of character. For Plato all virtue is one, since it is the dynamic quality of a human character or developed soul. But there are distinguishable aspects of virtue—*self-control*, which means the control of the bodily appetites and impulses by reason in order to produce moderation, harmony and proportion in their satisfaction; *fortitude* or *courage*, which means the control by reason of the volitional energy of the individual to the end that he may act wisely or moderately and harmoniously; *wisdom*, which is the right conduct of the reason, in the direction of all activity; and *righteousness* or *goodness*, which is the harmonious functioning of all human powers, and which is identical with character.

Aristotle does not differ essentially from Plato, though he makes a sharper distinction between the practical and the intellectual virtues; but, like Plato, he holds that intellectual virtue is a necessary condition of practical virtue. Virtue, says Aristotle, is a trained habit of action which

results from the repetition of right choices in the satisfaction of the natural capacities. Thus virtue is identical with character or habit of will. It is formed as a result of repeated acts of will. The formation of a virtuous character presupposes two conditions: (1) The inheritance of the right natural aptitudes. An individual born with an abnormally intense desire or born deficient in a desire will thus far be hindered from becoming virtuous. (2) The second condition of acquiring a virtuous character is that the individual shall be nurtured in a social environment favorable to the development of virtue. Aristotle enumerates in greater detail and more systematically, the practical virtues, than does Plato. He discusses the features of such virtues as liberality, magnificence, high-mindedness, gentleness, agreeableness and wittiness. So, too, in dealing with the virtues of the intellect, he distinguishes between *wisdom*, which is a knowledge of the highest objects of human life, and springs from the union of reason with scientific knowledge and *prudence*, which is intellectual insight applied to the concrete details of conduct. The practical virtues consist in moderation, in avoiding both the extreme of excess and the counter extreme of defect; but in matters of wisdom and rational insight there can be no extreme since no man can know too much.

Christian Virtues

In the Christian scheme of virtue both the manly virtue of active fortitude and the intellectual virtue of wisdom are subordinated to the virtues of love to God and man, faith and loyalty to the Kingdom of God and its founders, patience or passive courage, forgiveness and humility. With respect to the satisfaction of the bodily appetites the Christian doctrine inculcates with respect to the sex appetite complete abstention outside a lifelong monogamous marriage. The primitive Christian attitude also counsels the freedom

of the soul from any lasting concern for economic wealth. The primitive Christian looked for the speedy ending of the existing world order and the miraculous installation of the Kingdom of God in all its completeness. Therefore, his conception of virtue emphasized the renunciation of this-worldly concerns and of patient endurance of the present evils in so far as they were not removable by his own acts. But it is not true to say that the Christian virtues were primarily passive. Faith and love were essentially active virtues and the great Christian apostles, preëminently St. Paul, were men of the utmost vigor, courage and energy in the prosecution of their mission. The courage of the Christian was much finer than the courage of the warrior, it was the courage to endure and to dare for the salvation of men's souls. The devotion of the Christian was not less, nay even it was more, steadfast to its objects than that of the Greek philosopher.

In the modern industrial order the virtues that are the most emphasized are industry, efficiency, enterprise, thrift.

Definition of Virtue

Following Aristotle we will define virtue as consisting in the active and enduring quality of a character that has been formed out of favorable natural aptitudes by the individual's repeated deliberate choices. Virtue is identical with Kant's good will. When he says that there is nothing in the universe which is worthy of absolute reverence but the good will, and that the good will is a will that aims always at the right, Kant means that the virtuous character is the only kind of being that has absolute value. Kant's conception of goodness has been criticized on the ground that it disregards the necessity of the good will aiming hard at good results. I do not think this criticism is just. I think he would say that the will which does not aim to the very best of its ability at good results is not good. He does not

mean by the good will those fatuous good intentions which in the popular adage supply the paving stones for hell. It is true, of course, that good results may follow from evil intents. To gratify his vanity and win popular favor a rich scalawag may make munificent benefactions which in effect further human culture, but the results are not so good as they would be if the rich benefactor had honestly and with a regard for the welfare of his fellows acquired the wealth which he donates to public ends. A society in which it is possible to amass ill-gotten gains is a corrupt society even though the major portion of these gains be devoted to education, missions or charity. On the other hand a man may aim with the fullest good will in his power at good results, and his aim may be defeated through his own inability or through untoward outer circumstances, but his will is surely just as good as if he had achieved what he set out to do.

I shall not here discuss the question whether there are absolute values other than the good will, but with reference to matters of conduct it is surely true that only the will which aims persistently at good is absolutely worthwhile. The good will is the one form of intrinsically worthwhile reality which is accessible to all normal human beings. A personality which is insensible to æsthetic values is less rich than one which has an equally good will but is sensible to æsthetic values; but the former personality has just as good a will as the latter in the moral sense of the term good.

The Unity of Virtue

Since virtue is a settled will, a deliberately formed habit towards the good, it is possible to enumerate as many forms of virtue as there are distinguishable natural capacities that are deliberately directed and exercised towards the good in social relations. In popular speech and literature such virtues as the following are specified: self-control, moderation,

courage, patience, honesty, chastity, industry, thrift, truthfulness, fair-mindedness or justness, etc. We might say there are as many virtues as there are native dispositions that are trained and exercised in the right social directions; and as many vices as there are native dispositions that are misdirected. But there would be no point in attempting a complete enumeration of the virtues. Psychologists are not in agreement as to how many distinguishable native dispositions man has. Moreover, the native dispositions are given varied sets and emphases in the changing conditions of social life. After all the human self is a unity, and the better self it is the more compact its unity. The best self is the most unified. Virtue is one, since it is the organized and persistent will towards the good in all the relations of life. If I am asked to pick out a name for this one virtue I should call it *wholeness* or *integrity and harmony of character*. This is what Plato means by righteousness or goodness as the harmony in action of the various capacities of human nature. This is what Jesus means when He says: "If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light."

Of course no man is a paragon of all the virtues. Every individual has his besetting sins or weaknesses, for individuals are born with the elementary qualities of human nature present in different degrees of relative strength; moreover, owing to the differences in the conditions of social nurture, the developed characters of two individuals who are born with the same capital of dispositions will manifest different weaknesses. Nevertheless, while one man may be intemperate, another unchaste, and a third dishonest, the virtues that the three men respectively possess will all be modified by their vices. No human character can consist of a series of separate engines. Character is an organic whole. One vice weakens all the virtues and one virtue strengthens the other virtues.

There are certain cardinal aspects of character that are fundamental to all virtues. These are *self-control* (the Greek temperance), *fortitude* or *moral courage*, *honesty*, *consideration for others* and *wisdom* or *rational insight*.

(1) *Self-control*. It is obvious that no individual can be called virtuous who cannot control his appetites and passions. The glutton, the debauchee, the envier, and the man who gives way to fits of ungovernable anger, are lacking in virtue. (2) *Fortitude*, or moral courage. The power to endure, to suffer pain and loss, as well as the power to perform a dangerous or disagreeable duty, to face unpopularity or worldly loss, for the sake of the right, are aspects of moral courage. (3) *Consideration for others*. That sense of fair play, or readiness to consider the claims of others, which is justness between man and man, involves sympathy or love in the Christian sense. (4) *Thoughtfulness*, intelligence applied to the conduct of social relations is the virtue of wisdom or intellectual virtue as Plato and Aristotle define it. This virtue is the nurse and mother of all virtues. Without it one cannot exercise self-control for there is a time to be angry, as well as a time to be patient. There is a time and circumstance for the satisfaction of the bodily needs as well as times to refrain. Without wisdom one will be courageous in the wrong place and timorous in the wrong place. Without wisdom one will condone offenses in others that should not be condoned and vice versa. Without wisdom one will debauch the character of others through indiscriminate charity or fail to relieve unmerited distress. Without wisdom one may act from good motives and produce bad results because of one's failure to determine the right means.

There is a widespread popular notion that one can be good without exercising much intelligence. The adage: "Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever," expresses this notion. It is fallacious. I do not mean that stupid

people or ignorant people have no goodness, but their goodness is not as good, not so comprehensive and effective, as the goodness which is intelligent. Indeed, unthinking goodness is likely to produce bad results and to make its possessor the prey of circumstances. When Socrates said: "Knowledge is virtue, and vice is ignorance," he meant by knowledge a wisdom which consists in a full and clear insight into the meanings and consequences of human motives. It is often said that one can know what is right and be powerless to do it, but does the man who is blinded by passion or the slave of an evil habit know in the full and clear sense what is right? I trow not.

Virtue as Individual and Social

Some writers on ethics classify the virtues as individual and social. James Seth, for example, enumerates and discusses as primarily individual virtues temperance or self-discipline and culture, or self-development, and the social virtues as justice and benevolence. H. W. Wright includes in the individual virtues prudence, courage and idealism; in the social virtues kindness and friendship; in addition to the virtues enumerated by Seth. This distinction between individual and social virtues seems to me misleading. All virtue is a settled will of the individual directed towards some actual or ideal social situation. Every virtue is a quality of an individual person and every virtue has a social reference. Obviously self-control and courage have social reference and in so far as it comes within the purview of morality, culture, or the harmonious development of the capacities of personality, has social reference and social value. For society consists of nothing over and above the relations of human persons to one another and the moral life consists of these relations judged and lived in the light of ideals or standards of human improvement or perfection. A moral

ideal is a conception of a more humane and more fully human life for the members of society.

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CHAPTER XXX

THE SUPREME VALUES

Moral Values and Other Values

Moral values are not the absolute and all-inclusive values the possession of which completely fulfills the vocation of personality. Moral values concern primarily man's relations with his fellows, recognized as inherently worthwhile centers of value. The moral value of an intent or a motive depends on what is implied in it with reference to the agent's treatment of his fellows. It can conduce only to confusion of thought and an inhumane and joyless Puritanism in action to claim that all human quests for, and enjoyments of, values are governed directly by principles of morality and fall within the categories of right or wrong. The life of the individual contains more than can be subsumed under moral rules or principles. It is quite true that, when the satisfaction of any other value clearly conflicts with a moral principle, the other value should give way. But it is also true that human life, if its promises and potencies are even only modestly realized, includes rich and massive joys that go beyond moral goodness. There is nothing better than morality, so far as it goes. But it never satisfies a human soul. One may be morally good and unhappy, because deep tracts of one's individuality go unsatisfied; because life is "unfulfilled, patchy and scrappy." One may be good, in the moral sense, but insensible to the beauty of nature and ignorant of its meanings; insensible to the beauty, the pathos, the tragedy enshrined in the

history of man and revealed in great art; ignorant of the joys of understanding nature and man; deprived of the joys of sex-love, of parenthood, of comradeship and friendship.

The human good, in the inclusive sense of the term, includes all values in which the spirit of man finds massive, varied and enduring fulfillment. It includes comradeship, friendship and the love of the sexes, parental and filial affection; joy in the intellectual comprehension and æsthetic contemplation of nature in all her forms and moods; the joys of constructive and creative activity of all sorts; the joys of harmonious self-expression in language and movements through song and dance, music, lyric and drama; the growth of intelligent sympathy and the expansion of one's own life through the knowledge and appreciation of the career of man revealed through history and literature and wide social experience. Only in so far as individuals enjoy, in the fullest and most harmonious fashion possible, all their spiritual powers, do they realize the good life in the sense of happiness or well-being (the *eudaimonia* of Aristotle). A person may be morally good—he may be just, honest, merciful, kind and altruistic—and yet be unhappy! Either because through untoward circumstances some of his deepest impulses, interests and affections are thwarted or their legitimate objects wrecked; or because through some want of balance or lack of discrimination he stands in the way of his own happiness.

The Full Good

The full good, which constitutes happiness, is identical with the beautiful, the fair and harmonious in human experience. The highest beauty is spiritual harmony and comprehensiveness of personality. In the words of Socrates' prayer: "Oh, great Pan, give me beauty in the inward parts." The recognition of this principle that the

good is a fulfillment of one's spiritual capacities that transcends social morality is expressed in the Platonic ideal of harmony, measure, proportion, as criteria of the best life, and in those modern writers, for example Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Herbart, Schiller, Goethe, Havelock Ellis and A. K. Rogers, who hold to the ultimate identity of the ethical and the æsthetic criteria of value.

The test of the value of any social order lies in the degree in which it removes hindrances from the path of the individual in the realization of his various capacities, harmoniously and in a manner compatible with the fulfillment by other selves of their several individualities. This means the well-proportioned and harmonious energizing of all the psychical capacities. The irreducible inner sources of our judgments of good and evil are the dynamic impulses which make us what we are. When we become conscious of an impulse and its consequences it is transformed into a *desire* and an *interest* (*interest* is a name for a persisting propensity to desire). What we desire is good, in the absence of conflicting interests. The distinction between good desires and evil desires amounts to the distinction between those interests which yield lasting, pure and fruitful satisfaction to the self and other selves and those interests which yield discord, defeat and pain in the end. While what the individual desires always appears to him good at the moment of desire, it is bad if its satisfaction produces, in the end, more discord, pain, disharmony in himself and others, than the immediate satisfaction yields of the opposite experiences.

Is not this Hedonism? No, for while any pleasure taken by itself is good, happiness is achieved only through the continuous satisfaction of the main tendencies of our nature; but our natures are not thus satisfied if we ignore the differences, in *quality*, *purity*, *permanence* and *capacity* for harmonizing with other interests, of our several inter-

ests. Pleasure, simply as pleasure, does not afford us a criterion for choosing between competing interests.

The matter may be summed up as follows: Any activity is good which yields lasting satisfaction to the interests of the self in the direction which makes for the maximum harmonious energizing of his capacities as a member of the community of persons.

But the self grows into richness, harmony and stability of content only through the identification of itself with other selves and with more universal interests.

In the words of Shelley:

The great secret of morals is love; or a going out of our nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own. A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of the species must become his own. The great instrument of good is the imagination, and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause. Poetry enlarges the circumference of the imagination by replenishing it with thoughts of ever new delight, which have the power of attracting and assimilating to their own nature all other thoughts, and which form new intervals and interstices whose void forever craves fresh food.¹

Poetry, in this catholic sense, is the offspring of the marriage of love and spiritual imagination. Love is, in the highest sense, the fusion of imaginative power with sympathetic feeling. By it we project ourselves into, and identify our interests with, other persons and with the great super-personal or ideal interests of true patriotism, justice and happiness, the increase and spread of enjoyed truth and beauty among men. The final summit of love is that reverent embracement and enjoyment of the universal order, the Supreme Spirit of the Cosmos—which is religion when we find self-forgetting joy and peace therein. Thus re-

¹ Shelley, "A Defense of Poetry."

ligion is just devotion to, and the finding of full satisfaction in devotion to, the highest values of beauty, love and truth, believed to be supremely satisfying objects of service and united in one Cosmic Spirit—in *whose will is our peace*. We are so constituted that only in devotion to some supreme value that continually carries us beyond our already achieved selfhood, that makes us one with something stable and complete, can we be happy. We are happy only when we do not stop to ask ourselves whether we are happy, because we are absorbed in some superpersonal interest that for the time at least has supreme value. And since the integration of values is the basic spring of our lives we cannot forbear postulating, in faith, though we may not articulately express this faith, an Ultimate and Supreme Integrating Ground of Values. In their vital moments of feeling and action this is what all men mean by *God*: a symbol for the Dynamic and Integrating Source and Sustainer of life's values, of life's stable and satisfying interests.

The Locus of Values

One finds a tendency in some current philosophy to accord to *values* some sort of ineffable and mysterious reality. We are told that they are objective, exist in the nature of things apart from human minds and as such are eternal.² One reads about *absolute* values—truth, beauty and goodness.

To me such statements are very nearly meaningless. I say "very nearly," since I see how they arise from hypostatizing abstractions.

Clearly most things and activities have value *for* minds or selves because they are instrumental to the satisfaction

² This is the tendency of the South-West German School of Windelband, Rickert, *et al.*, with whom belongs Hugo Münsterberg. Curiously enough G. E. Moore, the English realist, regards values as real apart from minds.

of interests. All judgments of value have their roots in feelings. Valuing is a subject-object relation like knowing. Valuing leads to doing for the sake of enjoying. Neither value nor truth reside in objects-in-themselves. If there were no minds there would be no truth (or error). If there were no minds there would be no values. If materialism, in its latest fashionable form of emergent evolutionary naturalism, be true (the doctrine that minds and their qualities emerge from certain physical complexes) then presumably there was a time when in the universe there were no minds at all.³ Then there was no truth and no value. If one accept this theory, for him now it is true that once upon a time the universe or rather the primeval chaos contained neither truth nor value. This truth will have value for him now, if he enjoys it. But truth is not the same as value. Truth has its own values but it is not, as such, value. It is instrumental to the realization of other values, practical and æsthetic. It has immediate or intrinsic value for those who enjoy knowing. There must be, of course, objective (physical and social) conditions of value. To me Keats's "Ode to a Grecian Urn" and the Grand Canyon of the Colorado are their own excuses for being. I enjoy them, they satisfy my æsthetic feeling and that is enough. The Grand Canyon is a part of the physical cosmos. If it were not there minds could not enjoy it, but if there were no minds to contemplate it, it were not an existent æsthetic object. If Keats had not lived and written and if his poetry had not been preserved I could not enjoy it. But, on the other hand, there are many people who do not care

³ Emergent naturalism or evolutionism is either materialism or it is ■ quibble. If a specific complex of physical elements is the sole condition of the appearance of mind and if there was no mind until this complex happened then mind is a by-product of material elements. If the occurrence of the physical complex was not the sole determining antecedent of mind, then mind is an original constituent of the universe.

a straw for Keats and maybe there are some who care not for the Grand Canyon. For them these things are devoid of value. There are truths that have no value for individuals. Intrinsic, Supreme or Ultimate Value belongs then only to those things which satisfy individual minds and they are simply supreme or intrinsic for these minds and there are no minds which are not individual. There are different degrees of intrinsic value in experiences. Some are transitory and thin, such as the values of eating and drinking for the normal man. Some are massive and more permanent, such as the values of success in life, of friendship, of love and æsthetic values.

As for social and moral values, their objectivity consists only in their usefulness or worth as the conditions under which members of the group can realize and enjoy their individualities through coöperation, through living and letting live. The only thing that is of absolute value is the individual person's experience, since this is the only realizer, enjoyer and bearer of values.

He who sets up as absolute or sacrosanct the so-called social values is even more muddle-headed than he who asserts that whatever is is right. For the former is asserting, not only that whatever is *now* is right but that whatever is now is eternally right. This is the way of all Pharisees and stupid reactionaries. Only individuality is sacred, for it alone enjoys and suffers. All social and moral values are instrumental and, since the social (economic, political, legal, educational, intellectual) conditions for the realization of individuality are in flux, social and moral values are also in flux.

There are nine and sixty ways
Of constructing tribal lays
And every single one of them is right.

But what is right here and now is not right there and then. This is the situation. All values are private and

personal. This is to say that values are real only for valuing minds. On the other hand, minds are members of Nature or the cosmos. Minds depend on the presence of certain extramental natural conditions for their enjoyment of values. In this sense values have physical conditions. Furthermore values, while subjective and individual in their enjoyed reality, are not wholly capricious and indefinitely variable. If nature has a complex but definite structure, so has mind. Besides the physical objectivity as the condition of enjoying values, there is a mental objectivity or community of structure which is the basis of community of values. This too is complex and variable. One person has no ear for music, or no sense for poetry or architecture. For him their values do not exist. Among those for whom the æsthetic values of art and nature exist, there are variations in enjoyment and appreciation, dependent upon the variations in their original capacities as determined by variations in their cultivation. The influence of one's early social environment is great; considerable too is the influence of the later social environment in determining what one values. So too with moral values. These are instruments, conditions for the social lives of individuals. Without some moral conventions individuals cannot live together. Without living together individuals cannot realize their possibilities. The human objectivity of *moral* values consists simply in the *mores* necessary to maintain a given type of social culture. Since types of culture vary *mores* vary. The *ethical* values which I have sketched are those in which the human individual as a member of a community attains and enjoys the fullest development of his spiritual nature as I understand it.

To ask the question, what standing have the ethical values in the universe, is simply to raise, in another form, the question, what standing has spiritual individuality in the universe. In so far as ethical values have a secure place

in the nature of things this means that the spiritual self is an essential member of the cosmos. Those who, because of the obvious difficulties in finding an affirmative answer to the question "Has the spiritual self an enduring place in the nature of things?" have recourse to the doctrine that, while selves may be transitory by-products of the cosmos, universal values (Truth, Beauty and Goodness and the like) are permanent and regnant in the cosmos, are deceiving themselves and others by hypostatizing and worshipping abstractions.

On the other hand, since the ethical or spiritual self is one which possesses and enjoys not a collection but an organized whole of values, since it is, in short, a spiritual system an organized unity, and since the realization of this Value of all values takes place always in a society or community which, in turn, is a historically and geographically conditioned part of the universe, the realization of value in man implies a positive relation to a Cosmic Principle of Value. "The source of the principle of the perfection of social man is to be found in the life and purposes of the cosmos. . . . The pattern and standard of moral worth is not to be found in man's nature alone, but in his environment, not merely of human society, but of the wider cosmos."⁴

I have discussed these questions fully in my *Man and the Cosmos*, Chapters XXVIII-XXXII, XXXV, XXXVII-XXXIX.

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CHAPTER XXXI

WHY SHOULD ONE BE GOOD?

The motives that induce men to do right are as various as their individualities; and these, in turn, are determined by the reactions of their original impulsive natures to the social conditions of their nurture, to the effective social-moral and legal patterns of conduct. We cannot examine here all the varied motives for right conduct. We will consider the chief types of sanctions which supply incentives and inhibitions to the individual.

The simplest and crudest sanctions are the *physical* and *legal sanctions*. To live morally, within certain limits, is to attain better physical results in health and energy. Self-control of the animal passions is necessary to physical well-being, mental poise and general efficiency. The drunkard, the debauchee, the glutton, the physically inert, cannot enjoy good health and mental balance. But this sanction is limited and external in range. A man who practices restraint of his sensuous nature simply for the sake of his health is a prudent man but not a good man in the ethical meaning of the term. Another might say he preferred a shorter and a merrier life to a longer, though more colorless and healthy one. Self-control is the expression of a moral quality only in so far as it is practiced as the instrument of richer individual, social and supersocial ends. It is possible to concern oneself so exclusively with one's physical welfare that one becomes merely a prudential, arid, selfish, joyless machine. Moreover, there may be times when a man should be prodigal of his health, energy

and even life itself in the interests of other persons or of causes; times in which goodness and joy result from throwing prudence to the winds. Mere prudence is mean, small and calculatingly selfish—with a selfishness that is self-defeating.

The *legal sanction*, that one should be good in order to avoid the penalties of the law, actually operates where higher sanctions fail. But it is clear that one who does right and refrains from wrong simply from this motive is not a good man. Since his acts are good only in so far as they are enjoined by an external agency his character is not good.

The *social sanction*, beyond the law, is the desire for the good opinion of one's fellows. Since man realizes his moral and rational nature only in relations with his fellows, it is both natural and legitimate that he should be moved to do the right and refrain from the evil in order to stand well with his fellows. Aristotle indeed says that only the good can be truly friends. There cannot be lasting honor and loyalty between bad men. In so far as these qualities are found in criminals their badness is mitigated. If love is the highest form of goodness one will, in loving other persons, be moved to love and seek what they love and seek. The love for others who are better than oneself is a powerful and worthy motive for goodness. Indeed admiration and love are the strongest incentives to conduct.

But the social sanction, even in this its finest form, is a two-edged sword. If one continues to be incited to good conduct chiefly by the desire to win the approval of others one may become more or less a stage-performer, a self-conscious echo of others. Moreover, one may seek the approbation of persons who are not themselves exemplars of the highest good possible in the situations given. One may be satisfied with the approval of mediocre persons. Thus one will not do or be the best that one is capable of.

The highest sanction of the good life is reverence and love for the attainment and enjoyment of the fullest possible moral and spiritual individuality in others and in oneself. The highest incentive is the progressing attainment and enjoyment of a harmonious or integrated life as a co-operant member of the community of persons. We have many times insisted that the harmonious integration of one's several impulses or interests is the universal mark of goodness in individuals; and that the integration of selfhood is achieved only so far as the individual lives fully in interpersonal relations as a loyal member of the Beloved Community (the ideal society in its realization here and now). Since that weasel word "happiness" should mean the continuous and purest satisfaction of the permanent interests of one's nature, happiness is at once the resultant and the incentive of goodness. There is no enduring happiness without the integration of the self and no enduring integration of the self without active participation in the work of realizing the ideal community.

The Sanctions of the Good Life

The good life then requires no external sanction. Love is both the fulfillment of the law and its own sufficient excuse for being. "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue. It is virtue itself" (Spinoza). The good life should be sought because it is the good life. In it the sentient and spiritual possibilities of selfhood are realized and enjoyed in the fullest measure and the most harmonious manner. Just dealing, integrity in conduct and speech and thought, active and intelligent sympathy and fellowship, loyalty and devotion to the causes of truth, knowledge and beauty—all such qualities of spirit are jewels that shine by their own light. They need no borrowed radiance and in their presence all other lights are either meretricious or merely instrumental.

And the ethical function of religion, exercised through meditation and devotion and through love and reverence for noble personalities, is that it furnishes a powerful instrument for the integration of the life of selfhood as a member of the Beloved Community; through the integration of the emotional and impulsive nature of man, which is more basic than the intellectual and is only indirectly moved, cleansed and synthesized through the emotive and suggestive effects of intellectual processes. Images and concepts must catch fire in the emotive life before they can heal the conflicts in the self.

We have not, thus far, considered the supernatural sanctions of the good. It is said that the most powerful motive to right living is that thereby one insures for oneself a state of blessedness or felicity hereafter and avoids the risks of eternal punishment for wrong-doing. If there be a God who punishes the wicked and rewards the righteous for their hard and self-denying labor here and now, then it is worthwhile to forego the sensuous and selfish sweets of the present in order to obtain eternal bliss.

Against such a misuse of the religious motive we set the following:

I. We do not *know* that the individual will live hereafter; nor, if perchance he does, whether he will exist in a form that is consciously continuous with his present existence. If there be a break in the conscious continuity of personal identity, then the present existing individual will not enjoy or suffer in the future.

II. An appeal of the above sort undermines the very nature of goodness as being the inherently worthful character of moral and spiritual selves. It degrades human personality to the level of a poor calculating machine, by erecting as the dominant motive to right action an insurance gamble which consists in balancing the pain of foregoing for a short time sensuous delights in order to insure an

infinity of future delights *of the same kind*. Those to whom such considerations appeal have simply not reached the plane of rational and ethical selfhood.

On the other hand, it is a legitimate and indeed inevitable question to ask: What is the cosmic status of the good life? What justification have we for assuming or postulating that the humanly good life is the one most in harmony with the ultimate meaning of the universe? Or are we even entitled to presume that there is an ultimate Cosmic Meaning?

These are the questions of metaphysics, which is the attempt to determine, in the light of the main conclusions of our several fields of knowledge, what one may reasonably believe as to the ultimate meaning of reality. Metaphysics is an inquiry into problems that for religious faith are already settled in some way. If one is confidently certain, through the absolutely trustworthy and competent authority of some institution, book, person or mystical experience, what is the ultimate destiny of man and the sure means of attaining it, metaphysics is an entirely superfluous inquiry. If it reaches conclusions already assured it is a harmless waste of time; if it reaches different conclusions it is false and mischievous.

Ethics and Metaphysics

But if one is not entirely satisfied with the deliverances of some existing authority and if one has not had a private revelation, one cannot escape metaphysical inquiry, unless indeed one declines to think at all on these subjects.

Metaphysics is a comprehensive and difficult subject—indeed, the most comprehensive and difficult subject of human inquiry. Here we cannot do more than indicate its relation to ethics.

The principal conclusions or principles of ethics furnish one of the chief motives and occasions for metaphysics.

Ethics is not based on metaphysics—metaphysics is, in part, based on ethics. The central metaphysical problem, when one approaches metaphysics from ethics, is this: What is the place of the community of personal spirits, who alone realize and enjoy moral and other spiritual values, in the cosmos?

To this query there is no unequivocal and logically compelling answer. Our final attempt at an answer must be at best a matter of balancing probabilities in the light of all the considerations from natural science and humanistic studies and of reaching a conjectural basis for reasonable faith and hope.

On the one hand, the paramount significance of personality as the source and bearer of all values, the creator not only of all cultural life but as well of all scientific theories, philosophies and religions, makes it difficult to assume that so central an empirical reality has no abiding significance, no enduring reality in the blind driftings of the cosmic weather. On the other hand, the scientific study of nature seems to point towards an inexorable and blind physical order in which life and mind are but transitory by-products. We do not *know*, in any degree approaching certainty, what the ultimate meaning of the cosmic drift of things may be. Indeed we do not certainly know whether there is one supreme tendency at the heart of things, or two, or several.

It is possible that what we call life is, in all its manifestations, an evanescent flash in the blind whirl of insensate energies. It is possible that consciousness and thought are but uneasy dreams or nightmares cast up by the effervescing bubble, life. On the other hand, it is probable that livingness and sentience are inherent qualities of the universe and that human thought and feeling are still higher inherent qualities of the universe. No one has yet shown that nonliving matter produces life out of itself alone. No one has shown that thought, sentiment and volition are

physical by-products. Indeed it is well-nigh impossible seriously to entertain the doctrine that mind, which creates all the works of culture upon the basis of physical nature, including theories of the physical order, can be a mere homeless waif or transitory by-product of that order. It is unlikely that man, who is vastly more successful in controlling the forces of nature than any other being can be a merely momentary offspring of a fortuitous dance of electrons.

Conscious and rational individuality or personality is the fullest expression of the Cosmic Life Force that we know. We are entitled to assume, as a working faith, that in realizing and furthering the realization of integrated and intelligent individuality, we are rowing with and in the main stream of the Cosmic Life. We are carrying on, at a more intelligently conscious level, the creative evolutionary striving of the universal Life Force. We are sons of God and if sons, then heirs and fellow workers.

Our personalities are in incessant change. We are members of a changing, an evolving cosmic brotherhood. But through all these changes of personality there is continuity, there is persisting identity. Even the evolution of organisms or of matter cannot be thought without presupposing continuity. We have good right to work in the faith that, whatever may happen to this present empirical psychophysical ego, what is really valuable in our individuality will persist; that the Cosmic Life Force will go on increasing in the power, meaning and beauty of its multitudinous individual expressions. The most quickening and invigorating motive to endeavor is the faith that each one of us, however humble and weak, is an active participant in carrying on, in maintaining and increasing the dominance in the world of the Life of Intelligence, Love and Beauty—in a word, of Spiritual Individuality-in-Community. Does not the very insistence of the vital urge towards individual-

ity, its continuous triumph over obstacles enlarge and strengthen our sympathies with this unceasing and indomitable striving as the key to the meaning of the universe?

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CHAPTER XXXII

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY

In Western culture, since the downfall of the ancient Roman Empire, there have been three chief stages in the development of thought and practice on the central problem of ethics and social philosophy—the relation of the individual to the community. These stages are: (1) The upbuilding, in ancient and mediæval Christendom, of an authoritative and unitarian social order, resting upon class distinctions and having the sanction of religion. This order was embodied in feudalism, the mediæval Catholic Church, the Holy Roman Empire, the mediæval guilds. Its last expression was in the doctrine of the divine right of Kings. (2) The gradual emancipation of the individual and the growth of democracy. The gradual winning of representative government, religious liberty of conscience, political liberty of association and utterance, intellectual liberty, and industrial liberty have been phases of this great movement. It seemed to have achieved its goal by the beginning of the twentieth century. But the growth of large scale industrialism and capitalism in the nineteenth century and the very development of democracy itself brought new dangers to individual liberty. The divine right of the majority took the place of the divine right of the ruler. The individual has become more and more dependent on an exceedingly complex mechanism of industry, commerce and finance. The capitalistic organization of industry has brought in, as a counter make-weight in the struggle,

the association of labor—the growth of unionism. Neither the individual employer or the individual workman cuts much of a figure in the vast mechanism of modern business and industry. Nor does the individual consumer count for much. The political state has come to occupy a dubious position. Civilization becomes more complex, the individual of less account, and the mass-mind more potent. (3) So the third and present phase in Western civilization is this—how to reconcile the great scale industrialism of the present and the growth of the mass-mind with individual liberty. How is the individual to maintain and express his individuality in this vast machine in which he is but an insignificant cog or nut?

In order to approach with intelligence the problems that arise in the present situation we must first recognize that the individual does not exist as an isolated unit over against the community. The isolated individual is a nonentity; equally so is the community, if conceived to be more than the collection of its interrelated members. What really exist are individuals living as members of several social groups and groups whose memberships crisscross in confusing fashion. What faces us to-day is a great and increasing complexity of social relationships with corresponding perplexities in regard to group loyalties. Only abnormal individuals are really antisocial. The criminal is mentally disordered, although many mentally disordered persons are not criminals. From the standpoint of psychology and philosophy, it must be said that all antisocial persons are more or less insane. The law says that a person is sane if he knows what he is doing; but does the individual who acts under the violent storm of passion or who follows the career of a criminal know fully what he is doing? He may be conscious of the acts he is committing, but he is not fully and clearly aware of their complexly ramifying consequences. He is a creature of fixed ideas. There is no

test of sanity except the ability and the will to conform to the general rules of social life, to be a working member of the group. There is, of course, a type of mental disorder which ignores the limitations set on human action by the physical order; but, since the physical order for the time, is that interpretation of the processes of nature which is socially recognized to be such and guides social practice, since men's conceptions of the physical world undergo frequent changes, herein too the test of sanity is social normality.

Are then geniuses, the pioneers who are in advance of the accepted social culture—in science, philosophy, morals, art or religion—insane? Yes, from the standpoint of the average man, they are. What differentiates them from the insane, in the long run, is simply the fact, that sooner or later, the mass of men more or less catch up with their ideas. The genius is then accepted as having been the pioneer, the leader towards a higher culture. This usually happens after the genius has been ignored, abused, or perhaps severely punished in some way. The deepest and the most persistent social conflicts in our modern and highly complex civilization are, not between individuals as such, but between group interests. These conflicts are actual between groups and they enter into the very heart of the individual as a member of several groups.

The man, for instance, supports a family: he lives in a community: he has a bread-winning vocation; if his vocation be a profession he should have a noneconomic interest in maintaining and improving the standards of his profession; he is a member of a church; he is a citizen of a nation; even an artisan or a business man should have a noneconomic interest in maintaining and improving the standards of his vocational group as rendering an indispensable service to the community life as a whole; last but not least, he is a member of the human family. Conflicts may arise

between the furtherance of his family interests, his vocational interests, his nonvocational cultural interests, his interests in his nation's welfare, his interests in things spiritual, his broad humanitarian interests. Which interests should be made paramount and how far? How far should he sacrifice the economic interests of his family to patriotism, to missionary work or support, to the furtherance of art, letters, education or science, to the improvement of his vocational service? How far should he sacrifice cultural or humanitarian interests to the interests of his family? A member of a labor union may subject his family to great economic hazards in order by a strike to enforce what he regards as justice to his class. Josiah Royce said that the supreme moral principle is *loyalty*, but the trouble is that our loyalties are divided and they may become mutually antagonistic. The gravest problems of social life to-day center in the frequent conflicts between group loyalties or group interests, which conflicts enter into and produce schisms in the moral personality of the individual. This problem of the reconciliation of various group loyalties becomes intensified with the differentiation of groups and the consequent diversification of opportunities and multiplication of interests in our complex society. Each group represents, within its own sphere, a legitimate social purpose. Each group interest is the partial expression of a moral purpose. The life of the community, taken as a whole, can flourish only when there is harmony, coöperation and reinforcement among the special group purposes. Ethicists and social philosophers are given to talking about the pursuit of the *common good*, about the identity of social purpose which binds all persons together in the commonwealth, in work for the *common weal*. But the common good, the community of purpose, are actually abstractions made by leaving out of account the divergencies and the clashes between the interests of different groups. I

may know very well what sort of conduct on my part will serve the welfare of my family or the improvement of my vocational functions. But I may injure my family by too loyal a devotion to the service of my vocation or vice versa.

How am I to square loyalty to my vocation with loyalty to the state, if the state passes a law forbidding me to teach the theory of evolution which I believe, on good evidence, to be true? How am I to square loyalty to my country with loyalty to universal humanitarian interests, if my country takes what I believe to be a humanly harmful stand on some international issue?

In an ideal society, the economic rewards and the social recognition of the individual would be such as to enable him to render the maximum of service to the community through the practice of his vocation—whether the vocation were making roads, managing an industry, making inventions, teaching or researching, writing poetry or painting pictures. Such a society would be ordered on the principle of service. The needs of the individual would depend on the kind of service he could best render, so that the principle “from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs” would be carried out.

No actual community does more than remotely approximate to such an ideal. Leaving out of account the inequalities due to inheritance or fortunate gambling in stocks, bonds, land and natural resources, the rewards of men are proportional to their success in catering to what the mass needs or can be persuaded it needs.

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CHAPTER XXXIII

CRITERIA AND CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS

An Analysis of the Idea of Progress

One cannot intelligently consider whether social progress is actual unless one has a fairly definite idea as to what one means by the term *progress*. While the terms *social progress* and *human progress* are in constant use in journalistic writings, in books and on the public platform, it is rarely that one comes across any precise definition of their meaning. Clearly one's notion of progress is an application to social phenomena of one's ideal of human good. To ask whether there is or has been progress, if the question be asked intelligently, is to apply one's conception of the true values of life to social changes. Change and progress are not equivalent terms. Degeneration is also change. The supreme criterion of social progress is this: Does a given type of social order afford the favoring conditions for the development of an increasing proportion of thoughtful, harmonious, self-determining individuals rich in satisfying experiences; is there in it increase in wisdom and self-control, in wealth of experience and insight, in fair-mindedness, courtesy and simple friendliness? If a social order is not producing a larger proportion of individuals of this type it is not progressing. If it is producing a decreasing proportion of individuals of this type it is degenerating.

Conditions of Progress

There are certain technical conditions of progress which, although they do not in themselves constitute genuine prog-

ress may favor it. With respect to these alone man has, beyond dispute, advanced. I mean in the increase in his technical control over the forces of nature through the improvements in material machinery, intellectual machinery and the machinery of economic organization and administration. Man can turn out machine-made products more rapidly than ever before. He has greatly increased his equipment for the collection and analysis of facts; for example, by the improvement of mathematical methods, of scientific instruments and of other methods of research. He has learned to organize capital and labor, to carry out industrial enterprises on a vast scale. He has greatly increased the machinery of educational organization. He has greatly elaborated political and legal machinery. Social progress, as above defined, depends on the improvement of the social heritage of culture. This improvement takes place in two ways: (1) The enrichment of the transmissible content of culture.¹ (2) The improvement in the instruments for the transmission of the accumulated culture to the members of the coming generation.

1. *Enrichment of the Transmissible Content of Culture.*—That there has been much progress in Western civilization in the enrichment of the content of culture is not doubtful. This enrichment has been chiefly in the following directions: (a) The development of scientific methods and instruments; the improvement of the logical and mathematical technique of investigation and the great advance in instruments for physical analysis, measurement and other forms of experimentation; advances in these directions have taken place very rapidly in the last three hundred years. (b) The great advances in actual scientific knowledge, beginning with Galileo's mechanics. (c) The more spectacular advances, because more easily grasped by the multitude,

¹I am using the word *culture* here for the whole sum of the social achievement of civilized humanity.

in the control and utilization of the forces of nature by the application of machinery. This is a consequence of the development of sciences, physics, chemistry and biology. (d) The increase in humanistic insights, and imaginative creations from experiences and in beautiful and powerful expressions of such insights in literature, the fine arts, humanistic learning and in the systematic collection and interpretation of the social facts. Progress takes place in these fields by fits and starts. The systematic study of social facts, although as old as Plato, has gained its greatest impetus in recent years under the recent name of sociology. (e) Advances in moral insight and feeling.

T. H. Green² argues that moral progress has taken place in three respects, all of which are, as James Seth puts it, aspects in the growing appreciation of the individual as moral person and ethical norm. These are: first, "the increasing internality, spirituality or depth of the moral consciousness as expressed in moral judgment"; secondly, "the gradual subordination of the sterner to the gentle virtues"; thirdly, "the greater and greater scope attributed to morality or the larger number of persons to whom its application is extended."³

The argument runs as follows: In primitive society the individual is subordinated entirely to the group. Even for Plato the moral life was summed up entirely in a man's duties as a citizen. (This is not entirely true.) By Aristotle and the Stoics the emphasis was laid on the ethical value of the individual and, consequently, ethical personality was conceived to a universally possible attainment regardless of race or culture. Christianity emphasized the supreme value of the individual. The democratic movement of modern times does the same. Its moving spring is respect for the individual.

² T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Bk. III, Chap. V.

³ James, Seth, *Ethical Principles*, Part II, Chap. III.

This movement towards the universal recognition of the individual is shown: (a) In the gradual recognition that the good or virtue is a quality of the individual spirit or person; that what he *is*, not what he is good *for* determines his ethical value. In primitive groups ruled by folkways or customs, the individual is not recognized as a uniquely worthwhile member. What he is worth is what he is good for, as serving for the survival and welfare of the group. Even among the Greeks this was especially so in Sparta. Plato, in his *Republic*, while he recognized that the most worthwhile life for the wise man transcends the community life, identifies the ethical life of the members of the state entirely with their functions as members of the state. Aristotle paid more regard to individuality. The Stoics laid all stress on the value of the individual in his universal relations. Jesus proclaimed the inestimable worth of the individual. Amidst all the changes of Western civilization this principle has survived. The pivotal point of the great debate in the thirteenth century over the reality of universals was concern for the value of the individual. The more recent and present-day debates over the nature of the self and its place in nature have the same concern. It is the central problem of philosophy. (b) In the growing emphasis on the superiority of the virtues of moral and intellectual courage, faithfulness to a task through long years, active sympathy for one's fellows, gentleness, patient endurance, forgiveness and love, over the militant and sterner virtues of fighting courage, anger, revenge and self assertion. (c) In the extension of the application of moral values and relations, the gradually widening recognition of the inherent value of personality. In primitive society the family, the clan or tribe sets the limit of moral relations. In the Greek world the barbarians are outside the pale of moral relations. Even citizens of other than their own particular city-state have not the same moral rights. As

the city-state died as a political entity, the moral consciousness was extended to universal humanity by the Stoics. Christianity was a similar universalization of Hebrew ethical ideas and the Stoic and Christian universalism joined into one stream—the vision of the city of Humanity which is the city of God. This universal ideal of the ethical value of human personality as such has persisted amidst tendencies toward particularism and especially in recent times amidst the overgrowth of nationalism. It now demands for the sake of the survival and progress of the race a new affirmation and a more effective realization through international relations by means of institutions, the League of Nations and the World Court.

2. *Improvements in the Transmission of Culture.*—The indispensable condition of further social progress is the increasing recognition, expression and the putting-into-effect through law, administration and, above all, through education of the moral insights above enumerated.

That, on the whole, there has been progress in these directions is unquestionable. But the degree and rate of social progress may easily be overestimated. Is it so certain that the moral quality of individuals has improved? That emphasis on the gentler virtues has not brought a weakening of fiber? Is it so certain that we really effectively recognize the right to personality in others? The new great-scale industrialism, organized into economic groups and making use, as a tool, of nationalism and the emotion of patriotism, has brought grave dangers which have arrested and threaten to obscure, possibly even to destroy, the efficacy of the hard won fruits of progress in moral insight and rational outlook.

I shall now discuss the present conditions and the dangers that threaten the continuance of human progress.

I would define as follows the conditions of social progress: The only rational meaning that social progress can

bear is that it consists in the increasing realization of richer human personality. If relatively more human selves attain richer and more harmonious lives as self-determining beings, or if even a constant proportion attain greater fullness of spiritual being, there would be progress. Certainly if both these ends, namely some finer personalities and proportionately more fine personalities, be realized as historical time goes on, progress would be an unquestionable fact.

Elements of Progress

Full progress would require at least the following elements:

1. *Intellectual Progress.*—An increase in both the relative proportion and the social influence of highly intelligent individuals. Leaving aside the question whether the greatest intellectual geniuses of recent times have shown more intellectual power than did Aristotle, for example, have we sufficient grounds for believing that there are relatively more highly intelligent individuals in Western society to-day, and that they exercise more influence than ever before? One may doubt the affirmative in both cases. I mean by a highly intelligent person, one whose mind is not swayed by blind emotion, prejudices and catchwords; one who weighs facts critically; one who understands the limitations of evidence and the conditions of legitimate inference; one who suspends judgment in the absence of cogent grounds; one whose conclusions are not determined by sectarian suggestion or by the influence of the crowd; in short, one who is keen, open minded, critical and independent in his judgments. Thinking is done by individuals. No mob, crowd, party or sect ever did any real thinking. It is only in loneliness and by travail of spirit that truth is discovered. I do not mean that the fellowship of equal minds does not stimulate thinking. I do not mean that a man cannot think in a crowd. He may if the crowd is quiet and he is left

alone; but wherever the thinker gets his stimulation and his materials, it is only by his individual activity that true thought comes to birth. It is arguable that our present mechanized and urbanized civilization is somewhat inimical to thinking. Is it true that the individual withers and the world is more and more? The so-called crowd-mind, which is not a mind at all, but merely a complex of gregarious animals, swayed by the hypnotic suggestions of the printed page and the slogan or shibboleth of the moment and the party, grows more and more overmastering. Education has become too much mass suggestion and the unintelligent repetition of facts and formulas.

2. *Moral Progress.*—This consists in the development of an increasing number of persons who govern their conduct by rational self-determination. We may leave out of account, as beyond human control, the production of moral geniuses. It is open to doubt whether recently moral progress, in the sense defined, has been taking place. There has been an improvement, or at least a complication, in the legal forms and administrative institutions that aim at the promotion of morality. If we mean by morality simply conformity to law, its demands have been greatly increased in these latter years. But if the highest type of moral life be that in which the individual guides his conduct by loyalty to reflectively won standards of goodness; in which the individual is rationally conscientious, impersonally just and displays courageous loyalty to ideals which he has actively chosen; it is open to doubt whether society is progressing. Moral cowardice, fear of the crowd, fear of poverty and unpopularity seem to be marked characteristics of many persons to-day. No doubt there has been, as T. H. Green put it, since the ancient Greeks, a refinement and inwardization of moral ideals, at least for the minority—perhaps for the majority. But there has also been a refinement and complication or multiplication in the forms of wickedness

and folly. If there are more virtues there are more ways of sinning; if there are more ways of being wise there are more opportunities to be a fool. If the highest good were defined as happiness, then the question of progress would resolve itself into this: Are relatively more people happy in our present social order than ever before and are some people happier than before? The latter question is incapable of being answered even by a good guess. In order to answer it we should have to feel both the maximum of happiness obtainable to-day, and that which was attained by some of the dead who lived in the happiest ages. Since no one could know whether he is the happiest person alive, he certainly could not know whether he is happier than some one who lived in the days of Pericles or Queen Elizabeth. With regard to the other question, which of course could not be answered by comparing feelings, it may be argued that we have an objective standard. Let us define happiness as the satisfaction of the normal interests of the individual. Then it will be said that, since there are more opportunities for the satisfaction of the normal interests of individuals to-day than in the past, more people are happier.

There is no doubt that the rapid increase of mechanical control over nature and the wider-spreading accessibility of the products of this control for the use of human beings, what we may call the joint result of mechanical technique and democracy, have much improved the possibilities of human satisfaction. Conveniences and comforts of material living have multiplied. The means for instruction, entertainment and recreation are easily accessible. Pain can be easily alleviated. Disease is being conquered. A larger proportion of individuals can more fully satisfy their individual interests than even a generation or two ago. The opportunities for happiness for the ordinary person have improved. But, without something more than physical satisfaction, man is not happy. It is good to be physically

comfortable and well, but it is not enough. The overstimulation of the physical and sensuous and the understimulation of the mental or spiritual capacities produce unhappiness, a sense of frustration. What satisfactions do health, comfort and leisure bring, if we do not know how to use them aright? Human happiness is the enjoyable expression of the deepest and most permanent interests of our nature. In our industrialized and urbanized life with its monotonized forms of specialized activity, its high tension, its nervous haste, its strain and artificiality, its too great economic inequalities, some native capacities are thwarted, while others are overstimulated. Quietness, leisure, contact with the soil of mother earth, opportunity to loaf and invite one's soul, are denied to many of us nearly all the time and to others most of the time. Aristotle said that when the weaver's shuttle moved itself, one would need no slaves. Well it does so move and there are countless other automatic mechanisms for producing material goods. We are not slaves in the political and legal sense but we are in danger of being slaves of machinery—of industrial and economic machinery. This is why the hunger to get out into the wilds becomes a passion. This enslavement to machinery is a chief source of human unrest.

3. *Liberty or Social Freedom.*—The greatest social desideratum for intelligent human beings is liberty. By this I mean the power of the individual to direct his own affairs, to live as a free man and to accord to others a like power. True liberty is the exercise of self-determination by the individual. It includes liberty of conscience, liberty in the expression of opinion, liberty to criticize the powers that be in state, as well as liberty in action. The great problem of social organization is the reconciliation of government with liberty. The chief contribution of the Anglo-Saxon peoples towards social life has been in the development of a liberty not inconsistent with social order. This growth

of liberty has been accompanied by a wholesome distrust of government. John Stuart Mill, in his classic treatise, *On Liberty*, finds the functions of government to be confined to superintendence and check. But the industrial revolution, with the consequent organization of industries and workers on an increasingly large scale, constitutes a serious threat to liberty. The liberty of the individual to earn a living is seriously menaced by the vast and unwieldy power of organized industry, with its recurring cycles of depression. Prices are controlled to the consumer by combination, conditions of work and its returns are controlled partly by large combinations of employers mitigated only by combination of the laborers. The individual is pretty powerless, as worker or consumer. When a deadlock occurs, the state is asked to step in and then we are all controlled by a bureaucracy. The masses of men are inert until the shoe pinches them hard; public opinion is misinformed, inert and lacking in intelligence—therefore, ineffective. The spirit of liberty seems to be decaying. The most serious objection to state socialism is that it would destroy liberty by putting us all under the regimentation of a bureaucracy greatly increased in powers and numbers. The passion for liberty seems to have waned and the situation is ominous to one who believes that liberty is the keystone of the arch of social progress. The organized employers seem to want liberty only to impose their own conditions. Their open shop is a closed shop—closed to organized labor. Organized labor, in turn, wants liberty primarily for itself, not liberty for the nonunion producer or consumer. When the conflict between the two becomes intolerable, are we to have a socialistic bureaucracy with the final extinction of all remnants of individual liberty? What is the way out of our present economic and political deadlock? Is it by private coöperation, socialism or the scrapping of machinery and the return to domestic industry?

4. *Equality*.—We proclaim equality as a corollary of democracy. Equal treatment before the law is a condition of a sound social order. The law should be no respecter of persons. Furthermore, equality of educational opportunity is an indispensable condition of social progress; for, unless human beings can have an equal opportunity for the development of their powers, it cannot be expected that they will develop the intelligence and moral qualities necessary to make them good members of a free society. Fitzjames Stephen argued that liberty and equality were in inverse ratio. The more liberty the less equality and vice versa. The truth is that liberty involves the kind and degree of equality that will permit the individual to grow into and to live as a free, in the sense of self-determining, personality. The only indispensable equality, ethically, is that which is necessary so that one may be a free being. With regard to equality, the chief trouble is that we have too much of it in some respects and not enough in others.

The ethical purport of democracy consists in its instrumental value as supplying a passionate ideal of human progress. This ideal now signifies the increasing subordination of the discoveries of science and their applications to industry, economic organization, education and other organized social activities to the one supreme end of making universally accessible all means to the realization of human happiness; through the fulfillment and enjoyment of the basic potentialities of human nature. Unless it be guided and controlled by the democratic ideal, science and its applications become merely more powerful instruments by which the few can exploit and dominate the many for their own aggrandizement and enjoyment. Science, pure and applied, puts into the hands of an oligarchy the most powerful instruments that have ever been devised by man for social control. Therefore, if human nature is to progress in the realization of a more richly humane life, science and

humane learning must be made accessible to all, so that their intelligences may be developed and their purposes may be clarified and strengthened. Democratic education is thus the key to social progress. For the basic purpose of democracy is just that all human beings shall be enabled to lead the richest and most harmonious lives that their potentialities make possible for them.

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CHAPTER XXXIV

JUSTICE

Definitions

In the fullest sense of the term Justice is coëxtensive with social righteousness or goodness. As Aristotle said, "It is complete virtue, first of all, because it is the exhibition of complete virtue: it is also complete because he that has it is able to exhibit virtue in dealing with his neighbors, and not merely in his private affairs; for there are many who can be virtuous enough at home, but fail in dealing with their neighbors."¹

Ethical justice consists in rendering every man his due. It is the concrete application of the principle, "Treat every person as an end and never merely as a means." It is the effective recognition of the right of every self to an opportunity to develop and exercise, in freedom and with responsibility, his moral and rational nature. In this sense ethical justice is coincident with social justice. It is realized in so far as the social environment enables every member of society to develop and exercise his physical and mental powers in such a way that he can live a good life as a self-respecting being and win happiness through some form of useful social work. Thus moral justice is the virtue or goodness of society and it cannot be realized without that sympathetic insight by which the individual recognizes and accepts as equally fundamental to his own claims the claims of every other individual to a fair opportunity to lead a good life and to gain happiness thereat. The various rights

¹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. V, l. 15.

and obligations which inhere in personalities are specifications of justice in this broad sense as equity.

Legal justice consists in the formulation and administration, through the power and authority of organized society, of those principles of moral justice which can be defined and administered through public and compulsive agencies. Legal justice represents the ethical minimum of moral or social justice that can be defined and enforced by public agencies. The development of law and the administration thereof always lags behind the best insights of members of the community into the conditions of social or moral justice, but the animating spring in the improvement of law is always the vision by the moral leaders of human society of a wider and deeper realization of moral justice. If one will trace the evolution of legal justice from the primitive blood feud, through the trial by ordeal and the compounding for personal crimes by payment in money or goods to the development of trial by jury and the establishment of procedure in the taking and weighing of evidence, from an absence of the distinction between accidental and intentional injury to the recognition of this distinction, from the failure to take account of the congenital and environmental conditions which make criminals to the taking account of these conditions; in short if one will survey the progress of law from a primitive clan in which the principle of retributive vengeance rules up to a modern society in which, as a result of the increase of scientific knowledge and the spread of the humanitarian spirit, the administration of justice aims more and more at corrective and preventive measures; it will become plain from this survey that the dynamic principle in the evolution of legal justice is the increase of intelligence and the corresponding increase in sympathetic insight by which men learn to see and to put into better effect the great principle that the proper end of all legislation and administration, as of all education is

to so order the affairs of society that every human child shall have a fair opportunity to become a moral personality.

Natural Rights

Nearly all of the influential social and political thinking of modern times, as well as of the later middle ages have assumed that there are certain inherent and inalienable rights that belong to man as a person. These rights are known or recognized by reason. The mediaeval theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas and later thinkers, such as Hooker, Grotius, Pufendorf and Milton, hold that the natural rights of man are grounded in the eternal reason of God, which is known to man in two ways: (1) by the exercise of right reason; and (2) through divine revelation. All positive or customary and enacted laws are subject to natural laws, to the inborn and indestructible rights of the individual. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Voltaire and Tom Paine, all based their political theories on the doctrine of natural rights. "The phrase 'rights of man' was the watchword of those who advocated liberty and self-government. The philosophic doctrine of rights found in and after the sixteenth century had its origin in the desire to define government through Reason rather than Authority. A rational explanation differs from an historical justification in laying emphasis on the obvious correctness of its premises, not on the age of the precedents to which history appeals. But the ordinary man is more easily moved by the appeal to precedent than by argument; to persuade him that innovation is really the restoration of a primitive condition of affairs is to win his hearty, if blind, adherence. So a theory which is really rational and analytic, usually goes forth to the public arrayed in precedents. This was the case with the rights of man. Those who arrived at the conclusion that man has rights, tried, in many cases, to prove that these rights were not only natural and obvious

to reason, but had actually been the foundation of an earlier 'state of nature.' In this way the idea of individual rights was united with two quite distinct ideas, those of a primitive state of and of a universal law of nature. The former idea was to be found in the writings of antiquity, and came from the Sophists through the Stoics into Latin literature. The latter idea was brought into prominence by Grotius, who, 'by a fortunate misunderstanding,' converted the Roman legal system, called *Jus Gentium* or *Law of Nations*, into a scheme of international law. This interpretation was in fact partially justified by history, since in practice the Law of Nations had tended to be more universal in application and construction than the Law of Citizens."²

The doctrine of natural rights was the philosophical foundation of the bills of rights of the American colonies, of the American Declaration of Independence and of the French declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen which was the charter of the French Revolution.

Of course, it is easy to show that the so-called state of nature, especially in the form which it took in Rousseau as an uncorrupted condition of equality, is an historical fiction. Historically, the evolution of human society has proceeded from status to contract, from a condition in which man is ruled by customary obligations to a condition in which social order and progress are based on the recognition of man's freedom and responsibility as a moral and rational agent. For Hobbes the state of nature was unendurable. Even Rousseau did not desire a return to it. He holds that "actual political conditions are unnatural, that there is, consequently a better kind of life which is predominantly natural and this better government of man is the true state of nature."³ "The Natural Rights Philoso-

² G. S. Brett, *The Government of Man*, p. 267.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

phers" had no interest in determining the actual origin and evolution of human society. The historical and evolutionary viewpoint is foreign to them. They were not concerned to reconstruct the dawn of history. Their supreme interest was to find a charter of humane progress—a rational foundation for a social order in which, through liberty, moral equality and freer association under principles of self-government, human beings could realize their true natures or capacities. *Nature* and *natural* meant for them, as for Aristotle and the Stoics, a rational and just order in which the individual could grow to his full stature as a rational person. Since the authority of the church was bound up with the weight of political economic and spiritual oppression, with the hoary and unjust traditions of feudalism, these liberators of human nature sought and found their authority in reason and the natural desires of the common man for freedom and opportunity to realize his personality. As L. T. Hobhouse puts it, "In elevating human personality above social convention and making its essential attributes, tacitly, if not expressedly, the ground work of political obligation, the law of nature was one way of formulating the most vital tendency in modern ethical thought."⁴

In the natural rights philosophers, from the Sophists and Aristotle to Rousseau, we can trace a progressive deepening and universalizing in the conception of rights as the indispensable conditions for the moral fulfillment of human nature and the moral progress of society. The rights which belong to man as a being capable of developing into a rational and moral personality have but slowly won recognition in human society. These rights are natural, in the sense that without their enjoyment man cannot be his true self; they are rational, since it is through reason that they

⁴ Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. II, p. 225.

are discovered. They are moral, since without their exercise man's moral nature is unfulfilled. A moral right is a claim deducible from the moral vocation of man as a member of society. Since rights belong to men as members of society, rights and obligations are correlative. Every right involves a duty or obligation. The rights of A are limited by the like rights of B, and on A and B rest the obligation to respect one another's rights and to discharge the obligations which their own rights involve. Rights and duties are the specifications of justice. Social justice consists in the fulfillment of obligations and the enjoyment of rights.

Fundamental Rights and Obligations

1. *The right to life and the safety of one's person.* This right is limited by the superior right of organized society to defend itself by conscription in time of war or to maintain order by a *posse comitatus* in time of riot. The latter is the more inclusive right, since the effective enjoyment of this and other rights by individuals depends upon the maintenance of organized society. It is the duty of the individual to both recognize the right of others, to life and safety and to bear his part in securing this right.

2. *The right to liberty of action and the disposal of one's person*—physical liberty. This right is also limited. I have no right to sell myself into slavery, since that would be a negation of the right itself.

3. *The right to an opportunity to make a decent living.* Every individual has a right to a fair chance to earn a livelihood under reasonably safe and healthy conditions of work. It is a mockery of the right to life and liberty, if the economic conditions are such that individuals cannot, by their best efforts, earn a livelihood. This right carries with it the obligation of the individual to carry his own weight; to do his best to earn a livelihood.

Mental and Spiritual Rights

4. *The right to freedom of thought and expression.* This right follows from the vocation of man to be a rational, self-determining agent. Absence of it hinders the development of personality. This right carries with it the obligation to be conscientious or painstaking in the formation of one's opinions and considerate in their expression. I have no right to try to shove my opinions down other people's throats. Freedom to form opinions without freedom to express them is but a half right since, as a social being, man has a natural desire to communicate with his fellows. Difficult questions arise in time of war or great social unrest in regard to the limitation on freedom in the expression of opinions that may be subversive of the social order. In general, provided that radicals do not incite to riot or physical violence, social order and progress will be best furthered by permitting them freedom to criticize the existing conditions. Order is desirable; but so is progress and the community or state, like the individual, which will not brook criticism is in a condition of arrested development. A social order that cannot stand criticism and digest what is good therein is already dying.

5. *The right to a fair opportunity for mental and moral development*—the right to an education. This right carries with it the duty of the individual to make the most of his opportunities. This right has but recently begun to receive general recognition in progressive societies. It is not even yet in full practical operation. Some writers contend that it is the duty of organized society to provide only such means of education as may be necessary to insure that its members shall be able to discharge the elementary duties of citizenship and to earn a living. But, since the individual cannot grow to his full stature as a moral personality without opportunity for a full education, and since, moreover, the better developed the individual is physically,

mentally and morally, the better citizen he is and the more he contributes to social progress, it follows that enjoyment of the right to a full opportunity for education is an advantage at once to the individual and to society. Society is no wiser and no better than the individuals who make it up. It must not be forgotten that social wisdom and social well-being result from the free coöperation of the members thereof.

Civil and Political Rights

6. *Civil rights.* All the rights heretofore enumerated are civil rights, since their enjoyment depends upon the co-operation of men in organized society. There are certain special rights and obligations which are called civil rights in a narrower sense, since they are the guarantees and safeguards for individuals as members of voluntary associations. Such are the rights of business contract, of the exchange of services and property, of marriage contracts and of various voluntary associations which people form for mutual benefit; such as economic organizations, churches, colleges, clubs and societies for recreation, mental development or benevolent purposes. The determination and satisfaction of civil rights are dependent, in the last analysis, on the use of the courts. The right to sue and to be sued and the whole machinery of civil law, are means to the enforcement of civil rights and of education in peaceful modes of settling disputes in these matters. The equal right to the use of the courts, then, is the fundamental principle of civic rights.

7. *A fundamental political right is the right of every citizen to a voice in the making of the laws*, either directly or through elected representatives; and a voice in choosing the administrators of the laws, either directly or through elected representatives. This is the basic principle of democratic government. The exercise of this right imposes upon

the individual citizen the obligation to inform himself upon public questions and to discharge conscientiously his political duties.

The Idea of Personality in Law

The discovery, and the deepening and extension of the concept of Personality, as the supreme principle of moral valuation and social order, is reflected in the evolution of civil law.

The term Law has three chief meanings—Natural Law, Civil Law and Moral Law. A law of nature is a compact formula for the description of a uniform order or regularity in natural events; for example, the law of gravitation. It is a generalized description of fact. By contrast, both civil and moral laws are prescriptions and prohibitions, in regard to actions that human beings should perform or refrain from. The notion that civil and moral laws rest upon a basis of natural law goes back to the days of the Greek philosophers—to Heraclitus, Sophocles, the Sophists, Aristotle, and especially the Stoics. The Roman writers, especially Cicero, held it. It was the guiding principle in the codification of Roman Imperial Law. It was made the source, by the mediæval Church, of the code of civil and political rights. The Natural law was revealed in conscience, that is, man's natural reason, whereas the Divine revelation added religious duties and graces to these. It played a great rôle in modern social and political thinking down to the French Revolution. It is even to-day applied in American courts. The idea of natural law as the source of moral and civil law was that the true nature of anything is what it has in it to become under fitting conditions (Aristotle). For example, the true nature of man is to be rational and social; to be in harmony with the ultimate nature of things. The ultimate nature of things is good. It is the Divine Cosmic Order. The concept of the law

of nature furnished a ground for harmonizing the natural or reflective foundation of morals by Greek thinkers with the Hebrew-Christian theocratic belief that moral principles are expressions of the Divine Will. The *Nature* or ultimate *Reason* or *Spirit* of the Greeks is identified with the personal God of the Christians. The idea of the moral law as the supreme law of nature rendered great service in the struggle for recognition of the inherent rights of personality. When legal and political customs and enactments come into conflict with the higher needs of personality, appeal is made to the higher laws of nature as against custom and convention.

Yea, for these laws were not ordained of Zeus,
 And she who sits enthroned with gods below,
 Justice, enacted not these human laws.
 Nor did I deem that thou, a mortal man,
 Could'st by a breath annul and override
 The immutable unwritten laws of Heaven.
 They were not born to-day nor yesterday;
 They die not; and none knoweth whence they sprang.
 —SOPHOCLES—ANTIGONE.

But, when we take natural law in the modern sense of the physical order, it is obvious that moral laws are something quite other than natural laws. We are too acutely conscious of the schism between nature and morality to be able to make this identification.

What is the relation between civil law or law in the general sense and morals? Both have grown out of custom and thus have a common origin. Both have derived their immediate power, social authority, from the beliefs of the community. But moral principles must have a higher authority than customary ordinances; namely, in the rational conscience of the good man.

Civil or legal laws are distinguished from moral principles by the fact that they are supported by the power of the State. A legal law is one which the sovereign political

power will enforce. Legal rights and obligations should be the expressions of moral principles. They may not. They may fall short of the best moral insights of the members of the State in which they are in force. They may be survivals of earlier and lower moral ideas. Many of them are such. They may be enacted as the result of the influences of nonmoral or immoral powers in the State. An incessant conflict goes on between the best moral consciousness and the backwardness or clumsiness of the laws. At best legal laws must fall short of the best moral insights. For: (1) Law can only define, in very general terms, what is right and wrong. It cannot cover the complex and delicate relations between human beings. (2) Law, as a general rule, cannot deal adequately with varying circumstances. The law can compel a man to support his wife. It cannot compel him to love her. It can enforce the responsibility of the individual to the State. It cannot take account of all the subtle and complex factors which determine the individual to violate the law. Law then always lags behind moral insight; sometimes far behind it. The function of law is to maintain indispensable social order. Nevertheless, the development of law affords good evidence of the development of moral insight. Law has, in itself, no principle of moral progress. It reflects imperfectly, by its public recognition in the support of the State, the progress of moral insight which is due to movements of thought that are always in advance of the law. Great religious and moral teachers have been the chief agents in the improvement of law. The central principle animating the development of law has been the increasing recognition of the depth and extension of personality. In the early law of custom no distinction is made between accidental and intentional injuries. There is no taking account of circumstances, no recognition of individual responsibility. The great restraint upon disorder in primitive society was the fear of private

vengeance, of the *blood feud*. In Anglo-Saxon law all offenses were regarded as offenses against property. The *wergild* was the price that must be paid for taking a free man's life. There was a regular tariff for injury and death, ranging from the price of a slave up to the price of a noble. In early Roman society and indeed until quite late the head of a family had complete power over the lives of the children (*patria potestas*). The husband had power over the person and property of the wife (*manes*). When the twelve tables were made only the head of a family had full personality. A citizen's personality depended on his family status. The body of a bankrupt could be cut up and distributed among his debtors. A foreigner had not the same rights as a citizen. These rights were gradually modified, until in the time of the Christian Emperors the father could no longer expose a newborn child or take the life of a grown-up child, except of a daughter taken in the act of adultery. He could not sell a child except for extreme poverty. He no longer could take what the child earned except from funds advanced by him. A wife's power over her dowry was increased. The legitimization of children born to a concubine was made easier. Foreigners acquired citizenship easily. The methods of freeing slaves were simplified.

In English law it was through the King's courts that trial by jury and modern methods were established. Ordeal and compurgation fell into disuse. Parliament became supreme. Even then it was not until recently that the death penalty was not inflicted for petty thievery and other minor offenses and that the disabilities of women and children were removed.

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CHAPTER XXXV

THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY

Introduction

The problems of the sources, scope and limitations of the sovereignty of the state, both with respect to its own members and to other states, are to-day burning questions. From whence does the sovereign state derive its authority, what are the justifiable sources of the power which it exercises over the property, persons and lives of its members? From whence does the state justly derive the power to make war and peace? What is the right relation between the authority of the political state and the authority of other social groups, such as churches or labor organizations? Is the state but one of several cosovereign social-moral organizations, or is it supreme over all other social groups? What are the proper functions of the state with respect to social life as a whole? What are the principles, if any, which set the limits to state power? We are to discuss these problems as questions of right, and not of fact. We shall consider them under the following heads: (1) What is the ethical source of political authority? (2) What is the proper scope of political authority in relation to the individual and the various nonpolitical-social groups of which individuals are members? (3) What is the proper sphere of state action? (4) International Relations.

The modern state is the most comprehensive and sovereign form of community organization. In this respect there is a sharp contrast in the western world between

modern conditions and mediæval conditions. In the middle ages the church laid claim, and to a large extent made good the claim, to the independence of the spiritual power over against the temporal power. The church even went so far as to maintain that the temporal power derived its authority from the spiritual power. In the modern world, even in countries where the church has been established, as in England and Germany, the spiritual power is subordinate to the temporal power. As a result of the breakdown of unitary spiritual authority, kings and princes took the place of the popes. This subordination has been brought about by a struggle. In Prussia even Bismarck lost the battle in the so-called *Kulturkampf* with the Roman church, in which the temporal government claimed the power to control the whole content of education in the schools. In France the expulsion of the religious orders from state-supported schools was a victory of the state over the church. In England it was only after a prolonged and bitter struggle that public-supported schools were secularized. In Quebec the public-supported schools are still subjected to religious control and teaching. To-day, however, the most acute phases of the struggle over the source and limits of state authority center around the relations of industrial groups, capitalistic groups and labor organizations, to the power of the state.

Hobbes

The first noteworthy attempt at a philosophy of political authority in modern thought is to be found in the *Leviathan* and *De Cive* of Thomas Hobbes. He was the real founder of modern political philosophy. His doctrine, with modifications, runs through most of the social philosophy of western Europe up to the French Revolution. We find it in Locke, Spinoza, Voltaire, Rousseau and many lesser lights. It is the *contractual conception of society*. For

Hobbes and his successors, politically organized society, the *state*, is the supreme and all-inclusive form of social sovereignty. In this sense they are all *political absolutists* or *monists*; however they may differ in their views as to the manner in which government, that is the machinery of the state, should be set up and operated. As I have already said it is beside the mark to criticize Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau on the ground that, as a matter of historical evolution, states have not originated in a deliberate social pact. They are not concerned with the historical problem of the origin and development of actual states. What does concern them is the *rationale* or *justification*, from the standpoint of psychology and ethics, of political authority. Hobbes depicts the "state of nature," that is, the condition of man in the absence of political government, as a state of complete anarchism, "the war of all against all." Hobbes derives this conception from his egoistic psychology of desire. Human nature is inherently selfish and, unless restrained by superior authority, seeks primarily the complete satisfaction of its own appetites. Since there are not enough material goods to enable all men to completely satisfy their appetites, in the state of nature every one does that which is right in his own eyes and every man's hand is against his fellows. Under such conditions no civilization is possible. Without peace there can be no cultivation of the arts which yield the comforts and amenities of life. In the state of nature man is "in continual fear and danger of violent death"; the life of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." But man has also the power of reflection or reasoning. So he discovers, by reflection, that it will be better for him to renounce his unlimited claims to everything he desires, and by agreement with his fellows to transfer to a sovereign body the power and right to determine, subject to the reasonable consideration of the common conditions of individual well-being, the administra-

tion of rights. Thus the state results from enlightened self-interest, from a rational insight which leads men to see that by abrogating their unlimited demands, by bridling their desires, and setting up a central authority which shall define the rules subject to which men may satisfy their desires and shall enforce these rules, they run a better chance of the moderate and continuous satisfaction of their appetites. Hobbes finds in the nature of man three principal causes of quarrel; *first* competition, *second* diffidence, *third* glory. "The first maketh men invade for gain; the second for safety and the third for reputation." In the *Leviathan* (Part I, Chap. XIII) he paints a classical picture of the evils of the state of war.

Hobbes derives the content and authority of all moral laws from the establishment of a political society. Nevertheless, he regards the laws of states and moral rules as *natural laws*, in the sense that they are discovered by reason to follow from the nature of man in social relation. He says the laws of nature are immutable and eternal; "for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, exception of persons and the rest can never be made lawful; for it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it" (Part I, Chap. XIII). The first law of nature is this "that every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps and advantages of war." The second law of nature is "that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth, as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself." The third law of nature is, "that men perform their covenants made." This law is "the fountain and original of justice." I shall not repeat Hobbes' account of the other laws of nature, but the ninth and last

law is especially significant—"that every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature." From this law Hobbes deduces the Golden Rule "Do not that to another, which thou would'st not have done to thyself."

Thus Hobbes justifies the sovereignty of the state, as the instrument for establishing and maintaining peace, order, equity and human well-being. He holds that there must be an absolute sovereign power for this purpose. But the absoluteness of the sovereign state is limited by the principle of regard for the common weal; *salus populi suprema lex*. When the sovereign power, whether it be monarch or parliament, persistently fails to carry out this principle, the members of the state are justified in deposing it and setting up another.

Hobbes' egoistic psychology of desire is erroneous, but the fundamental principles of his social philosophy are not tied up with his psychology. His doctrine of the source of sovereignty has performed a great service. It is a clear and rational attempt to justify the existence of one supreme social authority. Through its emphasis on natural rights as discovered by reason, it attempts a rational foundation for law and ethics.

Locke

In principle Hobbes laid down the pattern for political philosophy. Locke added to it only a theory of representative government as the best instrument for the determination, in detail, of natural rights. Locke is a psychological hedonist, like Hobbes. Apart from their inadequate psychology of desire, the chief weaknesses in Hobbes and Locke are: (1) That they do not distinguish between the political, the moral and the economic phases of social life; and (2) that they do not adequately treat the central problem of political obligation which is this—to find a principle by which the relation of the individual will to group action,

in the political group and in other groups, is made clear and consistent. In brief, *how*, since all actual wills are the wills of individuals, *is the common will to be determined?*

Mill

John Stuart Mill, in his essay, *On Liberty*, makes freedom and opportunity for the harmonious development of one's individuality the moral criterion of society. He distinguishes between *legal rights* and *moral rights*. He holds "that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, whether physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."

Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. Thus, for Mill, the only justification of political authority is to protect the liberty of the individual against infringement at the hands of other individuals. So, for example, with respect to education, it is proper for the state to enforce those minimal educational requirements which are necessary to enable the individual to develop to mental maturity. Again, state interference with trade should go so far only as may be necessary to protect the liberty of the individual. He says: "The individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself."¹

Mill believes in representative self-government or democracy. He holds that a bad form of self-government is better than a good despotism; for "the most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves." Social progress is possible only in so far as all the members of the state are incited to participate in the work of government. In other words, the paramount

¹ *On Liberty*, Chap. V.

value of self-government resides in its capacity to act as an agency of national education. It cannot do this unless all the citizens have the power to participate actively in the conduct of government. Representative democracy, by encouraging activity, energy, courage, originality, is a great educative agency. There is no difficulty, for Mill, in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power, in the last resort is vested in the entire aggregate of the community; every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally called upon to take an actual part in the government, by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general. It is more desirable for the general good of humanity that the active type of character should predominate. "General prosperity attains a greater height, and is more widely diffused, in proportion to the amount and variety of the personal energies enlisted in promoting it; moreover, rights and interests of every and any person are only secure from being disregarded when the person interested is himself able and habitually disposed, to stand up for them." These desirable conditions are attainable only by popular representative government.

With regard to the means of expressing the popular will, Mill finds the following weaknesses in representative government: (1) A natural tendency toward collective mediocrity, and by consequence towards mediocrity in its elected representatives, executive agents and judicial officers. (2) A tendency towards class legislation in the interests of those who support the party in power. (3) The tyranny of the majority, which may be wrong, over the minority which may be right. Mill holds that the chief remedies for these evils are: (1) the substitution of proportional representation for majority representation; and (2) the recognition by the many of the superior ability of the few; in

short the willingness of the many to follow really good leaders. The problem of the right relation between the wills of the citizens, considered as private individuals, and the state, considered as the organ of the common will, Mill did not adequately treat, because he failed to see that the private wills of individuals cannot be partitioned off from the sphere of the social will.

Rousseau

Rousseau, by his doctrine of the *general will*, which is not the mere sum of particular wills but a more adequate expression of the individual's true nature or deeper self, made an important contribution to the solution of this, the fundamental problem of social philosophy—namely, what is the true and just relation between the individual will and the common will, the individual good and the common good. Rousseau recognizes, though perhaps not very clearly or fully, that a man's true self, his best self, in other words his richest and most harmonious self, his personality, in short, is developed only by willing coöperation in the common life. By contrast, man's capricious or merely biological self, which seeks particular interests at the expense of the common good is antisocial and not his true and permanent self. Rousseau says: "What man loses by the social compact is his natural liberty, and an unlimited right to anything that tempts him, which he can obtain; what he gains is civil liberty and the ownership of all that he possesses. . . . His faculties exercise and develop, his ideas expand, his sentiments become ennobled, his whole spirit is elevated to such a point that, if the abuse of this new condition did not often degrade him below that from which he came, he ought to bless without ceasing the happy moment which took him from it forever, and which has made of a dull, stupid, animal an intelligent being—a man." ■

² Rousseau, *Social Contract*, Bk. I, 8.

In short, the general will is the deeper will of individual members of society aiming at the common good—that is at the good of the whole society. The common good is the good of individuals as realizable and enjoyable only through social coöperation. The common good means goods achieved and shared in common. Thus, there is no good for the state, or for any other social group, except what is good for, and in, the individual members of the group. The good is the life of personality, which is unattainable by human beings except they will in concert and form a community. Therefore the realization and enjoyment of personal goods is predicated upon equality, in the sense of *equality of opportunity* afforded to all members of society to realize and enjoy their personalities—that is, to live as self-determining individuals. Individuals are various in their capacities and interests, but their diverse capacities cannot be realized, their various interests cannot be satisfied, unless there is a working agreement on the part of human beings to live and let live and to coöperate in furthering the maintenance of the conditions of good living. Rousseau did not sufficiently take account, perhaps, of the varieties and inequalities in men's natural capacities, which imply varieties and inequalities in the social conditions needful for their fruition. He did see that equality of opportunity, or a fair chance, implies liberty, not in the negative sense of mere freedom from restraint but in the positive sense of scope to exercise those rational and social powers without which a self cannot enter upon and enjoy the life of personality.

Basis of Political Authority

In so far as it may be necessary to make a choice between liberty and equality, the former is to be preferred. But, in fact, I do not see how reasonable personal liberty can be truly enjoyed throughout society without equality

of opportunity, or how equality can actually function without rational freedom. *The final authority of the state and its institutions must rest on the agreement of intelligent citizens, achieved by development of a public opinion striving, through debate and conflict, towards harmonious co-operation, for the development of personality in all members of the community.* Concrete social liberty can be achieved and maintained only through law and opinion, grounded on the exercise by the citizens of a reasonableness in which they share in so far as they coöperate. Equality of opportunity is the indispensable condition of social liberty, since this equality means the maintenance of those educational, economic, political and cultural conditions which stimulate and enable the individual citizen to become reasonable. The true spirit of Fraternity is the spirit of social coöperation or community of purpose, aiming at the maintenance of social liberty through equality of opportunity and of equality through liberty. Democracy, in the sense of self-government, implies that the common man, under favorable conditions will develop sufficient reasonableness and sense of justice to choose good representatives to make the laws and to choose indirectly through his representatives good administrators and experts to apply the laws. As Mill says, "a democracy has enough to do in providing itself with an amount of mental competency sufficient for its own proper work, that of superintendence and check."³

Determination of the Common Will

But how shall the common will be determined? By what instrument can it be justly and wisely decided what is the common good in specific matters? How are the conditions of the common good to be determined with respect to the

³ John Stuart Mill, *On Representative Government*, p. 248 (Everyman Edition).

distribution of economic goods, with respect to education and culture, or with respect to international relations? Rousseau argues that the common will is determined by vote of the majority. If I vote for a certain measure or a certain man as representative and the majority votes the other way then I was mistaken in my conception and the will of the majority has determined the general will in the case. In short, the particular interests of individual wills and of smaller groups, in so far as they clash with what is really the common good, tend to cancel one another and thus the common will finds expression.

This is, in practice what frequently happens, though frequently, too, a plurality of votes, which is an actual minority of all the votes cast, wins the day. But, in so far as men are agreed to this method of determining the common will, the latter is expressed even though the decision may not actually in result be for the greater common good. For example, it cannot be said that the majority is always right in its choice of representatives or executives; but, even if the choice be bad in the sense of being the lesser good, the general will is expressed, if this be the best way to determine what is the general will. Rousseau says, in response to the objection that the majority rule may not express the general will, if the actual decision be not in harmony with the true will of the individual, that when the citizen votes, what is asked is "not whether he approves the proposition or whether he rejects it, but whether or not it conforms to the general will. Each one, in giving his vote, gives his opinion upon it, and from the counting of the votes is deduced the general declaration of the general will. When, however, the opinion contrary to mine prevails, it shows only that I was mistaken and that what I had supposed to be the general will was not general. If my individual opinion had prevailed, I should have done something other than I had intended and then

I should not have been free.” To which the obvious answer is, that if I were a member of the minority which was right in that it voted, for example, against the legitimate suppression of freedom of speech and of a reasonable variety of opinion, the fact that the majority prevailed does not make it right. Mill was correct, when he said that democracy tends toward collective mediocrity and that frequently the right is realized only when the many follow the few or even the one. Actually, then, the general will, in the sense of the will which represents the deepest and truest interests of personality is not always best expressed by the vote of a majority or even by a plurality; still it is better to have a poor self-government than an efficient and wise autocracy or bureaucracy. For the opportunity for all to participate in the determination of the common good and the conditions of its realization is the indispensable condition for the realization of personality.

Democracy

Democracy makes greater demands on the intelligence and virtue of the whole citizenry than does any other form of government. The working of democracy presupposes sufficient intelligence and character on the part of the people to choose wisely their representatives and leaders. This presupposition is frequently not realized. The people do not always choose the best representatives, do not always follow the wisest leaders and the most competent experts. Thus democracy is, to a large extent, a failure. It frequently fails to establish the best conceivable conditions for the realization of the common good. It fails in the efficiency of its government. Probably it is not less honest than other forms of governance. It fails to establish and maintain equally good educational opportunities for all its

⁴ J. J. Rousseau, *Social Contract*, Bk. IV, p. 2.

children. It fails to establish even a fair measure of equality of economic opportunity. Democracy may, in the near future, do better in these and other social concerns for the realization of the common good—of personality in widest commonalty spread. But we cannot hopefully look for the even nearly complete disappearance of these failures. We may expect only their slow and partial mitigation. I cannot see that the Kingdom of Heaven is near at hand in democracy. On the other hand democracy is not so ghastly a failure as a bureaucratic caste system—government by the dictatorship of a hereditary aristocracy and military caste mixed with plutocracy, or government by the dictatorship of a class conscious minority of the proletarians as in Bolshevik Russia.

The world's hope for a humanly better order depends on representative democratic government (the principle of vocational group representation, whether as a substitute for or in combination with territorial representation, I shall discuss later on). In submitting to be ruled by simple plurality vote or by proportional representation, the individual has a voice in determining what he considers, in specific issues, to be the common good. Thus far he is a real factor if he so wills, though a very small factor, in the determination of the general will. The ultimate justification of democracy is that it enables every citizen to express his intelligence, to realize his better self in the promotion of the common good. The actual weakness of democracy is due, in part, to the fact that it does not demand a sufficient amount of public service from every citizen. If every youth and maiden were required, before the age of twenty-one, to render for a reasonable time some actual public service, democracy would function better. It is better that we should govern ourselves badly than that we should be well governed by some one else. Responsible freedom is the absolutely indispensable social condition for the realiza-

tion of personality, and there can be no common good which is not a good common to persons.

Mystical Doctrine of the Social Will

There is a doctrine of the general will which makes it a mystical entity an Oversoul having a superior reality above and beyond the wills of individuals. Hegel, in his *Philosophy of Right* and his *Philosophy of History*, speaks as though *objective mind*, that is mind embodied in social institutions, which are the results of an immense amount of coöperative thinking, were a reality more real and more enduring than the minds of individuals. Bosanquet, in his *Philosophical Theory of the State*, argues in a similar vein to Hegel, that *the great social institutions of family, property relations, community, class, state and church embody the real general will, in contrast with the actual, and, I suppose unreal or untrue will of the private individual considered as an individual*. As Hegel says, an immense amount of thought has gone into the making of the great social institutions. As institutions they are reasonable. But the family, as such is not a rational mind. Single families have *common spirits*, with all degrees of reasonableness and unreasonableness. So with property, the civil community, the state and the church. Social institutions are conditions for the development of personality *when they are good*, that is when they do further the development of personality. But the institutions of property, the family, the church, the state, are very different things in actuality from what they are *in abstracto*. In the middle ages, for example, the church was a great international and interracial social institution which furthered civilization. Later on, in the *Inquisition*, it tried to stamp out the free spirit of scientific inquiry, and I for one would not trust it not to try to do the same again if it had the power. The family is a noble social institution, but in the

concrete there are conditions under which it is sheer mockery to speak of a given family as an ethical institution or mind. The term *objective mind* or *real general will*, like the terms that are fashionable to-day in sociology, such as *social mind* and *social will*, are metaphors; like all metaphors they are subject to abuse. The general will is nothing but the joint endeavor of individuals to will intelligently and in coöperation the social conditions of the good life for individuals. I grant that the individual's actual self, his empirical character, is not at any moment his ideally best self. Progress is man's distinctive mark, and progress towards personality can take place only through self-determining action. It is conceivable, at any moment in our lives, that we might both do better and be better; only in so far as we keep before us the ideal of doing and being better can we become better, and we become better through doing better with our actual social problems in our actual social relations. In so far as we can and do use social institutions for the betterment of our lives, through coöperative action and community of thought and feeling, we can say that social institutions are the expression, and the condition for the further realization, of the social will; provided we do not forget that there is no real social will or social mind except in the attitudes of thought and feeling and the volitions of living individuals working together. Thus a social institution is not a mind. It does not think or feel or will. It is the product of the joint actions of past minds. It is a framework, an instrument for the coöperative activities of minds in the present. A church is not one mind, neither is a family or a state one mind in any literal meaning of the term *mind*. There are creeds, politics, rituals which are actual in so far as the living members of a church accept and use them. There are family traditions which are actual in so far as they are lived up to by the living members of the family.

The State Not a Person

Just so with the state. The American Constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court are not, as such, contents of any actual living mind. They are institutional instruments fashioned by minds, and by means of which the wills of the living citizenry, as directed toward the common good, may find partial fulfillment. Congress has not one mind; some of its enactments are not evidences of high grade mental work on the part of the enactors. Nor can it be said that the unstable equilibrium of clashing class interests always finds expression in enactments that really further the realization of the deeper self or personality on the part of the citizens in general. Neither *government*, which is the chief instrumentality of the state, nor the *state* itself, is a personality, except in a fictive legal sense. It is not even a superpersonality. Only living individuals are real persons. *Legal personality*, the subject of legal rights and obligations, is mentally and ethically a fictitious entity in the case of corporations and institutions. A corporation may be a legal person but it has no soul nor has a government a soul. The phrase *soul of a people* is valid if used to designate the community of traditions, memories, purposes and hopes shared in by the members of a nation acting in their coöperant and corporate capacities.

The Spirit of a People

A genuine nation or people enjoys a common spiritual life; it has a body of traditions or national memories, customs, beliefs, mental habits, appraisals of the intangibles of life, ideals, purposes and undefined social drifts or tendencies. In short a nation has a *historical ethos* or *spirit*, which has been built up slowly, slowly created and modified by the social interactivities of the past generations in interaction with the physical environment and the cultural in-

heritance. The spirit of the people is, next to its natural heredity, the most potent factor in shaping the mind and will of the present individual members of that people. National traditions, institutions, patterns of thought and conduct are the cultural soil and atmosphere, the very food and drink, of the growing minds of the living generation. But these things are not actual minds. They come alive only in the minds of individuals.

Thus the social mind and the social will are but generic names for mental attitudes, for what the psychologist calls *apperceptive systems*, that function in the minds of individuals. Every individual mind, which has matured in a specific civilization has developed a number of group dispositions or attitudes. For example, I have one group attitude as a member of a family, another as a member of a church, another as a scholar and teacher, another as a citizen of the United States, another as a sportsman, still others with respect to certain avocations such as literature and art. Every one of these mental attitudes is a phase or aspect of my total individuality, one way in which my native dispositions have been organized and find expression. These various aspects of my personality interact in various ways, since they must all live together somehow in my individuality. Sometimes they coöperate and reinforce one another; sometimes they conflict and block one another. Mr. Bosanquet has developed an interesting argument for what he calls "The Idea of a Real or General Will," by tracing the connections between social and mental groupings.⁵ He points out truly that, just as ideas may be associated in one's mind only through fortuitous contiguity and external resemblances, so the fortuitous association of individuals, say in a railroad carriage or in a crowd, embodies a very low type of community life. He rightly

⁵ Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, Chaps. V, VI, VII, especially Chap. VII, pp. 155-179.

criticizes the sociologists who have made so much of crowd psychology and of external imitation as keys to the structure of society. He argues that the higher organization of society, for example in an army, a state, a church or a school, is not merely like, but is conditional upon, the organization of mental systems or complexes of ideas that are unified by or grouped as parts of a single *plan* or *universal*. Thus each group relation of the individual (for example, in the family, the neighborhood, the profession or trade, and the state) is the outward expression of a mental system in the individual mind. And the individual mind, in so far as it is a unity, is an organized whole of such mental or apperceptive systems. Thus, he says, the social whole is a system of mental systems and therefore a general will, which is truer and more real than the individual will in the sense that it is the deeper and truer purpose at which the individual will aims when it is working at its best. But here I find an obscurity and, I think, a fallacy in Mr. Bosanquet's argument.

The True Meaning of the Social Will

I cannot see that there is any real will or self that is not the will or self of an actual person. In particular, my mental political system is only one of several kinds of mental social systems in my mind. I do not find that these mental social systems of idea and attitude constitute a completely harmonious whole under the government of the political system, either in my own mind or in any other actual minds with which I am acquainted. In short, I find all sorts and degrees of agreement and disagreement, with respect to the mental counterparts and sources of social attitudes and volitions. Thus, for me, there is not *one social will*, which is superior to or inclusive of all other social wills. There is no single real social will. There are only various degrees of community or agreement, with

respect to social aims and values on the part of a plurality of human persons. Therefore each individual possesses or is several social wills. The state is only one of several kinds of institutions through which the deeper self or personality is realized. In so far as persons share in their social valuations and purposes, in so far as they feel, think and will together, are stimulated by similar influences and molded by the same patterns in thought and action, we may speak of a common will. In so far as persons, in their quest for the good, have similar dispositions, similar powers, a community of cultural conditions, as well as of physical conditions, and therefore have similar valuations and interests and similar purposes which can be realized only through community of effort, we may properly speak of a common good and a common will towards the realization of ideal selfhood or personality.

The ethical justification of the authority of the political state consists in its being a comprehensive organ for the promotion of the common good. The individual ought to submit to it in so far as it expresses his deeper will, the will to protect and further the common good. It is true that the business of the state is largely negative—to remove hindrances in the way of the realization of the good life through enabling other forms of association to function. How far the state as such can properly engage in the active and positive promotion of the common good we will consider later on.

A man's best self, his truer and deeper self, is social. It is realized and engaged only in association, in coöperation with others. The ethical purpose of the state is to further this coöperation. Hence, even though I am a member of a minority group that is right on a particular issue of policy as against the majority which is wrong, I ought to submit to the decision as on the whole an expression of the common will, since this is the actual feasible way to

further the common good. Thus, as T. H. Green puts it, "will, not force, is the basis of the state."⁶ Selfish men, for example, Napoleon I, serve this end. "It is rather the state makes the sovereign than the sovereign makes the state. It is not the supreme coercive power which makes the state but the supreme coercive power exercised according to law, and for the maintenance of rights. A power which altered laws otherwise than according to law, according to a constitution, would be incompatible with the existence of a state which is a body of persons, recognized by each other as having rights, and possessing certain institutions for the maintenance of these rights."⁷ The state, or the sovereign as a characteristic institution of the state, does not create rights, but gives fuller reality to rights already existing.⁸ A state presupposes other forms of community with the rights which arise out of them.⁹ Where these political philosophers, who are right in tracing the ethical source of state sovereignty to the need of a single and supreme organ for the maintenance and furtherance of human rights and who thus rightly view the state as the organ of the common good and the means for the expression of the individual's truer and better self, his socialized individuality, are liable to fall into error is in unduly magnifying the authority and scope of the state to the exclusion of other groups, of other means of human association and coöperation. One's deeper and truer self, one's ethical personality, may be realized more fully, in certain of its aspects as a member of a vocational group such as a trade union, a cultural group such as an association of scholars, teachers or writers, or a spiritual group such as a church

⁶ T. H. Green, *Works, Lectures on Political Obligation*, Vol. II, pp. 427-599.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 443.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 444.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 445.

or ethical culture society than directly as a member of the state.

Of course it is the function of the state to protect these more special groupings, and, where needful, to regulate their relations. But it has happened, is now happening and may continue to happen, that one's ethical life as a member of some other group may come into conflict with the demands of the state. This has happened in the past, for example, with regard to the church and guilds in the Middle Ages. It is happening now in regard to trades' unions. It happened during the World War and since the War in regard to freedom in the expression of one's thought.

If competent historical scholars are led by their consciences to teach certain views in regard to the history of the country which the state proscribes, there is a case of such conflict. If the expert opinion of political scientists comes into conflict with what the state demands shall be taught as loyal Americanism there is another such case. The state can be and often is a stupid tyrant. The battle for freedom of investigation and freedom of teaching in institutions of learning is far from won. It is a battle between two conceptions of the common good: that the common good can be maintained only by *unanimity* on the part of teachers and scholars, as well as of citizens generally, in regard to the history and present institutions of the state. The other conception is that the common good will, in the long run, be served by loyalty to truth and the thorough and fearless investigation and expression thereof in all social, political and spiritual matters.

The ethical problem of the conflict of loyalties, as specified by one's membership in several groups, is not solved by asserting that in all cases the power of the state is rightfully supreme. It cannot be admitted that loyalty to the state takes precedence over all other loyalties. Resist-

ance to the will of the state may become a duty; were this not so, criticism, rebellion, would never be justifiable,

One's ideal self is always more than one's actual self; and this more is a real possibility. In so far as selves participate in the common cultural reality of a family, a community, a church, a state, a vocational union, they have a common will, and their realization of the good is subject to common conditions. Thus, in so far as their variations in individuality admit, they will agree, in their judgments of value and their volitions in regard to the group life and the relationships between the various groups. Thus far, and only thus far, may we properly speak of a common or general will. Thus the phrase, the common will, is a figure of speech for systems of beliefs, valuations and volitions that actually live in individual minds which, in so far as they are in agreement, coöperate. It is customary to speak of *public opinion* the *national mind* and the *national will*, etc. But, literally, public opinion is simply the opinion of individuals that prevails by being accepted and adopted by the mass, and for the most part passively. The national mind consists simply of ideas of action that are advanced and promulgated by individuals; and that, having won acceptance, become the national will. There was no national will in regard to the United States' relation to the great war until Woodrow Wilson and his counselors proclaimed the policy expressed in his speech of April 6, 1917. Under his leadership the new national will, which was still, so far as it concerned a large part of the population, only the will to acquiesce in doing whatever would win the War, became more determinate and clearer up to the Armistice. When the majority failed to follow Mr. Wilson's policy for peace and the League of Nations, the United States ceased thus far to have an effective national will with respect to these great international concerns. At the time of writing it would take more foolhardiness than I possess,

and a greater prescience than any one except perhaps God possesses, to predict what will be the national will in regard to the League of Nations twelve months from now (April 1, 1926). When a national will shall have been determined upon these matters, it will be simply an agreement on the part of the Cabinet and Congress in which the majority of the citizens will, in all probability, passively acquiesce. One must deny that the state, through its organs of government, is invariably the truest embodiment of the best will to realize the common good. The state is never the only organ of the best will; oftentimes it is an inferior organ, sometimes a very poor one. Neither in fact nor in right is the state the exclusive and supreme object of service for the good will, the rational will of human beings. Oftentimes we grope blindly, and sometimes we seek intelligently for the good, in a variety of ways and in a plurality of social relationships. The ideal of personality, depth and wealth and harmony of feeling and insight, is realized much more in the personal relations of love and friendship, in the enjoyment of nature and art, in the insights of science and vital scholarship and in religious devotion to spiritual perfection than it is in political activity. The function of the state is chiefly, if not exclusively, to safeguard and to improve the economic and cultural conditions for the free development of personality in these other spheres. Thus the individual citizen may have more spiritual community of interest with persons living in Europe or Asia than with any of his neighbors or with the majority of his fellow citizens. The highest life of spiritual personality knows no national boundaries. In it there is neither Jew nor Gentile, Greek nor Barbarian.

The Organismic Conception of Society

The conception that society is an organism, that the state is an organism, which has been quite fashionable in recent

sociological thought, is a cruder form of the notion, which I have just been criticizing, that society, in the form of the state, has a real and all-inclusive mind. An organized society is analogous to an organism in the following respects: (1) It consists of various parts or differentiated structures, each having a specific function to perform in the life of the whole society. (2) The various differentiated parts are interdependent. The well-being of the whole society depends on their harmonious functioning. For example, producers (farmers and industrialists), distributors (the transport workers, wholesalers and retailers), administrators, legislators, educators and the judiciary must each perform their proper functions, if the whole society is to prosper. (3) A society, like an organism, grows and lives only by adaptation to the natural environment and adaptation of the environment to its own uses. But an organized society is unlike an organism in the following respects: (1) Its ultimate constituents, human individuals, have a life of common interest and common worth which cuts through all specializations. Therefore an individual or a group thereof, are not mere subservient structures with merely subservient functions. Every member is an inherently worthwhile, self-determining member. (2) The coöperation of the members of society is not that of parts through which literally flows a common life. A society has no physical organism, no common brain or sensorium. It consists of coöperating individual centers of feeling, thought and will. (3) A society does not respond passively and as a whole, to the influences of the physical environment. Its individual members respond with different kinds and degrees of volitional activity. The wider and fuller the opportunity for the development of personality in a society, the higher its life and the less do its important activities consist in mere adaptation to the physical environment. Through the creative acts of leading individuals there is built up a social

heritage of ideas and ideals, of knowledges and purposes. In the appropriation by individuals and the improvement by individuals of these ideas and ideals consists chiefly of the higher work of civilization. Those individuals who can interpret and improve the ideas and ideals of the group most effectively are the leaders of the group towards a better life; such for example was Abraham Lincoln, greatest of all Americans. Civilized society is a mental growth incited and directed by ideas, which originate only in the minds of leading individuals.

A democratic social philosophy must be both realistic and idealistic. It must take account of the hard facts and also of the moving spirit of the race as expressed by its creative leaders. In a democracy all members have an opportunity to participate in the determination of the effective will toward the common good. This will is effective only in so far as it takes account both of the weaknesses and the promise of common humanity. Democracy in action is the clearer interpretation of what the average man has been more or less blindly thinking, purposing and hoping for. But if there is to be interpretation and progress toward the fuller realization of the common good, democracy must breed and follow interpreters and leaders—creative spirits who are always a small minority.

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CHAPTER XXXVI

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

Using the term *state* to include all the branches and minor subdivisions of government, what are the proper functions of the state? It has three great classes of functions—one, the police functions, two, cultural functions, three, economic functions.

Police Functions

These functions need not detain us long, inasmuch as they are admitted by all political theorists, except the anarchists who would destroy the state, and are in force in every state. The state has the duty of safeguarding the lives, personal liberty and good repute of its members, their property, their contracts.

Cultural Functions

It is the duty of the state to care for the education of its members. Some political theorists, such as Herbert Spencer, argue that there is no further obligation on the part of the state with respect to education than to insure that its citizens have sufficient education to discharge the duties of citizenship. Those who hold this view would deny that it is the province of the state to care for university education. Even John Stuart Mill, who was not an extreme individualist, held that while the state should supervise education, it should, as far as possible leave the conduct of education to private initiative. Mill feared that

a state-supported and directed system of education would result in too great a uniformity, and thus tend to stamp out mental originality. Curiously enough, he proposed a system of state examinations which surely would tend to produce the uniformity which he feared. The logic of events are against both Mill and Spencer, and rightly so. In the United States, as in western Europe, the state has steadily enlarged its sphere of educational activities. In fact it has come to be recognized that next to the maintenance of order and security for life and property, the most important activities of the state are educational. The tremendous growth of state universities in the United States is a striking example of this tendency of the times. As civilization increases in the differentiation of activities, and the multiplication of interests, it becomes more and more imperative that adequate means for education should be at hand. If higher education, for example, were left wholly to private initiative, the opportunities therefor would be wholly inadequate to the public demands and the public needs. At the present time public high schools and publicly supported universities are overcrowded, under-equipped and undermanned. Privately supported schools, colleges, and universities are not suffering at all from lack of patronage; moreover, where could one draw the line between the amount of education which is just necessary to enable the citizen to discharge the elementary duties of citizenship, and that which is superfluous. Does not society require more well-equipped teachers, physicians, administrators, expert servants and officials? Does not society need more good engineers, judges, lawyers? Does not the complexity of our problems require a deeper insight on the part of the voters at large into the psychological, moral, economic, political and historical conditions of civic welfare and civic progress? The chief trouble with public education is not that there is too much of it, but that there is not enough

of the wisest kind. In order that the individual may develop the best personality that his inborn talents make possible, social education of the best conceivable type must be open to all. A democratic society cannot endure and progress unless it is composed of individuals having well-developed characters and intelligences. The past history of the race and its present situation prove that these ends are not attained when any essential part of education is left wholly in private hands.

The state rightly engages in other cultural activities than those of formal education. It fosters science and the arts and it should do more in these regards. It should promote scientific investigation and encourage, by patronage and support, art and letters. The encouragement of artistic and literary genius should not be left to the accidents of private patronage. A great artist in New York State, Ralph Blakelock, died in an insane asylum, destroyed by the unsuccessful struggle to support his family. Poor and mediocre literature flourishes by private support; work of the highest grade goes begging. When the state recognizes and subvents the production of painting, sculpture, music, poetry and the drama, we may expect more high grade work to be produced. A state which cares for the culture of hogs but ignores and provides no means for the spiritual culture or mental enrichment of its citizens is still in a state of semibarbarism. If the state rightly cares for the elementary moral culture of its members, through the suppression of incitements to vice and through moral training in the schools, then surely it should support positively the enrichment of opportunities for æsthetic enjoyment and cultivation. No part of education is more important than the training of the individual in the right use of his leisure by means of spiritually refreshing and refining enjoyments. The state has failed of its duty, not only by not fostering art and letters but by not having beautiful public buildings.

Why should school houses, public offices, courts and legislative halls be ugly, when with more care and not much more expense they might be things of beauty and joys forever to the citizens?

Economic Functions

Our traditional political theory, in regard to the relation of the state to economic activities, is the individualistic or *laissez-faire* doctrine. Even Mill condemned governmental interference with the ordinary processes of industry. The doctrine was based on the principle of enlightened self-interest. It held that, if individuals were left free to pursue their own self-interests in economic matters, the interests of society as a whole would thereby be furthered. It held that the most powerful stimulus to energy and inventiveness is the unrestricted opportunity for economic gain. Thus production was stimulated and inventions and improvements encouraged. The enormous development of the factory system was based on new inventions in the processes of industry. This development was facilitated by the removal of governmental restrictions on industry and commerce, but these inventions were the causes, not the effects of the individualistic system of free competition. Moreover the development of the factory system led to the formation of vast organizations, of combinations, corporations and trusts. Wherever the large scale industry, or large scale methods of distribution are effective, free competition has been checked and in some cases eliminated. It is only in the case of small scale industries, such as farming, and where the worker still owns his tools and material that competition still reigns. Even the small retailer is subjected to organized control by manufacturers and wholesale distributors as well as by association with his fellows. In the production of most manufactured articles and in distribution of most goods, free competition

is wasteful. For example, a number of small competing railroads in a given territory is wasteful as compared with a single well-organized system. The covering of the same routes by a number of milk distributors is wasteful. A large number of little mines is a wasteful way of mining coal. In the economic world the method of free competition is obsolescent. As Dewey and Tufts say, our present industrial system is collectivistic in organization, and individualistic only in its lack of public control. The control of the materials of production and distribution of necessities of life by corporations, put in the hands of the few a tremendous power over the very lives of the many. A consumer of luxuries may refuse to buy when the price is too high but the consumer of necessities has the choice of either buying or starving and freezing to death. The instruments of transportation and communication, railroads, telephones and telegraphs, have become necessities. Our modern life is a complex of interdependent services and needs.

The present industrial system makes possible the control for speculative purposes and the manipulation by speculative combinations of supplies and prices. The mass of the consumers does not share sufficiently in the benefits of increased production. The consumers are at the mercy of the organized few who control the instruments of production and distribution. The wage earner who owns nothing but his own person, his own inherent energy and skill, without any ownership in the tools or materials of production is at the mercy of the managers and owners of the industry. He has no control over the conditions under which he works, the tenure of his job or the wages which he receives. Unless he is a member of a labor organization which controls the labor available in a given field, he enjoys only the hollow freedom of working under conditions beyond his control or quitting a job with the alternative of either finding another job or starving. Owing to the pres-

sure of economic needs the ignorant or unskilled laborer, women and child laborers are at the mercy of the employer.

Since it is the function of organized society through its public agencies to secure a fair measure of freedom and opportunity for all members of society to enjoy the rights that belong to them as persons, it follows that it is a proper function of the state to regulate the production and distribution of economic goods. The state has already done much in these regards. We are getting laws to protect the health and safety of the workers, to protect women and children, accident pensions, etc. We had during the War and still have fair price boards. The right of the public to control the rates of service of public utilities such as railways, telegraphs, street cars and telephones, gas, etc., is being generally recognized. In short the right to control by public agency the activities of economic production and distribution is being generally accepted. It does not require much argument to establish the principle that the economic functions of the state are of increasing importance. Since we live in an era of ever-increasing organization of production and distribution on a large scale the necessity of public control in order to insure to the individual an opportunity to enjoy those minimal economic conditions of livelihood without which he cannot be a personality is obvious. The debatable issues center in the question: In what way and how far can this public control be most equitably and wisely exercised? The real issue here is between a compulsory collectivism or communism and the continuance of private enterprise subject to state regulation. I shall discuss this issue in the next four chapters, and primarily with reference to its ethical aspects.

CHAPTER XXXVII

MAN AND THE MACHINE

The Industrial Revolution

One of the greatest revolutions in human society, perhaps the profoundest since the discovery of fire, was the Industrial Revolution, which began with the application of steam power to the driving of machinery for the production and distribution of economic goods, and which has continued with ever-increasing momentum to the present time. Power looms and railroad trains were among the first achievements of the Industrial Revolution. One may date its beginnings from about 1770, since Hargreaves' spinning jenny was patented in 1764, Arkwright's in 1769, Cartwright's power loom in 1785 and Watt's steam engine in 1761.

The rapid increase in inventions was stimulated by the expansion of trade, consequent upon England's imperial growth, the spread of scientific thought and the development of democracy. We are concerned here with history only to point out that the industrial life of western civilization has been completely revolutionized in one hundred and fifty years; first in England, then in other European countries, notably in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy; and finally, since our Civil War, in the United States. Our concern here is with the social and personal effects of the Industrial Revolution, with especial reference to its psychological and moral bearings.

What then has the industrial revolution accomplished?

Effects of the Revolution

1. *The Factory System.*—Except in agriculture and small retail trading, it has abolished the domestic system of industry and put in its place the large scale industry. Instead of working in or near their homes, owning their tools, purchasing their materials and making and vending the entire articles produced by them, the industrial workers now work in big factories. They no longer own their tools or purchase their materials. They have nothing to do with selling the finished products; they have no control over the nature or conditions of their work, except in so far as, by combination and collective bargaining, they can make their demands good with respect to wages, conditions of labor and hours. The individual and the family have ceased to be industrial units. The individual, as such, plays but an insignificant part in the industry by which he earns a livelihood for himself and family. His function during his working hours is to tend a machine by which a minute part of the finished product is fashioned. He is one of hundreds or thousands of workers engaged in the repetition of a simple task.

2. *Impersonality of Relation.*—The power of organized capital to control the conditions and rewards of labor, as well as the production and distribution of its products, has been enormously increased. The enterpriser has become, through combination, the economic master of the conditions of production and largely, of the distribution of the products. Thus industry has become, through the organization of business corporations and combinations thereof, impersonal and collectivistic. The industrial relations of human beings have been put on a purely economic basis. As Carlyle said, the cash nexus is the chief bond of western society. Even the distribution of farm products is controlled by combinations, by speculative traders, packers and wholesalers. Corporation control gives power to a few to

control the supply and manipulate the prices of the necessities of life, such as flour, meat, potatoes, light, heat and transportation. The control of production and distribution by a small number of powerful agencies, interested chiefly in gaining a maximum profit, results in constant fluctuation of prices and in the alternation of periods of too great scarcity and rising prices with periods of overproduction and falling prices. The economic order becomes a disorderly alternation of booming prosperity and depression.

3. *Specialization*.—Large-scale production has resulted in increase of specialization of production and distribution, rendering the members of our great society, the industrial state, much more dependent on one another.

4. *Urbanization*.—The enormous increase in urban population, as compared to rural population, is a consequence of the large scale industry. The problems of the modern city are chiefly the effects of the Industrial Revolution.

5. *Monotonous Repetition*.—The worker's task has been narrowed down to the monotonous repetition of a single process. For example, the domestic shoemaker in the old days made a whole pair of shoes to fit the feet of his individual customers. The shoe worker to-day cuts out with a stamp thousands of one piece of a shoe which is put together with the other pieces to make standard pairs of shoes. He is not in any sense an artist; he cannot put his creative or constructive impulse into his work. So it is in the making of automobiles, clothes, implements of iron, steel, wood, paper and countless other things. Even in the building trades work has become specialized and mechanized—structural iron work, concrete work, woodwork, sawn blocks of stone, etc.

Social Effects of Industrial Revolution

We may summarize the social effects of the industrial revolution as follows: 1. The individual contributor to the finished product has become a cog in a vast machine.

The single worker by himself is powerless. He has little or no voice in the control of his work. He owns nothing but his personal strength and skill. He has no stake in his work except in the pay envelope. He may lose his job at any time. In periods of boom or rising demand for product and scarcity of labor he may be able to make a very good bargain. In periods of depression or falling demand he may become jobless, his family homeless and starving. At best he may get a fair living wage. At worst he may starve. In the middle periods between the industrial boom and the industrial depression, he may earn enough on which to maintain his own existence and that of his family. The stockholder, too, the individual director, and even the manager of an industry may be powerless to mitigate the conditions of labor. In the winter of 1921, after a period of unexampled rise in prices followed by a rise in wages, consequent upon the turning of human energies, in the Great War, from the channels of production for consumption into the channels of production for the destruction of human beings of the products of their labors and of the results of accumulated capital, we were in the midst of an economic depression. The demand for goods slowed up, prices fell, wages dropped, thousands of workers were idle. This last cycle is only an extreme instance of cycles that recur with gentler curves over longer periods in our industrialized society.

2. The worker, as an individual, not only has no control over his tools and the conditions of his work, but he cannot put much of himself into his work. Engaged in a monotonous task, his instincts of construction, possession, stability, and even, owing to the uncertainty of the job and his lack of participation in control of it, the motive of self-respect, of reasonable self-expression, which is morally the most important motive in human nature, are often denied satisfaction.

3. The consumer is, with regard to the necessities of living, dependent on the power of the organized few to control supply and prices for the many. The fluctuations of supply and demand are subject to the wills of speculative combinations and to the confusion, amounting at times almost to chaos, which results inevitably from the control of production and distribution in the interest of greedy acquisition or profiteering by the few. The theory of law and economics on which our industrial order is based is that free competition results in the maximum of production and in the most equitable distribution of economic goods. In fact, free competition scarcely exists. It is kept in subjection, more or less, by speculative combinations to control the production and distribution of goods, even of such necessities as food, fuel and clothing.

4. The ever-increasing herding of masses of men in cities makes acute the problems of housing, sanitation, transportation and the distribution of the necessities of life.

5. The advantages of large scale industrialism are manifest: (a) Machine production means that man has a much greater power, through combined effort, to control the forces of nature for his economic welfare. The facilities for production and distribution have been enormously increased. This is true even in agriculture, the most domestic of all industries. In much less time and with much less expenditure of human energy, man is able to satisfy his needs to a degree undreamt of, except by a few prophets like Francis Bacon, before the Industrial Revolution. (b) Thus it is possible for man to have more leisure and more energy to enjoy his leisure than ever before. It is not necessary for him to work to the point of exhaustion for long hours and at heavy toil in order that society as a whole may have enough to live on and live decently. (c) The Industrial Revolution has brought great improvements in the physical conditions of living. The facilities for

transportation, communication, lighting, heating and sanitation have been greatly improved. The facilities for getting varied, appetizing and nourishing diet and good clothing have been much improved. (*d*) The easy means for the dissemination of reading matter, the easy means of communication, the growth of cities, the improvement of facilities for education, have brought the spread of information and the enjoyment of books, magazines, plays and music within reach of the masses. (*e*) While mechanical processes involve, for many of the workers, a monotonous repetition of work, it is scarcely to be doubted that they have brought about a quickening of intelligence. The stimuli and opportunities for the exercise of intelligence have increased in our dynamic society.

Criticisms of Large-Scale Industrialism

The chief criticism of the present economic order is that the benefits of the Industrial Revolution are not equitably distributed. Specifically, it is said: (1) The workers do not get a fair share of the products of industry, nor a fair share of the leisure which the increased power of production should bring to the many. (2) The enterprisers, the stockholders, the directors and managers of industry have too great a power over the economic conditions of livelihood for the workers. Insufficient pay, too long hours, the dangers and uncertainties of the jobs, insanitary conditions are some of the chief ways in which the present control of industry by corporations and combinations works social harm. (3) The control of the supply and the manipulation of prices means that the consumers do not benefit from increased productivity and the consequent cheapening of industrial processes.

The industrial workers have discovered that only in union is there strength. The individual worker is well nigh powerless in a bargain with the large scale employer. Thus

the combination of the workers to control the labor available is an inevitable and justifiable consequence of large-scale industry. If the single worker cannot own his tools, buy his materials and market his product, the only alternative is, by combination with his fellows to make a good bargain in selling his labor. Labor has been treated as a commodity. The labor combination or labor trust has been evoked by the combination of capital. But what has been the result? An armed truce between the organized workers and the organized enterprisers intermitted by industrial warfare in the form of strikes and lockouts. In this situation the consuming public, the workers themselves, and the enterprisers all suffer in different degrees. Our present economic order is wasteful. It breeds constant disorder; "things are in the saddle and ride mankind." The machines man has contrived are threatening to run away with humanity.

The spread of popular education and of democratic ideas means that the workers are demanding more voice in the control of the conditions of their work and a larger share in the product of their labor. They are demanding that a higher standard of living be effective for them and they are combining to achieve a higher standard of living. The revolt of the masses has been speeded up by the War. The War itself was a by-product of the economic rivalries of the great nations which led in large-scale industrialism, international banking and the exploitation of backward countries. The Serbian imbroglio was merely the spark which fired the long laid and ever-growing train of economic-political explosives. The World War was the product of economic causes aggravated by political stupidities. It was a war for economic domination, not for the defense of democracy, nor of the freedom of the seas, nor of *Kultur*. If not the Serajevo affair, then some other affair would have precipitated the holocaust.

The outcome of the War, which was the breaking out of a boil on the body of industrial society, has been unexampled social disorder and unrest and economic confusion. We fought the War "to make the world safe for democracy," and now we are pondering as to what democracy means in an industrial system uncontrolled by any generally accepted principles of social valuation. The economic order of uncontrolled individualism which arose as a result of the Industrial Revolution is weighed in the balance and found wanting. Shall its kingdom pass to Bolshevism, to the dictatorship of a minority of the proletariat, or to a genuine industrial and social democracy? The future of western civilization depends upon the solution of this problem.

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CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION

Economic Wealth and Human Weal

In every walk in life, there is a minimum of economic income without which a good life cannot be enjoyed, since without this minimum it is not possible to be a person and to attain that fair measure of happiness which consists in enjoying one's own self-respect and living in normal social relations. Some sort of regular work that is useful to society, that is not pursued through long hours and to the point of exhaustion, that yields sufficient income to enable one to satisfy one's bodily wants and to live in decent surroundings, that enables one to marry and raise a family, that enables one to enjoy some leisure and that enables one to provide with reasonable security against sickness, old age and death—such is the indispensable moral minimum of economic reward for service rendered to society.

Economic goods are in two ways indispensable conditions of personality: (1) They are the means for the satisfaction of those fundamental wants and interests without which a human being cannot be a full personality. (2) The acquisition of economic goods by the individual, through the performance of some regular form of service in society, is an equally indispensable condition of moral personality. Without continuous self-activity, in the form of serious labor which is useful to society, the individual cannot realize his moral personality, he can neither win the respect of others nor respect himself. It would be difficult to say

which are most devoid of moral personality—the social parasites who constitute the idle rich, or the paupers. The idle rich are moral paupers. Indeed there is no moral distinction between him who enjoys economic wealth without rendering hard work in the service of society and him who, without possessing any property, lives by charity. He who can work and will not should not eat. The man who lives well, in the economic sense, without contributing either to the production or distribution of economic goods, to education or to the satisfaction of the intellectual, æsthetic or religious needs of his fellows, or to the maintenance or improvement of public order, is not a moral person. He is a parasite, a thief, an excrescence on the body social. Genuine self-respect and the respect of others, the continuous exercise of one's own powers and the service of society by worthy labor, are the two poles of moral personality. Work is a blessing, not a curse, provided it calls out without exhausting one's powers and leads to the increase of human wealth. By human wealth I mean all results of labor which contribute to the maintenance and upbuilding of personality. Thus the educative process, science, literature and art, urbane social life, healthful recreation and religion, are all forms of *human wealth*. The justification of economic wealth lies solely in the social opportunities it affords for the maintenance of human life and its enrichment by the increase in enjoyment of the higher forms of humanistic wealth. When the process of producing and acquiring economic goods is carried out in such a way that it injures health and thwarts and maims personality, it is evil. When disease, physical deformity and weakness, ignorance, premature exhaustion and death, or avarice, hardness of heart, dishonesty and the corruption of one's fellows are by-products of the process of acquiring economic wealth, the process is antisocial and immoral. Thus, in so far as any economic order results in the physi-

cal and mental thwarting or maiming of personalities, in so far as it destroys or injures the bodily life, prevents the growth of man in enlightenment and knowledge, in friendship, fellowship, sympathy, the spirit of coöperation and justice, it is evil.

These things have been said again and again by moral teachers from the Hebrew prophets, Jesus and Plato, down to the present; but they need to be constantly reiterated.

Wealth and Property

It is necessary, for a clear-sighted consideration of the ethics of economic distribution, to distinguish between *wealth* and *property*. Wealth, in the human sense, is the condition of *weal*, or *well-being*. Social wealth includes all the conditions of the common weal; it is *common wealth*. This includes all the resources of education, recreation, science, art and religion that are at the disposal of society, no less than economic wealth. Material or economic wealth is the indispensable condition of the higher or spiritual forms of wealth. Goldsmith said

Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates and men decay.

But where material wealth accumulates men should grow and not decay; for the increase of material wealth means the increase of man's power over the physical conditions of his existence. Without material wealth there can be no leisure; there can be no sustained opportunities for the cultivation of the mind nor for the enjoyment of the more refined forms of social intercourse. A society always struggling to maintain against odds the margin of mere subsistence can have no culture, no humane, urbane, rich and harmonious mental and social life. In so far as all their energies are absorbed in the mere struggle for existence, members of society are denied the truly human life.

Property means the private possession by individuals of goods. The property sense has undoubtedly developed with civilization. Early tribal societies seem to have been communistic. The development of the sense of property has gone hand in hand with the recognition of the rights of individuality. Property is a means for the expression of individuality. Thus it is one of the means of dealing with the common wealth. But when the distributive process results in the acquisition by a few individuals of enormous property and the denial to many of the minimum of property which is indispensable for the realization of their personalities, property has become a hindrance rather than a help to the development and enjoyment of personality. It then becomes an injury to the common weal. For, as Dewey and Tufts point out, wealth may be: (1) privately owned and privately used, as in the case of clothing and food; (2) privately owned and publicly used, as in the case of a private estate or art gallery which is open to the public; (3) publicly owned but privately used, as in the case of street railway franchises leased for private operation; (4) publicly owned and publicly used, as in the case of public highways, parks, schools or libraries.¹

Principles to Govern the Distribution of Wealth

The fundamental problem of economic distribution is this: How can the economic wealth, which is a *social creation*, be distributed so as to yield the highest returns in the promotion of the common weal? What principles should govern the distribution of wealth in the form of property? With regard to this problem there are three principal standpoints: (1) unrestricted individualism or the competitive system; (2) communistic egalitarianism; and (3) democratic individualism. We shall now consider these three standpoints.

¹ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 488.

1. *Extreme Individualism*.—Unrestricted individualism, the theory of free competition, is that when free play is given to the motive of enlightened self-interest, in the production and acquisition of economic goods, the largest amount of wealth will be produced and it will be distributed in the manner which is most advantageous for society as a whole. Each man can best secure his own welfare and the welfare of his family, when there are no public restraints, except those involved in the protection of life, property and contract, upon his economic activities. Moreover, when the business of organized society is limited to the protection of individual freedom and the giving of free play to individual initiative, society as a whole will reap the largest benefit by the steady increase of production due to the powerful incentives of freedom of initiative and acquisition. Enlightened selfishness is the strongest and therefore best social motive power. Inventiveness, improvements in methods of production and distribution by better machinery, in both a mechanical and a social sense, are encouraged, it is argued by the method of free competition. The individual is stimulated thereby to the maximum of effort. If he does not respond to the stimulation, he does not deserve economic reward, since he is not contributing to the increase of social wealth.

Thus individualism takes account of the individual's services to society regardless of his motives, on the ground that it is impossible, in the matter of economic distribution, to take motives into account. It puts a premium on effort and it is in line with the evolution of morality from the group morality of more primitive societies towards the recognition of the freedom and responsibility of the individual which is characteristic of modern enlightenment. It does not make any allowance for the handicaps of physical heredity and of social inheritance. Nor does it take into account the factor of luck in determining the individual's good fortune or ill fortune. The individualist would say

that it is impracticable, and would retard economic progress, to attempt to weigh the good or ill fortune which comes to the individual through his biological or social inheritance or through the chances of the economic world. It judges by results alone and measures the success of the individual's efforts in terms of production. It makes enterprise, efficient energy and shrewdness, with common honesty, of course, the sole economic merits. It should be noted that the individualist does not mean by enlightened self-interest, as the best controlling motive in the economic order, the interests of the isolated ego. The motive that does and should dominate men's economic activities is well put in Kipling's poem, "The Imperial Rescript":

You can lighten the curse of Adam when you've lifted the
curse of Eve.

But till we are built like angels

With hammer and chisel and pen,

We'll work for ourselves and a woman, forever and ever, Amen.

Individualism, in the sense of the competitive system, does promote efficiency of economic production when it is intelligently carried out. It has stimulated inventions and the organization of industry, because of the prizes it has held out to exceptional ability and energy. The removal of restrictions from the course of industry made possible the development of large scale industrialism. If it did not produce the mechanical conditions of large-scale industry in the nineteenth century, it gave free play for their expansion. In the United States, with its vast and rich undeveloped resources, it stimulated settlement and the exploitation of the country's natural resources. The enormously rapid development of the United States west of the Allegheny mountains has taken place under the individualistic régime. Individualism has a powerful basis in the strong human instincts of acquisition, possessiveness, constructiveness and the sex and

parental instincts. Its appeal is weak, however, and moreover as a dominating motive, it is harmful, *in the case of the noneconomic services*. If the teacher, the spiritual pastor, the scientist, the scholar, the artist, or the public servant be actuated mainly by the individualistic motive he cannot render good service to society. In these callings, love of the work and desire to render a lasting service to his fellows are and should be the individual's dominating motive.

From the standpoint of the economic common weal alone, individualism or the system of free competition has broken down. It no longer exists. The organization of workers and the organization of capital are throttling free competition. Thus competition under an individualistic system tends to destroy itself. Our individualism is no longer democratic, it is *oligocratic*. The enterprisers, the captains of industry, the managers and directors of great industrial and commercial combinations control production and, in part, prices. Their control is disputed by the leaders of organized labor. Our present system is collective in organization, individualistic only in its lack of effective public control. We have learned that without social control what we get is child labor, too long hours, unsanitary conditions of labor, preventable accidents, charging all the traffic will bear and rendering insufficient service in the case of public utilities, such as street cars, railways, gas and light. The distribution even of the products of the earth, such as coal and the products of farm and garden, are controlled and the prices manipulated by speculative combinations. The consumer is at the mercy of private organizations of capital and labor. The ignorant, the weak and the poor are exploited. Unless the workers in a large scale industry are unionized there is a tremendous inequality in the bargaining between the employer and the worker. Free competition means, in effect, freedom for the poor, the ignorant, the helpless, to compete with one another in selling their services cheaply

and paying profiteering prices to industrial and speculative combinations to control production and marketing. Thus unrestricted individualism to-day does not guarantee a fair opportunity for all individuals. The only remedy, and the remedy which is slowly being put into operation, is the public control of our so-called competitive system. *This requires new standards of group morality.* The actual and very complex interdependence of human beings in the great society must be more explicitly recognized in law and ethics.

The inhumane struggle for existence of our competitive system based on the motive of acquisition must be turned into a fair struggle for a humane existence. The survival of the fittest under individualism is not the survival of the morally fittest; the survival of the morally fittest means the survival and development of every self which has the rudiments of a moral personality.

2. *Communistic Egalitarianism.*—The communistic egalitarian would so socialize the processes of production and distribution that all workers would receive an equal reward for an equal number of hours' work. Granting, for the sake of argument, that it would be possible to work this plan, its chief merit as a solution of the social problem would be its simplicity. It would weaken some of the most powerful human motives, the desire for distinction, the desire for self-expression through exceptional achievement and the unquestionably strong desire of many to acquire a competence in order to improve the opportunities of their families. Moreover, a reward which would be adequate to enable a factory worker to lead a decent life and bring up a family decently while rendering efficient services would not be at all adequate for a university professor or an artist. The services that men render to society are not of equal value and if their economic conditions were equalized they could no longer render their best services. Human beings are not born equal with respect to their inherent abilities. It is not desir-

able that all who perform social functions should receive equal rewards. If equality of reward were established it would soon vanish. Rare and great ability, exceptional energy and efficiency should receive exceptional reward.

3. *Democratic Individualism*.—Democratic individualism, the soundest principle of economic distribution, is a fuller equalization of opportunity. Every individual should have a fair opportunity to develop his powers and to exercise them in such a way that he can win self-respect and the respect of others, by rendering a service to society for which he will receive a reward sufficient to lead a healthy life in decent surroundings and with a fair amount of leisure and opportunity for mental and social recreation. This standard of distribution implies: (1) A minimum or living wage. There is, for every calling and with due reference to the physical and social environment, a minimum wage which is necessary to maintain a family in health and comfort and to enable the children to enjoy the benefits of a good education. (2) Good educational facilities free to all. (3) Good physical conditions of living, housing, highways, transportation, sanitation, light, heat, water, public playgrounds and parks. (4) Good opportunities for recreation, free libraries, music, drama and art.

It is not possible, nor if it were possible, is it desirable that all workers should receive a like economic reward. It is possible and it is desirable that all should have a fair opportunity to realize a good life. Over and above the economic minimum, reward should be proportional to the service rendered. The value of the service should be estimated by the intrinsic importance of the service rendered. For example, the production, transportation and distribution of the necessities of life are of the utmost importance. Education and the provision of elevating entertainment in the form of music, art and literature, are equally important. The extent and rarity of the service should be taken into

account. A national administrator or the manager of a great railroad or industry renders services of great extent and that only a few are competent to render. The administration of public affairs, the direction of great business concerns, leadership in education, discovery and invention are services which only few, all too few, are fitted to render. Men should be stimulated to fit themselves for these services by the offer of exceptional reward. Some services are not only rare in regard to the small number who can render them, but rare also in regard to the small number who appreciate them. Such are the services of the great teacher, scholar, scientific discoverer, poet and artist; in proportion to their real value these are the services that are most poorly rewarded in our commercialized, but otherwise mediocre, great society. The individual should receive the reward that will make him most efficient in his service. In so far as private enterprise fails in this regard, the control of distribution should be in the hands of public agencies. The standard is, I repeat, a democratic equalization of opportunity sufficient to liberate the constructive and creative powers of the individual so that he may attain a reasonable satisfaction of his personal capacities by contributing to the common good. By the common good I mean the development and enjoyment of human personality through the exercise of intelligence, fellowship, friendship, love, and the enjoyment of beauty. There is an ethical minimum of indispensable economic income without which no individual in any walk of life can become a truly human being. Over and above this there are all sorts of diversities and inequalities of gifts which should be fostered in the same spirit, for we are all members one of another. If one member suffer all the members suffer with it. If one member rejoice all the members rejoice with it. This is the social ideal. Social progress is impossible without scope for the free development of personality, but the free development of personality

is possible only in a social order in which human beings generally have opportunity and incitement to realize that they are sharers in a common lot, that they have a common destiny which can be achieved only through community of action. The common good and the individual good are but two aspects of the same good. This good is to be realized when more of the light of reason and the guidance of knowledge and of sympathetic insight enlightens and controls the economic order. In this world there is nothing great but man and in man there is nothing great but mind or soul. Man is like a reed shaken before the wind. The universe may crush him but he is a thinking reed, a loving and aspiring reed and thus superior to the blind forces that seem to crush him. By thoughtful and concerted action we may greatly increase the power of thought and good will in human society. We may greatly increase the proportion of well-rounded harmonious and happy personalities. There are no guides toward this end but reasonableness and good will. The increase of reasonableness and good will can arise only through education. Taken in the broad sense all life is a process of education, for education is the unfolding of personality. The first and last criticism of our social order is that it does not permit of the unfolding of personality in *all* the members of society.

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CHAPTER XXXIX

COLLECTIVISM OR SOCIALISM

Introduction

There is much confusion abroad in regard to the meaning and use of the term *socialism*. *It is necessary, in the interests of clear thinking, to confine the application of the term to the doctrines which aim at a more even distribution of the products of industry by the use of the power of the state; through the collective ownership, by the people as a whole organized into a government, of the chief instruments of production and distribution—the land and its products, factories, means of transportation and communication and so forth.* In other words, *state socialism* implies the exercise of compulsion. Properly speaking voluntary socialism such as the free coöperation of the early Christians, the Christian Socialists in England and the communism of Charles Fourier (1772-1837) and Robert Owen (1771-1858) are not socialist theories since they make no appeal to the power of the state.

Within theories of state socialism there are two sharply distinguished types which we may call respectively—Revolutionary and Evolutionary. The most important form of revolutionary socialism is that which originated from the *Communist Manifesto* by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and published in 1848. Marx also published *Das Kapital* (*Capital*), often called the workingman's bible. Hereafter we call this form of socialistic theory *communism*.

Marx holds that the chief thread that runs through history is the class struggle for economic control. All other features of historical culture are by-products of the class struggle: political systems, and even arts, religions and philosophy. This is his economic interpretation of history. The class war began with ancient civilization and has continued down to the present. He says: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, have stood in constant antagonism to one another and carried on an uninterrupted warfare, now secret, now open, which has in every case ended either in the revolutionary reconstruction of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes."

The present epoch has, says Marx, simplified the class struggle. The development of the great-scale industrialism has divided society into two hostile camps—the *bourgeoisie* and the proletariat, the capitalists and the workingmen, the exploiters and the exploited. The capitalist has become a drone, a passive owner of stock; the worker owns nothing and receives only wages enough to keep him alive, sometimes not even that much. The capitalist is the exploiter and the laborer the exploited; since, according to Marx, labor in the broadest sense of the term, is the source of all wealth, the conferrer of all value; whereas, through the monopolistic control of land, mines and machinery, the capitalist draws, in the shape of rents and profits, the lion's share of the wealth produced.

Marx holds that the continuously increasing aggregation of industry into fewer and fewer hands (by large corporations, monopolies, trusts, etc.) is paving the way for the *final* step—the taking over by the state of the chief instruments of production and distribution. All industries shall be *run* by the state for the common good and all the workers, in *the*

larger industries at least, will be government employees. This consummation can be achieved only by the union of all workers to achieve "the dictatorship of the proletariat," the absolute rule of the working class. The establishment of this dictatorship is the coming "Social Revolution"; and the slogan of the revolution is "Workers of the World, Unite!"

Marx's theory of value is erroneous. Labor alone does not produce value. No amount of labor will confer value on things unless there is a demand for them, actual or potential. Henry Ford has made an enormous fortune and incidentally, given employment to large numbers of human beings, by supplying a cheap instrument of transportation. The creator of "Mutt and Jeff" is said to have an income of \$200,000 per year because of the demand. The writer of a recondite treatise or a really fine poem has a good chance of starving for lack of demand.

Again, Marx ignores the fact that capital (when it is not the result of the manipulation of stocks to produce fictitious values) originates in some persons saving from their wages or other incomes. It is true that much capital is not earned by self-denial. It may be inherited or it may be an unearned increment or it may be the result of clever manipulation. But the ultimate source of solid capital is saving and investment.

The Bolsheviki in Russia have established the first Marxian State—the all-Russian Union of Soviet Republics. It has not proven a great success. It is not democratic. It throttles liberty and it is, by all accounts, relaxing its communism. The peasants hold their lands and private production and trading go on extensively.

The most interesting moderate form of state-socialist theory is that of the English Fabian Society, first broached in the *Fabian Essays*. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, George Bernard Shaw, Graham Wallas and H. G. Wells have been the most distinguished members of the society. They did

not organize a political party, but set to work to bring about social reform slowly in an evolutionary manner by persuasion and political action. Later the English Labor Party accepted for its platform many of their policies. Sir J. Ramsay MacDonald, late Premier in the Labor Party government, is the most eminent active English exponent of moderate or evolutionary socialism.

The essential differences between Marxian and Fabian Socialism are: (1) the absence in the latter of a dogmatic doctrine of the ultimate form that the socialist state will take; (2) the presence, in the Fabian type, of faith in democratic methods, in the power of persuasion and the gradual adoption of socialism by parliamentary methods—therefore the absence of a revolutionary doctrine and theory of the class war; (3) nor do the Fabians push the economic interpretation of history to the extreme that Marxianism does.

The Marxians or extremists and the English Socialists may conveniently be distinguished as *communists and moderates*. The Socialists, who drew up the new constitution for the German Republic, are like the late British labor ministry, moderates.

We shall not here consider further the questions at issue between communists and moderate socialists in regard to methods and goal. We are interested primarily in the psychology and ethics of state socialism.¹

¹ There are a number of people in the United States who go into hysterics over communism which they seem to fear is likely to undermine the Republic. Communism is so entirely foreign to the tradition and present spirit of the American people that there is no danger of it. A nation so prosperous is not likely to want a revolution. The chief danger in the United States is that, owing to the dominance of money values and the prosperity of the working classes, American civilization will become more and more mediocre and commonplace.

The Aims of Collectivism

Collectivism, or, as it is more commonly called, *Socialism*, proposes to moralize the production and distribution of economic goods by public or collective ownership and operation. The moderate collectivist would socialize the ownership and operation of only the most important instruments of production and distribution; namely, the land, the mines, the water powers, the railroads, the telegraphs and telephones, public municipal utilities, such as street railways, light, gas, heat, and the large-scale industries. The collectivist would not abolish all private property or private enterprise. He would allow considerable scope to voluntary co-operative agencies and to private industries in those fields which are least susceptible of monopolistic or socialistic operation, such as the production and sale of articles which require a high degree of individual skill—like works of art, books, cooking, tailoring, etc. Collectivists are not agreed as to the principle of economic distribution to be followed with respect to the socialized industries. Some advocate equal pay for an equal number of hours' work; but the best recent writers on socialism seem to accept the principle, "from each according to his ability and to each according to his need"; meaning by "need" the economic minimum necessary for decent subsistence. It cannot be fairly said that socialists as a whole reject the principle of differential rewards. It is not inconsistent with the basic principles of collectivism to recognize that some kinds of service being more difficult, valuable, or rare, with reference to the persons who are able and willing to render them, than other kinds of service, should receive a considerably higher reward. Collectivism by no means implies a flat mediocrity of reward. It aims rather, by collective ownership and operation of the fundamentally necessary instrumentalities and processes of economic life to correct the glaring inequalities of the present

order, so that every individual member of society may have a fair chance.

The collectivistic attack on the present capitalistic system is not directed against private property as such, but against a system which puts the control of most of the wealth-producing agencies and of the products of these agencies in the hands of a small minority, leaving the majority of human beings propertyless and economically impotent. Thus the collectivistic program is not directed at the obliteration of individuality or personality. It aims, by a more equitable distribution of social opportunity, at enabling all to develop their personalities. The collectivistic ideal might be summarized as follows: *universal equality of opportunity for self-realization through collective economic action*. The collectivist denies that there need be general coercion to put the individual on the job. Under collectivism a man would have a choice as to what he should work at, except in so far as there might be more candidates than jobs, in which case the best would be selected as now and the others would be under economic compulsion to seek other jobs. The collectivist would have the surplus wealth used for the promotion of the common good. By *surplus wealth* is meant the surplus which is left when the economic minimum necessary for decent subsistence has been provided for all the workers.

Collectivism would destroy the rental values, interests and profits which accrue now in private hands, through the reaping by private owners of the unearned increments in the monopolistic forms of economic wealth, of which land, mines, gas and oil fields and water powers, are striking examples. The collectivist would reward the labor which is necessary to procure from these natural monopolies social wealth. But he contends that the *social values* which the natural monopolies acquire through the demands of society for their products, apart from the labor expended in producing and distributing the products, belong to the members

of society in common and should not be permitted to become private monopolies. He argues that the speculative land holder, coal-mine owner, or monopolist in water power or oil or transportation, is filching from society and turning to his private aggrandisement, values which he neither created nor even in many cases discovered; but which he enjoys simply by reason of the fact that the presence and increase of human population creates and increases the demand for fundamental necessities of life which exist in limited quantities. The collectivist argues, further, that in the case of all things that are grown or manufactured, the raw materials and physical conditions of manufacture are *monopolies* which therefore belong to society as a whole. The only factors in growth and production which should receive a reward are the labor and skill involved in the transformation of the natural materials into finished products and the distribution of these to the consumer.

Syndicalism and Guild Socialism

The word *Syndicalism* is derived from the French word *syndicat*, meaning a trade union. The movement originated in France in the seventies and eighties. Guild socialism originated in England a few years before the World War. It is an attempt to avoid the weakness inherent in the political anarchism of syndicalism, by combining certain features of the latter with state socialism. The syndicalists regarded the existing forms of the political state, even when democratic, as useless to secure economic justice for workingmen. They proposed, by a general strike, to paralyze the capitalistic state and to substitute for the capitalistic control of industry control by the workers, organized as factory units in each of the industries. The local union in each industry was to own and operate the factory. By coöperation all the local unions in each industrial locality would determine output and conditions for the exchange of products. The vari-

ous local unions in each industry would be members of the national union in that industry. But the syndicalists never faced the problem as to how the national unions were to be related either to the individual factories or to one another. Syndicalism was tried out in Italy after the war and proved an utter failure. It has pretty well collapsed in France and its American form, *The Industrial Workers of the World*, has not amounted to anything.

The guild socialists took over from syndicalism the idea of utilizing the industrial union as an instrument for the control of industry. Guild socialism proposes that there shall be a complete organization of workers in each industry, from the local works committee up to the national board. From the national boards there shall be formed a central industrial board of management, which shall determine the allotments of materials and rates of exchange in the various products and services. But the state shall be the ultimate owner of all the means of production. Each guild would manage its own industry, buying, manufacturing, selling and determining the rates of reward for its workers. Each guild would pay a tax to the national state for the support of the common enterprises, such as education. Thus the guild socialists would have the organized workers in each industry control and operate the industry, but not own it. They would establish a complete hierarchy of self-government in industry, from the local works to the national guild. The industrial congress, consisting of representatives of the various guilds, would regulate the volumes of production and determine the rates of exchange between the various products and services; it would mediate in all disputes between the various guilds. They would also have a national or political government to conduct education, further culture, keep the peace and direct international relations. They reject the older state socialism, on the ground that it would only substitute for the present rule of the moneyed class and

the tyranny of the wage system a vast centralized bureaucratic state, which, because of its control of the economic life, would be more far-reaching and tyrannical, and perhaps more corrupt than the existing political state.

In the scheme of guild socialism the territorial or political parliament represents the interests of the consumers as well as the common noneconomic interests. If the decisions of the national guild congress and of the territorial parliament conflicted then the disputes would be settled by committees representing both houses.

The fundamental objections to this scheme, which as yet is in a purely academic stage, are two: (1) Each industrial group is prone to regard its own interests as paramount. Endless conflicts would be likely to arise in the industrial congress over the adjustment of prices and the apportionment of rewards. Strong groups would exploit weaker groups. One wonders what would become of the university teachers and the producers of literature and art. (2) The judicial, cultural, spiritual and international functions of the political state all have economic implications. Deadlocks would arise between the industrial congress and the political parliament which could not be removed by joint committees. The essence of a state is not mere power; but there can be no state without a central authority and power; otherwise the people slide back towards the Hobbesian war of all-against-all. Two coequal governments in one state means no state.

The valuable idea in guild socialism is that of providing for a national house of occupational representatives. At present there is no constitutionally established body of this sort. In view of the diversity and complexity of occupational interests in our *great society*, it might be well to substitute for one of our existing houses of congress a national occupational house of representatives. Actually it is impossible for our territorial representatives of diversified con-

stituencies to represent adequately all the interests that clamor for recognition in legislation. The Senate might be turned into the sole body to represent the common interests of the people. It, together with the President and his Cabinet, might be charged with the duty of determining how far the results of the actions of the occupational house were in harmony with the common interests and really promoted the common good. If organizations of workers and employers do not develop successful methods of settling their disputes by private agreements, the results of which in costs and wastes do not unduly encroach on the common good of the people as consumers, something in the way of an industrial house of Congress is likely to appear. Indeed the present methods of getting legislation to further special groups through *bloc* influences is an unrecognized form of occupational representation or sovietism.

But any such scheme of an occupational house of congress would be in the interest of national well-being only if it were kept subordinate to the territorial form of government as representative of the common interests. To elevate to a superior or even coördinate place an elected body representing only the diverse special occupational interests would be the first step towards national disintegration. It would result either in the tyrannical domination of the numerically strongest or the most strategically situated industrial groups—such as transport workers, miners and agriculturists. It would be a fatal step to abandon our traditional ideal that the aim of government is to protect and foster the interests and goods that are common to all members of the state from the undue encroachment of special interests which seek to make government subservient to themselves. This fundamental principle of American government is based on the belief in a community and equality of moral vocation more basic than any class interest. This implies the equal right and duty of every citizen, regardless of his special vocation

or station to have the same voice in the conduct of government that every other citizen has. This principle, together with the federal system of regional devolutions of political autonomy and authority, calling for local responsibility and initiative, from the state to the township and the village, constitute the solid and enduring strength of the American system. No machinery for the consideration of special group interests should be permitted to weaken our well-tested framework of government.

Comparison of State and Guild Socialisms

The fundamental distinction between ordinary state socialism or *statism* and guild socialism is that the former would vest the ownership and control of economic production and distribution in the hands of the state and its regional and local devolutions, such as the province or other political subdivision and the municipality, whereas the guild socialist would vest the operation and control of industry in the various trade guilds which would operate on a self-governing basis, from the local guild, for example of shoe or metal workers, up to the National guild of the same vocation. The *Statist* does not advocate the centralization of all industrial control in the national state. For example, under a system of state socialism the railroads, the mines, telegraphs and telephones might be nationalized just as the postal service is now; or the mines and water powers might be provincialized or regionalized just as in the province of Ontario now nearly all the hydroelectric power in the most populous part of the province is produced and distributed to municipalities and private concerns by the province. In the Province of Manitoba the long distance telephone system is operated by the Province. In the Provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan there are provincially owned grain elevators. Ontario built and operates a railroad. The Dominion of Canada, Australia and New Zealand own and operate

national railroad systems.² Municipal socialism has gone far in many parts of the British Empire. Many cities own and operate their street railways, markets. Even in the United States, the most deeply entrenched home of the private capitalistic system, we have municipal waterworks, lighting plants and a few municipal colleges. The tide seems to be setting more strongly towards municipal and regional socialization.

Objections to Collectivism

The chief objections to compulsory Collectivism or State Socialism are:

1. It would involve a vast bureaucratic and monopolistic state system which, by reason of its tremendous economic power, would enslave the individual and might be more tyrannical and corrupt than any political state system. The guild socialist would remove this objection by putting the processes of production and distribution in the control of national guilds. But guild socialists have not yet adequately explained how the interests of the consumer would be protected under his system nor how the peace would be kept, with justice, between the conflicting interests of monopolistic guilds. He cannot do this without reënthroning the state as the ultimate and sovereign arbiter between conflicting interests of diverse economic groups. A workable guild socialism would be only a form of state socialism, in which the administrative agencies were divided not on municipal or regional lines but on occupational lines. It would be equivalent to Bolshevism.

I do not see why, in principle, collectivism might not make use, according to the circumstances, of both these lines of division. Certain forms of economic interest are shared

² Outside the United States, about one half of the total railroad mileage in the world is owned and operated by national governments.

by all the members of a municipality. Others are national in scope. As I have already said, clear-sighted and moderate socialists, such as J. Ramsay MacDonald and Sidney Webb, do not advocate the complete centralization of industrial control. The socialist argues that many of the strongest motives for corruption, which now have their roots and nurture in the overstimulation of the acquisitive instinct in its most selfish form, would be removed under the collectivistic system. They say that the collectivistic state, under democratic control, would neither be tyrannical nor corrupt, since all the citizens would have a much directer, deeper, and more constant interest than they have under our present political system in watchful concern for the protection of the common interests. At present, they say, it is difficult for the average citizen to see what interest he has in the doings of legislatures unless the shoe pinches him hard in the matter of class legislation. Because of Karl Marx's emphasis on the supremacy of economic motives in history and of the persistence of the class struggle, because of his prophecy that the concentration of capital would go on into fewer and fewer hands and the miseries of the working class would increase,³ until in desperation the class conscious proletariat would revolt and set up the socialistic state, many critics of collectivism assert that collectivism means the tyranny of the industrial workers over all other social classes. If the struggle between the organized capitalistic employing class and organized labor should go on with increasing violence it is likely that this might happen. Organized labor, being more numerous and having learned the power of combination, might violently overthrow the capitalistic system and set up something akin to Russian Bolshevism. But if collectivism were to be established slowly, step by step, by education, by political persuasion and evolutionary means, the

³ These prophecies have been falsified by the actual course of events. The rich are growing richer and so are the poor.

result need not be class domination; since the members of all the *classes* would be leavened and their motives transformed by the permeating yeast of the collectivist ideal.

2. The gravest objection to collectivism is that, by greatly weakening the motive of self-interest, it would dampen individual initiative and effort and result in inefficiency and the lessening of production. The individualist argues that self-interest, the desire to acquire a competence, to rise in the world, to attain wealth, power, position and influence for one's self and one's family, is the strongest and most ineradicable motive to human industry. The socialist replies that our present capitalistic society overstimulates and hypertrophies the instincts of acquisition and self-seeking. The socialist denies that man must always be ruled by crude simian instincts. He argues that the undue prominence of the monkey side of human nature is due to the present system which puts a premium on selfish acquisitiveness, shrewdness, self-assertion, social dishonesty, and which puts a damper on altruism, honesty, fidelity, the spirit of fellowship and coöperation. The socialist points out that the most socially useful work, that work by which mankind benefits most widely and permanently, is done from love of the work, desire for the expression of one's higher and nobler instincts and the desire to serve one's fellows. Spiritual prophets and teachers, scientific discoverers, artists, poets, scholars, and teachers, do not do their work for gain; if they did they would be either fools or knaves. They work in order to express themselves honestly and to serve their fellows by enriching mankind's heritage of insights, things of beauty, ideals, visions and joys. The socialistic criticism of our present society contains a large measure of truth. Mediocre work and poor work in literature and art and commercially useful work in science and teaching bring the richest economic rewards, because they can be capitalized and dis-

tributed to the crowd of patrons which consists of the vulgar well-to-do. There is but little economic reward for the best things in the fields of imaginative and intellectual creation. Those who appreciate the best are in a minority and cannot afford to buy or patronize what they love and would enjoy. The socialist argues that, with equality of opportunity, the patrons of the finer things would greatly increase in relative number. On the other hand, the failure of our free public-school system, supported by democratic franchise, to produce relatively large numbers of persons of high intelligence and fine taste, does not augur very hopefully for the contentions of the socialist in this regard.

3. The critic argues that collectivism would hobble, and indeed well nigh destroy, individuality by weakening the incentives to its exercise; that, by excessive regulation of the economic life it would dry up the springs of free individuality. The socialist replies that this is just what the present system does by its gross inequalities of opportunity for mental self-development and creative work. The socialist argues that the inferiority of the public free schools to the private schools for the children of the rich is due to the power of concentrated wealth to prevent adequate taxation for the support of public schools. He argues that the lack of high standards in the teaching is due to inadequate financial support which results in poor equipment, too large classes, underpaid, overworked, inefficient teachers and ill-nourished children. Moreover, owing to the pressure of want, the children of the poor must leave school too young. Socialism aims, say its advocates, not at a dead level of mediocrity, but at an equalization of opportunity for the liberation of human individuality. It aims at economic conditions under which all children shall have full opportunity for a free education of the best attainable kind. The socialist holds that there is a great wealth of intellectual and spiritual capacity which now goes to waste, which is choked down or thwarted,

through lack of economic and cultural opportunity. He argues that by far the greater part of the intellectual and spiritual creativeness of mankind in science, art, letters and other fields of spiritual creativeness, have been contingent upon either the inheritance of an economic competence or the patronage of the wealthy. He argues that to leave it so is to subject the spiritual progress of mankind to the brute accidents and injustice of individualistic capitalism. Here again the socialist overlooks the fact that a wide diffusion of material prosperity and universal power to use the ballot have not resulted, in America, in raising the level of culture very much.

4. The critic argues that art, letters, pure science and scholarship would languish and die out under the collectivistic system, since the multitude, who would be in control of the public purse, would have no interest in sustaining the creators of these spiritual goods and giving them the leisure which is necessary for the highest creative work. The collectivist replies that genuine equality of opportunity under his system would produce in so much greater relative numbers intelligent and interested patrons of the works of higher culture, that the artist, the writer, the scientist, the scholar, would be surer of a ready hearing and support for his work than he is now. The collectivist argues that our present apotheosis of commercial success, our enthronement of the acquisitive instinct, is highly inimical to the flourishing of the generous and genial powers of the creative spirit in any other fields than industry and commerce. We are mammon worshipers because mammon grinds most of us under the wheels of his chariot. Let there be leisure, let there be full opportunity for the education of man's higher impulses in widest commonality spread and we shall have, in place of a few smug magnates patronizing science, art and letters, a whole people, from whom will rise large numbers of lovers, friends and patrons of the things of the spirit.

5. A serious criticism of collectivism, whether in the form of democratic state socialism or of guild socialism, is that it would weaken both the sense of responsibility and of freedom of action on the part of those occupying executive positions. If, as would be the case under guild socialism, foremen, superintendents, managers and directors of industry were chosen by the popular suffrage of those whose work they were to supervise and direct, there would be great danger of incompetent direction, owing to the directors feeling that they must win the favor of those lower down rather than those higher up in the organization. If, under a state socialistic system the responsibility devolved from above downwards, the system would be subject to all the evils of bureaucratism. It would, in effect, be an administrative oligarchy. The proposal of the guild socialists that, from the local guild to the national guild in the same industry, all supervisors and officers should be chosen by popular vote, seems to me the greatest single weakness in the system. If it is difficult, as it undoubtedly is, to get the voters in a political democracy to exercise the necessary care to select the best representatives and officials once in one, two or four years, would it not be more difficult to get them to choose efficient and honest supervisors and directors frequently and for every department of industrial service. The guild socialist, in reply to this objection, argues that the workers in an industry have a deeper, directer, more continuous and intelligent concern in choosing their own supervisors than in choosing political officials. This reply does not obviate the objection that the best work of supervision would not result if the supervisor were responsible to those supervised and not to his superior officers. Industrial democracy, in this thoroughgoing sense, would not work unless the workers generally were deeply imbued with and controlled by the motive of rendering efficient social service. Under state socialism the evils of bureaucratic inefficiency and corrup-

tion could only be obviated if the officials in general were deeply imbued with the motive of social service.

Collectivism a Utopian Idealism

The collectivistic ideal is the attempt to body forth, in the midst of modern industrial conditions, that vision of a far country of human brotherhood, of social justice and peace, of free and full personality, lived out in the joy of good will and comradeship, which has arisen in generous and loving souls in all ages. It is the vision of the Hebrew prophets, who called insistently for the establishment of justice, peace and mercy, for a new social order in which none need go hungry and none be oppressed or afraid. It is the vision of Jesus of Nazareth, with his ideal of the Kingdom of God, in which service or ministry to one's fellows should be the test of true greatness, in which the spirit of good will or love and of moral freedom should reign. It is the vision of St. John when he says: "He that loveth is born of God and knoweth God, and if a man say that he love God and hateth his fellows, that man is a liar; for if he loveth not his brother whom he has seen, how can he love God whom he has not seen?" It is the vision of St. Paul with his conception of a society in which there are diversities of gifts but the same spirit and in which all are members one of another, so that if one member suffer all the members suffer with it, and if one member rejoice all the members rejoice with him. It is the vision of Plato in his doctrine that the true end of society is not to make any single individual happy by himself, but to make all the members of society as happy as possible. It is the vision of Kant in his conception of human society as a kingdom of ends, a social order in which every person would be treated always as an end, that is as having inherent value and never merely as a means to some one else's pleasure or success.

Universal justice and fellowship, fellowship through jus-

tice and justice through fellowship, are the abiding constituents of this ideal. It has found fragmentary and fleeting realization in little communities and brotherhoods; in oriental, Greek and Christian monastic orders; in the primitive Christian Church, in lay brotherhoods, in the modern communistic attempts such as New Harmony, Brookfarm, Icaria. Ever and anon attempts are made to realize the vision of "each for all and all for each." Ever and anon these attempts are shattered on what Kant calls "Man's unsocial sociableness." They suffer shipwreck on the rocks of human greed and willfulness, of human selfishness, indolence and stupidity. Man cannot get along without his fellows nor can he get along very well with them. Modern collectivism or socialism is the attempt to establish, by social compulsion, a human brotherhood based on the principle of the moral worth of every individual, on the right of every person to the means of physical and spiritual life and growth, and on social service through coöperation as the indispensable means to the realization of personality.

This ideal is an illusion, the myth of individual perfectibility through social perfectibility which, by its perennial alluringness, in contrast with the hard and cruel actuality, arouses man to dream of and to work for a better social order. But the realization of the collectivistic social ideal, as the precondition of individual regeneration, could not be achieved by the mere installation of an elaborate machinery of social compulsion. The collectivistic ideal could only come into effective being by the gradual transformation or sublimation of human motives, by the regeneration of human nature. Were this regeneration achieved, compulsory social regimentation were then unnecessary. The ideal of anarchial communism is a *utopia*—a nowhere; this utopian dream is the vision of the Republic of man's soul, of the commonwealth of free comrades working and living in fellowship, which haunts and stings the soul of man towards

efforts for a freer, richer, more nearly universal equalization of opportunity; for the realization of personality in a happier social order in which human beings more generally may find deep and lasting satisfaction in the rendition of honest service by that continuous exercise of their personal capacities in which alone true happiness or self-realization lies. If compulsory collectivism be impossible, by what steps may the dominance of commercialism, the regnancy of the simian instinct of greedy acquisitiveness, and antisocial self-seeking be weakened?

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CHAPTER XL

TOWARDS COÖPERATIVE INDIVIDUALISM

Motives to Work

There are six chief motives which lead men to work. These are: (1) The instinct of self-preservation. When not interfered with by the pressure of other motives, this motive operates universally in man. (2) The instinct of workmanship. By this I mean the native impulse of man to realize his personality, to express himself in some way, by fashioning things. Man is a dynamic being. He desires to make things, to subdue the rude forces of nature, to fashion tools and with these to fashion things. All human inventions, devices and creations, from a flint arrowhead or a piece of rude pottery up to a great drama or philosophical treatise, are expressions of the instinct of workmanship. It is present in infinitely varying degrees of urgency, and it takes many forms of utterance according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual in interaction with external circumstances. (3) The desire to support a family. This is also a well nigh universal desire. (4) The desire for social approval. This desire, especially when fused with the instinct of workmanship, is very widespread in human nature. The desire for fame is just an extreme instance of the craving for the approval of one's fellows. (5) The desire for power, of which the desire for economic wealth and the desire to rule are special forms. This desire seems to exist in any considerable degree of strength only in a minority of human beings. (6) The desire to serve one's fellows without re-

gard to return in power; the desire to serve one's friends, one's countrymen or simply one's fellow men. The desire to serve one's friends is quite widespread. So too, especially in times of danger, the desire to serve one's country. The desire to serve one's fellow men is preëminently the Christian motive, but it does not seem to be a very widespread or powerfully operating motive in human society.

Under a system of compulsory social regimentation, the instinct of self-preservation would, of course, operate. The desire to support a family might be weakened, since under any system of compulsory socialism the care of the young would be guaranteed by public agency. The desire for social approval would probably be strengthened. The desire for power in the form of the striving for offices of superintendency and direction, would be increased. The desire to serve one's fellows might be somewhat increased. The instinct of workmanship would be dampened, since it would be thwarted by compulsory regulation and deprived of some of the strongest incentives for its continuous exercise in the shape of reward and recognition. It would be repressed, most of all, by the absence of freedom of choice and opportunity for full expression. Balancing up human motives under a system of social regimentation, probably the result would be a reduction in man's productive efficiency—especially in the fields of invention, improvement in methods and creative intellectual work.

It may be argued, as the Russian Bolsheviks are arguing to-day, that compulsory social regimentation is only a transitional stage in the progress towards a completely socialized state of society. When the goal has been achieved there will be a complete identity of interest and motive between the individual and his work for society. The individual will find the complete satisfaction of every instinct, except the instinct to dominate his fellows, in the production of social wealth; and the instinct to dominate one's fellows will be

eliminated, or at least completely thwarted, by the automatic operation of the social or communal ideal and motive. This is a pipe dream. There will always be much work to be done that is monotonous, uninteresting or positively disagreeable. Work of this sort will be done by most people only under the stress of economic compulsion. Under a system in which everybody who worked, whether he did his work well or ill, was guaranteed a good living there would have to be much more compulsion. At present, if the individual who is not capable of doing interesting work is willing to put up with the bare minimum of subsistence, he can reduce his labor to the amount necessary to gain this minimum. Under a socialistic system such an individual would have to do more work in order that the general average of living might be fairly good.

Human nature being what it is, and what it always has been, a system of involuntary socialism on a large scale is impossible. A system of compulsory socialism would be under the direction of bureaucrats and dictators who would hold office through the combined power of the inertia of the mass and of pandering to the materialistic and crude desires of the mass. "If social democracy, however, refused to diminish labour and wealth and proposed rather to accelerate material progress and keep every furnace at full blast, it would come face to face with a serious problem. By whom would the product be enjoyed? By those who created it? What sort of pleasures, arts, and sciences would those grimy workmen have time and energy for after a day of hot and unremitting exertion? What sort of religion would fill their Sabbaths and their dreams? We see how they spend their leisure to-day, when a strong aristocratic tradition and the presence of a rich class still profoundly influence popular ideals. Imagine those aristocratic influences removed, and would any head be lifted above a dead level of infinite dulness and vulgarity? Would mankind be any-

thing but a trivial, sensuous, superstitious, custom-ridden herd? There is no tyranny so hateful as a vulgar and anonymous tyranny. It is all-permeating, all-thwarting; it blasts every budding novelty and sprig of genius with its omnipresent and fierce stupidity. Such a headless people has the mind of a worm and the claws of a dragon.”¹

The fact is that the many are born to copy and to follow; the few are born to originate and to lead. Francis Galton estimated, after prolonged studies on the distribution of human faculties, that about one person in twenty is born capable of any degree of leadership or direction. His proportion may be too small for a society with a more equitable distribution of opportunity. But my own observations, extending over twenty-five years as a university teacher, in a field which offers abundant opportunity for the exercise of independent thought and creative imagination, is that comparatively few even of the selected group which constitute the studentship of a university have much mental initiative. In our actual democracy the economic disorders and the political and cultural defects are largely due to the lack of initiative, the inertia and indifference of the many. The United States began as a pioneer land of unexampled opportunity and but little economic inequality, without hereditary aristocracy or entail. If, as it has grown populous and wealthy, it has become a land of great economic inequalities that is surely due no less to the inertia and lack of initiative of the many than to the enterprise and energy of the few. Man, by nature, is in most cases, an easy prey to the inertia and routine of custom and habit. Socialism would make him not less but more a creature of habit.

Democratic Coöperative Individualism

The best social ideal is that of a democratic and co-operative individualism, a free society with a career open

¹ George Santayana, *Reason in Society*, p. 127.

to all talents. Our capitalistic industrialism can be so modified as to afford a fair opportunity for its members to make a real choice of work and vocation in the direction in which each one's individuality leads him. All that is necessary is that there shall be vouchsafed to the individual the opportunity for as good an education as he is capable of and a fair opportunity to make a livelihood. What we need is a capitalistic society with a wider distribution of capital, with much better educational opportunity supported by taxation and one which fosters the enterprise of private coöperation. Of course we shall not be freed from economic compulsion. I doubt if it is desirable or morally healthy that more than the few with extraordinary creative impulses should be freed from compulsion of this sort. In particular, so long as the family exists its heads must, in forming a union, submit to economic compulsion. The family is still the most powerful and deep-going unit in society. It is still the best primary school for the nurture of personality. It is highly undesirable that the family should be weakened, much less abolished. Indeed it is desirable that the family should be strengthened, in order that its opportunity should be improved. In order that this may result, what is needed is not a servile state, a socialistic leviathan, but a democratic society in which there is freedom and a fair opportunity for the development and exercise by human beings of their many-sided individualities, in the family, the school, the nation, and for the progress of humanity through the increase in the proportion of intelligent individuals.

In view of the complex and changing conditions of industry and the economic life it is not possible to lay down any general and dogmatic or ideal scheme for the relation of public control to economic activities. Policies must change with the changing conditions. A policy that would work well in England, France or Germany, with their long-

established high standards of civil service would not work in the United States where the fight to keep partisan politics out of public service of any kind (even teaching) has not yet been won and is not likely to be won for some time. On the other hand, the greater resources, energy and enterprise which public utilities can command in this country make state aid or state enterprise much less needful; private organization has a much greater field of operation.

No nicely laid out and elaborated theoretical plan will meet the complex and ever changing situations. One thing can be said; neither any system of state socialism nor unrestricted *laissez faire* are now practicable. Just how the great variety of economic activities can be best controlled in the interest of the common weal is a matter for careful inquiry and cautious experimentation—always with reference to the actual case in hand and never in obedience to some dogmatic theory, such as Marxism, Guild Socialism or entire freedom from public control. Moreover, since the industrial life of the United States has changed so rapidly laws and methods that were fairly adequate in earlier days are now inadequate.

Coöperative individualism does not mean a policy of *laissez faire*, "let alone" of unrestricted and unregulated competition, with the "devil take the hindmost." In the present organization of finance and industry on an ever-increasing scale and complexity, equalization of opportunity cannot take place without frequent regulation in the interest of the common weal. The power of combination and control on the part of great corporations is such that unrestricted competition no longer exists. And the laboring man, the weaker party to the bargain, has been forced to combine, and so restrict bidding for work, in the interests of better standards of work and living. There is no longer the alternative between absolutely free competition and regulation and control. It is now altogether a question of

degrees and kinds of control; a question of just *where*, *when* and *in what manner*, the state must control methods, prices and profits. It is also sometimes a question of whether the failure to control private enterprise does not justify public enterprise in the same field.

It is not possible to lay down any general theory on this matter. Only by slow and careful investigation and experiment can it be determined, *in the specific cases*, what public control is expedient or when and where public ownership and operation are expedient. The end in view is clear—the preservation of a fair measure of equality of opportunity for all members of the state. The means cannot be forecast without plunging into dangerous doctrinaire theories and headlong experimentation.

Democratic individualism means that *every* individual should be able to earn a sufficient livelihood by moderate hours of labor, to enable him to lead a life in which his capacities as a human being can be realized and enjoyed; and to lay by sufficient for his maintenance in old age. This end is being largely achieved by collective bargaining, so far as organized labor is concerned. It is impossible and inexpedient, in such complex and changing concerns as the economic order manifests, to do more than lay down certain highly general principles which follow from our ethical standard. These are, I think, the following:

1. All workers should be enabled to maintain themselves decently by moderate hours of labor. The conditions of their work should be sanitary, and as free as they can be made by due care from danger to life and health.

2. The physical conditions of the worker's home life should be healthy.

3. Children and women should be protected from exploitation. Motherhood should be safeguarded.

4. The public should be protected against exploitation through excessive profits and stock manipulation in the

great enterprises which are public necessities and utilities—the production and marketing of food, transportation, lighting, heating, communication and banking.

5. There should be compensation for accidents.

6. There should be insurance against unemployment.

7. There should be provision for old age annuities, for which the workers pay the minimum possible premiums.

8. The capitalization of big enterprises, particularly public service corporations, should be so regulated as to prevent the issuance of fictitious stock; that is, stock for which no money has been paid in. The right of stockholders to a knowledge of the business's methods and to a part in determining its policies should be safeguarded. A fair return for public service corporations should be estimated on the basis of the actual capital not the fictitious capital.

In so far as these ends can be attained by private initiative it is better. The power of the state to regulate and control should be employed only to safeguard the public interest. Some of the ways in which private initiative is achieving these ends are: (1) The recognition of the right of collective bargaining and of representation of the workers in determining not only wages and hours of labor but shop conditions. (2) Many corporations are recognizing the duty of complete publicity in regard to matters of organization and control. (3) Profit-sharing and the wide extension of shareholding are means to industrial peace and the extension of democratic ownership. Professor T. N. Carver, in *The Present Economic Revolution in the United States*, points out that there are over fifteen million holders of stocks and bonds and that the proportion of stock held by small stockholders is rapidly increasing.

But in this case more widely distributed ownership does not necessarily mean more democratic control. Indeed it is probable that the banking interests thereby increase, in many cases, their power of control. The many individuals,

of whom each owns a few shares in a large concern, cannot very well act in concert. Collectively they might exercise control, but they cannot be collected. It is a good thing to have stockholders widely distributed. But, in the interests of the public, the organization should be so conducted as to give the public a voice in its control.

It has recently been stated by a competent economist that, owing to the new methods of organization, although the ownership of corporations rests with the people of Main Street, control is in the hands of Wall Street.² This control takes place through elaborate systems of holding corporations, one built into another; also, lately, in a number of instances by the reservation of the voting privilege to a minor portion of the common stock not placed on the market and held by the promoters. The bulk of the stock bought by the general public is nonvoting stock. Thus the great majority of the stockholders have no way of exercising any control over the policies of the concern.

Open Shop versus Closed Shop

Are unions, organized for the purpose of improving the standard of living and conditions of work for their members, justified in insisting that nonunion men shall not be employed in the shops in which they work? This is a difficult question. If the standard of living insisted upon is a fair one (this is difficult in many cases to determine) the closed shop is morally justifiable. Since as individuals they are well nigh powerless, certainly the workers are justified in combining to improve their conditions.

But, if the purpose of the closed shop be to restrict to a small group the advantages of the collective bargaining, and if the open shop would not result in a lowering of

² W. Z. Ripley, "From Main Street to Wall Street," *Atlantic Monthly*, Jan., 1926.

the standard of living and conditions of work, then the closed shop is a selfish principle.

Public Utilities

There are certain great enterprises which may properly be called, *public necessities* or *public utilities*. Such are banking, transportation and marketing, communication, mining, lighting, water supply. In these enterprises the cost of public service should be reduced to what will furnish a moderate return on investment, through public regulation. It is better, wherever good service at moderate cost can be produced by private operation with public control, not to multiply state or municipal activities in these fields. But wherever public control fails to bring good public service at a moderate cost with modest returns, the municipality or state *may properly* engage directly in the enterprise.

The regulation of monopolies or pools in such matters as food products is a difficult question, but the principle is clear. Wherever the general interest of the consuming public is at stake, regulation in restraint of excessive profits from monopolistic control of necessities must be employed.

In the case of industrial enterprises in which the tendency is towards interlocking company organization with subsidiaries, the state may insist on complete publicity in regard to organization and methods.

The "Unearned Increment" or Social Value

The values of land, mines, water powers, lighting and communication, and transportation franchises, are due in large though varying part to the growth of the population in the community. A city increases in population; a holder of a piece of land, a street railway or lighting franchise, may or may not have contributed to the industrial development of the city. In either case the holding increases rapidly in value. Should the holder reap all the increased

profits? Or should they be shared by increased valuation and taxation, or lowering of rates in the case of public utility franchises? Increase of population means increased demand in retail businesses and the various forms of private service. But in the latter case increase of demand results in increase of competition and lowering of prices. In the case of land and public utilities there can be no competition. It is right that inheritances and larger incomes should bear a larger share of the burdens of taxation for public purposes—for improvements in highways, pavements, parks, education and recreation. And this principle is recognized in the graduated income and inheritance taxes. One danger that exists in the present increase of democratic control and raising the standards and conditions of living of the workers is that the highly trained and specialized public servants, whose numbers are small and whose voting power and power of using the method of collective bargaining are negligible, are in danger of being squeezed to the wall, their incomes and the standards for their services lowered, with the ultimate consequence of the deterioration in the personnel. I mean expert civil servants, judges, teachers, artists and scientists.

CHAPTER XLI

WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

Democracy is an ideal of human society, more or less vague, and which has not yet been realized, even in the more definite forms which it has taken in political and social movements. Its development has been complicated and retarded by the rapid growth of the newer industrialism, as well as by the inertia and incapacity of the *people*.

We must distinguish between *political*, *industrial* and *social democracy*. A *political democracy* is an organized form of governance in which all the legislative, judicial and executive powers are exercised by representatives and agents, entrusted by the whole people with the exercise of these powers subject to its will. In this sense the United States is a restricted political democracy. It is not a complete political democracy, since the laws passed by Congress and by the legislatures of the various states are subject to judicial review and nullification by the Supreme Court, which is the final interpreter of the intent of the Constitution. The United States is a constitutional republic, but not a thoroughgoing democracy. The United Kingdom and the Dominions of Canada, South Africa and Australia, as well as some of the newer European States, are more complete political democracies than the United States. Australia is perhaps the most thoroughgoing democracy in existence.

In any event, political democracy is not an end in itself. It is an instrument for the realization of *social democracy*.

Industrial democracy would, I suppose, mean the participation of all the workers in the government of the industries. It might take either various forms of private industrial democracy, such as coöperation or share holding, or some form of guild socialism. Whatever forms industrial democracy might take it would not be an end-in-itself, but a means to the realization of *social democracy*.

The final justification of any form of political or industrial democracy, then, must be that it will promote *social democracy*; democracy as a social ideal or ethical principle. What does social democracy mean? It means, I take it, the complete recognition of the right and duty of every human being to realize and express his personality, by taking his part and doing his bit in the life of the community. This implies four things—*Fraternity, Duty or Discharge of Function, Liberty, and Equality*.

1. *Fraternity or Community*. There can be no organized democratic society, no community life in which all can participate, without like-mindedness, without community of purposes and values, in short, without intelligent coöperation. Unless a people recognize and follow, in fellowship of ideas and purposes in coöperative work, a common good or end, there is no community and no real people. Without this community of thought and purpose there may be government, but there is no true political state; with it there is community, even without autonomous political government, as in the cases of subject peoples or nonpolitical brotherhoods and associations. Democracy, without fraternity, becomes merely egotistical self-assertion of rights and claims by individuals without the recognition of duties.

2. *Duty or Discharge of Function*. In a community, whether it be a state or some other form of fellowship and coöperative thought and work, each member has his station and its duties. He has his specific functions to discharge, his peculiar service to render as a member of the whole

body. He has his bit to do in the maintenance and improvement of the social conditions of the good life. Democracy means that each individual and each functional group is to be enabled to discharge its social function in the best way possible.

3. *Liberty*, rightly interpreted, is the ethical key to the democratic ideal of community, in contrast with oligarchies and despotisms. It means that each and every member shall have the duty and the scope to enable him to function in the whole, *as a responsible ethical personality*. It means that the political, economic and cultural conditions shall help or at least not hinder the individual to become a self-directing, self-respecting person who can, on his own responsibility, serve the perpetuation and progress of the community life, find satisfaction in so doing and have sufficient leisure and opportunity to exercise and enjoy those capacities which do not get satisfaction in his work.

The nature of man, as a moral being, means that, without liberty of choice and self-direction, there can be no real fellowship and coöperation, no genuine fraternity, no lasting community. On the other hand, as Mazzini puts it: "True Liberty cannot exist without equality, and there can be no equality among those who do not proceed from one basis, from a common principle, from a uniform sense of duty."¹

4. *Equality*. This is commonly supposed to be the peculiarly democratic principle of social life. In what sense is it valid? Certainly not as the assertion that all men are born equal in physical, intellectual, æsthetic or volitional capacities; or that they can become equal by the use of equal opportunities. Such an assumption is obviously false. *What equality means is that individuals are equal, in the fundamental moral sense that each one has a right to be treated, and all others have the duty to treat him, as a*

¹ *Duties of Man.*

self-directing, self-respecting member of the community; in short, as a free ethical personality. Moreover, the work of each member of the community, when honestly performed, and therefore when the worker is dutifully discharging his social function, gives him a moral status equal to that of any other member. "Whoever is willing to give for the good of all that much of work of which he is capable ought to obtain enough recompense to enable him to develop his own special life more or less in all the aspects which define it as human."²

Kant states the fundamental ethical principle of democracy thus: "Treat humanity, whether in thine own person or that of another, always as an end withal, never merely as a means." Be a person and treat others as persons.

False Idea of Democracy

There is a false conception of democracy that obtains currency all too widely. It is that democracy consists in the abolition of all distinctions, all differences; that its aim is to level all to the same standard, to make us all as like as two peas in a pod. This means inevitably leveling down in place of leveling up. It means the rule of a dead level of mediocre uniformity. It means the exaltation of the rudimentary appetites and impulses of human nature and the tyranny of the crowd-mind.

The belief in a spiritual equality in the sense of an invaluable worth in every human soul is a mystic faith that goes beyond the evidence of experience. This mystic faith is expressed in Buddhism, Stoicism, Christianity, in the ethics of Rousseau and Kant. It is an intuition, a feeling that in the presence of the essential spiritual identity of human beings the differences between them are unessential. It is an affirmation of the absolute and ineffable value of the individual soul and the relativity and inferiority of all

² *Ibid.*

other values. In so far as this mystic faith implies that every individual should have a chance to develop his humanity it is the moral essence of democracy, the spiritual nerve and ultimate criterion of social progress. But it is erroneous and mischievous, if taken to imply that, even under the most favorable and similar conditions, all men will prove to be equal; in respect to those capacities which indicate their values as members of the community. Human beings are born not only different but unequal. They are not born equal with respect to energy, intelligence, æsthetic capacity, or even with respect to their moral capacities. They are not equal in their natural powers of teamwork and devotion to duty, any more than in respect to their energy and doggedness of will, their powers of observation, reasoning, memory and imagination. And it cannot, in the long run, accrue to the advantage of the community that they should be treated as equal. In this sense equality is injustice. Even a mathematical equality of opportunity is impossible; for the reason that it is impossible to separate entirely the factor of environmental opportunity from the factor of individual reaction. One man's opportunity will seem more favorable than another's because the former makes a more effective use of his. The two may, so far as the original opportunities were concerned, have been in exactly the same case; but differences will at once be manifest in their utilization of the same.

The most erroneous and vicious dogma of democratic sentimentalism is that the majority is always right. There are no foundations in the history or the living experience of human society for the assumption that truth and justice are always on the side of fifty-one per cent of the adult population as against forty-nine per cent.

In matters involving the disinterested consideration of principles, in matters involving the dispassionate and impersonal weighing of evidence and principles, the majority

is usually quite apathetic and unconcerned; and when its passions and personal interests seem at stake it is likely to be on the wrong side.

The majority acquiesced in the sentence of Socrates. The rabble at Jerusalem clamored that Jesus be crucified and Barabbas released. Now Barabbas was a robber. No doubt the crowd approved the intimidation of Galileo and watched with keen interest when Giordano Bruno and Michael Servetus were burned at the stake. So it has been always and times have not changed much, though fashions in persecution have changed. "We do not burn heretics now, we fire them" (Glenn Frank).

Our universal public education and cheap reading matter have not resulted either in any general concern for freedom of investigation nor in any widespread intelligent interest in matters of intellectual inquiry. In the present movement to suppress the teaching of evolutionary or comparative biology, in which the entire matter of the scientific teaching of geology and biology are at stake, the majority of our people is made up of two groups: (1) those who are utterly indifferent to the matter and even indifferent to the gravity of the assumption that it is the proper function of the State to determine, *by counting noses*, and to enforce its determinations in regard to what shall be taught in schools and colleges and how; (2) those who are opposed to the study of evolution on grounds of passion and sentimental prejudice. One may venture the guess that the first group is by far the larger. The fact is that the majority of human beings, even in this enlightened republic, have not the slightest interest in the determination of truth in matters of science or historical or sociological scholarship. The number of human beings who have a disinterested nonegoistic concern for truth is very small. Nor have most human beings any deep and abiding interest in a comprehension of matters of impersonal or general justice.

It has been said recently³ that the teaching of the scientific method has failed, since so few of our people have any lively appreciation of what constitutes a scientific attitude of mind. This is true and, furthermore, *it is an open question whether the attempt to teach scientific method will not continue to fail with more than a small minority of the people*, because the majority have no lively interest in the impersonal and objective conduct of the understanding. Perhaps some such interest can be more widely engendered by a method of education which catches the child young enough. It is well worth trying, even though its success be dubious. For the need is clamant. If the trial is to be a fair one, it must be carried out in the field of history and the social studies no less than in the natural sciences. As Mr. James Harvey Robinson says: "The overwhelming mass of humanity is not interested in general reform, but is absorbed in making a living under existing circumstances and in rearing a family according to the current *mores*."⁴

All governments are necessary evils; necessary to forfend worse evils. Democracy is the least of these evils. But its cultural progress, its intellectual, æsthetic and even its economic progress, will depend on whether it can learn to keep its hand off many matters on which lately it has been laying rude hands—off *all* matters of scientific and scholarly inquiry and teaching; off *all* matters of religious regulation; off the airing of opinions that do not endanger the very existence of government. Democracy can prosper only if it acquires sufficient intelligence and self-restraint (it cannot acquire self-restraint without more social intelligence) to restrict its public control to securing economic fair play, full educational opportunity and personal freedom for all its members. And, in order to secure economic fair play

³ By Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler.

⁴ J. H. Robinson, *An Introduction to the History of Western Europe*, Vol. II, p. 563 (new ed., 1925).

and full educational opportunity, it will have to place a larger measure of confidence in its expert servants and aim to get the best available. Democratic government is, as Mill said, limited to general superintendence and check. Just what these functions involve is now the rub. It is a debatable question whether our democracy is not being led by the nose by various sorts of demagogues, to a degree of overlegislation and meddlesome interference, in matters wherein the general public has no capacity and slight interest, that will result in the production of a standardized herd and the arrest of cultural progress. Democracy, having gained the upper hand in the governance of man, has put itself on trial. And the cause is lack of intelligent interest sufficient to discriminate between what are, and what are not, matters proper for governmental regulation and control.

Standardization in machinery and product means cheaper quantity production in material goods. Standardization in human life means the suppression of individuality, the obliteration of distinctions and differences in the human soul. It means the goose step in education, in opinion, belief and action. This is a danger inherent in the organization and standardization of public systems of education. The educational system tends to embody uniform and too low mass standards. The same danger lies in an approach to equalization in economic possessions. Perhaps close approach to an egalitarian distribution of incomes would deal a severe blow to the nurture of the fine arts, literature, science and philosophy, and undermine human character at the same time. Where excesses of pecuniary reward over personal needs are employed, as they are to a considerable extent in the United States, to support the fine arts, higher education, research, to furnish opportunities for gifted individuals to perfect themselves in scholarship, research or the fine arts, as well as for ethical, social

and religious advance, it might be disastrous if private fortunes were abolished. We might then revert to an even more uniform and undistinguished type of culture and of spiritual life than we now have. The cultural justification of private fortunes consists in the fact that they can be used to further cultural and spiritual goods, beyond the appreciation of the multitude and therefore not likely to be encouraged by state supported means. On the other hand, with a rise in the average level of cultivation and taste there will come not only more generous support of, but much keener and wider response to, and appreciation of, science, learning, spiritual freedom and beauty.

True Idea of the Common Good

The easiest and most fallacious way of conceiving the common good is that of a lowest common factor. Ignore all differences of individualities, obliterate all distinction and the rudimentary impulses, appetites and patterns of conduct that are left are presented as the common good. Utter monotony, sameness on the simplest plane becomes the standard. There is no common good in this sense. A social order which obliterates distinctions, which ignores all differences is bad. "Unless we have intense life and self-consciousness in the members of the state, the whole state is ossified." ■

The good community is one of coöperation, of interaction, of give-and-take for the mutual development and enjoyment of individuality. Social action should be the expression of the give-and-take of free discussion, both critical and constructive, on the part of the members of the group.⁶

The genuine ethical personality cannot be bred by law.

■ Bradley, *Ethical Studies*.

⁶ This point is well emphasized by M. P. Follett, in *The New State and Creative Experience*.

Laws are necessary to insure to the individual the opportunity for development and self-expression in the community. Much regulation by law does not promote the good life. It turns individuals into hypocrites, spiritual shams. The goodness which comes from enforced obedience to law is, after all, only an external imitation of genuine goodness. The end of all social regulation should be the maturing of the individual in the freedom of self-control and self-direction. In this respect John Stuart Mill's great essay, *On Liberty*, remains a classic that should be taken to heart by citizens, educators, preachers and legislators, in these days when the United States, having forgotten its traditional spirit of liberty, exhibits two social phenomena that are really two aspects of the same social disease—overregulation by law and extreme lawlessness.

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CHAPTER XLII

IS DEMOCRACY A FAILURE?

The American Experiment

The first great and continuous experiment in democracy has taken place in the United States. Therefore we may regard the career of democracy in America as a crucial instance. If democracy has been an utter failure in America, it will probably be such everywhere else under the conditions of large-scale industry.

The American people entered upon the exploitation of the richest and most varied natural heritage that has ever fallen to any people and they have paid for it only by their own labors of development. They have been unhampered by most of the handicaps that have hindered the development of democracy in Europe. They have not had to throw off the incubus of hereditary entail, with its perpetuation of class privilege and its land monopoly. They have not been taxed to support ruling social classes which were closed to them. By virtue of their geographical isolation, they have not faced the constant imminence of wars with equal or more powerful neighbors. They have not had to maintain large standing armies, universal military service or great fleets. In the free air of America the memories of old unhappy far-off things have dropped from the minds of immigrants and have never entered their children's minds.

Nevertheless democracy has not realized all its fair promises in America.

Shortcomings of American Democracy

We may set down the following as the more striking shortcomings of democracy in America.

1. The rise of great inequalities of fortune, the development of monopolies in natural resources and public utilities, the reduction of an increasing proportion of the population to the status of wage earners without security of employment; in short, the rapid growth of economic classes, capitalists and laborers, with frequent conflicts arising between them.

2. Inefficiency, wastefulness and corruption, in politics and civic and judicial administration, due to low standards of intelligence and character for legislators, administrators and judicial officers; consequent, partly, upon the spoils system, partly upon the inertia and lack of civic intelligence on the part of the voters; but partly due also to the very complexity of the problems involved and the practical difficulties in the way of choosing competent representatives and agents. There have resulted the multiplication of laws, foolish inconsistent or ineffective and incapable of enforcement, because not backed by public opinion; the notorious inefficiency of our legal procedures; the slowness with which decisions are reached; the defeat of the purposes of the law by technical dodges; failure, in short, either to apply or enforce the laws. The alarming increase in crime is partly due to these causes and partly to the breakdown of moral and religious restraints, the failures of the home and the school, with the growing demand for luxuries and all sorts of self-indulgences. But the failure of the courts to function efficiently is largely due to the fact that our law and practice, developed for a simpler agricultural society, has not yet caught up with other complexities of the great scale industrial order.¹

¹ Cf. Roscoe Pound, "The Crisis in American Law," *Harper's Magazine*, Jan., 1926.

One of the most potent causes of lawlessness in America is the fact that members of so many different cultural groups, each with its own *ethos* or customary system of moral habits, have come to the country and have not been quickly and fully assimilated to the traditional moral *ethos* or *mores* of the country. The great danger here is that members of heterogeneous cultural groups, finding a different moral climate, shall drop their own ancestral *mores*, or *ethos*, without taking on in its place the *mores* of the country. Thus they become morally deracinated beings. Moreover, in the rapid development of our complex industrial and commercial system, our own traditional *mores* have been put to a severe strain, and have partly broken down. Our habits of judgment in law and opinion, framed for a simpler type of community, have not been and are not now adequate. This situation has made it more difficult for our moral folk ways to prevail with closely knit foreign groups. Hegel is quite right in saying that man is suckled at the breast of the common *ethos*. If he then cuts away from the *ethos* in which he was suckled, without being inducted into another *ethos*, he becomes morally a man without a country and a dangerous element in the community.

3. Low standards of education; superficiality, sloppiness, inaccuracy, in public education, from the elementary grades to the universities. Educators to-day boast of the practicality, the relation to life and the child's environment of the new curriculum. But this emphasis on the relation of education to practical life and the immediate environment too often results in a habit on the part of students of doing nothing well, of not knowing what honest intellectual work consists in.

4. The absence of good taste and good work in the agencies which minister to the public demands for amusement, news and entertainment, in the theaters, music, movies, newspapers, popular magazines and literature. In

literature and music America's production has been rather mediocre, not so mediocre in painting. Architecture is the art in which America is achieving most distinction and originality.

Extenuating Circumstances

This is a formidable catalogue of shortcomings. Does it mean that democracy in America is a complete failure? Before we answer with a categorical yes, let us consider certain explanatory and extenuating circumstances.

1. America has developed very rapidly from the pioneering agricultural state into the industrial state. This development has brought novel, complex and perplexing economic and general social problems, wherever it has gotten great headway. Against the gross inequalities of reward for work and the disabilities under which many manual and "white-collar" workers suffer, may be set the greater average standard of material well-being and opportunity for the education of his children that the American worker enjoys, as compared with other workers. This, perhaps, is due to our fortunate situation as exploiters of a virgin continent more than to our democracy.

Evidences of the widespread diffusion of material prosperity are the manner in which we feed, clothe and house ourselves; the ownership of eighteen million automobiles and of stocks and bonds by fifteen million people. On the other hand this wide diffusion of ownership does not mean a corresponding diffusion of economic control.

In the meantime economic injustice is not so widespread or so great in America that it cannot be mitigated without tearing the social fabric to pieces. Intelligent, literate, well-fed workers are in a good position to take their part in the solution of society's economic problems. They can do it best by concerted action for common ends; by collective bargaining, coöperative enterprise, shareholding and some

form of participation in the control of those features of the business that lend themselves to control by shop councils. State regulation is sometimes necessary, but it should always be regarded as a court of last resort.

2. Political democracy, carried on in so vast a country, one so rapidly industrialized and with a population increasingly heterogeneous, with large blocks untrained to participate in political action, is of course subject to great strains. In view of the somewhat reckless confidence with which we have admitted aliens to the vote and ignored political and civic education in the native born, the wonder is that we have not suffered worse things. But we are now awake to our difficulties. The remedy lies in an intelligent and general participation in the improvement of our political life. This improvement requires two things, (1) the development of a more general sense of civic responsibility and more social intelligence on the part of our citizens; (2) the reconstruction and simplification of our political machinery.

The country has developed rapidly in numbers and heterogeneity of population, heterogeneity of interests, wealth and complexity of production, under the handicap of a too rudimentary and partly ineffective form of political democracy—the mistaken notion that democracy implies the direct election, by the people, of judges, school trustees and other administrative officers. Direct democracy is inadequate to handle our present problems of government and administration. We must have more bureaucracy on a merit basis, with ultimate democratic control exercised upon the elected persons who are held responsible for the bureaucrats.

In view of our lack of experience, our rapid emergence from the simple pioneering tradition with its confidence in the all-round competency of the traditional Yankee, the absence of an established tradition of public service, our spoils system and meager pay for public servants; it is not

surprising that we have had so much inefficiency and corruption in public matters.

The remedies are: more appointive and few elective public officers; security of tenure with freedom from political interference; good living salaries; and insistence on training and efficiency.

Our political system has too many checks and balances. It affords too much opportunity for public servants to evade their responsibilities. Legislative, appointive and administrative powers are too widely distributed. Too many persons are elected by the people. We have altogether too many poorly paid, and therefore inefficient, lawmakers. In state governments the senates should be abolished, the legislatures reduced in numbers, elected for much longer terms and at higher salaries. State officials should be appointed by the joint action of governor and legislature. In smaller administrative units the same general principles of electing fewer representatives for longer terms and centering responsibility on them, subject to recall, should obtain.

There is no single defect in our public system that has so many disastrous consequences as political interference with the administration of civic matters, education and justice. It is because of this partisan political control of social concerns that should be entirely removed from partisan influence, together with insufficient pay, and insecurity of tenure that there is so much incompetency.² The most ominous features of the practice of political democracy at present are the growing indifference to the exercise of their obligations by the voters, and the consequent decline in the quality of their elected agents. In the last two presidential elections only about 50 per cent of the qualified voters cast ballots.

The increasing complexity and magnitude of our indus-

² Lord Bryce is of the opinion that democracies do not secure less honest service than other political forms, but that they do secure more mediocre services. See his *Modern Democracies*.

trial and financial life has made necessary the multiplication of laws. Those unable to protect themselves must be protected by laws against the sale of worthless stocks and other investments, against the sale of poisonous narcotics, adulterated foods, etc.; by laws protecting children and workers; by laws enforcing education; by laws regulating the enormous and ever-increasing motor traffic, etc.

On the other hand, we suffer from lack of uniformity in laws necessary for the protection of the public and the enforcement of the necessary minimum in public morals. A notorious instance is the lack of uniform divorce laws. Other instances are the lack of uniformity in compulsory education, the regulation of the conditions of labor and the regulation of the incorporation and manipulation of joint-stock concerns. We have gone too far in the practice of the doctrine of states' rights. The country should be homogeneous in its regulation of matters in respect to which there are no essential differences in the various parts of the country.

One consequence of the autonomy of the several states has been the passage, in the educationally and culturally backward states, of laws prohibiting the teaching of certain scientific theories and facts. The notorious instance of this is, of course, the prohibition in certain states, by legislative action, of the teaching of evolutionary biology and geology (the two go together). The passage of such laws means, in effect, the establishment, by the power of the state, of dogmas concerning the origin of the earth and of man that are based on the assumption that nothing should be taught, no matter how good the evidence for it may be, that conflicts with the literal and crass interpretation of Biblical stories. Such laws in effect affirm that the book of Genesis is the final and inerrant textbook of biology, anthropology, geology and cosmology. One wonders how the proponents of such legislation square the primitive and savage ethics found in

some parts of the Old Testament with the humane ethics of Jesus; how they are able to regard all the moral attitudes, in regard to both men and God, as equally final and binding. These laws are the most flagrant, but by no means the only instances of the lack, on the part of representatives and those whom they represent, of any sense of the proper limitations of legislation. An equally vicious type of law is one which compels parents against their will to send their children to the public schools.

In the past we have suffered from laws passed to advance the monetary interests of special groups. We are not entirely free from such laws now. But the most ominous type of unjustifiable legislation at present is that designed to proscribe intellectual, spiritual and even ethical liberty—in short, the writing into our statute books of acts of intolerance.

These things, we may hope, will pass with the increase of enlightenment bringing us back to the wisdom of the founders of the Republic.

3. With regard to education it is to be borne in mind that, if our achievements in the higher types are lower than those of European countries, we are offering nearly universal facilities for education and an ever-increasing proportion of our youth is seeking a higher education.

Our democracy has shown a true instinct for the instrumentality which is at once the most indispensable means for the realization of freedom of opportunity and the most necessary condition of the ongoing of democracy, in its passion for education. That we are attempting here on a scale never before attempted, to put before every child the fullest educational opportunity and that we are constantly trying to improve our educational system, is in itself the most heartening testimony to the wisdom of our democratic enterprise. After all, when our faith and our failures have been weighed, we need to remind ourselves that our faith in

and loyalty to the cause of universal education is not wavering.

Not many years ago American college student bodies represented a much smaller selection from the youth of the land. It may be that we need a new classification of educational purposes—a more clear-cut distinction and separation of junior college work, as the continuation of secondary school work, and of genuine university work. It is my opinion that we do. At the present time these two educational strata are mixed up together to the confusion of both. We must provide for the intensive education of the minority, without sacrificing the opportunity for the continuation of secondary school work by the many. We need to provide better opportunities for the more gifted. The present educational discussion is evidence that we are waking up to our deficiencies. We are certainly not traveling in ruts. We are incessantly experimenting in education.

The following figures in regard to higher education are significant. In the thirty-four year period from 1890 to 1924, the population of the United States increased nearly 80 per cent. In the same period the attendance at colleges and universities (exclusive of independent professional schools not connected with universities) increased about 700 per cent, and the number of instructors 700 per cent. In order that the economic status of college teachers should be maintained, as of 1890, it would be necessary that the salary budget should have increased at least 1400 per cent. No reliable figures on this score are available, but probably there has been no such increase. In the same period the total annual income of the institutions of higher education, exclusive of contributions to endowments, increased 440 per cent. Presuming that an increasing proportion of this increment has been devoted to instruction it would still be a fair inference that the relative proportion of cheaper instruction has grown considerably. What wonder that the average

quality of instruction has not improved; nay, in all probability, has deteriorated! This situation is being slowly remedied now by: (1) The limitation of enrollments to the numbers that the institutions on a fairly fixed budget can properly take care of. Limitation of numbers must be carried farther, and happily, it involves a higher average of student ability. (2) Increase of the salary budget. State supported institutions are doing this, although too slowly.

The Dominance of Economic Motives

America inherited the Puritan ethics of business; an ethics for which diligence in worldly affairs is a chief way of serving God. Since, according to the Puritan conception, one could not be certain that he was among the elect *fore-ordained to salvation*, Puritanism involved incessant striving to make one's calling and election sure. The American spirit of restless enterprise is partly the effect of this mental attitude. The traditional culture of the United States was Puritan—strong, but somewhat meager; strong in the theological and moral taboo elements, weak in the æsthetic and scientific elements. Here was a vast rich land calling for material development at the hands of a few pioneers with a meager and sporadic culture. What wonder that the growth of civilization in the United States has been a series of compromises between a relatively uncultivated democracy and a plutocracy! The two chief influences that have refined the spiritual crudeness of our life and mitigated the fierceness of our struggle for wealth have been universal education and organized religion. These, in the earlier days, were closely associated, but have lately become separated to a large extent. Since the Puritans, the first English and Scotch Irish and the Huguenots in the South and small special groups, such as the Germans of the abortive revolution of 1848, practically all the immigrants have come to America to better their economic conditions or to enjoy

religious and social freedom. Since the Civil War the economic motive has increasingly predominated. No one has ever come here in quest of culture or for the enjoyment or creation of the fine arts. Very few of our immigrants have brought much culture with them, unless they have been imported artists, lecturers, writers, scientists and teachers. These have come primarily for the sake of a better living. Just now we have immigration laws in force which make it as unpleasant and difficult as possible for a cultivated foreigner to settle in this country. Even Whitman, far as his dominant ideas seem from traditional Puritanism, remains a Puritan preacher softened by the Quaker mysticism. Only here and there occasionally, until recently, have other movements such as Unitarianism, Quaker mysticism, Deism and the rationalism of Jefferson shown their heads for a time. New England transcendentalism—with its descendants, New Thought, Eddyism and Theosophy, is the only one of these older movements that has had any significant and widespread influence. Emerson is still the greatest intellectual figure in our history, although William James's influence rivals that of the Concord sage. Lately the influence of natural science has become so potent as to arouse alarm and the struggle is now on between the scientific spirit and the traditional supernaturalism which has two great supports—authoritarianism and laic ignorance in the Roman Catholic Church, and emotionalism and laic ignorance in the Protestant churches.

The thin and sporadically distributed American culture above mentioned has been further thinned out by the competition of two forces. The first is the enormous development of business enterprise. The conditions were all favorable to this—immense resources, the pioneering spirit, the stimulating character of the climate, freedom from the restraining influence of long established economic customs and the absence of any widely recognized cultural and social

standards of value to check the rush for commercial success. Financial success is the most obvious and generally recognized standard of social value because it is the greatest instrument of power. The best measure of social value is what a society will pay for services. Especially is this proposition true in a society that has no effective tradition of values other than pecuniary. Can there be any doubt, in these terms, as to what things our ruling groups value most?

The second factor in retarding the development of an American culture has been the large accessions to our population from heterogeneous European sources—accessions which have added to the cultural confusion of the country. There was no really homogeneous deep-rooted and well-organized culture in the United States when the great immigration began. There has never been a homogeneous culture in America; perhaps we are nearer one now than ever before. The most distinctive early culture was the Puritan culture of New England. In the South, with its slave holding and easy-going aristocracy, there were little islets of culture in Virginia and Charleston.

The pioneer life of the frontier, ever pushing farther west, was no genial soil for culture. Speaking of the new nation at the outset of the nineteenth century, George E. Woodberry writes: "The nation grew slowly, indeed, into consciousness of its own existence; but it was without united history, without national traditions of civilization and culture, and it was committed to the untried idea of democracy. . . . The coincidence of an economic opportunity with a philosophic principle is the secret of the career of American democracy in its first century. The vast resources of an undeveloped country gave this opportunity to the individual, while the nation was pledged by its fundamental idea to material prosperity for the masses, popular education and the common welfare, as the supreme test of government. . . . the subjugation of the soil and experience in popular

government are the main facts of American history. In the course of this work the practice of the fine arts was hardly more than an incident. When any one thinks of Greece, he thinks first of her arts; when any one thinks of America, he thinks of her arts last. Literature, in the sense of the printed word, has had a great career, in America; . . . But, in the artistic sense, literature at most, has been locally illustrated by a few eminent names.”³

What Mr. Woodberry says here of literature applies to all the fine arts and to creative scholarship.

Not democracy as a social principle, but the attempt to realize democracy in a wholly unexploited and virgin soil, without an established homogeneous civilization, the incoming of hordes of heterogeneous peoples, mushroom growth of a new industrial order—all these factors have worked together to retard the development of an integral American social and cultural atmosphere and tradition.

Our cultural backwardness cannot be laid at the door of democracy alone. There are some encouraging signs of change. We are developing a common culture. The present seems to me the most promising time that American letters, fine arts and scholarship have ever enjoyed.

I cannot entirely agree with Mr. Woodberry when he says of the present; “The political unity of the nation is achieved, but it is not an integral people in other respects; . . . it is still a people in the making; . . . the imaginative life is feeble, and when felt is crude; the poetic pulse is imperceptible.” We are still, without doubt, a people in the making. It seems to me that the present spirit of criticism, irony, satire, protest, in regard to our culture, which is so widespread and which gets such ready hearing, is itself evidence that a new American spirit, a cultural faith or world-view and life-view is in gestation. In literature and the arts, in education and economic matters, one finds the

³ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., Vol. XXVII, p. 833.

same uneasy spirit of self-conscious searching, of critical questioning. This is the presage of a creative and affirmative spiritual movement. Indeed, one could cite positive evidences from literature, social philosophy, sociology, psychology and educational literature, that this new spirit has already come to birth.

Thus, if democracy has not proved a great success in America, it is very far from being an utter failure. It gives some signs of producing a genuine native culture.⁴ Even now perhaps it affords a soil as favorable as anywhere else for the nurture of the more humane values—a friendly and urbane social life, wide opportunity for individual self-development, and therefore promising more scope for the fine arts and letters, for science and scholarship. The chief obstacle to intellectual progress is fear of the crowd, which has no mind.

The true home of the spirit is beyond democracy and aristocracy, beyond oligarchy and autocracy. The true home of the spirit is in the pursuit and enjoyment and service of the best in thought, feeling and deed; of the best that the spiritual progress of the race has hitherto accorded to men; and of that better than the hitherto best which man may yet dream and conceive and will.

Let us not make a fetish of democracy. It is but a means at best, and can only give more elbow room and freer play and fresher air for the creative individuality and high enterprises of the human spirit.

Lord Charnwood finely and truly says of one of the greatest democrats since Jesus—our own Abraham Lincoln: "Yet, if he reflected much on forms of government it was with a dominant interest in something beyond them. For he was a citizen of that far country of the spirit where there is

⁴ I am inclined to say that, for the first time in our history, ■ genuine native culture is now in the making.

neither aristocrat nor democrat.”⁵ To afford to all men a fair chance to qualify as citizens of that far country, the home of the spirit of excellence, is the only justification of democracy, or any other form of human organization.

⁵ Charnwood, *Life of Lincoln*, p. 452.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE LIMITATIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Democracy and Biology

Many critics of democracy will not be satisfied with the excuses offered in the previous chapter for the shortcomings of our actual democracy. They will cite the findings of biology and the results of the intelligence tests as evidence that the inexorable facts of heredity, taken together with the actual defects of democracy at work, indicate that too small a proportion of human beings are born with the capacity for developing sufficient intelligence or mental initiative to make the judgments demanded of voters or to have any part in determining the control of public affairs, much less to control the business of education. In fine, they will say that the ever-increasing complexity of the social order puts a strain upon the intellectual and moral capacities of its members too great to be borne, if distributed among all the people. And it is worse than useless, it is a wasteful and dangerous policy to proceed, as we are doing, upon the assumption that universal public education will result in the development of a sufficiently discriminating intelligence and strength of character to correct the evils of democracy. Those who pin their faith to education, we are told, are grossly exaggerating the influence of the social environment on the individual. Public general education has been a failure. We are wasting our national income. What should be done is to give the many instruction in the three R's and confine educational opportunity, above the elementary

grades, to the choice few. Thus, instead of dissipating our resources, we shall concentrate them on the making of leaders and rulers.

What, then, are the remedies for this desperate situation? We are told that eugenics is our chief hope of salvation. Evidence is cited to show that imbecility, mediocrity, morality, criminality, immorality, insanity and genius run in families. The individual's career is determined entirely by the chromosomes. Therefore, we should apply the findings of the science of heredity and prevent the reproduction of the inferior strains. Also, since certain races are mentally and morally inferior to others, we should exclude them from citizenry.

Supposed Racial Differences in Mentality

I shall not discuss the question of inherent mental racial differences here, beyond pointing out that, in the white stock, our civilization has come from many sources, no one of them a pure race in the physiological sense. Sumerians and Accadians, Assyrians and Babylonians, Egyptians, Hebrews, Phoenicians, Minoan-Mycenaens, Greeks, Romans, Arabians, the Mediterraneans, the Alpines and the Nordics have all contributed to it. Probably no one of these was a physiologically pure race and certainly there is no pure race now. *A people, in the cultural sense, is not a race in the anthropological sense.* Indeed *race* is a term without definite meaning. The English race is a race only in the sense of having a distinctive national culture. The Indo-European race is a race only in the sense of linguistic affinities. It is not a biological, much less a cultural race. The factors in the development of cultures are very complex—geographical, economic, the contacts and minglings of difficult cultures; through migrations, conquests, trade, the vicissitudes of war and peace and economic and intellectual changes. One thing is clear—that the whole movement of West-European cul-

ture has been due to the easy and frequent contacts of one *people* (in the cultural sense) with others. If the term *race* be used in a vague inclusive sense for the white, yellow, brown (Malasian) and black stocks respectively, then it is an obvious fact that the great civilizations of the world have been due to the white and yellow races indigenous to Europe and Asia. The brown races in Malasia and Melanesia and the blacks of Australia and Africa have produced no civilizations worthy of the name. They must be rated as, on the whole, inferior in the capacities to produce civilization. In certain isolated cases—the Mayans, Aztecs, Toltecs, the Pueblo dwellers and the Incas—the Amerinds produced considerable degrees of civilization; but their descendants have not proven very responsive to the better stimuli of white civilization.

Heredity and Mentality

Let us turn to the question of individual variations in native capacity. Hereditary strains do persist in families. It is important that the best human stock should reproduce itself more generously than it does and that the poorest stock should not reproduce itself. We should be careful in choosing our mates, but when we have exercised due care we cannot control the results. The inheritance factors, the *genes*, that determine the innate characteristics of individuals are exceedingly complex. H. S. Jennings, a thoroughly competent biologist, says that perhaps fifty *genes* are involved in the determination of the color of the eyes of the fruit fly. In the same fly more than one hundred genes are required to produce normal straight legs. Each of the separate and independent ways in which the character can be altered yields a somewhat different rule of inheritance. Any single one of the genes affects many characteristics, probably the entire body.

If the same defect in the two parents is due to a peculiarity

of the same genes it may be transmitted to the offspring. If it is due to peculiarities of different genes in the two parents the two supplement each other and the defect in question may not be inherited by the offspring at all. Heredity in animals is much more complex and variable in its outcomes than the older form of the Mendelian doctrine assumed it to be.¹

How much more complex, then, are the factors that determine the amount of intellectual capacity, the emotional balance, the temperamental and volitional capacity of the human individual! Intelligence tests reveal the readiness of apprehension, the quickness and accuracy of response to superficial stimuli, the emotional balance, the general miscellaneous information possessed by developed individuals who have already been subjected to differences in physical and social nurture and to differing educational stimuli. Intelligence tests cannot be given to newborn babes. Education begins immediately at birth. The home is a potent factor; the physical environment, play fellows, schools, are other potent factors. A study of the army intelligence records in different states showed that the average record was correlated with the standard of education for the state as a whole; higher in the northern than in the southern states, highest in those states that had the best educational equipments and personnels, regardless of their racial constituents.

What Is Intelligence?

As to what constitutes intelligence, I would define it as the capacity to meet novel situations, to solve new problems, by bringing to bear on them the results of the past experience and reflection. Thus intelligence involves assimilation and inventiveness. The function of education is to make the social inheritance of culture a ready instrument for the living members of society in the development of emotional con-

¹ See H. S. Jennings, *Prometheus*, pp. 22-25.

trol and intellectual self-direction. E. L. Thorndike distinguishes between *mechanical*, *social* and *abstract* intelligence. I would add æsthetic or imaginative creativeness as a fourth aspect which affects the other aspects. Mechanical intelligence is high in America, because, as a people, we are constant users of machinery. We are being familiarized with machines and changes in machines all the time. We are all interested and trained to exercise mechanical ingenuity. Intelligence in regard to social relations is less well developed. But abstract intelligence, the capacity to analyze objectively, to generalize and make deductions, to think with scientific impersonality receives but little attention in our education. The same is true of creative imagination as applied to other than industrial and commercial activities (invention, application of invention, organization, salesmanship and advertising). The intelligence we show most markedly is a resultant, a fusion or synthetic product, not a mechanical sum, of two factors—native capacity and social training. We cannot assert offhand that the comparative intelligence displayed by two sixteen-year-old boys are the exact indices of their innate capacities until we know their respective environmental histories.

Arguments from Family Records

Those who argue, from the records of certain English families, or of the Jukes, Kallikaks, and Edwardses, in America; that the individual's career is determined entirely by his ancestry overlook two things. First, they forget that the individual's career is determined in a large measure by his early social environment. An energetic intelligent child brought up in a criminal or degrading social environment and with inferior physical nurture will stand a good chance to become a criminal or degenerate. The same individual in a better environment would become a useful member of society. John Bunyan said "There, but for the grace of God,

goes John Bunyan." Any one of us might say "There, but for the grace of a good environment goes myself, John Smith." The careers that men follow are determined largely by their environments. The Coleridges, Wedgwoods, Darwins, Wordsworths, etc., were all inheritors or beneficiaries of some wealth. Wealth was necessary to get a university education and to follow certain careers. It is safe to say that, if Charles Darwin had had to go to work young to get enough to eat, he would never have been heard from as a scientific discoverer. If he had not made so fortunate a marriage he would not have achieved what he did. In arguments from these selected family records the undistinguished careers of the vast majority of descendants are ignored. Even the subnormals and criminals are forgotten. To Elizabeth Tuthill, a very handsome, tall, strong, intelligent woman, who married Richard Edwards, is attributed a large share of the original impetus which bore fruit in their descendants—the Edwards family. It is overlooked that this pair must have had at least forty thousand descendants, from amongst whom only fourteen notables and two hundred and sixty-five college graduates have been taken into account. It is also overlooked that the parents who were not close kin or kin at all to their mates in every generation must have contributed something valuable to the Edwards tribe. Mates in every generation, the Dwights, Woolseys, Minots, Tylers, Merrills *et al.*, contributed something. Finally it has been overlooked that Richard Edwards divorced Elizabeth on the grounds of adultery and other immoralities. (Aaron Burr was a grandson of Jonathan Edwards.)

Given hereditary wealth, with the cost of higher education prohibitive for those who are born of poor parents without culture, then science, the arts and literature will tend to run in certain families, who inherit wealth. No one knows how much natural talent was prevented from realizing itself by the poverty of the English and French laboring classes.

It takes exceptional energy and vigor, as well as good luck, to rise from dire poverty and maintain oneself in noneconomic forms of creative work. There have doubtless been many mute, inglorious Miltons, Newtons and Darwins.

Complexity of Hereditary Factors

A second matter, entirely overlooked by those who place all emphasis on heredity and pooh-pooh the influence of the social environment, is that we know but little in regard to the complex factors that contribute to exceptional native capacity. "The wind bloweth where it listeth and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh nor whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the spirit." This is still true, our biologico-sociologico-educational wiseacres to the contrary notwithstanding. We know that certain strains tend to persist, *if bred together*. But mediocrity breeds genius once in a century or millennium and then falls back to its former level. Mediocrity, genius and insanity may be born of the same parents. Socrates, Shakespeare, Luther, Leonardo da Vinci, Beethoven, Schubert, Kant, Goethe, Schiller, Burns, Keats, Faraday, Pasteur, Napoleon I, Voltaire, Hegel, Lincoln, Carlyle—to take only a few names at random—were born of mediocre parents. They left no distinguished progeny. Samuel Taylor Coleridge belonged to a distinguished line, some of whom were mentally disordered. Kant's parents were so poor that his father did not leave enough to pay his burial expenses. His sisters were domestic servants.

The Influence of the Cultural Environment

The extraordinary productiveness of Scotland in philosophers, theologians and scholars has been due, probably, as much to the educational and intellectual environment, *especially to the high honor paid to these things in Scotland*, as to any special innate virtues in Scottish chromosomes. The

relative barrenness of the United States in the fine arts and pure scholarship is not due so much to the deficiencies of the American chromosomes, as it is to the lack of a social tradition and atmosphere, which honor the fine arts, scholarship, fine manners and high intelligence manifested in noneconomic and nonpolitical fields. America has been very fertile in just these lines in which the highest rewards in social power and distinction, as well as in money are paid-mechanical inventions, the organization of industry and commerce, the exploitation of nature and quantity production and distribution.

Something more subtle than a mechanically organized system of education goes into the potency of a social environment. That something is the pressure of the whole social and cultural atmosphere, the entire standards of value of a nation or community, expressed in many subtle ways. The chief causes of both the virtues and defects of American cultural life are the prevailing standards of social valuation.

Genetics and Eugenics

Hence, it does not follow that, because immigrants of a certain race or nationality into the United States show certain proportions of defective persons, these defects will persist in their offspring reared under different environmental conditions. It is impossible sharply to separate between environment and heredity, for the very simple reason that there is always an hereditary capacity for whatever the environmental stimuli may bring out. We could find out fully a race's capacities and limitations only by a study of its reactions to various environments.

Man, as breeder, may select, in the plants and lower animals, almost any type of individual and, by controlling the conditions, may cause that type to multiply at will. Having gotten the right combination of genes he gets the kind of fruit he wants, because of the small range of genetic com-

binations possible. But he cannot do this in the case of man, nor even very much in the case of the higher animals, because of the multiplicity, complexity and impermanence of the genetic factors. Geniuses are very rare special combinations that take place only once in many thousand instances. Every human combination of genes, no matter how good, how bad, or how indifferent, dissolves and other different ones take its place. Mankind may remain the same, but men are ever changing.

As Jennings puts it: If an inventor of superhuman ingenuity undertook to devise a mechanism of heredity that would introduce the maximum of diversity and instability into the human procreative process he could scarcely make one so well fitted to this end as the one that actually operates in nature. Nature seems to aim at fluidity and diversity. Indeed it looks as though a superhuman genius has been aiming all along at maximal individuality. The biologists who have succumbed to the temptation to find in their science the "scientific" sociological oracle that is ardently desired by those who think wisdom began yesterday, and especially the popular purveyors of these oracles, show a singular absence of knowledge of man's cultural history. After all, the study of Man is the best way to a knowledge of both Man and men. This includes the study of the past no less than of the present.

There are two great difficulties in the way of the eugenicist's plan to breed a type of uniform excellence: (1) The great difficulty (I put it mildly) of getting society to agree as to just what type should be aimed at; whether go-getters, mechanics, intelligentsia or artists. What emotional type should be aimed? (2) Even if the type or types were agreed upon, the complexity and fluidity of the reproductive process would tend to bar it out. If all the superior parents of the accepted type would have more children and the inferior would have fewer the level might rise slowly. But the

great storehouse of genes is constituted by the average mediocre mass, consisting of nine-tenths or more of mankind. It is from these that come, through indefinitely varying permutations and combinations of genes, both the supernormal and the subnormal individuals. Let us suppose that all who deviated from the normal were childless; then, from the mediocre mass would appear soon nearly as many supernormal and subnormal individuals as before. Heights, depths, and plains of human life; diversities, surprises, comedies and tragedies, must continue so long as biparental inheritance from the indefinitely complex permutations and combinations of genes persist.² It will be a long time before genetics will give us the formula for producing a race of supermen and when it does it will be very difficult for us to agree as to the lineaments of the superman. The power of science to banish human imperfection and suffering is vastly overrated by many to-day. I am not sure that this expectation of a scientifically inaugurated millennium is not almost as crass a superstition as that of a God-installed cataclysmic millennium.

In the meantime there lie at hand economic, physical, cultural and ethical improvements; real possibilities at which we can all work a little.

It is important that, by law, in the case of utter imbeciles reproduction should be prevented. It is equally important that, by education, people in all walks of life, but more especially those without the means to bring up large families, should be made to see that quality rather than quantity of offspring is most essential. If the time be fast approaching when the earth's population will be pressing hard on the limits of subsistence, then birth control must be practiced as the only alternative to the brutal hand-to-hand struggle for existence. In the meantime, it is important that the size of

² On the preceding, see Jennings, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59, 75-78, 82-83, 85-87.

the family should not pass the limit of the parental capacity for nurture. On the other hand, there is little to bemoan ourselves over in the case of the well-to-do women who refuse to have children because of the pains and responsibilities involved. That fact shows that they are less fit to be mothers than Polish or Italian peasant women.

The worst strains should not breed. We should have a qualitative and, perhaps, a quantitative restriction on immigration in order that the standards of our social life may not be lowered.

On the other hand, the science of heredity is in no position to dictate a set of laws regulating marriage in detail. Nor does it warrant the conclusion that democracy is a biological misadventure, or is workable only with certain so-called racial stocks, such as the mythical *Nordic*. Most of the men and women who have contributed to the cultural advancement of civilization have not come from the ruling or so-called upper classes. Achievement is the joint product of two factors—heredity into social nurture. We do not know just how much each contributes. We cannot predict where the slumbering torch of talent or genius lies ready to burst into flame at the kindling spark of educational opportunity. It is a pretty safe bet that the nations which spend the largest fraction of their national incomes, in wealth and human energy, on education will remain in the vanguard. We, a people with widely diffused education did, without previous training, get ready to wage war in a remarkably short time. We have taken, and are keeping, the lead in industry.

Every mature organism is the product of two interacting factors, heredity and environment. What heredity gives can be known only through environmental stimulation. The more plastic the organism, the greater the potency of the environment. *Man, the most plastic in capacities of all organisms, builds up a cultural or educational environment, which in turn molds his capacities in multiform ways.*

There are limits to the molding power of the cultural environment. One cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. But between two children, it is not apparent at birth or very soon thereafter which is silk purse and which sow's ear. One cannot tell what the powers and limitations of human capacity are until the human being has been exposed to a variety of environmental stimuli. This exposure is the business of education.

Democracy and the Cultural Environment

The preservation and more effective realization of the democratic ideal of a career open to all the natural talents depends upon two conditions, and the second of these depends upon the first. The first condition is the development of a prevailing social consciousness, a cultural standard of value, which subordinates *profitism*, the commercial values; in short, *business*; to *humanism*; in fine, a social standard which makes the full development and enjoyment of human capacities the supreme purpose of the community's concerted efforts. This means that the final ends of industry and business are not to be profits, but chiefly increase of opportunity for the wise use of leisure. The second condition is the making accessible to all the little children, whether in the mansions of the wealthy or the tenements of the poor, whether in the metropolis or the remote rural districts, equally good facilities for education.

Democracy and Human Nature

Several of the weaknesses asserted by its critics to be inherent in democracy are not chargeable to democracy but to the frailties of human nature. Such are clamor for one's supposed rights and disregard of the rights of others; in other words, self-assertion and lack of consideration for others. The author is free to say that he has more often met these defects in those who enjoyed economic well-being

and power, than in the poor and obscure. No class has a monopoly on these failings, but they tend to be emphasized in those who make their way upward by vigorous self-assertion in the economic struggle. The temptations are greater. Self-assertion is a condition of economic advancement.

A chief weakness of democracy, in the eyes of the hostile critic, is the lack of self-discipline, the absence of self-control, that issues in lawlessness. This again is more evident in the children of the well-to-do than of the poor, who are disciplined by the struggle for existence. Lack of self-discipline, the ripeness of a lawless spirit are two of the greatest weaknesses of America. They are not chargeable to democracy, but rather to an increase in material prosperity without a corresponding development of character and social intelligence. They are due to lack of a homogeneous moral tradition, a common spiritual culture, to the supervention of industrialism, easy and sudden prosperity and a crowded urban life on our pioneering, to the pre-eminence of the money standard of success.

It is true that men, hoping to better the economic conditions of their families by struggle with their economically more powerful employers, are prone at times to get out of hand, to exhibit lack of self-control. There is a danger in the insistence on universally human rights, that those who are engaged in a struggle for a better standard of living shall misinterpret liberty and rights and become anarchial, especially when the prevailing social drift suggests that right is interpreted in monetary terms alone.

The remedies lie partly in an education of the imagination and emotions, through the inculcation of social intelligence, so that all may understand and with sympathetic imagination realize the interdependence of the different functional groups in the community; and partly in a renaissance of the spirit of self-discipline, self-control, and self-respect.

Another charge made against democracy is that it in-

evitably involves failure to recognize qualitative distinctions in the work of social administration, education and culture; that it inevitably leads towards mediocrity, and worse, towards vulgarity, cheapness and tawdriness; that it has no eyes or use for the expert, the specialist, the scholar, the artist, the scientist; no place for fine manners or personal dignity.

This charge has some measure of justice in it. It is true that those who are ignorant may not appreciate knowledge, as those who are insensible will not appreciate beauty. On the other hand as opportunity offers and the level of education and culture rises throughout the whole mass, the relative proportion of the population who appreciate the finer things increases. By birth no economic class has a monopoly of those born to appreciate the finer things of life.

The mediocrity, vulgarity, and shallowness of our culture are not due so much to democracy in itself as to the subordination of every other standard to monetary success. Those who have the organizing ability and enterprise and can command the resources have chiefly exploited those powers in order to make money and so gain social power by catering to the lowest common measures of the people's appetites and by artificially stimulating new appetites for profit. There is much more profit in making things or distributing them for the hundred million than for the thousand.

The commercially-minded caterers to the public often underrate its tastes and offer the public worse than the public desires.

The rawness of our culture is due, more than to any other one cause, to the commercialism of those who, being in command of economic power, are in command of the social situation. "To whom much is given of him shall much be expected." The greatest leveler of distinctions that should be maintained is the thirst for profits and power in an acquisitive society run chiefly for profit. It cannot reason-

ably be maintained that those who show the great successes in the exercise of the acquisitive instinct are least given to the indulgence of this instinct.

Aristodemocracy

Supposing democracy to be a failure, with only the dismal promise of ruin ahead what shall we put in its place? An aristocracy? Of what? of wealth? That is a plutocratic oligarchy. We have had too much of it already. It has perverted our social standards and poisoned our motives. The lust for pecuniary wealth, as the great instrument of social power, has corrupted our politics and administration, debased our laws and their execution, retarded our educational progress. We can not have an hereditary aristocracy. What then? An *aristodemocracy*. This means that the people as a whole shall have their social intelligence quickened, their standards of judgment raised, their conceptions of the coöperative purposes and the common good so refined, strengthened and enlarged, that they shall know better how to realize their mutual purposes and how to choose their public servants. Aristodemocracy means a democracy enlightened with high social intelligence and character directed towards the mutual good.

The Place of Liberal Education

And the means to this end? A liberal or humane education! Education not primarily for making a living, but education in which the social or humane studies are given the central place. Education in which the imagination is fed on noble examples in literature and history as well as made at home in the great generalizations of natural science. Education in which the primary aim is not that the individual shall learn a mass of ill-digested facts whose significance he does not understand, but that he shall gain an insight into scientific methods of thinking and shall grasp the great gen-

eralizations and results of scientific inquiry in their bearings on human nature; education in which the individual shall gain an understanding and power of judgment in regard to the social and institutional conditions of a good life; in which he shall gain an appreciation of the refreshing, calming and uplifting power of beauty; in which, finally, he shall learn the meaning and place of reverence, and of faith in spiritual values. Liberal education will liberate the individual from ignorance and the thralldom of blind passion and set fire to his rational and ethical individuality so that he may be a creative contributor to the life of the race.

To sum up the matter, I think the two gravest weaknesses in democracy are simply the two gravest weaknesses in human nature. These are: (1) Mental sluggishness and lack of imaginative insight, by which men fail to see the complex character of the problems of modern society and the greatly urgent need of employing, at adequate remuneration, and under conditions of tenure free from political vicissitude, highly trained and capable experts. Education and social administration require longer training and a wider range of native ability for their successful prosecution than do business and commerce. (2) Lack of moral imagination, of liberal sympathy or social-mindedness. This lack prevents men from taking sufficiently long and broad views of social matters. They are too much devoted to their own little platoon, to use Edmund Burke's phrase; alive to the obvious and immediate concerns of their own families and vocations; somewhat less so to the concerns of the city and the nearer administrative units; still less so to matters of national import; scarcely at all to world policies.

Whether rapid improvement in these respects is likely it is impossible to say. This much is certain that improvement can come, if at all, only through greater and more effective stress on the educational task of developing in individuals a more vigorous social intelligence and a stronger sense of

their social ethical responsibilities. If the individual can be made to see and feel that it is his privilege and responsibility to discharge a worthy social function, to work not primarily for profit or gain but to perform a useful function in the community, a great advance will be made towards the solution of our social problems. He must be enkindled with the vision of the community so that he finds satisfaction in furthering its well-being. Without this ethical orientation no real progress can be made. Intelligence will not function unless the emotions are enkindled. The emotions will not be enkindled unless the imagination be fired. The imagination cannot be fired, for the ordinary run of human beings, except through history, poetry, art and worship. Let the youth be fed on the examples of the great cultural and spiritual heroes of the race. Let poetry, music, painting and the drama be enlisted to body forth in concrete symbols the religion of humanity.

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CHAPTER XLIV

MACHINE CIVILIZATION AND SPIRITUAL EXCELLENCE

The final test of any civilization consists in the values which it places in the forefront, the goods which have most social prestige and which are therefore sought most eagerly by the more energetic members of the community. No one can entirely escape the influence of the dominant social-prestige values of his community. The majority will more or less passively accept these values; a considerable minority will actively pursue them; a few, with very pronounced native variations, will rebel against them.

Dominance of Pecuniary Values

There can be no doubt as to what values occupy the position of eminent social prestige in our present Western Civilization. They are pecuniary power and political power as the means to other forms of social prestige and influence. Pecuniary wealth is not sought for its own sake, but as the most effective instrument of power and influence. It enables its possessor to raise the social status of his family as well as of himself, to live in a fine house, to have a country place, to travel, to gain political influence, to be the master of men, to feel the dependence of many on himself, to put his name on libraries, college buildings or other public buildings, to feel himself the benefactor of many. In short, the wealthy man gains more obvious and popular honor and renown than any other person. "Money talks." "Amateur" sports, pursued in the professional spirit in colleges, become means of

getting rich for the popular heroes. Even political leaders without command of financial resources have short-lived influence. Spiritually rich, mellow, and harmonious personalities are not highly regarded. A richly cultivated mind must be content to enjoy itself in the society of a few like-minded persons. It is not efficient enough in the production of pecuniary wealth. The spiritual values—ripe knowledge, well-balanced judgment, comprehensive insight, fertile imagination, fine taste for knowledge and beauty—go unregarded and unnoticed, not only by the multitude but by the leaders of the multitude. The scholar, the thinker, the æsthetically cultivated person, the creative artist, are not known to them. Their praises are not sung in the popular journals, their features are not represented in the movies.

The majority of human beings are not greatly guided by reason nor concerned for beauty in the inward parts. They follow impulse as shaped by the *mores* or controlling social customs. We call our industrialized society democratic; but, in terms of the values which have most social prestige, we might better call it a mixture of *plutocracy* and *ochlocracy* (the rule of the crowd mind).

Our Present Pluto-Democracy

Our present civilization may be described as a mechanized *plutodemocracy*. It is a democracy in the political sense; it is also an industrial democracy to the degree that it still affords opportunity for exceptionally capable and energetic individuals to improve their pecuniary status, to gain economic power; but it is a plutodemocracy, since the prevailing social value is pecuniary power. I do not, of course, mean that other values are not recognized. Certainly, æsthetic and intellectual values are to a considerable, and possibly increasing, extent recognized. I am dealing here with prevailing tendencies. In order that democracy may be justified as the humanly best form of social order, mechanis-

tic plutodemocracy must be transformed into *aristodemocracy*. Aristodemocracy is a social order in which equalization of opportunity prevails; but one in which the ruling standards of social value are spiritual—ethical, intellectual, and æsthetic. In an aristodemocracy, spiritual integrity and self-direction, the possession and enjoyment of knowledge and its fruits in wisdom of life, the increase and diffusion of insight, the growth of the imaginative life, the increase and diffusion of beauty and the joys it brings, and a general spirit of comradeship in life, would be regarded as the highest work of civilization. The men and women who were richest in these traits would be most honored and followed.

Pecuniary Values and Culture

The keenest critics of our present social order say that there is an irremediable conflict between this order and the flourishing of the finer, rarer and more difficult achievements of the human spirit; so that the waxing of commercial organization means the waning of distinction in the intellectual and spiritual products and values of civilization, the gradual eclipse of the creative spirit in literature, art, pure science, the higher scholarship, and the extinction of a social atmosphere congenial to the growth of rich and harmonious personalities. Certainly, in this day of elaborately organized commercial materialism, with its enormous output and facile distribution of cheap and machine-made products, our literature, fictional, poetic, dramatic, and critical, lacks distinction in style or marked significance in content; our productive scholarship is for the most part pedestrian and commonplace in character and we do not seem, in spite of our prodigious educational activities, to be developing many rich and liberal personalities freighted with well-rounded knowledge and experience illuminated by synthetic and creative insights. A strong case can be made out for the thesis that large-scale commercialism is instinctively hostile to intellec-

tual distinction, and that an industrialized and commercialized society has place and recognition only for mediocre talents and achievements in other fields than industry, commerce and politics.

Nothing reveals quite so vividly the dominance of crass and quantitative standards in our social life, the overweening emphasis on *business* energy and organization in our cultural activities, the blighting influence of the worship of externals, as the overappreciation of the administrator in education, his much greater financial and social recognition than those of great teachers, scholars and researchers. In the eyes of the general public, unable to evaluate the quiet and unsensational work of the thinker and teacher, the college and university president is a superman, an educational Napoleon and all-round oracle. The scholars and teachers who carry on the distinctive work of the university are his obscure, pallid and spineless henchmen. This situation is due to the chasm that yawns between the technical remoteness of the scholar's work and laic ignorance and thoughtlessness. The scholars are at fault in not making their learning more accessible, in not speaking and writing more in language understood of the common people. But it is also due in large measure to the prevalence of gross, material, quantitative standards—to the fact that the energies of our people are chiefly engrossed in the production, acquisition and enjoyment of material things.

Our popular systems of education are becoming truly *popular* and literally egalitarian in their methods and standards; thereby ceasing to be systems at all. All possible subjects of study, we are told, are of equal educational value, but this democratic proposition is qualified by the assumption that technological subjects and all those which involve the handling of material things and forces are *prima facie* of unquestionable value. No positive case need be made out of them. On the other hand, if you think that ancient liter-

ature, history or philosophy have any value, you must prove your case in the court of the *practical*, and you enter the court under suspicion of guilt. Playing with telephones and wireless outfits is assumed offhand to be more educative than working at Latin or mathematics, typewriting than history. The divinity in the child's individuality must be respected to the point of letting him study just what he wants to, when he wants to, and no longer than he wants to. Education must be made painless—an effortless joyous play—a prelude to adult life which will thus, I suppose, become one long picnic. As for the cultivation of habits of accuracy, concentration and persistence (habits painful in the acquisition) some of our latest educational oracles tell us it is an exploded superstition that such habits can be formed.¹ Curiously enough football, and other forms of play indulged in by boys, are quite effortful and even painful at times. Perhaps football will save the newly educated boy from fatty degeneration of brain, nerves and muscles.

The work of Americans in the field of the higher productive scholarship in literature, history, philology, philosophy and pure science, is handicapped by the absence of either adequate financial or social recognition for the producer. Only in the applied sciences and in subjects which, like psychology, economics, commerce, pedagogy and sociology, seem to have direct utilitarian value are such recognitions forthcoming.

One may well ask whether the vast tide of machine industrialism and machinelike business organization will totally engulf the liberalizing spiritual forces, which operate freely and make their contributions to civilization only through the free play of creative individuality? Will de-

¹ Certainly education should aim to develop the child's individuality. But true individuality is not developed by giving a free rein to caprice, mental indolence, willfulness and self-indulgence.

mocracy succumb to materialistic organization and finally lose all consciousness of the historic continuity of the higher civilization and of the conditions of its own birth and fruition? Will *business*, in irreverence and ignorance, trample down the finer and rarer values of intellectual culture and creative activity? Shall we have, as industrialism's final form, hundreds of millions of well-fed human beings, satisfied with food and the movies, the daily paper and the best seller, ragtime and the melodrama, motor cars and electric comforts in the home, satisfied with living thus and reproducing their kind to live in the same way; millions of raucous voices with no note of distinction heard above the clamor; deaf to the austerer tones of beauty, harmony, truth or spiritual distinction of any sort; indifferent to its spiritual bondage to the rulers of the money market; a race that has forgotten the intellectual rock from which it was hewn and the spiritual pit from which it was digged; a race of average sensual human beings knowing nothing of the quest for a nearer vision of truth, beauty, and integrity and harmony of spirit—the quests which urge on the souls of the poet, philosopher, scientist, artist, devotee?

It seems likely that we are committed to a more thoroughly socialized industrialism. The Industrial Revolution first led to an oligarchic industrialism—in part checked in Europe by a hereditary aristocracy which reaped where it had sown. The War has probably wiped out this check. What is called in Europe “social democracy” and in America “progressivism” is bound to lead to greater democratization of our industrial and political life. The next fifty years will probably bring forth a more effective social control and equalization of the means of subsistence and material welfare. This may come about either by peaceful evolution or through conflict; probably in America it will be a peaceful evolution.

Democratic Humanism

The very existence of a democratic humanism is at stake here. One need not despair of democracy. After all it is the best form of social order that mankind has yet devised, It is only beginning to hit its stride. It can and I believe will, subject mechanical industrialism to finer humane purposes. If it is a failure, in contrast with a utopian social order, it is less of a failure than any other form of human society. It does dimly recognize the necessity of an aristocracy of mind and character to its own successful ongoing. The common people do not in their hearts really think that all human beings are equal in capacity. Democracy is showing a fine sense of the conditions of progress in fixing upon publicly supported education as the one indispensable means for the perpetuity and improvement of the social order. Indeed, the more completely political and industrial life become mechanized, the more urgent the need for an aristocracy² of mind and character to lead and serve it, to solve its complex problems and to give distinction and flavor to its life.

This aristocracy of mind and character must be developed by a careful and rigorous selection, from the mass, of those who possess exceptional congenital endowments, and who display in the selective process the industry and persistence necessary to bring these inborn capacities to full fruition. A democratically engendered aristocracy will be born, not of hereditary privilege but of the creative fecundity of nature, aided and abetted by social instrumentalities of selective nurture in the shape of cultural institutions deliberately devised and conducted for this end. The eugenic control of natural generation has an important though a limited field of service, but the cultural control of spiritual generation has a wide and important field of

² By *aristocracy* is meant here the leadership of superior men and women.

operation. And democracy, if it is to save itself from incompetent mediocrity, from a life devoid of distinction, discipline or efficiency, must provide the means by which exceptional capacity shall be selected, sifted and trained; and given scope and incitement to achieve its informative, directive and creative work. It must nourish in every generation the conscious memory of the historical ongoing of civilization, formulate and apply rigorously to the work of the day sound critical standards of evaluation, fashion new intellectual and ethical instruments to deal with the new problems, thus adding to the heritage of genial insights and liberalizing intelligence.

No doubt, even under the most untoward conditions, exceptionally endowed individuals will follow their bents, impelled by the irresistible urge of their own personalities and sustained by indomitable grit. Murder will out, sometimes; and so will poetry, philosophy and science; even if their most ardent and unconquerable devotees suffer from poverty, neglect and hostility. Nevertheless, talent and even genius are not invariably associated with the indomitable will to live and produce spiritual offspring in the midst of a hostile or indifferent environment. Genius and exceptional talent are sometimes hampered, twisted awry, or even thwarted and diverted, by lack of opportunity or inducement to pursue their own proper vocations.

Democracy is commonly taken to mean equalization of opportunity for the average person, but it will be an egregious failure if, having released the springs of human personality in the mass, it hinders and thwarts the exceptional individual.

Assuming that democracy needs, for its own salvation, to develop, with clearer consciousness and more settled purpose, better methods and more effective instruments for the selection, training and functioning of the minority of its children who are capable of distinguished service in art,

letters, pure science, scholarship, social insight and the administration and direction of social organization and activity in their manifold forms, the practical question is—how may this work best be done? To what institutions must democracy chiefly look for the conservation of the highest historical values and achievements of civilization and for the creation and effectuation of new values? To what institutions should democracy lend its heartiest support, as being the principal agencies for the nurture of creative individuality, the culminating instruments of eupai-deutics (good education or nurture)?

Educational Forces

The Press.—The public press is an all-pervading agency, perhaps the most influential single molder of public opinion in the land. But we can scarcely hope that the press, with rare exceptions, will perform the rôle of spiritual foster mother to the finer and rarer interests of civilization. Certainly at present it shows no signs of aiming to fill this rôle. The press is, for the most part, a purely commercial enterprise. We can no more expect the press to guide, chasten and elevate public taste and opinion than we can expect the ten-cent store to do so in matters of knickknacks or the department store in matters of clothing and house furnishing. Large profits depend on pandering to mediocrity. There are notable exceptions to this situation—a few monthly and weekly journals, some dailies too, that are run in loyalty to an editorial policy not dictated from the business end of the concern. But, except in so far as we find here and there an endowed journal or one with rich and highly cultivated proprietors, who sink their money in the cause of finer things, mediocrity must rule in the public press just in the measure in which mediocrity prevails in society. It is noteworthy that the editorial columns of many papers are far superior in tone, both in subject

matter and method of treatment, to their news columns. This and the growth of schools of journalism perhaps indicate a growing sense of ethical responsibility on the part of newspapers. The situation is similar with the theater.

The Church.—The church has, in the past, been a very influential molder of public opinion and conservator and promoter of ethical and spiritual standards. The church has lost much of its former influence in this regard. The churches do not now lead the masses, much less the intellectual minority. The minister is no longer the most highly educated person in the community. Indeed, he is now frequently quite behind other professional men. Moreover, his popularity is often in inverse ratio to his scholarship or thoughtfulness. The church no longer controls higher education. The strongest institutions are beyond demoninational control. Admitting that the church has a most important rôle to play in popular leadership, through the interpretation of ethical values and their application to the existing social life, a rôle which she has partly lost and can only regain through earnest and concerted effort; it remains true that the church is no longer the chief custodian of the intellectual and spiritual life of civilization.

Higher Education.—The schools, colleges and universities must now be regarded as the chief custodians of the intellectual and spiritual life which is the very breath of democracy's being. It is a significant and hopeful fact that the growth of our industrial democracy has been accompanied by the growth in number, equipment, attendance and influence of the schools, colleges and universities. Democracy seems, without deliberate foresight and by a sort of wise instinct, to have settled upon the educational institutions to be fostered as the saving salt amidst its prevailing mediocrity and commercialism. The conservation, transmission, and enhancement of the spiritual and intellectual values of cultivated humanity, and the nurture of creative

personalities, who will perform the function of transmitting and enhancing the spiritual heritage of the race: the chief part in the execution of these critical responsibilities must fall to the schools, colleges, and universities. They are to minister to the finer values of civilization and to liberate the spiritually creative powers of the race.

Democracy has the right to demand that the colleges and universities shall so conduct their affairs as really to nourish the creative spirit among the exceptional youth whom the selective process has indicated as capable of transmitting, applying and enriching the higher values. Democracy has the duty, which it can neglect only at the deadly peril of its own soul, to accord to the colleges and universities the means and freedom to execute their difficult tasks.

Much criticism that has been made on colleges and universities from the outside has missed the point, because it has not started from a sound and intelligent conception of the true functions of the college and university. These institutions have been criticized for not teaching their students how to make money or become successful politicians, or because so many of their entrants fail to emerge with degrees. (The latter fact may be greatly to the credit of the institution, if, for example, as is the case in many states, state institutions are required to admit nearly all high-school graduates.)

Social Functions of the University.—It is the primary function of a college or university to impart to its students an intelligent vital and abiding concern for the liberalizing studies—for the race's literature, for its moral, æsthetic, social, political and scientific progress in history; for pure science, philosophy and art; for the principles and problems of the social order. The end of liberal education is that the mind of the individual may be quickened, enlightened and organized in such fashion that he will have laid the foundations for the formation of sound judgments as to

the relative values of the various material and spiritual factors of contemporary civilization and will exercise vigor of will in carrying such judgments into execution.

It is a second function of colleges and universities to afford to especially gifted members of their faculties ample facilities to become contributors in the fields of liberal scholarship and thought, to become scientific discoverers, philosophers, creative writers of history, politics, economics, civics and literature. In short, the universities should be the chief agencies by which the spiritual heritage of the race is enriched as well as conserved.

Failures of the Universities—The Cult of Quantity.—The colleges and universities have partially failed to fulfill their cultural mission. They have yielded too readily to the general American fallacy that bigness in numbers and equipment and richness in the varied display of courses offered are the ultimate tests of their success and value. Quantitative and material expansion have been at the expense of the qualitative growth of vivid and buoyant intellectual spirit in faculty and students. Both the general public and the officers who determine university policies have thought that imposing buildings, large corps of mediocre instructors, and hordes of students are sure signs that the universities are fulfilling their cultural mission. In these respects the universities, instead of being centers of resistance, criticism and correction for the mediocritizing and mechanizing tendencies of democracy, instead of being centers of selection and of inspiration and guidance for the selected, have simply reflected the weaknesses of our civilization.

One of the most mischievous notions that can prevail in a democracy is the fallacious doctrine that equality of opportunity involves, as its corollary, equality of capacity in the field of education. In business and industry the application of such a doctrine would be suicidal. And yet in

education, it is actually followed to an alarming extent. In practice the sound principle that higher education is a selective process, requiring intensive concentration upon the individuals who possess exceptionally high congenital endowments, is much ignored. Until the science of eugenics discovers a formula for engendering a whole race of geniuses no society can afford to blink the fact that nature in each generation produces only a relatively small number of individuals capable of developing a high degree of efficiency as educators, creative scholars, scientific experts and administrators. And yet the general public, and in part too college administrators and teachers, do blink this fact.

The increase in attendance and the multiplication of courses and departments have outrun the increases in incomes at our colleges and universities. Consequently, while the pedagogical tasks of the professors have increased, in many cases their incomes have actually declined owing to the failure of salary increments to keep pace with the increased cost of living. Many are receiving salaries smaller in actual purchasing power than they received before the World War. Comment would be superfluous as to the wisdom of a social policy under which the income of an important class of public servants declines as their social responsibilities increase. No wonder that the recruits decline in quality! I will hazard the guess that the increase in the material equipment of colleges and universities in the past twenty years has far outstripped the increase in man power, provided the latter be measured qualitatively rather than by counting noses.

The net result of these factors—increase in the pedagogical tasks, meagerness of salary with the inevitable *res angusta domi*, lack of substantial public respect for the calling, lack of regard and reward for solid productive scholarship, and regard for the number rather than the qualities of the student bodies and faculties—is that our

college and university chairs are being manned too largely by mediocre men, deficient in virility of spirit and dynamic quality of intellect. The increase in the student bodies is met by hiring cheap and untried instructors to teach an ever-multiplying and bewildering variety of courses.

The teaching is too often a matter of routine recitation, lecture, quiz and examination, similar in method to a secondary school. Higher education, and indeed all education so far as possible, should be carried on so as to enlist and stimulate the active participation of the student, the teacher acting only as a leader in the quest for many-sided insights. Knowledge in the acquisition of which the student's mind has not actively engaged carries no insight and is useless to him.

The Conditions of Efficiency in Higher Education.—The elevation of professorial capacity and of the standards of qualification for membership in the student bodies are the only means by which the colleges and universities will be enabled better to serve as nurturing grounds for the leaders and creators, without which democracy can not attain its highest development.

In order that they may be true to their high and difficult vocation as conservators, transmitters and enrichers of the liberal values of civilization our colleges and universities must be able to attract to their service a much larger proportion of highly gifted individuals than they do at present. A faculty must not be a comfortable roost for mediocrities. There will be mediocre men on it in considerable proportion, in any event and there will be useful work for them to do; but there must be men of virile and dynamic personalities, men of distinction, who set the pace for the institution. Such personalities will be found in the universities in much larger proportion than now, when their worth is recognized by more adequate salaries and more public respect.

Having secured men of dynamic personalities and outstanding scholarship, the university will not load them down with pedagogic burdens in the shape of heavy teaching schedules, disciplinary tasks and the disentangling of knots in the educational red tape. The mechanical side of university life occupies too prominent a place to-day. The machinery is too constantly oiled, repaired or geared up to respond to illegitimate demands from the outside or inside, and too much time and energy are spent in trying to turn refractory or indifferent and even unwilling material into scholars and graduates.

Efficiency is a shibboleth of the day, an idol of the market place. Wherein does the efficiency of a college of liberal arts consist? Surely in enabling the youth of exceptional talent to gain an intelligent insight into the main results and meanings, for human progress and individual perfection, of humanity's social and spiritual evolution and of the growth of science, literature, art and philosophy; in enabling him to win for himself an intelligent acquaintance with the great outstanding achievements in the history of human culture and in thus aiding him to apply his knowledge and insight to the upbuilding of his own spirit in harmony and power and to the furtherance of the like destiny on the part of his fellows. This is the most that any of us can do for a fellow being. We can bring high values and worthy ends into the light of his day, we can offer hints and suggest plans for their attainment, we can stimulate, incite and furnish some guidance. But no one of us can *educate* or develop the spiritual individuality of another soul. "The deeds that ye do by two and two, ye must answer for, one by one."

The Necessary Qualifications and Status of the Teachers.—The highest type of teacher is one who, whatever his special subject of instruction may be, whether biology, chemistry, physics, history or literature, has an intelligent

and liberal insight into the humane significance of his own field, and therefore understands its relations to other fields. No one who has not a vigorous appreciation of the cultural history of the race is fitted to be a college professor in the liberal arts. The mere specialist has no place in the college of arts. Even the noted authority, who may be master in a very narrow field but is ignorant of the other fields in the great area of mental cultivation, is not fitted to guide undergraduate students. I doubt if he be fitted to train those who are to teach in colleges. The colleges need, not pedants and mere diggers and collectors of information, but liberally enlightened and vigorous personalities, with genuine insight and deep human sympathies. That we have too few of this kind now is due to the fact that the college professor is undervalued as a force in the social and cultural development of the nation. We shall not get in larger measure the type of man I have in mind until the professor is more generally regarded and treated as he should be—as one of the most important functionaries in society.

The vocation of the scholar as teacher is to transmit to the members of the new generation, for the stimulation of their thought on nature, man and the social order, the molding of their sentiments and the formation of their ideals and purposes, the most valuable achievements of the race in the history of its efforts in the upbuilding of civilization—in short, the vocation of the scholar as teacher is to be the initiator of the young into the usufruct of the fruits of man's cultural development. The vocation of the scholar as researcher is to add what he can to these achievements, the sum total of which constitute the instruments of spiritual growth for the generation that is about to take the torch from the failing elders.

If the opportunity for the scholar to fulfill his vocation as teacher and researcher has always been essential to the perpetuity and spiritual prosperity of civilization, it is even

more urgent in a democratic society than in any form of oligarchy; since in a democracy every individual is to participate freely, so far as in him lies, in the maintenance and enhancement of the coöperant life of culture. This is true of the scholar in democratic society. In order that he may fulfill his social vocations, discharge his social functions, the scholar must have the means to live and work up to the highest point of efficiency. If he has to be incessantly troubled about where bread for his family is to come from and what is to become of him and his wife in his old age, he cannot do his work properly. He must then engage in distracting gainful outside work, must spend a large part of his time and energy, all of which are needed for his proper vocation, in finding ways to make money. He must practice economies in regard to books, instruments, travel and recreation that lame his efficiency.

The scholar must have security of tenure. His work requires long training costly in effort, time, and money. He becomes an expert and therefore unfitted to turn to other occupations. He must plan his studies and researches to extend over a long term of years. Insecurity of tenure is even more paralyzing to the efficiency of the scholar than material poverty.

The scholar as teacher must, to enable him to do his best, have self-government. He must be able to participate in the direction of the institution through which he serves society. Teaching and research are highly expert vocations, with their own techniques and conditions of successful work. If the conditions under which he works are imposed upon him from without by a body of persons ignorant of the nature and proper conditions of teaching and research, he will be hampered and dissatisfied. His work will inevitably suffer. The fact that so many people are interested in the results of education does not imply that almost everybody is competent to lay down its conditions, still less than

the fact that everybody is interested in automobiles implies that nearly anybody can tell how automobiles should be made.

The scholar must have, in order to serve society, all reasonable freedom in teaching and the public expression of his views. It poisons the very atmosphere of teaching and research when outsiders attempt to dictate, from the standpoint of their special prejudices, opinions and interests, what and what not shall be taught or published by scholars. It makes no difference whether the interference with freedom of teaching or research and publication arises from religious sectarianism or economic or political or any other form of sectarianism. The spiritual responsibility of the scholar is to the facts, the laws and the hypotheses of science; to the facts of history and their probable meanings; *to fact and law, principle, or value, grounded on fact, everywhere.*

Finally, the scholar will not be of the highest type—virile and creative—unless his vocation receives the highest public respect. Without self-government, security of tenure, and freedom of publication, the scholar's work is not respected. He cannot be a money-maker and an efficient scholar. This avenue to social prestige and influence is closed to him. Unless then his calling is honored and he is heard with respect and tolerance, he cannot regard his vocation with the amount of respect that will bring into it the more vigorous types of personality. The abler a man is, the less likely is he to follow a vocation in which he cannot respect highly his work and himself as its servant. If the community pays no high respect to a vocation how can the members of that vocation regard their work highly?

The ultimate responsibility for the deficiencies of the scholar, as well as for the shortcomings of those whom they teach, rests with the type of social order which makes economic power and material enjoyment the highest values,

which has so little respect for intellectual integrity, honest and serious thinking and perhaps still less for scholarship or other spiritual excellence; a type of society which fails to reward its scholars with sufficient adequacy in a pecuniary way, which makes their pursuit of their vocation precarious by pecuniary insecurity and which lames, at its spring, the human instinct of self-expression, without which the spirit in man cannot prosper, by repressing freedom of teaching and expression.

These adverse conditions have hitherto obtained all too widely in America. As a consequence too few of those best endowed have followed the careers of scholars, teachers, and researchers. At present the situation is, possibly, more encouraging than it has been in the immediate past.

A university or college, which shall be an effective ministrant of liberal culture and a witness to the highest values in a democracy, must gather together a group of scholars who teach their special subjects from the standpoint of a broad perspective of humane historical culture, and who have a genuine passion to communicate their insights, their appreciations and their faiths (without this passion there is no *inspiring* teaching); pay them good salaries; give them liberty as to the number of hours they shall teach; and give them a carefully picked body of students. It should not be expected that any even relatively fixed proportion of their students should get degrees. The matter of degrees should be wholly incidental. The degree-fetish hinders good teaching and throttles genuine intellectual activity.

I have discussed the functions and problems of the colleges and universities in a democratic society because it is these problems that I know better than any other and they are crucial problems for cultural life. Of course the principles which I have stated apply to the earlier phases of education with this difference, that institutions of sec-

ondary education are institutions for teaching and training not for research.

After all the countervailing considerations are weighed, the outlook for democracy is not hopeless and the outlook for democracy is the outlook for mankind. The work of the creative thinker, the creative artist, the creative leader, in the conduct of public affairs has always been hard, owing to the mental inertia of the mass. But where else will one now find such a field and so manifold opportunities for creative leadership as in American democracy? If quacks, mountebanks, fakers and demagogues of all sorts flourish, nevertheless the field is open and the harvest is great for those who are willing and able to be creators and leaders in all lines—in the fine arts and literature, in science and scholarship, in religion and public life. We need many more great personalities, creative individuals; but we need only those who have sympathy for and faith in humanity—those who do not despise the average man. Indeed despal of the average man is not a mark of spiritual greatness nor of spiritual independence but of egoistic pride.

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CHAPTER XLV

SOCIAL PRINCIPLES IN EDUCATION

The Determining Power of Education

Man seeks to achieve what he believes to be good. If he believes material wealth or power to be the chief goods he will seek them; if knowledge or the joys of æsthetic creation and contemplation, then he will seek these. Beliefs are the product of education, by which the innate dispositions of human nature are molded, transformed and given set and direction. Man's innate powers are plastic and, in the broad sense, education is the whole process by which these powers are molded, transformed and set. All life is a process of education. The cessation of the process means the arrest of living; thus we may regard the entire life of the individual in society as an educative process. But here we shall be concerned with the institutional agencies and methods of education in the formal sense of the term.

The Family

The family is the first and perhaps the most powerful and deep-going educational institution. The individual begins to develop his sense of selfhood, his social and moral life in the family. The very shape and direction that his personality takes on, his fundamental ideas and attitudes towards himself and other selves are due to his reactions to the psychical influences, the patterns of conduct, thought and feeling in which he lives as a member of the family. It is normally in the family that first and most deeply the

child learns to be a person and to treat others as persons, to live and let live, to do as he would be done by, to be coöperative, sympathetic and loyal. In the family he develops too, antagonisms, twists and quirks that effect his entire later life. In brief, the family life probably has more to do with the making or unmaking of personality than any other social relation. Thus the family is the first school of social life, but it is often a narrow school, sometimes even a bad one. The parents may be too harsh, blind, inconsiderate, lacking in insight, thoughtfulness, dignity and self-control. They may override the individuality of the child, turn him into a rebel or an unhappy being with thwarted and twisted impulses. In the opposite case the parents may be too indulgent and too blindly partisan to give the child a proper moral nurture and discipline. The intense devotion of the family to the welfare of the child may lead to a selfishness which makes out of the child a man or woman ruled by egotistical impulses and lacking in social-mindedness or at best, one who sacrifices all other social considerations to the supposed welfare of the family group.

The School

The school is the great instrument of mediation between the family point of view and the larger social outlook which makes the individual a worthy member of the community and the state. The function of the school is to enlarge the social point of view in the family life by widening its sphere of application and enlightening the individual's insight into social relations, social rights and duties. There has been much discussion in regard to the problems and effectiveness of the school as a teacher of morality. The prime value of the school, as a moral agency, does not consist so much in the formal teaching of the principles of ethics as in the influence of the social spirit, the *esprit*

de corps which prevades the school life. If there be no school spirit or sentiment, no feeling of honor, pride and devotion to the welfare of the school, no effective school code of conduct, then the school is but a collection of little egotists, then it is not a moralizing agency and does not perform its social function. The fundamental trouble with many of our schools is that they lack in so large a degree the living spirit of social morality. Spoiled children enter them and the spirit of egotistic individualism and family egotism enters into them and prevents the development of a true social spirit. Teachers must not reprimand or punish their pupils, they must not exact thorough work nor give low grades, because the parents and the local politicians who wish to curry favor will not stand for these things, and principals and teachers are given to understand that they must please the people by treating their children gently. Poor work is condoned and dishonesty is winked at. The widespread prevalence of cheating in examinations and exercises is due to a lack of school morale. This lack, in turn, is due to the prevalence in our democratic society, which controls the schools, of the spirit of slackness, dishonesty and egotism which spring from the rule of the desire to get rich quickly and without much effort. The schools cannot be much better than the community which wills them to be what they are, until the community recognizes that the welfare and progress of society depends upon the development in the plastic youth of that sense of honor, self-respect and mutual goodwill which finds expression in the spirit of honest work and fair play, of self-control, diligence and devotion to the good name of the school.

The School as Character Builder.—It is a lament frequently heard to-day that the school does not develop *character*. The lamenters are apparently disposed to think that there is some special course and technique of education by which character can be developed, analogous to courses

and techniques by which the youth may be trained in languages or mathematics or natural science. This is a fallacious assumption. A character is the entire organized and dynamic individuality of the self. A character is developed in the entire give-and-take of interplay between the organism and its entire physico-social environment. The beginnings of the development of character are made in the home. During the school period the development continues in the home and among one's playfellows, as well as in the school. After the school period the development continues in the activities of the vocation and recreation of the individual.

So far as the school is concerned, character is developed through honest and thorough work in all the subjects studied, as well as in the playtime. There is no single character-developing subject. The character of the pupil is not being developed in self-respect, sense of duty and satisfaction in good work, when the teacher does the work for the pupil and the pupil simply passively accepts and repeats what he is told. A character development is being hindered when the parents think the child should not study any difficult subjects. It is to strike at the very roots of character building when, through local political pressure, teachers and principals are expected to pass, with high grades, pupils who have been allowed to drift along doing little or no work. The fundamental causes of the failure of the schools to develop strong character lie in the absence in the community of regard for intellectual integrity and honest work, in the widely prevalent feeling that anything goes if it can be gotten away with, that it is quite all right to get something for nothing: in this case to get a certificate of graduation without doing any real work for it. To play fast and loose with the school work, to have no standards honestly maintained, to give certificates where the work has not been well done, is to undermine the very foundations

of morality. Intellectual immorality, slackness and dishonesty are the most insidious and widespread forms of immorality, slackness and dishonesty. How is a child being prepared for honest and thorough workmanship, loyalty, self-control and self-respect if its very mentality, the intelligence, its highest capacity, is treated with disrespect or indifference in its school years?

Assuming a healthy *esprit de corps* or school morale, in what ways does the curriculum contribute to the development of the right ethical spirit? The love of truth, *the intellectual conscience*, is cultivated by insistence on precision and thoroughness in the work done. The study of mathematics, languages, history and the natural sciences are all good means to this end. There is probably no greater need in our society than that the individual should learn, until it becomes part and parcel of his mental being, the moral responsibility involved in intellectual work. Dishonesty, due to slovenliness, inaccuracy and pretension to knowledge that one has not, is just as bad as commercial dishonesty and it is much more prevalent. A pretender and bluffer in things intellectual is just as antisocial and immoral a being as a liar. In fact, he poisons the well-spring of truth in himself.

Socializing Studies.—There are certain studies that stimulate and feed the imagination, enlarge the social outlook and strengthen the individual's will to be a useful member of society. Of preëminent value in this connection are the study of literature and history. The history of one's country and of the world, should be taught to every child, as the story of man's intellectual, moral and general cultural progress. The child should not leave school until he has some real knowledge of the chief epochs, events and actors in man's conquests over nature through the march of science, in man's imaginative achievements in creating and enlarging the kingdom of the mind or spirit through the great

works of literature, through the ethical and religious classics of the race and through the successive improvements in forms of social organization, in government, law and education. Mr. H. G. Wells, in his *History of the World*, has set the pattern for the teaching of history as a socializing instrument. In connection with and following the study of literature and history there should be a systematic study of the principles of civic obligation and right, of public morality with reference to the community, the state and the international order. Unfortunately at the present time there is a hiatus between the teaching of private morality and of public morality. Many so-called good citizens who are scrupulous in the discharge of their private obligations are not good citizens of the state and of the common wealth of nations, in that they are deficient in insight and conviction in regard to the principles of civic and planetary morality. Not much lasting progress towards intranational social peace with justice and international social peace with justice can be expected until citizens generally are imbued with intelligent convictions in regard to their fundamental obligations and rights, their responsibilities and opportunities as citizens of the state and of the commonwealth of nations.

The social aim of education may be conceived and practiced in a misguided and promiscuous fashion. It may be directed toward the production of the greatest possible degree of mental uniformity in the students, towards turning out of a horde of machinelike mediocrities "like as two peas in a pod" in their beliefs and reactions. This is the educational spirit which we associate with the Kultur of pre-War Prussianism, the generation in the multitude of a docile mental goose step attitude. The aim is to make all individuals act and think alike in obedience to the powers that be whatever they be. Prussianism in education is a state of mind by no means peculiar to the bureaucratic

and autocratic form of governmental control of education and social order which we associate with the pre-War German empire. Mental Prussianism can flourish and does flourish in so-called democracies. As we have seen, the great weakness of the average man is his tendency to feel and act exclusively with the crowd, with his own group or class, and, therefore, not to think since the crowd never thinks. The tyranny of the average mediocre man, ruled by mass, class and group prejudices, over the individual and the minority may be as bad as or even worse than the tyranny of the bureaucrat and the autocrat. The rights of minorities and of individuals may be overridden in just as roughshod a fashion in a democracy as in a junkerdom. We think we have escaped Junkerish Prussianism, but in fact we suffer from class and mass Prussianism, from the tyranny of the group or herd. The slowly won principles of Anglo-Saxon and American liberty for the individual are in danger of being ground to powder between the upper millstone of the vested interests and the lower millstone of organized labor. To-day it requires hardihood for an individual to dare to call his soul his own and to challenge the blind prejudices and mass actions of both of these groups. If we cannot develop an educational system which will help the individual to stand on his own feet as a rational and responsible being, and to escape both the Scylla of the romantic and anarchic individualism of Rousseau's educational philosophy and the Charybdis of Prussianized mass rule, it will go hard with civilization. Education, up to the college age, should be primarily liberal in aim. Its purposes should be to develop the innate powers of the pupils and to give them a knowledge of the essential and permanent conditions of civilization and social progress. In short they should be first trained how they may learn to live well before they are set to work to learn how to make a living in the economic sense.

If in the ways above sketched all normal human beings are enabled to develop their physical and mental powers, to acquire health and the knowledge how to preserve it, to acquire an intelligent insight into the personal and social conditions of happiness, to learn the story of human progress, and to acquire sufficient appreciation of letters, art and science, to employ their leisure in ways at once refining and refreshing; if, moreover, having been educated to live well, they have the opportunity by honest and faithful labor to secure the economic conditions of a decent life with security against disease and old age, this world will become a happier, a more just and peaceful place of abode.

In order that these aims of social democracy may be realized, it is necessary that human motives, human emotions and beliefs should be more socially developed, so that human beings may become more socially minded. Plato was right when he taught that the welfare of the state, and the well-being of the individual as a member of society or the state, depends above all else upon the effectiveness of an educational system manned by the most gifted persons, and directed towards nurturing socially minded citizens. Plato saw clearly that education can be intelligently and effectively directed towards this end only if it be guided by a faith or conviction, based on philosophical insight, in regard to the true and lasting values of human life—a reasoned conviction by which the educational leaders are possessed through and through, and which they communicate or rather develop in their subordinates and finally in the pupils who are being made into good citizens. Social justice and peace and personal welfare through social justice and peace can be achieved only through the socialization of human motives and human beliefs in the rising and still plastic generation.

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CHAPTER XLVI

THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND EDUCATION

Progress in the Idea of the Human Community

The development of civilization, as a humane order, has consisted in the increasing extension of the sphere of application of moral principles in an ever-widening social order, as well as in the enriching insight into the conditions of a humane life for the individual. From the family, through the clan and tribe, to the city-state and from the city-state, through the territorial state, to humanity—such is the direction in which the recognition of the moral worth of man as such has grown. Stoicism and Christianity were both universally human in their ethical attitudes. The mediæval world-view culminated in the conception of a universal political as well as spiritual order. This order broke down and the modern world (since the Reformation) has laid increasing emphasis on the value of nationality. The national state is the most powerful social organization in the present-day world. In times of dispute and misunderstanding morality stops short at national boundaries. The applicability of a universally human ethics is denied. Since the World War nationalism has received even more emphasis than ever before.

A nation we have seen is a people having community of memories and traditions, sentiments and purposes. It need not be linguistically one, though it usually is. It need not be religiously one. It suffices that it be politically and economically one.

The International Order

The problem of the development of an international order, a world community, was never so urgent, so fraught with tremendous issues as now. For communication, industry and science are all agencies which bring nations closer together. In its scientific and industrial and economic activities and interests western civilization is more unified than ever before. Even the Orient is being industrialized, as well as adopting western science and western movies. Nations remote from one another in cultural traditions, memories and sentiments—in their inherited ethoses in short—are meeting in the world market. Misunderstandings, due to the suspicions and dislikes born of ignorance and strangeness, are increased by various sorts of economic and social cross purposes—the monetary stakes of the citizens of one country in the development and exploitation of the resources of other countries; tariff barriers; prejudices against other colors and cultures such as the American prejudice against Asiatics and so forth. The problem is insistent, in that the occasions for conflict and misunderstanding, as well as for coöperation and understanding, have multiplied to such an extent that disputes may increase in frequency. The more contacts the more chances of trouble. In the meantime war has become far more deadly than ever before. Aircraft, poison gases, submarines and so forth would probably make another great war much more destructive of life and property than the last. War is dysgenic as well as economically wasteful. It destroys the most vigorous members of the population; it destroys industrial wealth and perverts industry into channels of destruction.

Unless the occasions for war can be dealt with by peaceful means, the human race, in its culturally most advanced members, bids fair to commit suicide. The chief causes of war to-day are economic rivalries between nations. These take many forms—the gaining of special concessions for

the exploitation of undeveloped regions, the gaining of special privileges, the control of routes of commerce, the protection of investments.

Added to these economic causes are ignorance of other peoples, a failure to recognize them as fully human. This ignorance is fostered by the type of historical teaching which exalts one's own nation at the expense of all others, which fails to give due credit to all for the work they have done for civilization.

The League of Nations and the World Court

Two great agencies to avert war have been established—the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice.

The League of Nations has done very well, considering the many perplexing problems that have confronted it.

1. Its values are: (a) Its machinery delays the onset of war and offers means for the settlement of many disputes. (b) While it has no power to enforce its decisions, it makes it a very temerarious undertaking for a nation to run counter to the opinion of fifty-seven nations expressed through their central council.

2. The very existence and work of the League is a rallying point for reasonable public opinion. It is a great educational agency which keeps before men's minds the importance of the nation's taking an international and humanitarian point of view and practicing restraint.

3. It is incessantly engaged in many universally humane activities such as the protection of women and children, the control of drug traffic, the prevention of disease. Coöperative action towards improving the conditions of human life—for example, cleaning up the tropics—is the best moral equivalent of war.

The Development of International-Mindedness

While the League of Nations is, like other human institutions, far from perfect it has achieved gratifying success. It offers the chief more immediate hope for the preservation of international peace. *The ultimate hope of the world for peace is the development of the international attitude of mind through education.* Science and industrial processes are themselves international, but do not have much influence in molding sentiments and ideas in regard to human relations. The great religions are universally human in their outlook; but actually, in the organized churches, have been unduly subordinated to national and sectarian interests. The church as such stands for the spiritual unity of mankind and it has no greater duty than to use its powers of education and moral suasion to get the peoples of the world to establish more effectively the community of human interests through the necessary international organization and the making, through education, of an international mind.

Education the Chief Instrument for Developing International-Mindedness

The progress towards the realization of peace through the institutional organization and functioning of the world community, depends finally on the possibility of developing through education an international habit of mind on the part of the citizens of the various nations who are members of the world community. Let us see how education may be directed to develop the international mind.

Undoubtedly the effect of scientific training, the dominance of the spirit of dispassionate inquiry, the careful analysis of facts, the weighing of evidence, the probing for general principles, so far as it goes is to develop the international mind. But the minds of most individuals are not dominated by the spirit of science. Emotion and sentiment

are the ruling powers in human action. Democracies may easily be swept by sudden waves of passion inflamed by sensational journalism and demagoguery into war.

The most important educational instrument for the development of international-mindedness is *history*. In the teaching of history emphasis should be put upon the *contributions* which all nations have made to the common stock of knowledge, insight and power which constitute civilization. The teaching of history must start, of course, from the history of one's own country. But it should show what elements in our civilization we owe to other peoples and what contributions our own country has made to human progress. Patriotic feeling should be based on what we have given the world, not on what we have taken from others, the services we have rendered, not the injuries we may have wrought. History teaching should go farther and consider what good things we might still get from other nations.

The content of history-teaching must emphasize the *cultural* progress of man. Emphasis on the contributions that the various peoples have made to the common stock of culture should include the arts, literature, morals, law, religion, the sciences. When the younger generation has some knowledge of what we owe to China, India, Greece, Rome, the mediæval world, modern Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Russia and so forth, in the enrichment of our civilization; it will be clear that patriotic pride must be based on what we have contributed to human welfare. We owe our chief moral and religious ideas to Hebrews, Greeks, Romans and their European successors; we are even indebted to Hindus; our political and legal ideas we owe largely to Greeks and Romans; the beginnings of science and philosophy to the Greeks and before them to Egyptians, Assyrians and perhaps to Hindus. Modern science is due chiefly to the joint contributions of

Italians, Germans, Slavs, French and British. The great literature of the world includes the works of Chinese, Hindus, Persians, Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, as well as of the aforementioned modern European nations. All western nations have contributed industrially valuable discoveries and inventions. The plastic arts owe most to Italians and French, music to Germans.

If humanity were an abstraction one could neither act justly nor cherish love towards it. One cannot love an adjectival noun. Humanity is not an abstract essence distilled from all racial and individual varieties of humankind. Humanity is a concrete world of persons, of beings like ourselves and possessing the same moral and affectional natures. As an ideal for our striving, humanity is a spiritual whole or society of selves in which the absolute value of each individual member is recognized, regardless of the color of his eyes or skin, the mathematical index of his head form, or the philological relations of his mother tongue. Our duty towards humanity is simply our duty towards other selves having the same moral natures as ourselves. Love for humanity is an effective practical regard for the worth and dignity of other human beings. It is readiness to act with reference to the growth of moral and rational individuality in the other man.

One of the chief, if not the chiefest of, hindrances in the way of the spread of a humanitarian ethics that shall supersede tribal and national ethics has been poverty of moral or social imagination. The imagination is the greatest agency for spiritual creativeness and social progress in the equipment of the human soul. Its cultivation for the exercise of social and public functions has been greatly neglected and perverted in education and moral training. In order that we may practice justice and love we must be able to put ourselves in the other man's place. We cannot do this without imagination of the sympathetic sort. The great

moral teachers of the race, such as Gautama Buddha, Socrates, Plato, Jesus, Tolstoy, exhibit in a preëminent degree this quality of ethical imagination. In order that the average man may be enabled to exercise the social imagination, moral education must cease to be based solely on an historical acquaintance with the heroes of one nation, people, or even of one great branch of the human family. The historical materials of moral education must not be exclusively Teutonic, or Latin, or even Aryan. Great harm has been wrought by the failure to make a sympathetic study of the great masters in the moral advancement of mankind the basis of all historical education, the inspirational groundwork of moral education. The exclusive study and laudation of national military and political heroes have worked much evil. History should be taught in the schools, not as the story of dynastic ambitions, battles and intrigues, but as the growth of the race in moral insight and cultural elevation under the leadership of humanity's spiritual heroes. Cultural and moral history, with the race's spiritual leaders as the central figures, would prove the most enlightening and moralizing study that the child and youth could have presented for their attention.

Justice is the treatment of every individual as a being having inherent worth. Love is the feeling of regard for the human worth of every individual. Man, this paradoxical blend of fire and clay, has moved upward from the brute through the extension of the sphere of application of justice and love. These social attitudes have been working themselves out into wider relations through the development of the family, the clan, the tribe, the city-state, and the territorial state. The goal of this unceasing upward process, whose history is coeval with civilization, is the application of justice and love to all men—to every man because he either is in fact, or has in him the power to become, a free personality.

Education must be directed to inculcate the following truths: Material civilization alone without the leadership of a fine humanistic culture is but an imposing and specious barbarism. It may be stupendous in the fields of industry, commerce and war, but it is not worthy of our respect, much less of our admiration. In the past fifty years men have placed their trust too much in the industrial applications of physical science, in organized efficiency and in material enjoyment as the finest fruits of civilization. The World War revealed in the most vivid light the futility of placing utter faith in the all-redeeming power of applied science. Of more worth than any specific form of state polity is human personality. Of more worth than the proudest technical achievements and the greatest political and commercial expansion is human personality. Of more worth than the special literary, artistic and scientific culture of any state is the sacred spring of moral individuality. A clear vision of, and devotion to, the universal ethical values that are grounded in the intrinsic dignity and worth of personality is the alchemy which will transmute the clay in man into fine metal and make it the instrument for the realization of the Republic of Man, the community ruled by the rational and humane spirit.

Nationalism and Internationalism

This does not mean that education for the world community, for the ideal of humanity, will cease to be national and patriotic. The proposal to abolish nationalism is a vain and foolish dream. It cannot be done and, if it could be done, the loss to mankind would be irreparable. For *humanity*, without local habitation and name, without spiritual and political traditions and memories, without individuality of life, gifts, occupations and achievements, is a vicious abstraction, a barren phrase bathed in the mists of

vacuous sentimentalism. The geographical, historical, cultural and spiritual individuality of the nation is the familiar and nourishing soil on which the highest personal individuality develops and makes its specific contributions to the life of the race. Only where the sense of social and spiritual solidarity has been strong in states and peoples have great and significant contributions been made to civilization. It was thus in the city-states of ancient Greece, especially Athens. It was thus in the Hebrew state and in republican Rome, in the Renaissance city-states of Italy, in France, in England and in the German states. It is through the nurture and stimulation derived from interwoven group-individualities or spiritual wholes—the family, the school, the church, the craft, the community, the nation—that the human person grows to his full spiritual and intellectual stature, leads a full life and makes a worthy contribution to the race's material and spiritual wealth and welfare. Civilization does not grow in deserts, in dense forests, or in the eremite's cell. Not through the cult of the vague and formless abstract of *humanity* in general, but through life and action in the specific concrete and individual relations of definite social wholes, do rich and harmonious personalities, full-bodied happiness, and progressive cultures come into being and grow. The proposal to eliminate or ignore nationality, because of the evils of nationalism running riot, is on a par with the proposal to abolish the family and substitute free love and public nurseries, because of the failure of the institution of the family to attain universal perfection.

It is the nation seeking to live as an exclusive competing and dominating economic and political unit, the nation seeking territorial and commercial aggrandizement at the expense of other national units, the nation striving by foul means to get the best of the bargain, the nation puffed up with arrogance, fortified by ignorance and blindness to

the worth of other nations, that engenders in these days the evils of war.

The principle of democracy is the key to the situation. Democracy within the state means the equalization of opportunity for all members of the state, in order that they may be able to develop and exercise their several individualities, their native powers, in the way most effective to bring individual well-being and social welfare. The same principle must be applied to the relations of those more comprehensive individualities called *nations* and *peoples*. Nations must have equal opportunities to develop and exercise their inherited and native powers (natural resources, political social and cultural traditions, the native qualities of their peoples); in short, their own specific individualities, with due regard to the like rights on the part of other peoples and to recognized standards of humane civilization and progress.

The foundations of a stable world community must be laid in the moral and social intelligence and feeling of the earth's peoples. The extension of democracy and the cultivation of its political intelligence are the only sure roads to lasting peace. The development of sympathy depends upon the development of understanding. To understand is to sympathize. To comprehend is to pardon. Therefore international sympathy and forbearance, international justice and equity are predicated upon international understanding; and only through the growth of intelligent democracy is increase of international understanding possible. The will of man is not a separate psychological entity that operates on its own hook. A man's will consists of his interests, organized and directed by intelligence. So with a nation's will. International good will will follow upon an intelligent recognition of community and interdependence of interests among the peoples. This community and this interdependence of interests does not exist among dynastic

autocrats, oligarchic governing castes, militarists, money lenders and the diplomatic tools of these interlocking directorates of nations. But community and interdependence of interests does exist among all the peoples of this earth, if they can only be brought to see it by the training of their political and social intelligences. When they do see it they will cease to be led by the nose to slaughter at the behests of their rulers.

The Duty of the United States

The United States is a great world-state. It must prepare to function more intelligently and vigorously as a leader among states. It must assume its part in the pains and efforts of the world to bring to birth and fruition a new moral world-order. The American must acquire the habit of thinking in international terms. He must learn to consider his domestic social and political problems, the organization of industry and commerce, the production and distribution of wealth, protection and free trade, the development of science and education in the light of world organization; in the light of the same problems as they exist for other states. The days of our isolation have been long past, but many of us did not awaken to cognizance of the fact until the World War rudely disturbed our parochial habits of mind and action and we found, to our irritation and perplexity, that we are our brother's keepers and that we cannot stand apart from the dominating world currents and remain a great state. We have been so engrossed with the material and cultural development of our native resources, with building up an industrial democracy on a virgin continent, that we have neglected international questions. We have some good excuses. Owing to our geographical isolation and our economic self-sufficiency, we have not been frequently threatened by international conflicts. We set out upon our national career with a happy

unity of language and institutions, and we fortunately discovered the great principle of federation and successfully maintained it in the Civil War. The great variety of languages, traditions and institutions which lend such picturesque charm to Europe in days of peace are the unhappy sources of conflict which force the intelligent European to be more internationally minded.

Our geographical isolation has been annihilated by rapid transit and well nigh instantaneous communication. The exploits of German submarines off our coast demonstrated that we cannot any longer hide behind the seas in time of war. For the purposes of both peace and war the world is fast becoming unified. Our social task at home is now, not so much the exploitation of nature as it is the elimination of the exploitations of man by man, the social control of economic production and distribution for the development of a more equitable and richer type of common weal. Thus in the economic problems and conditions of our domestic life, we are rapidly approaching the status of Europe. The same problems of social organization for equalization of opportunity confront America and Europe; with this difference that our economic power is greater than Europe's, and therefore it is harder for us to practice saving and efficient coöperation. We do not suffer so acutely from the War as Europe is suffering.

The supreme task of the school in a democracy is education for the intelligent practice of citizenship in the nation and the world community. Such problems as vocational training, or the respective values of science and language study, are secondary in importance. The schools must prepare the embryo citizens to be good citizens, not simply to make a living. The schools must prepare the coming citizens to be good citizens of the nation and the world. And I do not see how this can be done without systematic instruction in the elements of social and political

ethics. As matters stand now many a good workman or business man is a poor citizen when it comes to the exercise of his public duties.

The nation will fail in the future and will lay up trouble for itself and the world if it does not make training in social and international ethics, the education of its citizens to be intelligent members of the world's democracy of states, an integral part of its universal and public scheme of education. The coming citizens should be trained as if a world federation were coming into being through their efforts. Only in this way will an effective international organization for peace with justice ever really come into being. I venture to make some suggestions as to how this end may be set about.

What is most urgently needed in education is not so much a concordant between the conflicting claims of the natural sciences and the humanities, as it is science, literature and history all taught in a more liberal and humanistic spirit, as expressions and instruments in humanity's universal struggle towards liberation and self-fulfillment. Literature and history, including the story of the growth of the scientific spirit taught as records of the progressive moralization of the human soul, as instruments of ethical and intellectual inspiration and enlightenment, as the progressive expression and record of the human spirit in its struggles towards more intelligent and harmonious individual self-development and social integration should be the basis of all our education. Thus the average citizen should develop a more vivid and intelligent sense of the moral foundations of international relationships, as well as of intra-national social relationships and a stronger and more enlightened conviction in regard to the moral and rational forces operative in history. For history can best be taught as the working out, on large-scale patterns in space and time, of a moral world-order, of the progressing refinement

and increasing recognition of ethical values and of the steady elevation of the human race through the more effective realization of just and humane purposes, through the operation of social intelligence. So to teach history that the working of a moral order is discerned therein is not to distort the facts. It is rather to select, organize and interpret the facts that are worthy of perpetuation and study. It is the only method of dealing with historical study that justifies the labor and time spent upon it, by finding in it meaning and worth for living humanity. Otherwise history becomes the disconnected, muddled and dispiriting tale of an endless, purposeless sequence of events, conducing only to mental ennui and moral pessimism in its students.

In the final analysis every social problem and every political issue, whether in the municipality, the state, the nation or international affairs is an ethical problem—a problem in human conduct to be solved by the exercise of an intelligent good will. Every conflict in these social fields is between a lesser good and a greater good, between a best and a good which, by opposing the best, becomes the bad in that particular connection; between individual interest and the welfare of a group, between class interest and a wider common weal or between a chauvinistic nationalism and a just and humane internationalism. It is quite as important that the ordinary citizen should be equipped with the tools and the materials for intelligent reflection and action in regard to matters of international conduct and misconduct as that he should be equipped to think intelligently and fairly in regard to the principles and facts of conduct between fellow citizens or business associates or neighbors or members of his own family. Behind every issue now in regard to international rights and obligations, political sovereignty, trade arrangements, national autonomy and national expansion, there is a moral issue which is

usually obscured by a tangle of legal and diplomatic verbiage or hidden by the devious ways of international finance or by the fuming vapors of a narrow and exclusive nationalism.

If law and administration within the nation must be controlled by moral principles, it is equally true that trade arrangements and all diplomatic and treaty relations between nations must be similarly controlled, as indeed the laws on international copyright, extradition, protection of the persons of nationals, navigation and postal matters are now controlled. There cannot be one standard of equitable dealing between citizens of the same state and an entirely different standard or no standard at all between states. The late War exemplified upon a more stupendous scale than any previous international conflict, the enormous folly and cost of educating the citizens of a state in their duties towards one another, as members one of another, and at the same time denying or ignoring the existence of any parallel international obligations or common membership and participation in the life of humanity. The War was a tragically stupid catastrophe.

Through blood and iron, through fire and rapine, through untold tears and suffering, mankind, we may hope, is moving towards the dayspring of a world-order whose foundation stone shall be justice universal and whose crowning and shining summit shall be the ideal of free personality. As that day dawns more clearly it will bring nearer the fulfillment of the ancient vision of a universal ethics and a religion of humanity. Christianity must either decay or move forward to a new synthesis. To this higher synthesis the Buddhist and the Vedantist, with their wholehearted devotion to the inmost soul of things, will contribute. They will help to purify a secularized, materialized and disintegrating Christendom. Protestant, Roman and Greek

Catholic, Jew, Confucianist, Hindu mystic and Japanese Samurai—they must learn from one another and the lesson will be in many tongues and diverse guises the same—that every state and every culture and every religion must justify its existence and its claim to be heard by bringing its contribution to the building up in all mankind of the common spiritual essence which flowers forth in the deeds of universal justice and the sentiment of universal regard. Humanity as the ideal of our striving is a living whole, a community of selves each possessing intrinsic value. The absolute worth and dignity of the moral essence in every son of man; this is the ethical touchstone of civilizations and cultures, of nations and religions.

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CHAPTER XLVII

RELIGION AND THE COMMUNITY

The Relation Between Social Ethics and Religion

The question of the relation between social ethics and religion has been a subject of much controversy. Those who argue that morality is essentially independent of religion have no difficulty in furnishing from history cases in which institutionalized religion has not been on the side of, in fact has hindered the acceptance of higher ethical insights. The prophet Jeremiah was cast into a pit because he did not prophesy smooth things. Socrates was condemned to death and Jesus was crucified by the defenders of orthodoxy. Less notorious instances of the conflict between established religion and progressive morality might be multiplied manifold times. Moreover, to try to enforce right conduct by the promise of future bliss and the threat of the pains of hell, respectively, is to appeal to lower motives. "Morality," said Kant, "is a jewel which shines by its own light," Are not the promise and fulfillment of personal integrity, of inner harmony, of social justice, order and progress, sufficiently high and powerful motives for right social conduct? What need is there, even if it were possible, to try to fan into flame the dying faith in supernatural sanctions for right conduct? The authority of organized religion, as a social dynamic, seems to be waning rapidly. Many perspicacious observers hold that religion has already ceased to be an effective social force.

Nevertheless, the coincidence of the decline of religion as

a social force with the recrudescence of moral confusion and materialism, should give pause to thoughtful minds and lead to hesitancy in dismissing the consideration of religion as a social factor. The coincidence in question is not a new phenomenon in the history of civilization. Hitherto no great civilization has outlived the demise of its religious faith. When the gods of Greece and Rome ceased to be regarded as realities, Greek and Roman civilization declined. The moral canker at the heart of Roman civilization was not removed—it may rather have been accelerated by the emperor worship. It required the new moral austerity, energy and faith of a religion originating with a handful of Judean peasants to bring to pass a moral renovation of the Roman world and the up-building of a new civilization.

Every stable, historical order has involved a metaphysical conviction, a faith that above the shows of sense and the allurements of passion, there rules supreme an order which embodies and conserves the spiritual values of human life. Every great moral and social ideal has involved a religion or a philosophy which, in this respect, is a religious faith based on reflection. Plato based his ideal republic on the belief in a cosmic moral order, the metaphysical Idea of the Good which for him is God. The Stoics based their ethics of rational self-control and cosmopolitan philanthropy on the belief in the reality of the cosmic spirit of Good. The Hebrew prophetic ideals of social justice and peace were founded on faith in the cosmic supremacy of the holy and loving will of Jahveh. Jesus' entire conception of the new social order, in which the ruling principles were personal integrity and self-control and social fellowship, service and love, was based on the doctrine of the Divine Fatherhood on which was founded the human brotherhood. Kant defines religion as the consciousness of our duties as divine commands, and argues for faith in a moral order of the universe as implied in the very idea of the good, which

involves the possibility of the infinite progress of man in the realization of the good life and the attainment of happiness thereby. Fichte's conception of reality as a moral world order culminates in his doctrine of one eternal divine life of which the human moral order is the expression in time. Hegel's whole conception of the good, as realized through the harmony of the individual will and the social will, is based on the doctrine that this harmony is the manifestation and realization in time of the life of the absolute spirit. So too, in English thought we find Hooker, Locke, and others basing the doctrine of political authority, as grounded in the rational consent of the governed, ultimately on the belief in a divine reason which is a righteous will. Thus religion has, hitherto at least, served in all well-ordered and stable societies, as the conservator of social values. The religions of the Semites, notably that of Israel, of Greece and Rome, as well as Christianity, have furnished supernatural sanctions for the working social morality of the peoples. Religion has done this by affirming a supernatural cosmic ground for the social-ethical order. This has been true in times of ethical advance, as well as in periods of social equilibrium. The effective prophets of juster and more humane orders have always claimed a cosmic support for their higher insights. Religion has not been always a social soporific, although many times it has been just this. Every social-ethical advance hitherto made has had a religious background. Hitherto religion has always involved belief in a supernatural or metaphysical ground of the moral and spiritual life for both the individual and the community. The minimal definition of religion, in the light of its history, is thus: *Religion is the feeling of dependence on Higher Powers or a Higher Order, with whom man may enter into fellowship and by whom the supreme values of the individual life and the group life are furthered and conserved.*

Religious Positivism

The Religion of Humanity.—At the present time many liberal thinkers are disposed to reject, as incompatible with the findings of science, any reference to a spiritual order that transcends actual humanity. They hold that man is the product of blind evolutionary forces which have reached their highest product thus far in him. Humanity cannot look to any aid or comfort beyond itself. It is, with respect to its distinctively human qualities, alone in the universe. The increase of human well-being can be accomplished only by coöperant acts of human intelligence, guided by coöperant good wills. Man must rely on himself alone. *God* is simply the social good will and social intelligence of the ethically most advanced moiety of mankind. There is no good will above the good will of men. Our feeling of dependence on a higher power is that of dependence on the best human powers. If we must have an ideal object to stir our imaginations, to enkindle our affections and to fire our wills, this object of faith and stimulus to endeavor can only be the vision of the spirit of a constantly improving humanity. Devotion to the social weal, the service of the cause of cultural progress is to be the whole content of the religion of intelligent beings. In place of a God who transcends human nature, we are to worship and serve the God who is the growing point of human betterment and nothing more. There is no other God than this one. We can know nothing of any transcendent being, and the scientific knowledge of nature makes it in the highest degree improbable that there is any quality or tendency in the universe which transcends the good in man.

But God, if a God there be, is the substance of men which is man.

Our lives are as pulses or pores of his manifold body and breath;

As waves of his sea on the shores where birth is the beacon of death.

We men, the multiform features of man, whatsoever we be
Recreate him of whom we are creatures, and all we only are
he.

Not each man of all men is God, but God is the fruit of the
whole;

Indivisible spirit and blood, indiscernible body from soul.

Not men's but man's is the glory of godhead, the kingdom of
time,

The mountainous ages made hoary with snows for the spirit to
climb.

* * * * *

Men are the heartbeats of man, the plumes that feather his
wings,

Storm-worn, since being began, with the wind and thunder of
things,

Things are cruel and blind; their strength detains and deforms;
And the wearying wings of the mind still beat up the stream
of their storms.

Still, as one swimming up stream, they strike out blind in the
blast,

In thunders of vision and dream, and lightnings of future and
past.

* * * * *

By the spirit are things overcome; they are stark and the
spirit hath breath;

It hath speech, and their forces are dumb, it is living, and things
are of death.

But they know not the spirit for master, they feel not force
from above,

While man makes love to disaster, and woos desolation with
love.

Yea, himself too hath made himself chains, and his own hands
plucked out his eyes;

For his own soul only constrains him, his own mouth only
denies.

* * * * *

For his face is set to the east, his feet on the past and its dead;
The sun rearisen is his priest, and the heat thereof hallows
his head.

His eyes take part in the morning, his spirit outsounding the
sea,

Asks no more witness or warning from temple or tripod or tree.

* * * * *

He hath set the centuries at union; the night is afraid at his
name;

Equal with life, in communion with death, he hath found them
the same.

Past the wall unsurmounted that bars out our vision with iron
and fire,

He hath sent forth his soul for the stars to comply with and
suns to conspire.

His thought takes flight for the centre wherethrough it hath
part in the whole;

The abysses forbid it not enter: the stars make room for the
soul.

* * * * *

He hath stirred him, and found out the flaw in his fetters, and
cast them behind;

His soul to his soul is a law, and his mind is a light to his mind.
The seal of his knowledge is sure, the truth and his spirit are
wed;

Men perish, but man shall endure; lives die, but the life is not
dead.

He hath sight of the secrets of season, the roots of the years
and the fruits;

His soul is at one with the reason of things that is sap to the
roots.

He can hear in their changes a sound as the conscience of con-
sonant spheres;

He can see through the years flowing round him the law lying
under the years.

* * * * *

Glory to man in the highest! for man is the master of things.¹

Does not this beautiful and heart-stirring picture of the rise
and career of man imply a close kinship between man and

¹ Algernon Charles Swinburne, "Hymn of Man." Cf. also the
same author's "Hertha" and "The Pilgrims" in "Songs before Sun-
rise."

the spirit or order or tendency of the cosmos in which man has arisen and develops? I shall not here discuss the metaphysical question whether the negation of any spiritual power in the universe transcending man is the most cogent conclusion from the dispassionate examination of our common experience. I have done this elsewhere.² I shall consider here only the possible consequences to social practice of such negation.

Since every actual human society is far from perfect, when measured by even our present standards of goodness, the God of the religion of humanity is a God that ought to be but never is nor can be. Now, we reject the idea of religion as a social soporific, the bulwark of existing institutions and practices, the sanctifier and sustainer of whatever is. We share the passion of the humanitarian positivist for social progress, for wider justice and fellowship among men. We share his passion for making over the actual community more and more in the image of the ideal community. We have insisted that the one criterion of social progress is the opportunity afforded by the community life for the realization of personality. We have likewise insisted that the realization of personality is impossible without devotion to the common good.

Difficulties of Religious Positivism.—On the other hand we must point out that man, *as an ethical personality*, transcends, both in his possibilities of spiritual life and in his possibilities of tragic defeat, any actual or possible social order on this earth, under the present conditions of existence. The heart knoweth its own bitterness, its own weakness and sin, its own strivings and joys. In its meanings and values, its spiritual struggles, its defeats and its victories, in its freedom and responsibility as a self-determining agent, the ethical personality transcends the social order. The value of any social order finally depends on the pro-

² In *Man and the Cosmos*.

portion and quality of the ethical personalities included in it. The destiny of the individual seems to rise beyond any actual social order. Man cannot live fully unless he can commune with the oversocial, here and now in the lonely places of his individual spirit.

The religion of humanity, the positivistic social religion, offers us, as the object of faith, devotion and inspiration, the ideal of an endless progress, which consists in the possible slow approximation of human society to a condition that can never be actually and fully realized. Every generation is to find spiritual satisfaction and ethical strength in laboring for a future which will never, in all human probability, become a real present. An enormously long succession of generations may approach a little nearer towards the fulfillment of the social purpose. They may not. One generation may not really be any happier, wiser or better than another. Thus the highest value of life is to lie in the sacrifice of life to a value that has no real status in the universe, to a hypothetical future state that will never exist as a present possession of men. Always, in spite of the best efforts of the wisest men, human society falls far short of the ideal of community. We should strive to bring it closer thereto, but when we have done our best, by the concerted action of the noblest wills and finest intelligences, we shall not succeed. Men are saved from pessimism, cynicism and despair, in their efforts to improve the life of the community, by the recognition that the individual spirit transcends, in its inherent capacities and its actualities, every actual social order. To one who considers the mutations of human society, its continuing imperfections, the weaknesses of human beings, the tragic circumstances of many lives and the tragedies of the inner life, the very power to labor and to serve requires the recognition that there is something sacred and eternal in human personality.

Indeed man is, with respect to his cultural life, a dual being—a citizen of two orders. He must live and work here and now in the given economico-political order. He must be subject to its laws and customs. But he is also a member of a spiritual order of persons. He is a spirit who finds satisfaction only in the service and possession of spiritual values—of justice, integrity, beauty, love, comradeship and fellowship. To deny or ignore the latter order is to cause the former to fall into a materialistic and egotistical struggle for the sensuous and economic goods. The economico-political order is not and never can be made the complete servant of the personal order. But whatever of moral health, of justice, integrity and humaneness the economico-political order contains is due to its subservience to the personal spiritual order. This means that the surest, sanest, most stable basis for our aims and labors to realize a better social order is the recognition that the individual man is a being of infinite worth who, in his vocation, his capacities, his aspirations and strivings transcends any actual or possible social order.

Herein lies the dilemma which confronts all who do not accept, as finally authoritative, the claim that some special and absolute revelation from beyond the human world has been given in regard to the place of man in the universe. On the one hand, when one considers with what complete indifference to ethical or other humane qualities the order of physical nature goes on its way; how sudden cataclysms break with catastrophic effects and minute unnoticed slow gathering pestilences arise and spread, how climatic and other changes take place, how birth and illness and death proceed; all utterly regardless of the moral qualities or the sufferings of human individuals; when one considers further the enormously long and prodigally wasteful and blind procession of life on the past of the earth, as it got a precarious foothold, struggled with adverse physical con-

ditions; now advancing and now retreating; insinuating itself here and there; falling and rising again through all the secular drift of the geological and climatic process. When one considers all this, it is difficult to entertain the supposition that there can be any single power or group of powers either immanent in the natural order, or controlling it from above, that has any concern for the ethical and spiritual life of man. Huxley's conclusion seems the one that follows. Only in the associated endeavors of men in the community, working for the community as the means of realizing a finer and richer human individuality does there seem any legitimate object of devotion, of faith and hope.

Man and Nature

On the other hand, man is the offspring of the natural order. He is not an eruption from beyond the flaming ramparts of the world. He manifests the most complex and the most successful (in transforming and utilizing his physical environment) powers of any living organism. It is difficult to assume that humanity is a homeless waif in the midst of a *nature* in which it makes itself so much at home. How can a cosmos have engendered a species that is at once so much at home and so much a stranger and a pilgrim in it? This is the ultimate paradox of human existence.

It seems to one that this much is a reasonable faith—that there is an enduring cosmic order of which we ourselves are members, but which is vastly greater than humanity and so transcends it; that yet manifests its own nature in sustaining the world as the seed plot for the growth of personality. In brief, there is a cosmic power not ourselves, but of which we ourselves are offspring, that makes for personality. Since personality is the bearer and creator of all values, the conservation of these values in-

volves the perduration of this superpersonal power in which personality-in-community is grounded.

This is a sufficient religious or metaphysical faith, as ground for humane striving. Religion may be regarded, either from the standpoint of the individual, or of society. From the former standpoint, it is that attitude of devotion, of active faith and dedication of the will which expresses a man's total reaction to the problems and meanings of life. From the standpoint of society, religion is the consecration of the spiritual values, purposes and ideals, in common devotion to which men are united in feeling and purpose. Thus religion, as a social force, is based on the faith in a community of origin, purpose and destiny shared in by humanity. The religion of a group is the synthesis and apotheosis of the life-values that are normative for that group. Of course, since man realizes his personality only through participation in the common life, the religion of the individual and the religion of the group cannot be entirely divorced. As a social being the individual must and will communicate and try to get recognition for his religious insights, will seek social realization of his religious values.

Need for Faith in a Reality Transcending Humanity

While exceptional individuals may find their spiritual stay and sustenance in a philosophy arrived at by systematic reflection; for the great majority of human beings a common faith or world view using concrete, pictorial symbols is the only means through which the moral values shared in by society can acquire sufficient force to prevail against their opposites. It is peculiarly difficult in the present confused state of culture to find and to make effective a community of faith and action. So far as European and American civilization is concerned, the obvious point of departure for social faith is Christianity. For the many, such a faith

must be clothed in some concrete and familiar symbols. It is much better to take symbols already in general use than to attempt to make current new ones. Those in use have their roots deep down in the common traditions of language and imagery.

For occidentals such symbols are the Christian. I suggest that it is best, while recognizing the inadequacy of all symbols and that even the most carefully chosen language consists of stumbling and vague hints thrown out at a great mystery, that we use the Christian symbols of the Fatherhood of God and of the Realm of God (as the ideal community). The continued use of the Christian symbols by intelligent persons to express, to communicate and to enkindle the feeling of the essential community of man with man and of man with the universe depends, of course, on whether those who shape the destinies of organized Christianity can sufficiently recognize the figurative and nonliteral value of these symbols to bridge the ever-widening chasm between religious traditionalism and modern thought. If they cannot do this some new form of symbolic cosmic background for the ideal life, some new communal poetry of the spirit will arise. Some new epic must succeed the Christian epic. Without attempting to discuss the question how other religions which contain universal elements might be synthesized with Christianity, I wish to suggest briefly the minimal elements of a regenerated and purified Christianity which might serve as a common basis and source of strength for a better social order. I should put aside, as beyond the possibility of a common understanding, the Greek metaphysics embodied in the Nicene creed. I would take as our common point of departure the acknowledgment that the idea of God, as the ever-working holy and loving Will for integrity, love and the freedom of the ethical personality, furnishes an adequate symbolic support for our social ideals and pur-

poses. The social import of this symbolic faith in a cosmic overwill seems to me well adumbrated in the ethical teachings of Jesus, in the Sermon on the Mount and the parables. These include emphasis on the absolute worth of the individual soul and of self-control, integrity, purity of motive and spiritual freedom, as being the conditions for the development of the individual soul; of service or ministration, fellowship and love as being the guiding principles of the self for the individual man and his social relations. The kingdom or Realm of God is the ideal of a commonwealth of moral personalities to be realized progressively through obedience to the principles embodied in the life and teachings of Jesus. I would have God conceived as the fittest symbol for faith in a cosmic life which is the source of the stream of tendency in the spiritual progress of the individual and of humanity. With Mazzini I would say while recognizing the inadequacy of the symbols, "We believe in God the Father, Who is Intelligence and Love, Creator and Teacher of humanity. . . . What He wills is that the Idea of perfectibility and of love which He has given to the world should reveal itself in ever-increasing glory, ever more adored and better manifested. Your earthly and individual existence within its narrow limits of time and of capacity can only manifest it most imperfectly and by flashes. Humanity alone, continuous through the generations and through the general intellect fed by the individual intellect of each of its members, can gradually unfold that divine idea and apply or glorify it. Life, then, was given you by God that you might use it for the benefit of humanity, that you might direct your individual faculties to the development of the faculties of your fellowmen, that you might contribute by your work some portion to that collective work of improvement and that discovery of the truth which the generations slowly but continuously carry on. You must educate yourselves and educate others; per-

fect yourselves and perfect others. God is in you, without doubt; but God is likewise in all men who people this earth; God is in the life of all the generations which were, which are, and which are to be; and which have progressively improved and will continue to improve, the conception formed by Humanity of Him, of His law, and of our Duties. You must adore Him and glorify Him wheresoever He is. The universe is His temple."

"We believe in one God, author of all that exists, the living absolute Thought, of which our world is a ray and the Universe an incarnation."

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